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IT is utterly impossible that any work which communicates to us any authentic information as to the most minute particulars of the life of Napoleon, should be without its interest. The volume before us contains information which, we believe, may be perfectly relied on. It is, in fact, an authentic record of the opinions delivered by Bonaparte in the Council of State, by a note-taker of unexceptionable fidelity, a member of the Council, who turned his opportunities to account, and attempted to preserve for posterity the conversations of the extraordinary man to whose councils he was admitted. Thus writes the Baron Pelet:

"At the enthusiastic age at which I became a member of the Council of State,+ I watched with avidity every word Napoleon let fall, and as I recorded them at the moment, in the expectation of their proving of interest to posterity, I often thought how much we should now give to have such notices of Alexander the Great or of Julius Cæsar! Posterity, indeed, in the case of Bonaparte, has come much sooner than I had expected; and I venture to present it with a document which will aid essentially in estimating the character of one of the most extraordinary men who has ever appeared on earth, and whose catastrophe and melancholy end have placed their seal on what was wonderful in his history."

Before we proceed to make our readers in some degree acquainted with the contents of this most interesting volume, it may perhaps be necessary to inform them of the opportunities which the author of the original enjoyed, and of the credit which we may attach to his narrations. The translator has prefixed a preface, in which he thus alludes to these points:

"From an intimate personal acquaintance with the author, Monsieur Pelet (de la Lozère), I feel thoroughly persuaded that the whole is written in good faith, and that every incident or conversation here recorded, is perfectly authentic.

"The subject, it may perhaps be thought, is well nigh worn out; but as there can

be no doubt that many parts of it have hitherto been mystified-some by design, and some unintentionally-it occurred to me that a trustworthy statement, coming from a person who has enjoyed peculiar advantages for ascertaining the truth, might still be considered acceptable.

"Mons. Pelet's means of obtaining information arose from his having occupied high and confidential situations, first under the Consulate and the Empire, afterwards during the Restoration, and more recently under the present government of France; while his rank in society, his talents, and his habits of business, enabled him to profit by the ample opportunities which a position so advantageous gave him, during these successive political epochs.

"Under Napoleon, the author was long a member of the Council of State, and Administrator of the Royal Forests of the Civil List; both of which situations brought him frequently in contact with the head of the Government.

"During the Restoration, he enjoyed the title of Councillor of State, and for four years was Prefect of the Loire and Cher, of which department he was elected a deputy in 1827, a seat which he has occupied up to this time.

"Since the accession of Louis Philippe to the throne, he has been Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, and for some time held the important office of Minister of Public Instruction.

"Finally, by his marriage with the daughter of Mons. Otto (who, it may be remembered, negotiated the preliminaries of the Treaty of Amiens, and afterwards filled various high diplomatic situations on the continent,) Mons. Pelet came into the possession of many valuable official documents, several of which, so far as I know, are now for the first time laid before the public.'

The work is divided into two parts: the first, including fifteen chapters, all of a most pleasantly readable length, in which conversations of Napoleon are reported, in connexion with the narrative of the events to which they refer. In the second portion there are seventeen chapters, equally to be commended for their judicious brevity, which are

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exclusively occupied with discussions in the council of state.

In the singular constitution which, at the close of the year 1799 terminated the French republic, the Council of State was one of the bodies provided to wield the powers of the executive and legislature. The system of this new constitution required four separate bodies the Legislative Body, the Conservative Senate, the Tribunal, and the Council of State. This clumsy working of checks and counterchecks was framed only to be inefficient, and admirably did it answer the ends for which it was designed. The Council of State, the members of which were nominated by the consuls, and which was intended to be a kind of cabinet council to submit measures to a complicated revision by the other three bodies, became very soon the governing power.

"The Council of State alone preserved its character of a deliberative assembly, and took any real share in the business of the country. It inherited the attributes of its defunct companions; and it alone could give no offence to Napoleon, for, since all its members were nominated and dismissed by him, they acted merely as his council, and their authority had no impulse or direction but in his will and pleasure.

"Napoleon, however, took the greatest pains in the formation of this Council, as it afforded him the only check on the errors of his ministers; in fact, it formed the only body whose concurrence really lent to his acts the countenance of public opinion. He called to his assistance, accordingly, all the best qualified persons he could find in every department of government, and wherever he could lay his hands upon them. In this manner, Merlin and Portalis were selected to assist in the business of legislation Fourcroy and Chaptal in science-Fleurieu in naval affairs, and Gouvion SaintCyr in those relating to military matters. Besides these, there were many others whose names are well known to the world.

Having formed his Council, he divided it into sections, to each of which he referred the various projects proposed to him by his ministers to be separately considered. The same matters were afterwards discussed by the assembled Council, and generally in his presence."

The Council of State was, in fact, all that stood between France and the most unlimited despotism; how slight was the barrier will be understood from the fact, that all the members were nominated and dismissed at the plea

sure of Napoleon. He appears, however, to have treated this body with some species of deference, and to have encouraged the members to speak their sentiments freely. The entire proceedings of this body were as singular as its original constitution; it was virtually the cabinet of a despot, without one certainly essential characteristic_its secrecy; a deliberative council, without even the shadow of independence; a legislative body, without the power to pass a single law.

It is not, however, our present object to discuss the anomalies of a revolutionary constitution, but to bring before our readers a few passages illustrative of what may be termed the cabinet politics of Napoleon. We will aim at no connection either in subject or in time, but just transcribe the passages as they strike us. We extract, in the first place, a few sentences from Baron Pelet's able sketch of the Council.

"The meetings of the Council of State were held at Paris, in the palace itself— or, if Napoleon happened to be at St. Cloud, the members were summoned there. They met at least twice a week, the interval being employed by the sections in separate deliberation. The orders of the day, that is, the affairs for discussion, were divided into lesser and greater orders. Those which were of minor importance might be taken into consideration in the absence of the Emperor-the others were reserved till he was present. proposals were always printed and distributed to the members previously to their being considered in Council.

The different

"Napoleon sometimes gave notice of his intention to be at the meeting; at other times he entered unexpectedly—the sound of the drum on the Tuilleries' Stairs giving the first intimation of his approach. chamberlain went before him, while the aid-de-camp on duty followed, and both took their station behind him.

His

however, were full of interest, as they often betrayed the internal state of his mind, or let out the secret of his intended projects.

"Whoever wished to speak had only to say so; and Napoleon often urged those persons to speak whose opinions he desired to learn. The style of address was simple, and without flourish; for the eloquence of the Tribune would have been considered quite ridiculous in the Council. A new member, who had gained a certain degree of reputation as a public speaker, wished to set out with the oratorical manner he had found succeed in public assemblies; but he soon discovered that he was only laughed at in the Council, and speedily lowered his tone. There was no method in that place of concealing the want of ideas under the profusion of words: what was required was substantial matter, and a mind stored with facts. Not only was every description of knowledge represented in the Council of State, but every different epoch. Napoleon's principle, indeed, in its formation, was not merely to draw into it men possessed of all kinds of information, but persons of all different shades of politics. In this spirit he called to his assistance not only those who had most distinguished themselves in the preceding assemblies, but he recalled those who, though not hostile to the revolution, had been expatriated by its early political storms, such as Malouet, Mouneir, Ségur, and others. In this way the Council exhibited all the different parties of the state, fused, as it were, into one mass."

There is much that is amusing intermingled with much that is terrible and gloomy in the portraiture of Bonaparte which is here presented to us. Nothing can be better adapted to excite a smile than the curious calculations by which the success of the formidable invasion of England was made a matter of expectation. An immense number of flat-bottomed boats and pinnaces were to transport the invading army across the channel.

"It has often been asked how a flotilla, consisting of such a multitude of small vessels, could, by possibility, get past the English fleet without being knocked to pieces? And this difficulty became all the greater when it was considered that several successive tides, and, consequently, different days, were required to get the whole to sea, and, consequently, that they would be attacked and demolished piecemeal before they could form into line. was, however, hoped that, by exercising the flotilla sufficiently in the outer roads, they might acquire the habit of getting

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quickly together,—and as it was farther supposed possible that they might be favoured with dark nights and calm weather, they might slip past and reach the shallow parts of the English coast without being impeded, and then the large ships could not attack them for want of water to come near enough.

"To these encouraging speculations was added the assurance that the Rochfort and Toulon fleets, starting ostensibly for India, and having drawn off the English ships, would suddenly double upon them, and return to the channel to cover our passage across. The more wonderful these wild combinations really were, the more they pleased the fancy and raised the spirits of the troops-who readily believed that the grand secret of this invasion was found out by their chief, to whose genius nothing, they firmly believed, was impossible. So that every individual soldier indulged himself confidently in anticipated glory and fortune!"

We have not room to extract the most amusing account of the manner in which the revival of a monarchical government was effected in the person of Napoleon-a proposal to this effect having been submitted to the senate, they were told by way of quickening their deliberations, “make up your minds, or you will be accelerated by the voice of the troops." The result of the deliberation was, that they called on the First Consul to accept the imperial

crown.

The senate however acocmpanied their call with some stipulations for themselves

1st, "That the office of senator might, in like manner, be made hereditary, and that they should be tried only by their peers of the Senate.

2d, "That the Senate should have the

initiative in proposing laws, or that they should possess a Veto upon them.

3d, "That the Council of State should not be the interpreters of the Senatus Consultes.'

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4th, That two commissioners should be nominated out of the Senate; one to protect the liberty of the press, the other to secure freedom of persons.

"The First Consul expressed, in the Council of State, the highest displeasure at these pretensions which the Senate had presumed to set up.

"The day may come,' exclaimed he, 'when the Senate will take advantage of the weakness of my successors to seize the reins of government for themselves. The spirit of that body is quite well known; it stimulates them to strengthen their power

by all possible means. They would demolish the Legislative Body if they could; and if an opportunity were to present itself, they would make a compact with the Bourbons at the expense of the nation. The senators wish to be legislators, electors, and judges, all in one! But such a union of powers is monstrous. They affect, forsooth, to consider themselves as the guardians of the liberties of the country; but what better guardian can they have than the prince? Besides, should he choose to attack them, who could make head against him? The Senate are mightily mistaken if they fancy they have any national or representative character. Their authority is one which emanates from the government, like the rest, and is constituted as they are. As a body, a certain degree of power is ascribed to them; but as for the members, considered individually, they are nothing at all.

"These pretensions,' he continued, 'of the Senate, are merely old recollections of the English Constitution; but no two things can be more dissimilar than France and England. The Frenchman lives under a clear sky, drinks a brisk and joyous wine, and lives on food which keeps his senses in constant activity. Your Englishman, on the other hand, dwells on a damp soil, under a sun which is almost cold, swills beer or porter, and demolishes a quantity of butter and cheese, (consomme beaucoup de laitages). Accordingly, the blood of the people not being composed of the same elements, their characters are unlike. The Frenchman is vain, giddy, bold, and, above all things on earth, fond of equality: and thus we have seen them at all periods of their history declaring war against the distinctions of rank and fortune. The other, the Englishman, is rather proud than vain; he is naturally grave, and does not trouble himself with petty distinctions, but attacks serious abuses. He is far more solicitous to maintain his own rights than to invade those of others. An Englishman is at once haughty and humble, independent and submissive. What folly, then, to dream of giving the same institutions to two such different people! Moreover, I should like to ask who is to protect the French Chambers against a prince who has at his disposal an army of four hundred thousand men, whom the geographical situation of the country renders it always necessary should be kept on foot?'

In a debate on the propriety of excluding two of his brothers from the succession, there is a most amusing concentration of the spirit of what, in

these days of nicknames, has been termed democratic liberty.

The

"I propose, for the present, to exclude from my political succession two of my brothers; one because, in spite of all his abilities, he has made a ridiculous marriage, (un mariage de carnival). other, because he took upon himself, and without my consent, to marry an American lady. If they agree to give up their wives, I shall give them back their political rights. As to the husbands of my sisters, they can have no pretensions on this occasion. I do not come into possession of this empire in right of succession, but by the will of the people; and I may call whom I

please to share fortunes with me.""

The conclusive reasoning of the last sentence contains, we repeat, the concentrated essence of what is called democracy: I have it by the will of the people, and I will do what I like with it. So convenient is it for those who desire arbitrary power, to receive it unshackled by any ancient prescription, and derived from an authority so unlimited in its extent as the sovereignty of the people.

The institution of the trial by jury found no great favour in Napoleon's eyes.

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'Juries,' he exclaimed, almost always let off the guilty. Even the English admit this; and, if they still continue the system, it is less for judicial than political purposes -for they consider it a guarantee against the power of the crown. But is it to be supposed that a tyrant will have less power of influencing a jury than he has of influencing judges for life? What signifies, at this hour of the day, the question of its original intention? Is it not a double function, since the power of pardon given to the Sovereign enables him to soften the too great rigour of the laws in certain cases ?'"

And lawyers were not much better liked:

"On this occasion, Napoleon complained bitterly of the conduct of the 'One of these gentlelawyers of Paris. men,' said he, had the temerity, during the trial of Moreau, to pronounce a public eulogium on the Count d'Artois; and another, who was engaged to go to Lyons to defend a man who had killed a gendarme employed to arrest him, actually preached up the doctrine of resistance to authority! These lawyers are ever ready,' he continued, 'to intermeddle with political affairs-they attack, on all occasions, the law of divorce-and that of the national property. It is thus that they sap all

foundations of government. I shall forbid their pleading any where out of Paris without permission from the grand judge --and that shall be granted only to those who will not make a bad use of it. If that is not found to answer, I shall find still more effectual means of managing them.'

There is some truth, and more shrewdness, in the following remarks: "There does not exist in the world,' said he, on the 9th of January, 1808, 'a single constitution which is acted up to. Every thing is in a state of change. The government of England, for instance, has fallen into the hands of forty or fifty great families, who found no difficulty in giving the law to the House of Brunswick, who were strangers in the land; but that cannot last. In France, things are not a whit more firmly established. A corporal might take possession of the government at the moment of any crisis, for the constitution does not give the government power enough; and whenever the government is feeble the army are the masters. ought not, therefore, to be in the power of the legislature to check the march of government by stopping the supplies. The taxes, accordingly, when once fixed, ought to be collected by simple decrees, for it is absurd to suppose that in the interval between the sessions there shall not exist an authority to promulgate such laws as the circumstances of the period may require. The Court of Cassation considers my decrees as laws, and unless it were so, there would be no government at all in the country.'

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In penal matters, his discriminating judgment perceived the necessity of some dispensing power in the constitution. "While men," he said, "have some bowels, the laws have none." The maxim, however, is as old as the days of Tarquin, or at least as those of Livy. When, on the expulsion of the kings the republican sternness of the supremacy of law succeeded to the more pliant forms of monarchical administration, it was felt at Rome that there was an inconvenience in having a tribunal where there was no dispensing power -a judge to whom no palliating circumstances could be pleaded-and a sentence that could not vary with any changing modifications of guilt-"leges res surda et immutabiles."

In the following remarks there is a strange mixture of profound sagacity and political shrewdness, with an overweening selfishness, which seems almost

unconsciously to warp the judgments of this extraordinary mind.

"SITTING OF THE 7TH FEBRUARY, 1804.

The fresh plots,' observed Napoleon, 'which have been discovered, render it necessary that commissary generals of police be established at Lyons and other cities. It is quite a mistake to suppose that the intervention of the legislative body is required on this occasion; on the contrary, I consider it quite out of their way to attend to matters of police; taxation and the formation of general laws for civil affairs are their topics. A single session of a month or six weeks, once a year, is quite enough for these purposes. Every thing relating to executive business, public security, or police, is out of their beat; and so are politics, both internal and external. Indeed, the long residence of the deputies in the country unfits them for these matters.

"The government is no longer, as it used to be, an emanation of the legislative body, with which it has now only remote relations. The legislative body is the guardian of the public property; and, accordingly, their office is to see to the taxes. So long as they object to laws merely local, I shall let them pursue their own way; but if there should grow up amongst them such an opposition as might be strong enough to clog the movements of government, I shall have recourse to the senate to prorogue them; or change them; or dissolve them; and, in case of need, I shall appeal to the nation which is behind all these. Various opinions will be expressed on this head, but I care not. Tomfoolery (la badauderie) is the characteristic of the nation ever since the days of the Gauls!'

"At the sitting of the 29th of March, 1806, he said: 'I can see no inconvenience likely to arise from declaring the office of a legislator compatible with those of a judge and a magistrate. I should even say it is of public utility that many members of the judicial class should have

seats in the legislature, in order that the government might not promulgate laws inconsistent with the established jurisprudence, which can never vary.

"I have no desire that such a legislative body shall be got up as shall require nothing at my hands; and care must be taken not to render it weaker than it now is, otherwise it might be unable to serve me. The legislative body ought to be composed of members who, after their time of service expires, should be able to maintain themselves on their fortunes, without having places given them. As things are now arranged, there are sixty legislators going out annually, whom one does