sued, is an abuse of their true character and purpose.' And again: "Every holder of a city order or certificate knows, that to be valid and genuine at all, it must have been issued as a voucher for city indebtedness. It could not be lawfully issued for any other purpose. He must take it therefore subject to the risk that it has been lawfully and properly issued. His claim to be a bona fide holder will always be subject to this qualification. The face of the paper itself is notice to him that its validity depends upon the irregularity of its issue. The officers of the city have no authority to issue it for any illegal or improper purpose, and their acts cannot create an estoppel against the city itself, its tax payers or people. Persons receiving it from them know whether it is issued, and whether they receive it for a proper purpose and a proper consideration. Of course they are affected by the absence of these essential ingredients; and all subsequent holders take cum onere, and are affected by the same defect." The counsel for the defendant in error relies strongly on the cases of Lynde v. County of Winnebago, 16 Wall. 6, decided by this court, and State ex rel. Ross v. Anderson County, 8 Baxter, 249, decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, as well as upon various decisions of other State courts, particularly Williamsport v. Commonwealth, 84 Peun. St. 487; Mills v. Gleason, 11 Wis. 470; Bank of Chillicothe v. Chillicothe, 7 Ohio, pt. 2, p. 31. Conceding that views different from those which we have expressed are entertained by some of the State courts, and that they may be controlling in the States where they are thus entertained, we are more especially concerned to know what is held to be the law in Tennessee, as well as what may have been held in the decisions of this court in former cases. In the case in 8 Baxter, supra, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, it is true, expressed an opinion that authority to issue the bonds was implied from the power given to subscribe for stock, without the aid of the act of 1854, stating, as a general rule, "that a county, like another corporation, having right to create a debt, has also the incidental right to issue the commercial evidence of it, in such forms as may be satisfactory to the parties." But the statement of this genera! proposition may be regarded as only a dictum in the case, since the judgment was fully supported by the express provisions of the act of 1852, ch. 191, if not by the power given to subscribe for stock in a railroad corporation. We are not referred to any other decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee which comes any nearer to a determination of the question. It is undoubtedly a question of local policy with each State what shall be the extent and character of the powers which its various political and municipal organizations shall possess; and the settled decisions of its highest courts on this subject will be regarded as authoritative by the courts of the United States, for it is a question that relates to the internal constitution of the body politic of the State. But as all, or nearly all, the States of the Union are subdivided into political districts similar to those of the country from which our laws and institutions are in great part derived, having the same general purposes and powers of local government and administration, we feel authorized,in the absence of local State statutes or decisions to the contrary, to interpret their general powers in accordauce with the analogy furnished by the common prototypes, varied and modified of course by the changed conditions and circumstances which arise from our peculiar form of government, our social state and physical surroundings. In the case of Wells 7. Supervisors, 102 U. S. 631, we held that the power to issue county bonds did not arise from a power to subscribe for stock in a railroad company, where authority was at the same time given to assess and collect a tax for the payment of the capital stock, and no other authority to raise the requisite funds was given. Under the Code of Tennessee contracts may of course be made for the erection and repair of public buildings, and the power to issue vouchers for payment is necessarily implied: but no power is given to issue bonds or other commercial paper having the privileges and exemptions accorded to that class of commercial securities. No such power is expressly given, and in our judgment no such power is necessarily implied. Claiborne County v. Brooks. Opinion by Bradley, J. [Decided April 21, 1884.] WRIT OF ERROR-LIES ONLY FROM FINAL JUDGMENT -PRESUMPTION--REHEARING--PRACTICE.--In Brockett v. Brockett, 2 How. 238, it was decided that a petition for rehearing, presented in due season and entertained by the court, prevented the original judgment from taking effect as a final judgment, for the purposes of an appeal or writ of error, until the petition was disposed of. The record in this case does not show in express terms when the motion for a rehearing was made, but it was entertained by the court and decided on its merits. The presumption is therefore, in the absence of any thing to the contrary, that it was filed in time to give the court control of the judgment which had been entered, and jurisdiction to enforce any order that might be made. This presumption has not been overcome. The writ of error as issued is on its face for the review of the final judgment, not of the order refusing a rehearing. The judgment is sufficiently described for the purposes of identification. We are of opinion therefore that the judgment as entered is properly before us for consideration. It was expressly ruled in Brockett v. Brockett, which has been followed in many cases since, that if a petition for rehearing is presented in season and entertained by the court, the time limited for an appeal or writ of error does not begin to run until the petition is disposed of. Slaughter-House Cases, 10 Wall. 289; Memphis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 717. The motion for rehearing in this case was not decided until December 21, and the writ of error was sued out and served within sixty days thereafter. This was in time to secure the supersedeas. The motion to vacate is therefore overruled. Texas Pac. R. Co. v. Murphy. Opinion by Waite, C. J. [Decided April 21, 1884.] MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT* NEGLIGENCE CONTRIBUTORY INTOXICATIONPROXIMATE CAUSE-CONCURRENT-NO RECOVERY.-In an action against a railroad company for its alleged negligence, whereby the plaintiff was injured, he must show the injury he received was occasioned exclusively by the negligence of the defendant. If therefore it be found that the plaintiff has himself been guilty of any negligence or want of ordinary care that has directly contributed to cause the accident, he can have no cause of action against the defendant for the injury received, though the latter may likewise have been guilty of negligence. And this whether the plaintiff was sober or drunk at the time the accident occurred. A.though the plaintiff may have been guilty of negligence, and such negligence may, in fact, have remotely contributed to the production of the accident, yet if the defendant could, in the result, by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, in view of the circumstances of the case, have avoided the accident, the plaintiff's negligence, being the more remote cause, will not excuse the defendant. If the plaintiff, who was injured by the alleged negligence of the railroad company, was in fact drunk. and failed to To appear in 61 Maryland Reports. observe the reasonable precautions to avoid danger to himself while in the act of crossing the defendant's road tracks, or while upon the tracks of the road, though improperly there, and under circumstances to constitute negligence on his part, yet if the defendant's servants in charge of the train, after discovering the perilous situation of the plaintiff, could by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence have avoided the accident, they were bound to do so. If they possessed knowledge of the plaintiff's situation, and failed to make proper and reasonable exertions whereby he could have been saved, the defendant would be liable, though it was by reason of the negligence or drunken condition of the plaintiff that he was found in the situation of danger. In such case their failure to use due care and exertion would constitute negligence, which would form the direct and proximate cause of the injury. If on the other hand, the plaintiff was on the crossing, or at any other place on the road tracks of the defendant, in such condition as not to be able to take care of himself, or paid no heed to the warnings of the approach of the train; or if from negligence, or reckless indifference to the perils of his situation, he failed to observe the precautions necessary to his safety, and his situation was not known to those in charge of the train, and while observing a careful lookout, was not discovered by them in time, by the use of reasonable care and diligence, to save him from injury, then his own want of care and reckless negligence in putting himself in such place of danger would deprive him of all ground of action against the defendant. And this would be the case though there may have been negligence on the part of the defendant in detaching the engine from the cars and allowing the latter to run down the switch by their own momentum, or by the force of the 'grade. In such case, the negligence would be mutual or concurrent, and that of the plaintiff so directly contributing to the production of the accident as to preclude the right of recovery. Kean v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. Opinion by Alvey, C. J. OF AN ESTATE WILL-CONSTRUCTION-VESTING VESTED REMAINDER.-In the absence of plain expressions, or an intent plainly inferable from the terms of the will, the earliest time for the vesting of property will be adopted where there is more than one period mentioned in the will. A testator by his will gave his farm in A. A. county to his wife and brother in trust for his wife, A. E. C., to use and enjoy said farm and premises, and receive the income therefrom "until such time as they shall have an offer of one hundred thousand dollars, and shall invest fifty thousand dollars of the proceeds of such sale in good and safe securities under the direction of the court, and pay the interest received from the said fifty thousand dollars so invested unto my wife, A. E. C., during her natural life, and at her death said fifty thousand dollars, or the securities in which the same may be invested, shall go to and become the property and estate of such person or persons as would, by the now existing laws of the State of Maryland, be entitled to take an estate in fee simple in lands by descent from me, and the heirs, executors and administrators of such person or persons, per stirpes, and not per capita." Held, that the remainder in said fifty thousand dollars vested in the persons who were the heirs of the testator at the time of his death. Estates will be held to be vested whenever it can be fairly done without doing violence to the language of the will, and to make them contingent there must be plain expressions to that effect, or such intent must be so plainly inferable from the terms used as to leave no room for construction. Taylor v. Mosher, 29 Md. 443, adopted in Fairfax v. Brown, 60 Md. 50. Crisp v. Crisp. Opinion by Stone, J. INSURANCE LAW. -Where a LIFE POLICY-BENEFIT-TO WHOM PAID.life insurance policy provided that the benefit shall, at the death of the insured, be paid to his wife and children," held, that such benefit should be paid to his wife and children equally, and not one-half to his wife and the other half to his children; and further held, that each child should receive his share of the benefit, although one of such children may have never lived with his father as a part of his father's family, and may have also received a portion of his father's estate prior to his father's death. Hamilton v Pitcher, 53 Mo.334, 336. Sup. Ct., Kans. July, 1883. Felix v. Ancient Order Workmen. Opinion by Valentine, J. (31 Kans. 81.) FIRE- OTHER INSURANCE -CANCELLATION-NOTICE REPAYMENT--RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEE.- (1) A provision in a policy of insurance, "that in case there be any insurance in any other office extending to the property hereby insured, then this company, in case of a loss, will only be liable to pay its ratable proportion of the damage," has relation to the existence in fact of other insurance at the time of the loss, and does not bind the assured to keep up another policy which was on the property. He may consent to or submit to a cancellation of the latter before the loss has occurred without affecting his rights under the former. Hand v. Williamsburgh Ins. Co., 57 N. Y. 41, 47. (2) To effect the cancellation of a policy under a condition that "the insurance may be terminated at the option of the company on giving notice to that effect and refunding a ratable proportion of the premium for the unexpired term of the policy," there must be proof that the conditions on which the right to terminate the insurance depended were complied with before the loss occurred. (3) A notice dated February 3, 1874, stating that the company, desiring to cancel the policy, will allow the assured until the 4th of February, 1874, to replace the same in some other company, but on and after said date will consider said policy as cancelled and of no further force and effect, is sufficient in form. But proof that the notice was prepared on the day it bears date for immediate service; that it was found among the papers of the assured after his death-the fire. which happened February 12, 1874, having occurred in his life-time--is not sufficient proof of service. (4) A policy of insurance issued to the owner of the premises, in which is written "Loss, if any, payable to F. L. and A. L., mortgagees," is a contract by the insurer with the mortgagees to pay them the insurance money according to the terms of the policy. State Ins. Co. v. Maackens, 9 Vroom, 564. It is also a contract for the full term for which the policy is issued, and the insurer, under such a stipulation as is in question, cannot terminate the contract of insurance by withdrawing it before the expiration of the term specified in the contract, without notice to the mortgagees. (5) Repayment, or a tender of the ratable proportion of the premium, is also a prerequisite to the termination of the policy. Notice without repayment, or an actual tender of payment, is no compliance with the condition unless there be a waiver of repayment. Van Valkenburgh v. Lenox, 51 N. Y. 465; Hathorn v. German Ins. Co., 55 Barb. 28; Peoria Ins. Co. v. Botto, 47 Ill. 516; Wood on Ins., § 106. (6) Repayment or a tender to the assured is compliance with the condition; but a credit by the company of a ratable proportion of the premium on a debt due to it from the assured, not asIn Bergson v. sented to by him, is not sufficient. Builders' Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 541, the policy had been issued on a credit of part of the premium, and when the notice of cancellation was given the payment that had been made by the assured on account of the premium was not sufficient to cover pro rata the time that had run on the policy. The court held that inasmuch as no part of the premium was repayable, nothing was due to the assured, and no money was to be returned to him, and consequently no tender was required. (7) Though the mortgagees to whom the insurance money is payable are entitled to notice of the withdrawal of the contract of insurance by the insurer, they take their contract subject to be defeated by the breach of the conditions of insurance by the assured. State lus. Co. v. Maackens, supra; Warbasse v. Sussex Ins. Co., 13 Vroom, 203. Sup. Ct., N. J. Lattan v. Royal Ins. Co. Opinion by Depue, J. (16 Vroom, 453.) FIRE STATEMENTS NOT IN APPLICATION-INCUMBERING PROPERTY--OTHER INSURANCE--RECOVERY.--(1) Where the secretary of an insurance company fills out an application for insurance, the company is presumed to waive any statements of fact that are not inserted in the application, and are not called for until after losses occur. (2) Incumbering insured property, without notice to the insurance company, does not avoid the policy if neither the by-laws of the company nor the contract of insurance provides for such avoidance. (3) Chattel mortgages on growing crops are not to be regarded as increasing the hazard of insurance until the crops are harvested. (4) A provision in the by-laws of an insurance company that notices of other insurance of increased hazard by mortgage, and of whatever else affects the rights of the parties, must be made to the secretary, and that his approval must be indorsed, is not necessarily to be construed as providing for the avoidance of the policy if such notice is not given. (5) False swearing by an insured person will not necessarily defeat his right to recover upon the policy if it was not done with fraudulent intent to obtain more pay than he was entitled to. Sup. Ct., Mich. April 16, 1884. Tefenthal v. Citizens' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. Opinion by Sherwood, J. (19 N. W. Rep. 9.) FINANCIAL LAW. AS ΤΟ valid in case of mortgages, to be consistent they must be held valid when applied to the collection of money on notes or securities other than mortgages. It must be admitted therefore that a stipulation of this kind does render the amount recoverable on the notes uncertain when an action is brought upon them in this State. When the amount recoverable in an action upon a written contract, whether in the form of a promissory note or otherwise, is uncertain, such instrument is not negotiable, as is held by most of the courts which have considered the question. In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Woods v. North, 84 Penn. St. 407, Sharswood, J., who delivered the opinion in that case, says: "But in the paper now in question there enters as to amount an undoubted element of uncertainty. It is a mistake to suppose that if this note was unpaid at maturity, the five per cent would be payable to the holders by the parties. It must go into the hands of an attorney for collection. It is not a sum necessarily payable. The phrase 'collection fee' necessarily implies this. Not only so, but this amount of percentage cannot be arbitrarily determined by the parties. It must be only what would be a reasonable compensation to an attorney for collection. This, in reason and usage of the legal profession, depends upon the amount of the note. How then can this note be said to be certain as to its amount, or an amount unaffected by any contingency? Interest and costs of protest, after non-payment at maturity, are necessary legal incidents of the contract, and the insertion of them in the body of the note would not affect its negotiability. * * But a collateral agreement, as here, depending too, as it does, upon its reasonableness, to be determined by the verdict of a jury, is entirely different. * * If this collateral agreement may be introduced with impunity, what may not be?" To the same effect upon the same point are Garretson v. Purdy (Dakota), 14 N. W. Rep. 100; Jones v. Radatz, 27 Minn. 240; 6 N. W. Rep. 800; Bank v. Trenton, 63 Mo. 38; Hardin v. Olson, 14 Fed. Rep. 705; Bank v. Bynum, 84 N. C. 24. In a late case in the Supreme Court of Maryland the rule laid down in the cases above cited is approved and followed after a full consideration of the cases * * * * * NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT STIPULATION ATTORNEY FEES.- To constitute a note tiable under the law-merchant, it is essential that the promise must be "to pay a certain sum of money unconditionally." The notes in question containing a stipulation to pay ten per cent as attor ney's fee for collecting the same, which amount must be construed to mean a reasonable collection fee not exceeding ten per cent, an element of uncertainty is added as to the amount recoverable by action, and the notes are not negotiable. Whether this stipulation renders the amount uncertain recoverable upon the notes in question depends - 1st, upon the question whether the stipulation is valid for any purpose; and 2d, whether the amount stipulated to be paid is conclusive upon the parties as to the amount which may be recovered for such costs. This court has repeatedly held that a stipulation in a mortgage to pay attorney's or solicitor's fees, other than the taxable costs, in case it becomes necessary to foreclose the same, is not void and will be enforced when the amount stipulated to be paid is reasonable. See Boyd v. Sumner, 10 Wis. 41; Rice v. Cribb, 12 id. 179; Hitchcock v. Merrick, 15 id. CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT-ALTERATION.-Where a 522; Mosher v. Chapin, 12 id. 453; Tallman v. Trues-party takes a certificate of deposit from a banker, and dell, 3 id. 443; Reed v. Catlin, 49 id. 686-691; 6 N. W. Rep. 326. This amount therefore fixed by the parties is not conclusive upon the defendant, and the amount to be recovered under such a stipulation must be fixed by the court or jury on the trial of the action. In some of the States, viz., in Michigan and Kentucky, such stipulations are held void as contrary to public policy and the statutes regulating costs recoverable in actions. See Bullock v. Taylor, 39 Mich. 137; Witherspoon v. Musselman, 14 Bush,214. In other States they are held binding, and as this court has held them nego-holding a contrary doctrine. Maryland F. & M. Co. in selling it induces and allows another party to fill up the printed blank so as to make it draw 10 per cent interest, no such rate being agreed upon by the banker, he adopts the fraudulent alteration as his own act, and the certificate becomes void. The original cause of action upon the account was merged in the certificate, and the circumstances under which it became void do not justify the court in holding that it revived by reason of the fact that the certificate became void. No recovery can be had on the certificate, or on a count for the money given for it. Sup. Ct Iowa. Woodworth V. Anderson. Opinion by Adams, J. (19 N. W. Rep. 296.) The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1884. CURRENT TOPICS. CHARLES JAMES FOLGER. the death of Secretary Folger our State and ing to the pressing importunities of a friend high in office, and to the promptings of an old friendship, and deserting our bench for the National treasury. The life and the occupation were uncongenial to him, but he would not be driven from his office by the creatures who wanted it, or who desired improperly to use him and could not. He was determined to stay in office only because he thought it his duty, and not because he was ambitious or loved office unduly. He was not ambi I the Nation have lost one of their wisesa, band, tious, we think, at least not in the sense of a fault. and most useful citizens. He has died untimely, too, at the age of sixty-six, when we hoped so much from his counsels and his example. Worn out in the public service, in a department not the most congenial to him, for his heart was ever with our profession, he has fallen a victim to his sense of duty, and has given his life for his country as fully as if he died on the battlefield in defense of her honor or her rights. What we shall say of him may be tinged by the personal affection and reverence which we have long borne for him, and it is impossible to write critically when the tears almost obscure the page as we dwell upon the memory which we bless, and which will remain to us as long as life remains. There is no need to rehearse Secretary Folger's public services, for they are the well-appreciated property of the Nation. There is little need to speak of his character, which was unblemished, and a synonym for dignity, integrity, candor, fear lessness, firmness and devotion. It is much that a man goes through a long public life without incurring a single hostile imputation; it is more that when he is dead and gone every survivor, foe as well as friend, will rise up and testify that he never deserved any. Even when he was made the victim of an overwhelming denunciation of political methods and party intriguers, no breath ever tarnished his fair fame he was a blameless victim. Of Judge Folger's learning, research, wisdom and acuteness, and of his original and peculiarly forcible and felicitous style of writing, the pages of our law reports bear most ample witness. find his opinions quoted in other States with great frequency and respect. No one however who has not, like ourselves, had occasion to delve in the pigeon holes of the reporter, can have any conception of the amount of labor he performed as a judge. Scores of opinions were written by him, apparently simply to satisfy his own mind, and marked "not to be reported," or "to be reported only in part, if at all." Here, as well as in his administration of the National affairs, he evinced his unfailing determination to master every thing for himself, and to take nothing on trust. Undoubtedly this trait existed in him to excess, and has shortened his inestimable life. We Judge Folger unquestionably had a marked fitness for political life, and his political career has been highly honorable to himself, and useful to the State; but he was most fit for a judge, and he was speedily conscious of the mistake he made in yieldVOL. 30- No. 11. He once wrote us, and we believe sincerely — he could have had no object in being insincere with us, even if his nature could have permitted it: "I do not want to be governor. Few will believe it. Few will think that I am not ambitious. Few will ever understand how my judgment and my desires yielded to friendship and a sense of duty, when I came here. I have proposed to myself to work steadily on in the place of trust, until the end. I am not ambitious. Give me a competency a little more, so that I can have pictures and books and horses and friends about me and though bounded by a nut-shell, I count myself a king of infinite space." This was from Washington, April 5, 1882. - nay, Again, on the 7th of August last less than a month before he died—he wrote us: "I am glad that you are to have a rest. I wish that I was. I hope that I am. I am seriously out of health and spirits, and the world is not bright to me. I was at Geneva for some days, but not for rest or sport. I am back here". at Washington - "and find my table full of papers waiting my perusal and disposal. But there is a break in the clouds. The 4th of March, 1885, is the rift. I wish that I could cut out a large strip of time between now and then, and patch it on to the thither side of that day of jubilee." We do not believe that Judge Folger was in any sense the victim of a disappointed political ambition. Undoubtedly he felt his overwhelming political defeat, but he had foreseen it and calmly faced it, and certainly ought to have been proud of his fall on a field where all was lost save honor. He has more than once assured us that if his party could afford the result, he thought he could. And once, of late, when we expressed our regret that he had ever left our State and our bench, he replied, with great earnestness and sadness, "you are not half so sorry as I am." The nearest approach to complaint or repining that we can recall in his correspondence with us, is the following: "I have read nothing but miserable newspapers; having not had the mental fibre even for a novel. These awful newspapers: 'Fling forth a lie amid the crowd, Let but the papers vouch 'tis true, And Guilt stalk forth in garments new.' A trait of Judge Folger, not commonly known, was his love of literature, both legal and general. Even in the midst of his engrossment in the treas ury, he found time to carry on with us a correspondence on literary topics, and to send us many curious results of his wide reading, and many acute reflections suggested by it. He told us last winter that when he got "a little time" he was going to send us an article on singular family names, suggested by curious titles of law cases, of which he had once made a list. Very frequently in his letters we find poetical quotations which we cannot trace to their source. But the saddest and more characteristic letter that we ever had from him was written at Geneva, on the 27th of August, a week before he died -- probably one of the last letters he ever wrote. We love to think, from the closing sentence, that it may have been the very last. At all events, we cherish it as his dying legacy to us. He says: “I am at home sick; but I can read a book; and doing so this forenoon I strike this, which may amuse you, and lead you to look up the piece: Lucian wrote a whimsical piece called Aìuý Þovnèvtov, the lawsuit of the vowels.' Had I access to books here I would search for it; but alas! I can walk but a few steps at a time, and to climb a library step-ladder would be stepping into futurity. "There is or was a poet named Motherwell. I once met in one of Littell's Mag. a poem of three or four verses, called 'The Auld Ash-Tree,' or something like it, I think by him. I cut it out to save it, but it has cut me and gone, evasit, erupit. Perhaps some one hab stole it. Did you ever meet it? "The doctors say I must not work, even to write a letter. So I stop." This is in his beautifully legible handwriting, with all his accuracy of puncuation. What a picture of his fortitude, patience, playfulness, affectionateness, and love of books and poetry this little letter gives us! We had it in our hands to answer it, when the news reached us of his death. We must leave it to abler and calmer minds than ours to analyze and describe his character. At present we can only say, farewell, grave and wise statesman, profoundly accomplished lawyer, learned and equitable judge, elegant scholar, affectionate and faithful friend, noble and unblemished man! Such virtue and such wisdom cannot perish. The thought that we may meet thee again and hold converse with thee renders us almost indifferent to the ills of life. Let us look upon thy picture in the high court room of our State, and praise thy memory, and recommend thine example to thy successors and to all coming generations of the country for which thou hast toiled and which thou hast died to serve. Would that this poor tribute could be as lasting as our love and reverence for thee! be worth our while to look back to the annals of the past, and examining its long and ghastly record of judicial murders, to pause and see if the old saw, "better that nine guilty should escape than that one innocent should perish," is not, after all, exactly true. It is not by the famous instances which are every-day citations that we can judge of the number of victims that have been immolated on the altar of a hasty vengeance, miscalled justice, but by these long-forgotten tales of wrong that lie hidden in the dusty recesses of English archives. Let us drag one such story to light, a story strange in all its circumstances, but singular not so much in its terrible injustice as in the completeness with which that injustice was afterward revealed -- too late for human redress. This is no cause célèbre, but the tragedy of a quiet country side, one sample of hundreds long since forgotten by mankind. On Thursday, August 16, 1660 (Car. II, D. G. Reg.), William Harrison, a man seventy years of age, and the trusted steward of Lady Campden, of Campden Hall, Gloucestershire, went from the Hall to the village of Charringworth, about two miles distant, to collect rents. He did not return at his usual hour, and night approaching his wife sent a man servant, one John Perry, to meet him and escort him home. Neither master nor servant reappearing, Edward Harrison, the steward's son, started very early next morning for the village, and on his way met Perry, who told him he had made inquiries at Charringworth, but Mr. Harrison was not there. Thence they went to Ebrington, and after various inquiries found a poor woman, who whilst out "leesing" (gleaning), had picked up the missing man's "hat, band and comb," hacked with a knife and covered with blood, in the highway. A general search now took place throughout the district, but no further traces of the murder could be found, nor was the body discovered. Perry's absence from the Hall over night caused suspicions to attach to him, and he was brought before a justice of the peace and examined. He stated that after starting for Charringworth he grew afraid of the darkness, and meeting William Reed turned back with him as far as the Hall gate, where they parted. After this one Pearce came along, and he started a second time with him, but his heart failing him, he again returned and went into the hen-roost, where he lay for about an hour, but slept not, and on the clock striking at midnight he rose and started a third time for the vil lage. He lost his way in a fog, and spent the night under a hedge. Before day-break he resumed his journey, and after calling at a house there started back, and met his master's son, as before narrated. Reed and Pearce corroborated his statements as to their meeting him. Being asked "how he, who was afraid to go at nine, became so bold as to go at twelve?" he answered that at nine it was dark, but at twelve the moon shone. Asked again "why, returning twice home, he went not into the house to know whether his master were come home before starting a third time?" he answered that he |