school. That evening, after the members of the board had convened, and before the tender had been acted upon, the teacher placed upon the secretary's table a writing, addressed to the board, stating that, after much urgent solicitation on the part of his many friends, he thereby withdrew his resignation. Nevertheless, the board accepted the resignation, and, when the teacher presented himself, after the vacation, ready and willing to continue to perform the duties of teacher under the contract mentioned, they forbade and prevented his doing so. Moreover, 2 days after the special meeting referred to, an order was drawn on the treasurer, and delivered to the teacher, for the balance due up to the commencement of the vacation, and this order was paid to him a few days later.

Under such circumstances, could the teacher recover damages for breach of contract? The supreme court of Iowa holds that he could. First of all, it does not consider that there was a renunciation of the contract upon his part. It holds that the writing in which he stated that he tendered resignation was simply an offer to resign,-to terminate the contract,—and, until accepted, was not binding upon either party. If it had been accepted (before being withdrawn), both parties would have consented to the termination of the contract; but, if not accepted (though not withdrawn), both would continue to be bound by the contract. Being a mere offer, the teacher making it had the right to withdraw it at any time before it was acted upon by the board. Wherefore, after its withdrawal before being acted upon, it was as if no such offer or tender of resignation had been made. At the time the board acted, it had no such offer to act upon.

The tender of the resignation did not show an abandonment of the contract. Nor is one shown by the fact that he drew the balance of the pay due him, nor by the fact that he delivered the key of the schoolhouse, on demand of the board, prior to the time when school was to commence again. He drew his pay to the end of the year because it was due him, and delivered up the key because it was demanded of him. The fact that the tender of resignation was handed to the

president, and retained by him, did not constitute an acceptance of it, for the reason that it remained for the board to act upon the offer.

It was further contended that if, by reason of the withdrawal, there was no resignation before the board, then their action was an order of discharge, under the section of the Iowa code, which provides that the board may, for sufficient cause, after a full and fair investigation, discharge a teacher. The court says that the proceedings at the special meeting were not intended to be, and were not, in fact, in pursuance of that provision of the statutes. No complaint of incompetency, partiality, or dereliction of duty was made against the teacher, nor was he called upon or permitted to defend against such accusations. Besides, the relief sought in this case being exclusively a money judgment, which the county superintendent had no power to grant, the court does not consider that the teacher lost any rights therein by not appealing from the action of the board to him. (82 N W 444)

(562)

The duration of the contract must be stated. Agreements between teachers and trustees that either party may terminate the employment at any time are against public policy. Employment should be for a specific length of time. (D 3678) See N. Y. Teacher vii. 421.

The law does not permit trustees to assume dictatorial powers. It will not allow them to exact agreements of teachers into which a self-respecting person cannot enter; nor wilk it allow them to turn a teacher out of the schoolhouse in the midst of employment only because of pique or spite, or in order to put some one else in. The employment must be at least for a reasonable length of time. It should be for a term at least a time sufficient to enable a teacher to show proficiency or make so complete a failure that no district will employ him again. (D 3735)

If the board make a valid contract, reserving the right to discharge a teacher whenever they see fit, then the public

schools must be taught to suit the whims, caprices, and pepeculiar notions of the hiring board, and not as the teacher in the conscientious discharge of his duty should teach the same. They could compel teachers of district schools to teach the same to the satisfaction of the boards who hire them, instead of to the satisfaction of the people who compose the district, or in a manner most beneficial to the pupils, or as a good, competent, and faithful teacher ought to teach the same. (50 Wis 651)

A rule that the teachers should be liable to discharge at the pleasure of the board is no defence to an action on a contract of hire for a specific term. (15 Colo 367, 55 Mo 149, 60 Wis 651)

A decision rendered Feb. 7, 1896, by the State superintendent of Washington contains this ruling:

In this case two questions arise at the outset upon the determination of which will depend the decision of the whole matter: First, Is the provision in the contract empowering the board to dismiss at pleasure operative?

On the first question raised the assistant attorney-general has advised this office as follows: "All authority of the school board to employ a teacher is traceable to some provision of law. Such law is not only the source of their authority but the limitation of it. The power to discharge a teacher is restricted by the provision that the discharge must be for sufficient cause. The board cannot, by the form of the contract they enter into with a teacher, give themselves greater powers than the statute has conferred upon them. No power whatever is conferred upon the board to discharge a teacher, except for sufficient cause. Any provision therefore in a contract with a teacher giving them the power to discharge at will is unauthorized and invalid." (50 Neb 171, 69 Neb 772)

But it is entirely a question of statute law. In states where the statute empowers the trustees to employ teachers and remove them at pleasure, this enters as part of any

contract made under it, and a teacher may be discharged notwithstanding the terms of his employment. (D 1845; cf. 3888; S. B. xv. 105)

(12 Gray 339, 3 Hun 181, 26 Ill 379, 81 Ill A 304, 10 Kans 283, 123 Mass 545, 1 Neb 76, 6 Neb 167, 19 Neb 494, 42 Neb 127, 49 Neb 759, 50 Neb 174, 60 N W 347, 69 N W 114, 772, 97 Tenn 489, 38 Vt 602)

This was true in New York city and Brooklyn previous to their consolidation into the Greater New York. (66 N E 675)

Where board employs teacher for a year "unless sooner removed by the board" he cannot be removed without cause. (45 Pac 119)

A stipulation to pay the teacher for time actually occupied in school does not prevent payment for such time as the trustees might arbitrarily prevent her from performing her duties. (60 Pac 1100)

Trustees have the power to hire beyond their term of office, for a term not exceeding one year. A sole trustee has the same right. (D 3640, 4311, 4466, 4888, 5295)

(53 Ark 468, 63 Barb 177, 36 Conn 280, 8 Cush 191, 4 Hill 168, 4 Ill A 224, 4 Ind 396, 106 Ind 478, 126 Ind 528, 1 Ind A 138, 13 Ia 555, 75 Mo 408, 27 NE 303, 34 La 354, 47 Mich 112, 67 N Y 36, 47 Pac 758, 20 Vt 487, 23 Vt 416, 24 Vt 528, 56 Vt 551, 7 Wend 181, But see 87 Ill 255, 92 Ill 293, 24 Ill A 191, 5 Jones 98, 51 Mo 221)

Texas upholds this right, which has been affirmed by courts of Mich., Ind., Wash., Ark., and federal courts. Delaware denies it. (42 Atl 368)

In some states, the trustees may not engage a teacher after their successors have qualified (87 Ill 255, 4 Ill A 224, 24 Ill A 191, 51 Mo 149, 55 Mo 149, 50 N W 293), or before the annual re-organization of the board (87 Ill 255, 92 Ill 293, 16 Wis 33), but may make contract for a term beginning after some members go out of office. (53 Ark 468, 106 Ind 478, 44 Mich 500, 81 Mich 214, 67 N Y 36, 16 Wis 316) Ark., Minn., Ky. even forbid that contracts for the coming year be made before July 1. (42 Atl 368)

In the absence of statutory limitations a school district can enter into a contract of employment with a teacher for a period of two scholastic years, though such contract extends beyond the term for which some of the directors were elected.-Caldwell vs. No. 7, Lake county, USSC Oregon, March 1, 1899.

In New York common districts no contract for the employment of a teacher may be made for more than one year in advance; or for a shorter time than ten weeks unless for the purpose of filling out an unexpired term of school. (562, D 4466, 5106, 103 N Y

65)

(87 I11 255, 92 Ill 293, 4 Ill A 224, 32 Pa 194, 28 Pa Sup 16)

No such restriction is placed on hiring in union schools. (D 3653)

Some cities, like New York and Albany, make the engagement of teachers permanent, either at once or after a year or two of probation. In such cities teachers may be removed only for cause.

New Jersey has recently made this a law.

Contracts should be made by the year, or for a certain number of months, weeks, or days. (12 Gray 339)

The school month is now almost universally regarded as 4 weeks of 5 school-days each. (2 Wallace 77) Where the time is not stated it must be assumed to be for a year. (170 Mass 289)

A contract for one year is a school year. (72 Pac 408)

Where a teacher was first engaged in 1880; in the summer of 1881 was hired for another year; and in the summer of 1882 was hired “for another term at a salary of $900 per annum", and discharged Nov. 29, 1882, held that the contract did not expire till the end of the school year, in June, 1883. (Sup't Gilmour, N. Y., April 5, 1883. 50 Neb 171, 69 N W 172)