been a rédacteur of a different description from some of his successors, Mr. Bentham would never have attained the distinction of even giving his name to a sect.

UTILITARIAN THEORY OF

GOVERNMENT.
(OCTOBER 1829.)

Westminster Review, (XXII. Art. 16,) on the Strictures of the Edinburgh Review (XCVIII. Art. 1) on the Utilitarian Theory of Government, and the" Greatest Happiness Principle." We have long been of opinion that the Utilitarians have owed all their influence to a mere delusion-that, while professing to have submitted their minds to an intellectual discipline of peculiar severity, to have discarded all sentimentality, and to have acquired consummate skill in the art of reasoning, they are decidedly inferior to the mass of educated men in the very qualities in which they conceive them selves to excel. They have undoubtedly freed themselves from the dominion of some absurd notions. But their struggle for intellectual emancipation has ended, as injudicious and violent struggles for political emancipation too often end, in a mere change of tyrants. Indeed, we are not sure that we do not prefer the venerable nonsense which holds prescriptive sway over the ultra-Tory to the upstart dynasty of prejudices and sophisms by which the revolutionists of the moral world have suffered themselves to be enslaved.

tinised, the world would see that it had been under a mistake respecting them.

We have made the experiment; and it has succeeded far beyond our most sanguine expectations. A chosen champion of the School has come forth against us. A specimen of his logical abilities now lies before us; and we pledge ourselves to show that no prebendary at an anti-Catholic meeting, no true-blue baronet after the third bottle at a Pitt Club, ever displayed such utter incapacity of comprehending or answering an argument as appears in the speculations of this Utilitarian apostle; that he does not understand our meaning, or Mr. Mill's meaning, or Mr. Bentham's meaning, or his own meaning; and that the various parts of his system— if the name of system can be so misapplied-directly contradict each other.

Having shown this, we intend to leave him in undisputed possession of whatever advantage he may derive from the last word. We propose only to convince the public that there is nothing in the far-famed logic of the Utilitarians of which any plain man has reason to be afraid; that this logic will impose on no man who dares to look it in the face.

The Westminster Reviewer begins by charging us with having misrepresented an important part of Mr. Mill's argument.

"The first extract given by the Edinburgh

Reviewers from the Essay was an insulated passage, purposely despoiled of what had preceded and what followed. The author had been observing, that 'some profound and benevolent investigators of human affairs had adopted the conclusion that, of all the possible forms of government, absolute monarchy is the best.'

the surface of history affords, therefore, no certain principle of decision, we must go beyond the surface, and penetrate to the springs within. This is what the Reviewers have

The Utilitarians have sometimes been abused as intolerant, arrogant, This is what the reviewers have irreligious, as enemies of literature, omitted at the beginning. He then adds, as of the fine arts, and of the domestic in the extract, that Experience, if we look only eharities. They have been reviled for at the outside of the facts, appears to be divided some things of which they were guilty, on this subject;' there are Caligulas in one and for some of which they were inno-place, and kings of Denmark in another. As cent. But scarcely anybody seems to have perceived that almost all their peculiar faults arise from the utter want both of comprehensiveness and of precision in their mode of reasoning. We have, for some time past, been convinced that this was really the case; and that, whenever their philosophy should be boldly and unsparingly scru

omitted at the end."

It is perfectly true that our quotation from Mr. Mill's essay was, like most other quotations, preceded and followed by something which we did not quote. But, if the Westminster Re

viewer means to say that either what for their lives and their possessions preceded or what followed would, if under Nero and under the National quoted, have shown that we put a Convention, it follows that the causes wrong interpretation on the passage from which misgovernment proceeds which was extracted, he does not un-existed both in the despotism of Rome derstand Mr. Mill rightly.

and in the democracy of France. Mr. Mill undoubtedly says that, "as What, then, is that which, being found the surface of history affords no certain in Denmark and in the United States, principle of decision, we must go be- and not being found in the Roman yond the surface, and penetrate to the Empire or under the administration springs within." But these expressions of Robespierre, renders governments, will admit of several interpretations. widely differing in their external form, In what sense, then, does Mr. Mill use practically good? Be it what it may, them? If he means that we ought to it certainly is not that which Mr. Mill inspect the facts with close attention, proves a priori that it must be,—a he means what is rational. But, if he democratic representative assembly. means that we ought to leave the facts, For the Danes have no such assembly. with all their apparent inconsistencies, The latent principle of good governunexplained-to lay down a general ment ought to be tracked, as it appears principle of the widest extent, and to to us, in the same manner in which deduce doctrines from that principle Lord Bacon proposed to track the prinby syllogistic argument, without paus-ciple of Heat. Make as large a list as ing to consider whether those doctrines be or be not consistent with the facts, -then he means what is irrational; and this is clearly what he does mean: for he immediately begins, without offering the least explanation of the contradictory appearances which he has himself described, to go beyond the surface in the following manner:"That_one_human being will desire to render the person and property of another subservient to his pleasures, notwithstanding the pain or loss of pleasure which it may occasion to that other individual, is the foundation of government. The desire of the object implies the desire of the power necessary to accomplish the object." And thus he proceeds to deduce consequences directly inconsistent with what he has himself stated respecting the situation of the Danish people.

If we assume that the object of government is the preservation of the persons and property of men, then we must hold that, wherever that object is attained, there the principle of good government exists. If that object be attained both in Denmark and in the United States of America, then that which makes government good must exist, under whatever disguise of title or name, both in Denmark and in the United States. If men lived in fear

possible, said that great man, of those bodies in which, however widely they differ from each other in appearance, we perceive heat; and as large a list as possible of those which, while they bear a general resemblance to hot bodies, are nevertheless not hot. Observe the different degrees of heat in different hot bodies; and then, if there be something which is found in all hot bodies, and of which the increase or diminution is always accompanied by an increase or diminution of heat, we may hope that we have really discovered the object of our search. In the same manner we ought to examine the constitution of all those communities in which, under whatever form, the blessings of good government are enjoyed; and to discover, if possible, in what they resemble each other, and in what they all differ from those societies in which the object of government is not attained. By proceeding thus we shall arrive, not indeed at a perfect theory of government, but at a theory which will be of great practical use, and which the experience of every successive generation will probably bring nearer and nearer to perfection.

The inconsistencies into which Mr. Mill has been betrayed by taking a different course ought to serve as a warning to all speculators. Because

Denmark is well governed by a monarch that the division of power can never exist long, because it is next to impossible that the equal division of power should ever exist at all.

"When Mr. Mill asserted that it cannot be for the interest of either the monarchy or the aristocracy to combine with the democracy, it and aristocracy were in doubtful contest with is plain he did not assert that if the monarchy each other, they would not, either of them, accept of the assistance of the democracy. He spoke of their taking the side of the democracy; not of their allowing the democracy take side with themselves."

If Mr. Mill meant any thing, he must have meant this-that the monarchy and the aristocracy will never forget their enmity to the democracy in their enmity to each other.

who, in appearance at least, is absolute,
Mr. Mill thinks that the only mode of
arriving at the true principles of go-
vernment is to deduce them a priori
from the laws of human nature. And
what conclusion does he bring out by
this deduction? We will give it in
his own words :-"In the grand dis-
covery of modern times, the system of
representation, the solution of all the
difficulties, both speculative and prac-to
tical, will perhaps be found. If it
cannot, we seem to be forced upon the
extraordinary conclusion that good go-
vernment is impossible." That the
Danes are well governed without a re-
presentation is a reason for deducing the
theory of government from a general
principle from which it necessarily fol-
lows that good government is impossible
without a representation! We have
done our best to put this question
plainly; and we think that, if the
Westminster Reviewer will read over
what we have written twice or thrice
with patience and attention, some
glimpse of our meaning will break in
even on his mind.

"The monarchy and aristocracy," says he, "have all possible motives for endeavouring

to obtain unlimited power over the persons
and property of the community. The conse-
quence is inevitable. They have all possible
motives for combining to obtain that power,
and unless the people have power enough to
be a match for both they have no protection.
The balance, therefore, is a thing the existence
be regarded as impossible."
of which upon the best possible evidence is to

If Mr. Mill meant only what the Westminster Reviewer conceives him Some objections follow, so frivolous to have meant, his argument would and unfair, that we are almost ashamed leave the popular theory of the bato notice them. lance quite untouched. For it is the "When it was said that there was in Den-very theory of the balance that the mark a balanced contest between the king and help of the people will be solicited by the nobility, what was said was, that there the nobles when hard pressed by the was a balanced contest, but it did not last. It was balanced till something put an end to the king, and by the king when hard balance; and so is everything else. That such pressed by the nobles; and that, as a balance will not last, is precisely what Mr. the price of giving alternate support to the crown and the aristocracy, they will obtain something for themselves, as the Reviewer admits that they have done in Denmark. If Mr. Mill admits this, he admits the only theory of the balance of which we ever heardthat very theory which he has declared to be wild and chimerical. If he denies it, he is at issue with the Westminster Reviewer as to the phenomena of the Danish government.

Mill had demonstrated."

Mr. Mill, we positively affirm, pretends to demonstrate, not merely that a balanced contest between the king and the aristocracy will not last, but that the chances are as infinity to one against the existence of such a balanced contest. This is a mere question of fact. We quote the words of the essay, and defy the Westminster Reviewer to impeach our accuracy :

:

"It seems impossible that such equality should ever exist. How is it to be established?

Or by what criterion is it to be ascertained? If there is no such criterion, it must, in all cases, be the result of chance. If so, the chances against it are as infinity to one."

The Reviewer has confounded the division of power with the balance or equal division of power. Mr. Mill says

We now come to a more important passage. Our opponent has discovered, as he conceives, a radical error which runs through our whole argument, and vitiates every part of it. We suspect that we shall spoil his triumph.

"Mr. Mill never asserted that under no

despotic government does any human being, ex

cept the tools of the sovereign, possess more than the necessaries of life, and that the most intense degree of terror is kept up by constant cruelty. He said that absolute power leads to such results, by infallible sequence, where power over a community is attained, and nothing

checks.' The critic on the Mount never made a more palpable misquotation.

always place some restraint on the rapacity and cruelty of the powerful, surely the knowledge of those checks, of their nature, and of their effect, must be a most important part of the science of government. Does Mr. Mill say anything upon this part of the subject?

"The spirit of this misquotation runs through every part of the reply of the Edin-Not one word. burgh Review that relates to the Essay on Government; and is repeated in as many shapes as the Roman pork. The whole description of Mr. Mill's argument against despotism,'-including the illustration from right-angled triangles and the square of the hypothenuse, is founded on this invention of saying what an author has not said, and leaving unsaid what he has."

The line of defence now taken by the Utilitarians evidently degrades Mr. Mill's theory of government from the rank which, till within the last few months, was claimed for it by the whole sect. It is no longer a practical system, fit to guide statesmen, but merely a barren exercise of the intellect, like

We thought, and still think, for reasons which our readers will soon un-those propositions in mechanics in which derstand, that we represented Mr. Mill's principle quite fairly, and according to the rule of law and common sense, ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Let us, however, give him all the advantage of the explanation tendered by his advocate, and see what he will gain by it.

The Utilitarian doctrine then is, not that despots and aristocracies will always plunder and oppress the people to the last point, but that they will do so if nothing checks them.

the effect of friction and of the resistance of the air is left out of the question; and which, therefore, though correctly deduced from the premises, are in practice utterly false. For, if Mr. Mill professes to prove only that absolute monarchy and aristocracy are pernicious without checks,-if he allows that there are checks which produce good government even under absolute monarchs and aristocracies,—and if he omits to tell us what those checks are, and what effects they produce under different circumstances,-he surely gives us no information which can be of real utility.

In the first place, it is quite clear that the doctrine thus stated is of no use at all, unless the force of the checks be estimated. The first law of motion is, that a ball once projected will fly on But the fact is,-and it is most exto all eternity with undiminished ve- traordinary that the Westminster Relocity, unless something checks. The viewer should not have perceived it,—— fact is, that a ball stops in a few seconds that, if once the existence of checks on after proceeding a few yards with very the abuse of power in monarchies and variable motion. Every man would aristocracies be admitted, the whole of wring his child's neck and pick his Mr. Mill's theory falls to the ground at friend's pocket if nothing checked him. once. This is so palpable, that, in spite In fact, the principle thus stated means of the opinion of the Westminster Reonly that governments will oppress un-viewer, we must acquit Mr. Mill of less they abstain from oppressing. This having intended to make such an adis quite true, we own. But we might mission. We still think that the words, with equal propriety turn the maxim "where power over a community is atround, and lay it down, as the funda-tained, and nothing checks," must not mental principle of government, that be understood to mean that under a all rulers will govern well, unless some monarchical or aristocratical form of motive interferes to keep them from government there can really be any doing so. check which can in any degree mitigate the wretchedness of the people.

If there be, as the Westminster Reviewer acknowledges, certain checks which, under political institutions the most arbitrary in seeming, sometimes produce good government, and almost

For all possible checks may be classed under two general heads,—want of will, and want of power. Now, if a king or an aristocracy, having the power to

plunder and oppress the people, can want the will, all Mr. Mill's principles of human nature must be pronounced unsound. He tells us, "that the desire to possess unlimited power of inflicting pain upon others, is an inseparable part of human nature;" and that "a chain of inference, close and strong to a most unusual degree," leads to the conclusion that those who possess this power will always desire to use it. It is plain, therefore, that, if Mr. Mill's principles be sound, the check on a monarchical or an aristocratical government will not be the want of will to oppress.

It would perhaps be unreasonable to expect that a writer who cannot understand his own English should understand Lord Bacon's Latin. We will therefore attempt to make our meaning clearer.

What Lord Bacon blames in the schoolmen of his time is this,-that they reasoned syllogistically on words which had not been defined with precision; such as moist, dry, generation, corruption, and so forth. Mr. Mill's error is exactly of the same kind. He reasons syllogistically about power, pleasure, and pain, without attaching If a king or an aristocracy, having, any definite notion to any one of those as Mr. Mill tells us that they always words. There is no more resemblance, must have, the will to oppress the says the Westminster Reviewer, bepeople with the utmost severity, want tween pain and substantia than between the power, then the government, by pain and a line or an angle. By his whatever name it may be called, must permission, in the very point to which be virtually a mixed government or a Lord Bacon's observation applies, Mr. pure democracy: for it is quite clear Mill's subjects do resemble the subthat the people possess some power in stantia and elementum of the schoolmen the state some means of influencing and differ from the lines and magnithe nominal rulers. But Mr. Mill has tudes of Euclid. We can reason a priori demonstrated that no mixed govern- on mathematics, because we can define ment can possibly exist, or at least with an exactitude which precludes all that such a government must come to possibility of confusion. If a mathea very speedy end; therefore, every matician were to admit the least laxity country in which people not in the ser- into his notions, if he were to allow vice of the government have, for any himself to be deluded by the vague length of time, been permitted to ac- sense which words bear in popular use, cumulate more than the bare means of or by the aspect of an ill-drawn diasubsistence must be a pure democracy. gram, if he were to forget in his reaThat is to say, France before the revo-sonings that a point was indivisible, or lution, and Ireland during the last cen- that the definition of a line excluded tury, were pure democracies. Prussia, Austria, Russia, all the governments of the civilised world, are pure democracies. If this be not a reductio ad absurdum, we do not know what is.

The errors of Mr. Mill proceed principally from that radical vice in his reasoning which, in our last number, we described in the words of Lord Bacon. The Westminster Reviewer is unable to discover the meaning of our extracts from the Novum Organum, and expresses himself as follows:

breadth, there would be no end to his blunders. The schoolmen tried to reason mathematically about things which had not been, and perhaps could not be, defined with mathematical accuracy. We know the result. Mr. Mill has in our time attempted to do the same. He talks of power, for example, as if the meaning of the word power were as determinate as the meaning of the word circle. But, when we analyse his speculations, we find that his notion of power is, in the words of Bacon, "phantastica et male terminata."

"The quotations from Lord Bacon are misThere are two senses in which we applications, such as anybody may make to any thing he dislikes. There is no more re- may use the word power, and those semblance between pain, pleasure, motives, words which denote the various distri&c., and substantia, generatio, corruptio, elemen-butions of power, as, for example, tum, maleria,-than between lines, angles, magnitudes, &c., and the same." monarchy;-the one sense popular and