Locating Debtor's Bank Deposit By EVERETT E. AREY, Manager Equitable Adjustment Company, Brockton, Mass. There has been more or less suggested in 1egard to locating a debtor's bank account, but we have not as yet heard of anyone using our method of ascertaining this most important information. We call the bank on the telephone and get the person who passes on loans, tell him who we are and ask him his opinion of Mr. Debtor. From the answer we are almost sure to know whether or not he has an accuont there. Another method which we use, is to go to the bank personally and state to the cashier, president, or any one of the high officials, that we have a claim for collection against Mr. Debtor, that we have exhausted our hopes of collecting peaceably and state that we think he has an account in that bank. We ask them if the only way to find out is to have an attachment served, which makes work for the bank which is useless and expense for us, which is the same, providing there is no account there. The reply will nearly always be that they aren't allowed to tell, or that they don't consider it good business to tell; but, if there is no account in that bank, the official will nearly always say that there isn't. We rather doubt if this last method would work with the banks in the largest cities, as the officials do not know their clientele well enough to know all the accounts that are in the bank. But, we do think it would work well in any of the smaller cities, as it works well for us here. Resolution On Deporation of Aliens Whereas, the Constitution of the United States and the constitutions of the several states of the Union, make ample provision for changes or repeal through the exercise of lawful methods in fundamental laws of the United States and of the several states; and Whereas, both federal and state governments have established, and so maintain, ample agencies through which changes in the law or repeal may be effected; and Whereas, all classes of people have the right to avail themselves of the ballot, free speech, and other lawyful agencies, to accomplish such changes or repeal; and Whereas, the use of physical force and violence to accomplish such changes in the law or repeal are unnecessary and un-American; Now, therefore, be it resolved, by the Missouri Bar Association, in regular meeting assembled, as follows: That the Missouri Bar Association hereby recommends to the Congress of the United States and to the legislatures of each of the states in the Union, the passage of laws which shall, respectively, in substance, provide as follows: That any person who shall privately or publicly advocate, either verbally or in writing, or attempt to bring about by individual action or by combining with others, any changes in or nullification of our laws, constitutional or statutory, state or national, by means of physical force or violence, shall be punished by imprisonment at hard labor, or, in the case of aliens, by deportation. Important to Corporations Your attention is called to the importance of following the requirements of the statutes of other States than your own where these statutes have, as in many cases, made requirements upon "foreign" corporations, and affixed penalties for failure to comply therewith. In many cases, statutes recite that where the requirements of the law are not strictly followed "foreign" or outside corporations shall not have the privilege of enforcing contracts in the local courts. Many corporations doing business beyond the limit of their own State are negligent in this matter, and frequently find themselves unable to maintain their rights because of their failure to take the steps necessary. The publishers of this magazine have printed below a ist of Attorneys, one for each State, residing in an important business center, who are unquestionably competent to see that your papers conform to the requirements of the law, attend to having them properly fled, and obtain your certificate Where it is required that you shall have an office in the State. we would suggest that you make arrangements with the attorneys named to designate their office as your particular place or office of business in the States named, and make arrangoments with them that they or some member of their firm may be named as the person upon whom process may be served Make arrangements with them for 38 annual fee for attending to this service, which ought not to be less than $10. nor more than $25 per annum. Neglect in attending to this matter may deprive you of the right to do business in some desirable territory or to bring suit in some Important matter These attorneys would then inform you what it is necessary that you do, and whether or not the provisions of the law refer to corporations who sell within the State by means of traveling salesmen, while having no branch or factory or other business office in the State CORPORATION ATTORNEYS. COLORADO-Grant & Wellington, Equit- Point. IOWA-B. J. Cavanagh, Fleming Bldg., Des Moines. LOUISIANA-Lawrence M. Janin, 837 Maison Blanche Bldg., New Orleans. MAINE-Harry L. Cram, 102 Exchange St., Portland. MICHIGAN-Selling & Brand, 502-3-4-5-67-8-9-10 Hammond Building, Detroit. MISSISSIPPI-R. H. & J. H. Thompson, Thompson Building, Jackson. NEW YORK-Lester T. Hubbard, 227 Arkay Bldg., State and Pearl Sts., Albany. NORTH DAKOTA-M. J. George, First National Bank Bldg., Ashley. OHIO-Miller, Thompson, Dunbar & Martin, 310 Columbus Savings & Trust Bldg., Columbus. PENNSYLVANIA-Conard, Middleton & Orr, Lincoln Building, Philadelphia. Incorporated under the Liberal Laws of Maryland. $65.00 pays for $100,000 charter and equipment. The Corporation Co. of Maryland, P. O. Box 440, Baltimore An Inquiry Concerning Justice By FLOYE R. MECHEM (University of Chicago) "Justice," said Daniel Webster, "is the greatest interest of man on earth." Alexander Hamilton, in the "Federalist," declared: "Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It has ever been, and ever will be, pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit." Fiat justitia, ruat coelum,-Let there be justice though the heavens fall,-has been crystallized into a maxim. We often call our courts, courts of justice. Lawyers are termed officers of justice. The function of the whole judicial machinery of the state is said to be the administration of justice. We speak frequently, in dealing with legal matters, of "natural justice" and often of "abstract justice." We also distinguish often between "legal justice," or that which is administered between the parties to an action by the courts, and "social justice," or that which regulates the rights, privileges and duties of individuals considered as members of society. We distinguish sometimes between "restorative justice" and "distributive justice"-a distinction which has the same foundation as that first mentioned, namely, justice administered by the judicial machinery which restires a man to his proper rights, and the justice which attends the distribution among men of the rights, privileges, immunities, duties and obligations which belong to them as members of society. We also distinguish between "reparative justice" and "retributive justice," or that which, on the one hand, secures to the deserving man his dues, and, on the other, to the undeserving man his deserts. In this sense, we pray for justice for ourselves and threaten it to our enemies. This importance of the subject and this frequency of use would naturally lead one to believe either that there is an established definition of justice or at any rate that a workable definition of justice is capable of being agreed upon. As said by Professor Ritchie in his book on "Natural Rights," in dealing with the subject of justice. laws and the State: "The man who speaks in the law courts or political assemblies speaks as if he knew what these terms meant." What, then, does justice mean? How is it to be defined? Now, I am not so unwise as to believe that everything which exists is capable of being defined. For example, I believe that there is such a thing as life, but, so far as I know, no one has ever been able to give a satisfactory definition of it. We speak often of the "good," but what is "good"? Is it capable of being defined, or can we deal with it only relatively in comparision with other subjects? The age-old question which Pilate asked, "What is truth?" remains still essentially unanswered, although upon every judicial trial every witness is sworn to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." Nothing, it has been said, is more fascinating than the attempt to define the virtues, but nothing is more difficult. Perhaps the same difficulty inheres in the case of justice. Is justice capable of being defined? Many attempts certainly have been made to define it, and a brief review of some of them, culled from wide sources and different times, may throw some light upon the problem. The opening paragraph declares, "Justitia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribunendi,"-Justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render every man his due. Almost the whole of Plato's "Republic" is made up of the discussions which Socrates and his friends are reported to have had concerning the nature of justice. Eventually, in the discussion, justice comes to have a very general significance, being largely identified with virtue. But in the course of the discussion respecting the standard appealed to in the trial of causes before the courts, the question is asked, "And are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what is another's nor be deprived of what is his own." And the answer is, "Yes, that is their principle." "Is it a just principle?" "Yes." "Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and enjoying what is a man's own and belongs to him?" "Very true.” James Martineau, in his "Types of Ethical Theory, says: "Justice is the treatment of persons according to their deserts." Herbert Spencer, in working out his "Synthetic Philosophy," devotes a volume to the consideration of Justice, as a part of Ethics. He attempts to show that even animals have standards by which they determine the quality of actions.. and that they punish the members of the animal group that violate the standard. The essence of this standard is that animals shall have and do in accordance with their nature and functions. He then proceeds to develop the idea of a subhuman justice (which expands as the animal organization becomes higher) that animals shall have to be what their nature and inherent qualities may warrant. Working upward to men, he discovers first a "sentiment of justice," developing later into an "idea of justice" that every man should have what his inherent nature and conduct may merit. This, however, must be modified by the equal right of every other man, and this combination, stated in its affirmative form. Mr. Spencer develops into a "formula of justice" which is that "Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man." President Wavland, in his book on the "Ele PENSACOLA, FLORIDA H. J. MACKEY, Attorney REMITTANCES on collections made daily. REPORTS: Mercantile and individual reports made from investigations after receipt of inquiry. The CLEARING QUARTERLY Grows in popularity with all classes be- AS A LEGAL MAGAZINE, it is alert, AS A LAW LIST, it is famous for its Address THE CLEARING HOUSE QUARTERLY Minneapolis, Minnesota-Eastern Offices: 320 Broadway, New York Kindly refer to the American Legal News in replying to this ad. Howard B. Carlisle (Carlisle & Carlisle) Attorney and Counsellor at Law Spartanburg, S. C. Representing Nationa Bank of Spartanburg, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, R. G. Dun & Co., etc. Specialty, Commercial Law and Collections. Will make reports and collect anywhere in Spartanburg County. ments of Moral Science," written many years ago, declares that justice, when used in the sense in which we are now considering it, "signifies that temper of mind which disposes a man to administer rewards and punishments according to the character and actions of the object." President Fairchild, in his book on "Moral Philosophy," published near the middle of the last century, declares that justice as a virtue is but another name for benevolence dealing with the interests and deserts of man. There is an impulse to treat every interest according to its value and every person according to his deserts, and there is satisfaction in witnessing such a result. This characteristic of our nature is often called the principle of justice, but it becomes the virtue of justice when benevolence enters in to regulate and limit it. What is called justice becomes sin when it goes beyond the limits which benevolence appoints." Professor Lorimer, in his "Institutes of Law," though he works out a very elaborate scheme of natural rights, much the same as that of Mr. Spencer, contends that justice and charity are identical; that their separate realization is impossible, and that their common realization necessarily culminates in the same action. John Austin, quoting the statement of Hobbes that "no law can be unjust" (which he explains as meaning that "no positive law is legally unjust"), declares that justice, when used with reference to legal matters, can mean no more and no less than conformity to the existing law. Mr. James C. Carter, in his book on "Law, its Origin, Growth and Function," asks, "What is justice," saying that there has been much uncertainty upon the point; that to some it seems to import a sublime attribute, almost an emanation of the Deity, recognizable by an innate moral sense, while to others it means no more than an expression of what is right or what ought to be done; and he declares that the attempt to form a conception of some absolute attribute which would properly be named justice, is an abortive one. He concludes that "justice consists in the compliance with custom in all matters of difference between men." Professor Pattee, in his book on the "Essential Nature of Law." adopts as the definition of justice substantially that of Justinian, though he insists that it has both its subjective and objective sides, and is not complete unless the desire to render to every one his due is accomplished obiectively by securing that it be done. Professor Paul Elmer More, in his recent "Essays on Aristocracy and Justice," declares that, in a way, justice is easily defined. "It is the act of right distribution; the giving to each man his due," though he proceeds to point out, what must hereafter be more fully emphasized, that such a definition does not carry us very far until some of its terms have themselves been defined. Professor Sidgwick, in his book on the "Methods of Ethics," devotes a chapter to a very discriminating and interesting discussion of the nature and formula of justice. After pointing out that, in many cases, justice seems to consist of equality among all of a given class and impartiality in dealing with them, he proposes "as the principle of ideal justice, so far as this can be practically aimed at in human society, the requital of voluntary services in proportion to their worth." In concluding his chapter, he says: "The results of this examination of Justice may be summed up as follows: The prominent element in Justice as ordinarily conceived is a kind of equality; that is, impartially in the observance or enforcement of certain general rules allotting good or evil to individuals. But when we have clearly distinguished this element, we see that the definition of the virtue required for practical guidance is left obviously incomplete. Inquiring further for the right of general principles of distribution, we find that our common notion of Justice includes-besides the principle of reparation for injury-two quite distinct and divergent elements. The one, which we may call conservative justice, is realized (1) in the observance of law and contracts and definite understandings, and in the enforcement of such penalties for the violation of these as have been legally determined and announced; and (2) in the fulfilment of natural and normal expectations. The latter obligation, however, is of a somewhat indefinite kind. But the other element, which we have called ideal justice, is still more difficult to define; for there seem to be two quite distinct conceptions of it, embodied respectively in what we have called the individualistic and the socialistic ideals of a poltiical community. The first of these takes the realization of freedom as the ultimate end and standard of right social relations; but on examining it closer we find that the notion of freedom will not give a practicable basis for social construction without certain arbitrary definitions and limitations, and even if we admit these, still a society in which freedom is realized as far as is feasible does not completely suit our sense of justice. Prima facie, this is more satisfied by the ALTOONA H. F. Walters, Pennsylvania ATTORNEY Succeeding LEISENRING & WALTERS Reference: Any Bank or Trust Company in Altoona GENERAL PRACTICE in all Ohio, Indiana and Kentucky State and Federal Courts socialistic ideal of distribution, founded on the principle of requiring deserts, but when we try to make the principle precise, we find ourselves again involved in grave difficulties; and similar perplexities best the working out of rules of criminal justice on the same principle." Professor Willoughby, in his book on "Social Justice," contends that there are no absolute rights, and, defining Justice as the rendering to each individual, so far as possible, of the opportunity for a realization of his highest ethical self -including therein the general duty of all, in the pursuit of their own ends, to recognize others as individuals who are striving for, and have a right to strive for, the similar realization of their own ends-concludes that it is impossible to formulate any definite principle or to frame any absolute rules of justice. An encyclopedia writer (The New International) says that "Moral justice may, perhaps, be defined as allowing each man such freedom of action, security of possession, and realization of expectations based on custom, as are comparable with the welfare of society;" but, he says, "There is no such thing as an absolute justice if by that is meant any particular method of treatment which any man has a right to expect of society, regardless of the times in which he lives and of the character of his life." Professor Carver, in his recent "Essays in Social Justice," approaches the question from an entirely different standpoint, namely, the standpoint of the State and its functions, and declares that in its most general terms, "justice may be defined as such an adjustment of the conflicting interests of the citizens of a nation as will interfere least with and contribute most to the strength of the nation." And, finally, in these days, we hear much of a "new morality," and of a "new justice." The characteristic of this new justice is said to be the expansion of the spirit of collectivism instead of individualism, the promotion of the feeling of Willingham & Covington Attorneys and Counsellors at Law Rome, Georgia Organized Collection Department co-operation, "the exercise by society of its collective powers in support of the legitimate claims of individual life." Its formula is, "To every man according to his needs," rather than "to every man according to his deserts." As declared in Dewey and Tufts' "Ethics," "The old justice, in the economic field, consisted chiefly in securing to each individual his rights in property or contracts. The new justice must consider how it can secure for each individual a standard of living, and such a share in the values of civilization, as shall make possible a full moral life." Such quotations might be indefinitely extended, but it would serve no useful purpose. Enough have been quoted to show that among the older writers at least, justice was thought to bear a close relation to merit, and might be epitomized in the common formula, "To every man according to his deserts." Upon the theory that desert should not be passive, but that every one should strive to achieve, it is often said that the formula should be, "To every man according to his effort." Without any great violence to its form, perhaps, though it leads to different results, it might be said that every man deserves to have what his strength and nature entitle him to secure; and, therefore, the formula of justice should be transformed to read, "To every man according to his strength," or "To every man according to his might." Recently a different conception has been advanced, which may perhaps be thought to lie implicitly in the older statements, though this also leads to a still different conclusion. Every man deserves to have what his inherent nature demands; the matter should therefore be approached from the standard of his needs, and the formula then becomes, "To every man according to his needs." No short formula, however, such as any one of these, can do more than express a general thought, and, while it may perhaps serve as general principle of action, it can not be of much LEIN OF MILWAUKEE KI a |