there is a moral duty and responsibility in- | recognition of the doctrine of national personvolved in it The governors are reasoning agents for the nation, in their conjoint acts as such. And therefore there must be attached to this agency, as that without which none of our responsibilities can be met, a religion. And this religion must be that of the conscience of the governor, or none." ality can justify. National honour and good faith are words in every one's mouth. How do they less imply a personality in nations than the duty towards God, for which we now contend? They are strictly and essentially distinct from the honour and good faith of the individuals composing the nation. France is done to her is a moral act, and a moral act a person to us, and we to her. A wilful injury quite distinct from the acts of all the individu als composing the nation. Upon broad facts like these we may rest, without resorting to the more technical proof which the laws afford in their manner of dealing with corporations. If, then, a nation have unity of will, have pervading sympathies, have the capability of reward and suffering contingent upon its acts, shall we deny its responsibility; its need of religion to meet that responsibility?..... A nation, then, having a personality, lies under the obligation, like the individuals composing its governing body, of sanctifying the acts of that personality by the offices of religion, and thus we have a new and imperative ground for the existence of a state religion." Here again we find propositions of immense extent, and of sound so orthodox and solemn, that many good people, we doubt not, have been greatly edified by it. But let us examine the words closely, and it will immediately become plain, that if these principles be once ad mitted, there is an end of all society. No combination can be formed for any purpose of mutual help, for trade, for public works, for the relief of the sick or the poor, for the promotion of art or science, unless the members of the combination agree in their theological opinions. Take any such combination at random-the London and Birmingham Railway Company, for example--and observe to what consequences Mr. Gladstone's arguments inevitably lead. "Why should the Directors of the Railway Company, in their collective capacity, profess a religion? First, because the A new ground, certainly, but whether very direction is composed of individual men ap- imperative may be doubted. Is it not perfectly pointed to act in a definite moral capacity clear, that this argument applies with exactly bound to look carefully to the property, the as much force to every combination of human limbs, and the lives of their fellow creatures-beings for a common purpose, as to governbound to act diligently for their constituentsbound to govern their servants with humanity and justice-bound to fulfil with fidelity many important contracts. They must, therefore, sanctify their acts by the offices of religion, or these acts will be sinful and punishable in themselves. In fulfilment, then, of his obligations as an individual, the Director of the London and Birmingham Railway Company must be a worshipping man. But his acts are public. He acts for a body. He moves at his word ten thousand subject arms. And because these energies are out of the range of his mere individual agency, they must be sanctified by public acts of devotion. The Railway Directors must offer prayer and praise in their public and collective character, in that character wherewith they constitute the organ of the Company, and wield its collected power. Wherever there is reasoning agency, there is moral responsibility. The Directors are reasoning agents for the Company. And therefore there must be attached to this agency, as that without which none of our responsibilities can be met--a religion. to wield its collected force." Would Mr. Glad- Again, "National will and agency are indisputably one, binding either a dissentient minority of the subject body, in a manner that nothing but the ments? Is there any such combination in the world, whether technically a corporation or not, which has not this collective personality from which Mr. Gladstone deduces such extraordinary consequences? Look at banks, insurance offices, dock companies, canal companies, ciations for the relief of the poor, associations gas companies, hospitals, dispensaries, assofor apprehending malefactors, associations of medical pupils for procuring subjects, associations of country gentlemen for keeping foxhounds, book societies, benefit societies, clubs of all ranks, from those which have lined PallMall and St. James's Street with their palaces, down to the "Free-and-easy” which meets in the shabby parlour of a village inn. Is there Mr. Gladstone's argument will not apply as a single one of these combinations to which well as to the State? In all these combinations-in the Bank of England, for example, or in the Athenæum Club-the will and agency of the society are one, and bind the dissentiert minority. The Bank and the Athenæum have a good faith and a justice different from the good faith and justice of the individual members. The Bank is a person to those who deposit bullion with it. The Athenæum is a person to the butcher and the wine-merchant. If the Athenæum keeps money at the Bank, the two societies are as much persons to each other as England and France. Either society into difficulties. If, then, they have this unity may increase in prosperity; either may fall of will; if they are capable of doing and suffering good and evil, can we, to use Mr. Gladstone's words, "deny their responsibility, or their need of a religion to meet that responsibility ?" Joint-stock banks, therefore, and clubs, "having a personality, lie under the ne sacrament. cessity of sanctifying that personality, by the It will hardly be denied that the security of offices of religion;" and thus we have "a new the persons and property of men is a good oband imperative ground" for requiring all the ject, and that the best way, indeed the only way, directors and clerks of joint-stock banks, and of promoting that object is to combine men all the officers of clubs, to qualify by taking the together in certain great corporations-which are called states. These corporations are very variously, and, for the most part, very imperfectly organized. Many of them abound with frightful abuses. But it seems reasonable to believe that the worst that ever existed was, on the whole, preferable to complete anarchy. The truth is, that Mr. Gladstone has fallen into an error very common among men of less talents than his own. It is not unusual for a person who is eager to prove a particular proposition, to assume a major of huge extent, which includes that particular proposition, without ever reflecting that it includes a great deal more. The fatal facility with which Mr. Gladstone multiplies expressions stately and sonorous, but of indeterminate meaning, eminently qualifies him to practise this sleight on himself and on his readers. He lays down broad general doctrines about power, when the only power of which he is thinking is the power of governments,-about conjoint action, when the only conjoint action of which he is thinking is the conjoint action of citizens in a state. He first resolves on his conclusion. He then makes a major of most comprehensive dimensions; and, having satisfied himself that it contains his conclusion, never troubles himself about what else it may contain. And as soon as we examine it, we find that it contains an infinite number of conclusions, every one of which is a monstrous absurdity. Now, reasoning from analogy, we should say that these great corporations would, like all other associations, be likely to attain their end most perfectly if that end were kept singly in view; and that to refuse the services of those who are admirably qualified to promote that end, because they are not also qualified to promote some other end, however excellent, seems at first sight as unreasonable as it would be to provide, that nobody who was not a fellow of the Antiquarian Society should be a governor of the Eye Infirmary; or that nobody who was not a member of the Society for promoting Christianity among the Jews should be a trustee of the Theatrical Fund. It is impossible to name any collection of human beings to which Mr. Gladstone's reasonings would apply more strongly than to an army. Where shall we find more complete unity of action than in an army? Where else do so many human beings implicitly obey one ruling mind? What other mass is there which moves so much like one man? Where is such tremendous power intrusted to those who command? Where is so awful a responsibility laid upon them? If Mr. Gladstone has made out, as he conceives, an imperative necessity for a state religion, much more has he made it out to be imperatively necessary that every army should, in its collective capacity, profess a religion. Is he prepared to adopt this consequence? It is perfectly true, that it would be a very good thing if all the members of all the associations in the world were men of sound religious views. We have no doubt that a good Christian will be under the guidance of Christian principles, in his conduct as director of a canal company or steward of a charity dinner. If he were to recur to a case which we before put-a member of a stage-coach company, he would, in that capacity, remember that "a righteous man regardeth the life of his beast." But it does not follow that every association of men must, therefore, as such association, profess a re- On the morning of the 13th of August, in ligion. It is evident that many great and useful the year 1704, two great captains, equal in auobjects can be attained in this world only by thority, united by close private and public ties, co-operation. It is equally evident that there but of different creeds, prepared for a battle, cannot be efficient co-operation, if men proceed on the event of which were staked the liberties on the principle that they must not co-operate of Europe. Marlborough had passed a part for one object unless they agree about other ob- of the night in prayer, and before daybreak jects. Nothing seems to us more beautiful or received the sacrament according to the rites admirable in our social system, than the faci- of the Church of England. He then Laslity with which thousands of people, who per- tened to join Eugene, who had probably just haps agree only on a single point, combine confessed himself to a Popish priest. The their energies for the purpose of carrying that generals consulted together, formed their plan single point. We see daily instances of this. in concert, and repaired each to his own post. Two men, one of them obstinately prejudiced Marlborough gave orders for public prayers. against missions, the other president of a mis- The English chaplains read the service at sionary society, sit together at the board of an the head of the English regiments. The hospital, and heartily concur in measures for Calvinistic chaplains of the Dutch army, the health and comfort of the patients. Two with heads on which hand of bishop had men, one of whom is a zealous supporter and never been laid, poured forth their supplicathe other a zealous opponent of the system pur- tions in front of their countrymen. In the sued in Lancaster's schools, meet at the Men- mean time the Danes would listen to their Ludicity Society, and act together with the utmost theran ministers; and Capuchins migat en. cordiality. The general rule we take to be un-courage the Austrian squadrons, and pray to doubtedly this, that it is lawful and expedient the Virgin for a blessing on the arms of the for men to unite in an association for the promotion of a good object, though they may differ with respect to other objects of a still higner importance. Holy Roman Empire. The battle commences, and these men of various religions all act like members of one body. The Catholic and the Protestant generals exert themselves to assis and to surpass each other. Before sunset the Empire is saved. France has lost in a day the fruits of eighty years of intrigue and of victory. And the allies, after conquering together, return thanks to God separately, each after his own form of worship. Now, is this practica. atheism? Would any man in his senses say, that, because the allied army had unity of action and a common interest, and because a heavy responsibility lay on its chiefs, it was therefore imperatively necessary that the army should, as an army, have one established religion-that Eugene should be deprived of his command for being a Catholic that all the Dutch and Austrian colonels should be broken for not subscribing the Thirty-nine Articles? Certainly not-the most ignorant grenadier on the field of battle would have seen the absurdity of such a proposition. "I know," he would have said, "that the Prince of Savoy goes to mass, and that our Corporal John cannot abide it; but what has the mass to do with taking the village of Blenheim? The prince wants to beat the French, and so does Corporal John. If we stand by each other, we shall most likely beat them. If we send all the Papists and Dutch away, Tallard will have every man of us." Mr. Gladstone himself, we imagine, would admit that our honest grenadier had the best of the argument; and if so, what follows? Even this: that all Mr. Gladstone's general principles about power, and responsibility, and personality, and conjoint action, must be given up; and that, if his theory is to stand at all, it must stand on some other foundation. We have now, we conceive, shown that it may be proper to form men into combinations for important purposes, which combinations shall have unity and common interests, and shall be under the direction of rulers intrusted with great power and lying under solemn responsibility; and yet that it may be highly improper that these combinations should, as such, profess any one system of religious belief, or perform any joint act of religious worship. How, then, is it proved that this may not be the case with some of those great combinations which we call States? We firmly believe that it is the case with some states. We firmly believe that there are communities in which it would be as absurd to mix up theology with government, as it would have been in the right wing of the allied army at Blenheim to commence a controversy with the left wing, in the middle of the battle, about purgatory and the worship of images. It is the duty, Mr. Gladstone tells us, of the persons, be they who they may, who hold supreme power in the state, to employ that power in order to promote whatever they may deem to be theological truth. Now, surely, before he can call on us to admit this proposition, he is bound to prove that these persons are likely to do more good than harm by so employing their power. The first question is, whether a government, proposing to itself the propagation of religious truth, as one of its principal ends, is more likely to lead the people right than to lead them wrong? Mr. Glad stone evades this question, and perhaps it was his wisest course to do so. If," says he, "the government be good, let it have its natural duties and powers at its command; but, if not good, let it be made so .... We follow, therefore, the true course in looking first for the true diz, or abstract conception of a government, of course with allow ance for the evil and frailty that are in man, and then in examining whether there be comprised in that a capacity and consequent duty on the part of a government to lay down any laws, or devote any means for the purposes of religion,-in short, to exercise a choice upon religion." Of course, Mr. Gladstone has a perfect right to argue any abstract question; provided that he will constantly bear in mind that it is only an abstract question that he is arguing. Whether a perfect government would or would not be a good machinery for the propagation of religious truth, is certainly a harmless, and may, for aught we know, be an edifying subject of inquiry. But it is very important that we should remember, that there is not, and never has been, any such government in the world. There is no harm at all in inquiring what course a stone thrown into the air would take, if the law of gravitation did not operate. But the consequences would be unpleasant, if the inquirer, as soon as he had finished his calculation, were to begin to throw stones about in all directions, without considering that his conclusion rests on a false hypothesis; and that his projectiles, instead of flying away through infinite space, will speedily return in parabolas, and break the windows and heads of his neighbours. It is very easy to say that governments are good, or, if not good, ought to be made so. But what is meant by good government? And how are all the bad governments in the world to be made good? And of what value is a theory which is true only on a supposition in the highest degree extravagant? We do not admit that, if a government were, for all its temporal ends, as perfect as human frailty allows, such government would, there fore, be necessarily qualified to propagate true religion. For we see that the fitness of governments to propagate true religion is by no means proportioned to their fitness for the temporal ends of their institution. Looking at individuals, we see that the princes under whose rule nations have been most ably protected from foreign and domestic disturbance, and have made the most rapid advances in civilization, have been by no means good teachers of divinity. Take, for example, the best French sovereign,-Henry the Fourth, a king who re stored order, terminated a terrible civil war brought the finances into an excellent condi tion, made his country respected throughout Europe, and endeared himself to the great body of the people whom he ruled. Yet this man was twice a Huguenot, and twice a Papist He was, as Davila hints, strongly suspected of having no religion at all in theory; and was certainly not much under religious restraints in his practice. Take the Czar Peter,-the | tions. We see that, for the temporal ends of Empress Catharine,-Frederick the Great. It government, some of these constitutions are will surely not be disputed that these sove- very skilfully constructed, and that the very reigns, with all their faults, were, if we con- worst of them is preferable to anarchy. But sider them with reference merely to the tempo- it passes our understanding to comprehend ral ends of government, far above the average what connection any one of them has with of merit. Considered as theological guides, theological truth. Mr. Gladstone would probably put them below the most abject drivellers of the Spanish branch of the house of Bourbon. Again, when we pass from individuals to systems, we by no means find that the aptitude of governments for propagating religious truth is proportioned to their aptitude for secular functions. Without being blind admirers either of the French or of American institutions, we think it clear that the persons and property of citizens are better protected in France and in New England, than in almost any society that now exists, or that has ever existed,-very much better, certainly, than under the orthodox rule of Constantine or Theodosius. But neither the government of France nor that of New England is so organized as to be fit for the propagation of theological doctrines. Nor do we think it improbable, that the most serious religious errors might prevail in a state, which, considered merely with reference to temporal objects, might approach far nearer than any that has ever been known to the fea of what a state should be. But we shall leave this abstract question, and look at the world as we find it. Does, then, the way in which governments generally obtain their power, make it at all probable that they will be more favourable to orthodoxy than to heterodoxy? A nation of barbarians pours | down on a rich and unwarlike empire, enslaves the people, portions out the land, and blends the institutions which it finds in the cities with those which it has brought from the woods. A handful of daring adventurers from a civilized nation, wander to some savage country, and reduce the aboriginal race to bondage. A successful general turns his arms against the state which he serves. A society made brutal by oppression, rises madly on its masters, sweeps away all old laws and usages, and, when its first paroxysm of rage is over, sinks down passively under any form of polity which may spring out of the chaos. A chief of a party, as at Florence, becomes imperceptibly a sovereign and the founder of a dynasty. A captain of mercenaries, as at Milan, seizes on a city, and by the sword makes himself its ruler. An elective senate, as at Venice, usurps permanent and hereditary power. It is in events such as these that governments have generally originated; and we can see nothing in such events to warrant us in believing that the governments thus called into existence will be peculiarly well fitted to distinguish between religious truth and heresy. And how stands the fact? Have not almost all the governments in the world always been in the wrong on religious subjects? Mr. Gladstone, we imagine, would say, that, except in the time of Constantine, of Jovian, and of a very few of their successors, and occasionally in England since the Reformation, no government has ever been sincerely friendly to the pure and apostolical Church of Christ. If, therefore, it be true that every ruler is bound in conscience to use his power for the propagation of his own religion, it will follow, that for one ruler who has been bound in conscience to use his power for the propagation of truth, a thousand have been bound in conscience to use their power for the propagation of falsehood. Surely this is a conclusion from which common sense recoils. Surely, if experience shows that a certain machine, when used to produce a certain effect, does not produce that effect once in a thousand times, but produces, in the vast majority of cases, an effect directly contrary, we cannot be wrong in saying, that it is not a machine of which the principal end is to be so used. If, indeed, the magistrate would content himself with laying his opinions and reasons before the people, and would leave the people, uncorrupted by hope or fear, to judge for themselves, we should see little reason to apprehend that his interference in favour of error would be seriously prejudicial to the interests of truth. Nor do we, as will hereafter be seen, object to his taking this course, when it is compatible with the efficient discharge of his more especial duties. But this will not satisfy Mr. Gladstone. He would have the magistrate resort to means which have great tendency to make malcontents, to make hypocrites, to make careless nominal conformists, but no tendency whatever to produce honest and rational conviction. It seems to us quite clear that an inquirer who has no wish, except to know the truth, is more likely to arrive at the truth than an inquirer who knows that, if he decides one way, he shall be rewarded, and that, if he decides the other way, he shall be punished. Now, Mr. Gladstone would have governments propagate their opinions by excluding all dissenters from all civil offices. That is to say, he would have governments propagate their opinions by a process which has no reference whatever to the truth or falsehood of those opinions, by arbitrarily uniting certain worldly advantages with one set of doctrines, and cerWhen, again, we look at the constitutions of tain worldly inconveniences with another set governments which have become settled, we It is of the very nature of argument to serve find no great security for the orthodoxy of the interest of truth; but if rewards and pu rulers. One magistrate holds power because nishments serve the interest of truth, it is by his name was drawn out of a purse; another, mere accident. It is very much easier to find because his father held it before him. There arguments for the Divine authority of the Gos are representative systems of all sorts,-large pel than for the Divine authority of the Koran. constituent bodies, small constituent bodies, But it is just as easy to bribe or rack a Jew universal suffrage, high pecuniary qualifica-into Mohammedanism as into Christianity. VOL. III.-49 2 K From racks, indeed, and from all penalties | a single instance in which the system which directed against the persons, the property, and he recommends has succeeded. the liberty of heretics, the humane spirit of Mr. Gladstone shrinks with horror. He only maintains that conformity to the religion of the state ought to be an indispensable qualification for office; and he would think it his duty, if he had the power, to revive the Test Act, to enforce it rigorously, and to extend it to important classes who were formerly exempt from its operation. This is indeed a legitimate consequence of his principles. But why stop here? Why not roast Dissenters at slow fires? All the general reasonings on which this theory rests evidently lead to a sanguinary persecution. If the propagation of religious truth be a principal end of government, as government; if it be the duty of a government to employ for that end its constitutional power; if the constitutional power of governments extends, as it most unquestionably does, to the making of laws for the burning of heretics; if burning be, as it most assuredly is, in many cases, a most effectual mode of suppressing opinions-why should we not burn? If the relation in which government ought to stand to the people be, as Mr. Gladstone tells us, a paternal relation, we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that persecution is justifiable. For the right of propagating opinions by punishment is one which belongs to parents as clearly as the right to give instruction. A boy is compelled to attend family worship; he is forbidden to read irreligious books; if he will not learn his catechism, he is sent to bed without his supper; if he plays truant at church-time, a task is set him. If he should display the precocity of his talents by expressing impious opinions before his brothers and sisters, we should not much blame his father for cutting short the controversy with a horsewhip. All the reasons which lead us to think that parents are peculiarly fitted to conduct the education of their children, and that education is a principal end of the parental relation, lead us also to think, that parents ought to be allowed to use punishment, if necessary, for the purpose of forcing children, who are incapable of judging for themselves, to receive religious instruction and to attend religious worship. Why, then, is this prerogative of punishment, so eminently paternal, to be withheld from a paternal government? It seems to us, also, to be the height of absurdity to employ civil disabilities for the propagation of an opinion, and then to: hrink from employing other punishments for the same purpose. For nothing can be clearer than that if you punish at all, you ought to punish enough. The pain caused by punishment is pure unmixed evil, and never ought to be inflicted except for the sake of some good. It is mere foolish cruelty to provide penalties which torment the criminal without preventing the crime. Now it is possible, by sanguinary persecution unrelentingly inflicted, to suppress opinions. In this way the Albigenses were put down. In his way the Lollards were put down. In this way the fair promise of the Reformation was blighted in Italy and Spain. But ☛ may safely defy Mr. Gladstone to point out And why should he be so tender-hearted? What reason can he give for hanging a murderer, and suffering a heresiarch to escape without even a pecuniary mulct? Is the heresiarch a less pernicious member of society than the murderer? Is not the loss of one soul a greater evil than the extinction of many lives? And the number of murders committed by the most profligate bravo that ever let out his poniard to hire in Italy, or by the most savage buccanier that ever prowled on the Windward Station, is small indeed, when compared with the number of souls which have been caught in the snares of one dexterous heresiarch. If, then, the heresiarch causes infinitely greater evils than the murderer, why is he not as proper an object of penal legislation as the murderer? We can give a reason, -a reason, short, simple, decisive, and consistent. We do not extenuate the evil which the heresiarch produces; but we say that it is not evil of that sort against which it is the end of government to guard. But how Mr. Gladstone, who considers the evil which the heresiarch produces as evil of the sort against which it is the end of government to guard, can escape from the obvious consequences of his doctrine, we do not understand. The world is full of parallel cases. An orange-woman stops up the pavement with her wheelbarrow, and a policeman takes her into custody. A miser who has amassed a million, suffers an old friend and benefactor to die in a workhouse, and cannot be questioned before any tribunal for his baseness and ingratitude. Is this because legislators think the orange-woman's conduct worse than the miser's? Not at all. It is because the stopping up of the pathway is one of the evils against which it is the business of the public authorities to protect society, and heartlessness is not one of those evils. It would be the height of folly to say, that the miser ought, indeed, to be punished, but that he ought to be punished less severely than the orange-woman.` The heretical Constantius persecutes Athanasius; and why not? Shall Cæsar execute the robber who has taken one purse, and spare the wretch who has taught millions to rob the Creator of his honour, and to bestow it on the creature? The orthodox Theodosius persecutes the Arians, and with equal reason. Shall an insult offered to the Cæsarean majesty be expiated by death, and shall there be no penalty for him who degrades to the rank of a creature the Almighty, the infinite Creator? We have a short answer for both: "To Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's. Cæsar is appointed for the punishment of robbers and rebels. He is not appointed for the purpose of either propa gating or exterminating the doctrine of consub stantiality of the Father and the Son." so," says Mr. Gladstone. "Cæsar is bound in conscience to propagate whatever he thinks to be the truth as to this question. Constantius is bound to establish the Arian worship throughout the empire, and to displace the bravest captains of his legions, and the ablest ministers of his Treasury, if they hold the Nice ne faith. 'Not |