that slovenliness of thinking which is often tocracy may soon de saturated with the objects concealed beneath a peculiar ostentation of of their desires, and may then protect the comlogical neatness.

munity in the enjoyment of the rest? Mr. Having determined the ends, Mr. Mill pro- Mill answers in the negative. He proves, with ceeds to consider the means. For the pre- great pomp, that every man desires to have servation of property, some portion of the the actions of every other correspondent to community must be intrusted with power. his will. Others can be induced to conform This is government; and the question is, how to our will only by motives derived from pleaare those to whom the necessary power is in- sure or from pain. The infliction of pain is trusted to be prevented from abusing it? of course direct injury; and even if it take the

Mr. Mill first passes in review the simple milder course, in order to produce obedience forms of government. He allows that it would by motives derived from pleasure, the governbe inconvenient, if not physically impossible, ment must confer favours. But, as there is no that the whole community should meet in a limit to its desire of obedience, there will be no mass; it follows, therefore, that the powers of limit to its disposition to confer favours; and, government cannot be directly exercised by as it can conser favours only by plundering the people. But he sees no objection to pure the people, there will be no limit to its disposiand direct democracy, except the difficulty tion to plunder the people. “It is therefore which we have mentioned.

not true, that there is in the mind of a king, or “ The community,” says he, “cannot have in the minds of an aristocracy, any point of an interest opposite to its interest. To afirm saturation with the objects of desire." this would be a contradiction in terms. The Mr. Mill then proceeds to show that, as mocommunity within itself, and with respect to narchical and oligarchical governments can itself, can have no sinister interest. One com- influence men by motives drawn from pain as munity may intend the evil of another; never well as by motives drawn from pleasure, they its own. This is an indubitable proposition, will carry their cruelty, as well as their rapaand one of great importance.”

city, to a frightful extent. As he seems greatly Mr. Mill then proceeds to demonstrate that to admire his own reasonings on this subjeci, a purely aristocratical form of government is we think it but fair to let him speak for him. necessarily bad.

self. “The reason for which government exists “ The chain of inference in this case is close is, that one man, if stronger than another, will and strong to a most unusual degree. A man take from him whatever that other possesses desires that the actions of other men shall be and he desires. But if one man will do this, instantly and accurately correspondent to his

will several. And if powers are put into will. He desires that the actions of the greatthe hands of a comparatively small number, est possible number shall be so. Terror is the called an aristocracy,-powers which make grand instrument. Terror can work only them stronger than the rest of the community, through assurance that evil will follow any they will take from the rest of the community failure of conformity between the will and the as much as they please of the objects of desire. actions willed. Every failure must therefore They will thus defeat the very end for which be punished. As there are no bounds to the government was instituted. The unfitness, mind's desire of its pleasure, there are, of therefore, of an aristocracy to be intrusted course, no bounds to its desire of perfection with the powers of government, rests on de- in the instruments of that pleasure. There monstration."

are, therefore, no bounds to its desire of exactIn exac:ly the same manner Mr. Mill proves ness in the conformity between its will and the absolute monarchy to be a bad form of govern- actions willed; and, by consequence, to the

strength of that terror which is its procuring “If government is founded upon this as a law cause. Even the most minute failure must be of human nature, that a man, if able, will take visited with the heaviest infliction ;) and as from others any thing which they have and he failure in extreme exactness must frequently desires, it is sufficiently evident that when a happen, the occasions of cruelty must be in: man is called a king he does not change his cessant. nature; so that when he has got power to en- “ We have thus arrived at several concluable him to take from every man what he sions of the highest possible importance. We pleases, he will take whatever he pleases. have seen that the principle of human nature To suppose that he will not, is to affirm that upon which the necessity of government is

government is unnecessary, and that human founded, the propensity of one man to possess į beings will abstain from injuring one another himself of the objects of desire at the cost of of their own accord.

another, leads on, by infallible sequence, where “It is very evident that this reasoning ex-power over a community is attained, and notends to every modification of the smaller thing checks, not only to that degree of plunnumber. Whenever the powers of govern- der which leaves the members, (excepting alment are placed in any hands other than those ways the recipients and instruments of the of the community, whether those of one man, plunder,) the bare means of subsistence, but of a few, or of several, those principles of hu-to that degree of cruelty which is necessary to man nature which imply that government is at keep in existence the most intense terrors." all necessary, imply that those persons will Now, no man who has the least knowledge make use of them io defeat the very end for of the real state of the world, either in former which government exists."

ages or at the present moment, can possibly Bul is it not possible that a king or an aris- be convinced, though he may perhaps be be

ment.

.

wildered, by arguments like these. During | execration, are feelings from the influence of the last two centuries, some hundreds of ab- which scarcely any man is perfectly free, and solute princes have reigned in Europe. Is which in many men are powerful and constant it true that their cruelty has kept in exist- motives of action. As we are afraid that, if ence the most intense degree of terror, that we handle this part of the argument after our their rapacity has left no more than the bare own manner, we shall incur the reproach of means of subsistence to any of their subjects, sentimentality, a word which, in the sacred their ministers and soldiers excepted? Is this language of the Benthamites, is synonymous true of all of them? Of one-half of them ? with idiocy, we will quote what Mr. Mill him. Of one-tenth part of them? Of a single one ? self says on the subject, in his Treatise on Is it true, in the full extent, even of Philip the Jurisprudence. Second, of Lewis the Fifteenth, or of the Em- “ Pains from the moral source are the pains peror Paul? But it is scarcely necessary to derived from the unfavourable sentiments of quote history. No man of common sense, mankind.

These pains are capable however ignorant he may be of books, can be of rising to a height with which hardly any imposed on by Ms. Mill's argument; because other pains incident to our nature can be no man of comm n sense can live among his compared. There is a certain degree of unfellow-creatures for a day without seeing in- favourableness in the sentiments of his fellow. numerable facts which contradict it. It is our creatures, under which hardly any man, not business, however, to point out its fallacy; and, below the standard of humanity, can endure happily, the fallacy is not very recondite. to live.

We grant that rulers will take as much as “ The importance of this powerful agency, they can of the objects of their desires; and for the prevention of injurious acts, is too obthat when the agency of other men is neces. vious to need to be illustrated. sufficiently sary to that end, they will attempt by all means at command, it would almost supersede the in their power to enforce the prompt obedience use of other means. of such men. But what are the objects of hu- “To know how to direct the unfavourable man desire ? Physical pleasure, no doubt, in sentiments of mankind, it is necessary to know part. But the mere appetites which we have in as complete, that is, in as comprehensive, a in common with the animals, would be gratified way as possible, what it is which gives them almost as cheaply and easily as those of the birth. Without entering into the metaphysics animals are gratified, if nothing were given to of the question, it is a sufficient practical antaste, to ostentation, or to the affections. How swer, for the present purpose, to say that the small a portion of the income of a gentleman unfavourable sentiments of man are excited in easy circumstances is laid out merely in by every thing which hurts them." giving pleasurable sensations to the body of It is strange that a writer who considers the the possessor? The greater part even of what pain derived from the unfavourable sentiments is spent on his kitchen and his cellar, goes not of others as so acute, that, if sufficiently at to titillate his palate, but to keep up his charac-command, it would supersede the use of the ter for hospitality, to save him from the re- gallows and the treadmill, should take no noproach of meanness in house-keeping, and to tice of this most important restraint, when cement the ties of good neighbourhood. It is discussing the question of government. We clear, that a king or an aristocracy may be will attempt to deduce a theory of politics in supplied to satiety with mere corporeal plea- the mathematical form, in which Mr. Mill desures, at an expense which the rudest and lights, from the premises with which he was poorest community would scarcely feel. himself furnished us.

Those tastes and propensities which belong to us as reasoning and imaginative beings, are not, indeed, so easily gratified. There is, we No rulers will do any thing which may hurt admit, no point of saturation with objects of the people. desire which come under this head. And This is the thesis to be maintained; and the therefore the argument of Mr. Mill will be just, following we humbly offer to Mr. Mill as its unless there be something in the nature of the syllogistic demonstration. objects of desire themselves which is incon- No rulers will do that which produces pain sistent with it. Now, of these objects there is to themselves. none which men in general seem to desire But the unfavourable sentiments of the peo more than the good opinion of others. The ple will give pain to them. hatred and contempt of the public are gene. Therefore no rulers will do any thing which rally felt to be intolerable. It is probable, that may excite the unfavourable sentiments of the our regard for the sentiments of our fellow people. creatures springs by association from a sense But the unfavourable sentiments of the peo of their ability to hurt or to serve us. But be ple are excited by every thing which hurts this as it may, it is notorious, that when the ihem. sabit of mind of which we speak has once been Therefore no rulers will do any thing which formed, men feel extremely solicitous about may hurt the people, which was the thing to the opinions of those by whom it is most im- be proved. probable, nay, absolutely impossible, that they Having thus, as we think, not unsuccessfully should ever be in the slightest degree injured imitated Mr. Mill's logic, we do not see why or benefited. The desire of posthumous fame, we should not imitate what is at least equally and the dread of posthumous reproach and perfect in its kind, his self-complacency, and Vol. 7.-85

3 L

PROPOSITIONI.

THEOREM.

proclaim our Eugnxz in his own words: “The solicitous about the opinion of his neighbours
chain of inference, in this case, is close and as a rich man.
strong to a most unusual degree.”

But we do not see that, by reasoning a priori The fact is, that when men, in treating of on such subjects as these, it is possible to things which cannot be circumscribed by pre advance one single step. We know that every cise definitions, adopt this mode of reasoning, man has some desires which he can gratisy when once they begin to talk of power, happi- only by hurting his neighbours, and some ness, misery, pain, pleasure, motives, objects which he can gratify only by pleasing them. of desire, as they talk of lines and numbers, Mr. Mill has chosen only to look at one-half of there is no end to the contradictions and absur- human nature, and to reason on the motives dities into which they fall. There is no pro- which impel men to oppress and despoil others, position so monstrously untrue in morals or as if they were the only motives by which men politics that we will not undertake to prove it, could possibly be influenced. We have already by something which shall sound like a logical shown that, by taking the other half of the demonstration, from admitted principles. human character, and reasoning on it as if it

Mr. Mill argues, that if men are not inclined were the whole, we can bring out a result diato plunder each other, government is unneces- metrically opposite to that at which Mr. Mill sary; and that, if they are so inclined, the has arrived." We can, by such a process, easily powers of government, when intrusted to a prove that any form of government is good, or small number of them, will necessarily be that all government is superfluous. abused. Surely it is not by propounding di- We must now accompany Mr. Mill on the lemmas of this sort that we are likely to arrive next stage of his argument. Does any combiat sound conclusions in any moral science. nation of the three simple forms of government The whole question is a question of degree. afford the requisite securities against the abuse If all men preferred the moderate approbation of power? Mr. Mill complains that those who of their neighbours to any degree of wealth, or maintain the affirmative generally beg the grandeur, or sensual pleasure, government question, and proceeds to settle the point by would be unnecessary. If all men desired proving, after his fashion, that no combination wealth so intensely as to be willing to brave of the three simple forms, or of any two of them, the hatred of their fellow-creatures for six- can possibly exist. pence, Mr. Mill's argument against monarchies "From the principles which we have already and aristocracies would be true to the full ex. laid down, it follows that, of the objects of hu. tent. But the fact is, that all men have some man desire, and speaking more definitely, of desires which impel them to injure their neigh- the means to the ends of human desire, namely, bours, and some desires which impel them to wealth and power, each party will endeavour to benefit their neighbours. Now, if there were obtain as much as possible. a community consisting of two classes of men, “If any expedient presents itself to any of one of which should be principally influenced the supposed parties effectual to this end, and by the one set of motives, and the other by the not opposed to any preferred object of pursuit, other, government would clearly be necessary we may infer, with certainty, that it will be to restrain the class which was eager of plun- adopted. One effectual expedient is not more der, and careless of reputation : and yet the effectual than obvious. Any lwo of the par. powers of government might be safely intrust- ties, by combining may swallow up the third. cd to the class wnich was chiefly actuated by That such combinations will take place, apthe love of approbation. Now, it might, with pears to be as certain as any thing which deno small plausibility, be maintained, that, in pends upon human will: because there are many countries, there are two classes which, in strong motives in favour of it, and none that some degree, answer to this description; that can be conceived in opposition to it. the poor compose the class which government The mixture of three of the kinds of governis established to restrain: and the people of ment, it is thus evident, cannot possibly exist. some property the class to which the powers . . It may be proper to inquire, whether of government may without danger be con- a union may not be possible of two of them. fided. It might be said, that a man who can “Let us first suppose, that monarchy is united barely earn a livelihood by severe labour, is with aristocracy. Their power is equal or not under stronger temptations to pillage others equal. If it is not equal, it follows, as a neces. than a man who enjoys many luxuries. It sary consequence, from the principles which might be said, that a man who is lost in the we have already established, that the stronger crowd is less likely to have the fear of public will take from the weaker till it engrosses the opinion before his eyes, than a man whose whole. The only question, therefore, is, What station and mode of living rendered him con- will happen when the power is equal ? spicuous. We do not assert all this. We only “In the first place, it seems impossible that say, that it was Mr. Mill's business to prove such equality should ever exist. How is it to the contrary; and that, not having proved the be established ? or, by what criterion is it to be contrary, he is not entitled to say, " that those ascertained? If there is no such criterion, it principles which imply that government is at must, in all cases, be the result of chance. If all necessary, imply that an aristocracy will so, the chances against it are as infinity to one. make use of its power to defeat the end for The idea, therefore, is wholly chimerical and which governments exist." "This is not true, absurd. . . muless it be true that a rich man is as likely to “ In this doctrine of the mixture of the simvet the goods of his neighbours as a poor ple forms of government is included the celeD; - that a poor man is as likely to be / brated theory of the balance among the com

ponent parts of a government. By this it is tors, each of whom has a vote for a borcugh, supposed that, when a government is composed possess, in that respect, equal power. If not, of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, they all Mr. Mill's political theories fall to the ground balance one another, and by mutual checks at once. For if it be impossible to ascertain produce good government. A few words will whether two portions of power are equal, he suffice to show that, if any theory deserves the never can show that, even under a system of epithet of “wild, visionary, and chimerical,' it universal suffrage, a minority might not carry is that of the balance. If there are three every thing their own way, against the wishes powers, How is it possible to prevent two of and interests of the majority. them from combining to swallow up the third ? Where there are two portions of power dif

" The analysis which we have already per- fering in kind, there is, we admit, no criterion formed will enable us to trace rapidly the con- of equality. But then, in such a case, it is abcatenation of causes and effects in this ima- surd to talk, as Mr. Mill does, about the stronger gined case.

and the weaker. Popularly, indeed, and with “We have already seen that the interest of reference to some particular objects, these the community, considered in the aggregate, or words may very fairly be used. But to use in the democratical point of view, is, that cach them mathematically is altogether improper. individual should receive protection; and that If we are speaking of a boxing-match, we may the powers which are constituted for that pur- say that some famous bruiser has greater bopose should be employed exclusively for that dily power than any man in England. If we purpose.

... We have also seen that the are speaking of a pantomime, we may say the interest of the king and of the governing aris- same of some very agile harlequin. But it tocracy is directly the reverse. It is to have would be talking ronsense to say, in general, unlimited power over the rest of the commu- that the power of the harlequin either exceeded nity, and to use it for their own advantage. In that of the pugilist, or fell short of it. the supposed case of the balance of the If Mr. Mill's argument be good as between monarchical, aristocratical, and democratical different branches of a legislature, it is equally powers, it cannot be for the interest either of good as between sovereign powers. Every The monarchy or the aristocracy to combine government, it may be said, will, if it can, take with the democracy; because it is the interestine objects of its desires from every other. If of the democracy, or community at large, the French government can subdue England, that neither the king nor the aristocracy should it will do so. If the English government can have one particle of power, or one particle of subdue France, it will do so. But the power of the wealth of the community, for their own England and France is either equal or not equal. advantage.

The chance that it is not exactly equal is as “The democracy or community have all infinity to one, and may safely be left out of the possible motives to endeavour to prevent the account; and then the stronger will infallibly monarchy and aristocracy from exercising take from the weaker, till the weaker is alloge. power, or obtaining the wealth of the commu- ther enslaved. nity for their own advantage. The monarchy Surely the answer to all this hubbub of unand aristocracy have all possible motives for meaning words is the plainest possible. For endeavouring to obtain unlimited power over some purposes France is stronger than the persons and property of the community. England. For some purposes England is The consequence is inevitable; they have all stronger than France. For some, neither has possible motives for combining to obtain that any power at all. France has the greater power.”

population, England the greater capital; If any part of this passage be more emi- France has the greater army, England the nently absurd than another, it is, we think, the greater fleet. For an expedition to Rio Janeiro argument by which Mr. Mill proves that there or the Philippines, England has the greater cannot be a union of monarchy and aristo- power. For a war on the Po or on the Danube, cracy. Their power, he says, must be equal or France has the greater power. But neither has not equal. But of equality there is no crite-power sufficient to keep the other in quiet sub. rion. Therefore the chances against its exist. jection for a month. Invasion would be very ence are as infinity to one. If the power be perilous; the idea of complete conquest on not equal, then it follows, from the principles either side utterly ridiculous. This is the of human nature, that the stronger will take manly and sensible way of discussing such from the weaker, till it has engrossed the questions. The ergo, or rather the argal, of Mr. whole.

Mill, cannot impose on a child. Yet we ought Now, if there be no criterion of equality be- scarcely to say this; for we remember to have tween two portions of power, there can be nc heard a child ask whether Bonaparte was common measure of portions of power. There- stronger than an elephant? fore it is utterly impossible to compare them Mr. Mill reminds us of those philosophers together. But where two portions of power of the sixteenth century, who, having satisfied are of the same kind, there is no difficulty in themselves a priori that the rapidity with which ascertaining, sufficiently for all practical pur- bodies descended to the earth varied exactly as poses, whether they are equal or unequal. It their weights, refused to believe the contrary is easy to judge whether two men run equally on the evidence of their own eyes anil ears fast, or can lifi equal weights. Two arbitrators, The British constitution, according to Mr. whose joint decision is to be final, and neither Mill's classification, is a mixture of monarchy of whom can do any thing without the assent and aristocracy; one house of Parliamen of the other, possess equal power. Two elec- / being composed of hereditary nobles, an I the

other almost entirely chosen by a privileged ample, may, by physical force, subjugate them
class, who possess the elective franchise on both: nor is there any form of government,
account of their property, or their connection Mr. Mill's Utopian democracy not excepted,
with certain corporations. Mr. Mill's argu- secure from such an occurrence. We are
inent proves that, from the time that these two speaking of the powers with which the consti
powers were mingled in our government, that tution invests the two branches of the legisla-
is, from the very first dawn of our history, one ture; and we ask Mr. Mill how, on his own
or the other must have been constantly ev- principles, he can maintain that one of them
croaching. According to him, moreover, all will be able to encroach on the other, if the
the encroachments must have been on one consent of the other be necessary to such en-
side. For the first encroachment could only croachment?
have been made by the stronger, and that Mr. Mill tells us, that if a government be
first encroachment would have made the composed of the three simple forms, which he
stronger stronger still. It is, therefore, mat- will not admit the British constitution to be,
ter of absolute demonstration, that either the two of the component parts will inevitably join
Parliament was stronger than the crown in against the third. Now, if two of them com-
the reign of Henry VIII., or that the crown bine and act as one, this case evidently resolves
was stronger than the Parliament in 1641. itself into the last; and all the observations
“Hippocrate dira ce que lui plaira,” says the which we have just made will fully apply to
girl in Molière; “mais le cocher est mort." it. Mr. Mill says, that “any two of the par-
Mr. Mill may say what he pleases; but the lies, by combining, may swallow up the third;"
English constitution is still alive. That, since and afterwards asks, “How is it possible to
the Revolution, the Parliament has possessed prevent two of them from combining to swal-
great power in the state, is what nobody will low up the third ?" Surely Mr. Mill must be
dispute. The king, on the other hand, can cre aware, that in politics two is not always the
ate new peers, and can dissolve Parliaments. double of one. 'If the concurrence of all the
William sustained severe mortifications from three branches of the legislature be necessary
the House of Commons, and was, indeed, un- to every law, each branch will possess consti-
justifiably oppressed. Anne was desirous to tutional power sufficient to protect it against
change a ministry which had a majority in any thing but that physical force, from which
both houses. She watched her moment for a no form of government is secure. Mr. Mill
dissolution, created twelve tory peers, and suc- reminds us of the Irishman, who could not be
ceeded. Thirty years later, the House of Com- brought to understand how one juryman could
mons drove Walpole from his seat. In 1784, possibly starve out eleven others.
George III. was able to keep Mr. Piit in office, But is it certain that two of the branches of
in the face of a majority of the House of Com- the legislature will combine against the third ?
mons. In 1804, the apprehension of a defeat “It appears to be as certain,” says Mr. Mill,
in Parliament, compelled the same king to part “as any thing which depends upon human
from his most favoured minister. But in 1807, will; because there are strong motives in fa-
he was able to do exactly what Anne had done vour of it, and none that can be conceived in
nearly a hundred years before. Now, had the opposition to it.” He subsequently sets forth
power of the king increased during the inter- what these motives are. The interest of the
vening century, or had it remained stationary? democracy is, that each individual should re-
Is it possible that the one lot among the infinite ceive protection. The interest of the king
number should have fallen to us? If not, Mr. and the aristocracy is, to have all the power
Mill has proved that one of the two parties must that they can obtain, and to use it for their own
have been constantly taking from the other. ends. Therefore the king and the aristocracy
Many of the ablest men in England think that have all possible motives for combining against
the influence of the crown has, on the whole, the people. If our readers will look back to the
increased since the reign of Anne. Others passage quoted above, they will see that we re-
think that the Parliament has been growing in present Mr. Mill's argument quite fairly.
strength. But of this there is no doubt, that Now we should have thought that, without
both sides possessed great power then, and the help of either history or experience, Mr.
possess great power now. Surely, if there were Mill would have discovered, by the light of his
the least truth in the argument of Mr. Mill, it own logic, the fallacy which lurks, and indeed
could not possibly be a matter of doubt, at the scarcely lurks, under this pretended demɔn.
end of a hundred and twenty years, whether stration. The interest of the king may be op-
the one side or the other had been the gainer. posed to that of the people. But is it identical

But we ask pardon. We forgot that a fact, with that of the aristocracy? In the very page irreconcilable with Mr. Mill's theory, furnishes, which contains this argument, intended to prove in his opinion, the strongest reason for adher- that the king and the aristocracy will coalesce ing to the theory. To take up the question in against the people, Mr. Mill attempts to show another manner, is it not plain that there may that there is so strong an opposition of interest be two bodies, each possessing a perfect and between the king and the aristocracy, that if entire power, which cannot be taken from it the powers of government are divided between without its own concurrence? What is the them, the one will inevitably usurp the power meaning of the words stronger and weaker, of the other. If so, he is not entitled to conwhen applied to such bodies as these? The clude that they will combine to destroy the une may, indeed, by physical force altogether power of the people, merely because their indestroy the other. But this is not the question. terests may be at variance with those of the A third party, a general of their own, for ex. I people. He is bound to show, not merely thai