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march myself on Naples; but with the generals whom you have, and the instructions which you will receive, you will do all that I could. Do not say whither you are going, except to the arch chancellor; let it be known only by your letters from the army."

Having thus dispatched Joseph himself in pursuit of a crown, Napoleon wrote nine days after to Joseph's wife as follows:

"Munich, Jan. 9th, 1806. Madame, my sister-in-law-I settled, some time ago, the marriage of my son, prince Eugene, with the princess Augusta, daughter of the king of Bavaria. [The elector of Bavaria had just assumed the title of king.] The elector of Ratisbon [one of Napoleon's ephemeral princes] marries them at Munich on the 15th of January. I am detained, therefore, for a few days longer in this town.

"The princess Augusta is one of the handsomest and most accomplished persons of her sex. It would be proper, I think, that you should make her a present, costing from fifteen to twenty thousand francs. She will set off for Italy on the 20th of January. The king of Bavaria will write to you to announce the marriage. Whereupon I pray God. madame, my sister-in-law, to keep you in his holy and worthy protection."

On the 18th of February, Napoleon wrote to Joseph as follows:

"Caution is no longer necessary. You are already master of Naples, and on the point of taking Sicily by surprise; this is your chief aim. You should entitle your acts-Joseph Napoleon, you need not add Bonaparte."

From the time of his assumption of the imperial crown, Napoleon, in all his family and personal arrangements, had aped old regal and imperial usages; and as the oldest of the royal families of Europe had no surnames, he was resolved that he and his family should have none. So Bonaparte was to be dropped, and Napoleon substituted for it.

In the letter, some six weeks after, in which Napoleon announces to Joseph his definitive installment as king of Naples, he makes the following suggestions as to Joseph's brother-in-law, Bernadotte, the husband of the Eugenie whom Napoleon did not marry :

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'Paris, March 31st, 1806. You will see that I have created six fiefs in your kingdom. You had better, I think, give the best to Marshal Bernadotte, with the title of Duke of Taranto. That title was afterwards conferred on Macdonald, Bernadotte, as we shall see, being otherwise provided.] Your connection with Bernadotte, whose children are your nephews, requires you to give him some privileges in your palace. You should secure him four or five hundred thousand francs a year. The queen of Naples did as much for Nelson. I roward, as you see, and intend to reward, my generals and soldiers nobly. Be inflexible,

and let no one rob. [No one, that is, but you and I.)"

In a subsequent letter, he thus resumes the subject of providing for Bernadotte :

"St. Cloud, June 3d, 1806. I had thought that, in any circumstances, the insulated papal

territories of Benevento and Ponte Corvo could not fail to be troublesome to your kingdom. I have made them into two duchiesthat of Benevento for Talleyrand, and that of Ponte Corvo for Bernadotte. I know that these provinces are poor, but Talleyrand is rich, and I will make Bernadotte's duchy worth having. You must be aware that I give the titles of duke and prince to Bernadotte for your wife's sake, [partly, perhaps, too, for Eugenie's sake;] for I have in my army generals who have served me better, and on whose attachment I have more reason to rely. [Bernadotte had taken no part in the famous 18th of Brumaire, which made Napoleon first consul, and laid the foundations of the empire.] But I thought that it was proper that the brother-in-law of the queen of Naples should have a distinguished position in your kingdom."

Joseph being thus made a king, Napoleon began to look round for thrones for the younger brothers also. Lucien still obstinately refused either to accept a throne-held, as it must have been, as Napoleon's vassal-or to part with his wife; nor was even Louis half so anxious to be a king as Napoleon was to make him one. The fol

lowing letters, which mention the crown bestowed upon Louis, contain references also to Jerome and to Fesch, the maternal uncle of the Bonapartes, who by this time had been made a cardinal:

"St. Cloud, May 19th, 1806. The business with Holland is settled, and before long, Louis will be king of Holland. He is willing; but his health continues to be indifferent. It ap pears that the squadron that Jerome is in, and which has been to the East Indies, has captured a large English convoy, and three men-of-war. I have no anxiety about this squadron."

"June 3d, 1806. In an hour I am to receive the Turkish ambassador, proclaim prince Louis king of Holland, and cardinal Fesch coadjutor of the elector, the arch-chancellor."

The office of king, held under Napoleon, was not found by his brothers so very agreeable. It may well be doubted whether Joseph, from the moment he accepted the unlucky crown of Naples, till after seven years he fairly got rid of the still more unlucky Spanish crown-which, in lieu of that of Naples, Napoleon presently thrust upon himreally enjoyed a single day of ease, peace, and comfort. He had taken up the idea, that to maintain himself on the thrones of Naples and Spain, all that

was needed was to rule mildly and equitably, and to recommend himself to the subjects, on whom he had been thrust, by an administration of the government more enlightened and more beneficial than that of the dynasties which he had superseded. He entirely overlooked the fact, that he was a usurper, placed in power by foreign bayonets, and, in that point of view, wholly irrespective of the administrative character of his government, an object of national hatred and detestation. Napoleon, on the other hand, understood all this

perfectly well. He was fully aware that as conqueror and usurper, Joseph could only maintain himself by force and terror, and he was constantly urging severities, at which the soft temper of his brother relucted. He insisted upon Joseph's exacting from his subjects the means of paying the French army that sustained him, and his letters, from the beginning to the end of Joseph's royal life, are only a series of shrewd criticisms on Joseph's Utopian schemes of policy, with a few compliments and cajoleries sparingly intermixed; sharp reproaches for his inefficiency and too great good-nature; and peremptory denials, or unwilling concessions to Joseph's frequent and urgent requests for money and troops, as to both of which the many calls that he had for them, obliged Napoleon to practice the strictest calculation and the most rigid economy.

Take the following as specimens among a hundred others:

"Feb. 26th, 1806. By this time you can no longer be in want of money. Disarin Naples, and levy a contribution of ten millions upon the town; it will be easily paid. You may safely resort to the expedient of confiscating all the English merchandise. The loss will fall upon the part of the nation which deserves least consideration."

March 8th. It seems to me your measures are too narrow; it is not by being civil to people that you obtain a hold upon them. This is not the way to get the means to reward your army properly. Raise thirty millions from the kingdom of Naples. Pay well your army; remount your cavalry, and your trains; have shoes and clothes made. This cannot be done without money. It is impossible that you should keep within the bounds that you profess; back yourself, if you like, by an order of mine. Your proclamations are not enough in the style of a master; you will gain nothing by spoiling the Neapolitans. The people of Italy, and, in fact, of every other country, if they do not feel that they are mastered. are disposed to rebel, and to murmur. In my opinion, your throne will have no solidity, unless you surround it with a hun

dred generals, colonels, and others, attached to your house, possessing great fiefs of the kingdom of Naples and Sicily. Bernadotte and Massena should. I think, be fixed in Naples, with the title of princes, and with large revenues. Enable them to found great families. I do this in Piedmont, the kingdom of Italy and Parma. In these countries, and in Naples, three or four hundred French military men ought to be established, with property descending by primogeniture. In a few years they will marry into the principal families, and your throne will be strong enough to do without a French army-a point which must be reached.

"March 12th. My armies are very numer ous; they are coming home, and cost enormous sums; so does my fleet. I can meet no new expenses. Up to this time, your Neapolitan administration has been too lax"

"It is absolutely impossible that I should send you fifteen hundred thousand francs a month, for the army of Naples. Levy a war contribution of thirty millions on the kingdom of Naples. It is strange that it gives only a You are too kind: that is not the way to bethird of what I get from the kingdom of Italy.

gin an administration."

"March 20th. Put to death the leaders of

mobs. Your administration in Naples is too feeble; you treat the populace with too much consideration. I cannot imagine why you do not execute the laws. Every spy should be shot; every lazzaroni who stabs a soldier should be shot. The property of all those who belonged to the court the late Neapolitan court, which had fled to Sicily] should be confiscated."

"March 31st. There is nothing sacred about the azzendamenti, [certain portions of the public revenue, which had become private property] for there is nothing sacred after a conquest. With such principles you will never found a kingdom. Your government of Naples is much too lax. If you showed more vigor, your ariny would be at its ease."

"April 21st. I am glad to see that a village of the insurgents has been burnt. Severe examples are necessary. I presume that the soldiers have been allowed to plunder this village. This is the way to treat villages which revolt. It is one of the rights of war, but it is also a duty prescribed by policy." [That was exactly Napoleon's idea of duty, duty prescribed by policy"-he seems, so far as his own conduct was concerned, to have had no idea of any other.]

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"June 3d. I see some passages in your speech [Joseph's speech to the deputation of French senators sent to congratulate him on his ascension to the throne of Naples] which you must allow me to think ill-judged. whole proceeding had given very little satisfaction to Napoleon, who had a very keen perception of the ridiculous, and of the sarcastic turn which might be given to incongruous and unseasonable suggestions. In a previous part of the letter, he had excused himself for not having put into the Moniteur Roederer's speech, to which Joseph had replied, on the ground that it was "nonsense," especially in the suggestion of an unlucky comparison between Napoleon and Machiavelli. You compare the attachment of the French to my person, to that of the Neapolitans for yours; that looks like a satire. What love for you can a people have, for

whom you have done nothing? whom you govern by right of conquest, with forty or fifty thousand foreigners? In general, the less you speak of me, and of France, directly in your state papers, the better it will be. I am sorry to see in your letters that you are captivated by particular services. To be captivated is very dangerous. The Neapolitans behave well; there is nothing extraordinary in that. You have treated them kindly; they expected worse at the hands of a man who was at the head of an army of fifty thousand men. Your disposition is mild and temperate; you have a good understanding, and you are appreciated; but this very far from a national feeling-from a submission and attachment founded on reason and interest. These distinctions ought not to escape you. I do not know why I tell you these things, for they will certainly annoy you. What I want is, that your acts and your language should be decorous, and suitable to your character."

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July 26th. I cannot understand how, surrounded as you are by men of military experience, there are so few that can give you good advice. Your measures have no life or movement, no organization or method. Till now you have made nothing but mistakes; but I ought not to distress you. For my part, I am not surprised at what happens in Calabria [an English army had landed, and the people were in insurrection]; your policy with regard to Naples is just the reverse of what ought to be pursued towards a conquered nation. Let your troops march together; do not scatter them. I suppose that you have armed all the castles in Naples. What is the meaning of this Neapolitan national guard? It is leaning on a reed-perhaps putting arms into the hands of your enemies. How little you know men!"

"July 30th. You should order two or three of the large villages, that have behaved the worst, to be pillaged. It will be an example, and will restore the gayety and desire of action of your soldiers."

July 31st. Bear in mind what I tell you; the fate of your reign depends on your conduct when you return from Calabria. Grant no pardous; do military execution on at least six hundred rebels; they have murdered a great number of my soldiers. Let the houses of thirty of the principal heads of villages be burnt, and distribute their property among the troops. Disarm all the inhabitants, and pillage five or six of the large villages which have behaved worst. Desire the soldiers to treat well the towns which have remained faithful. Confiscate the public property of the revolted villages, and give it to the army; above all, disarm vigorously.

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As Calabria has revolted, why should you not seize half the estates in the province, and give them to your army? This measure would be, at the same time, a great help to you, and an example for the future. You will never succeed in changing and reforming a country by weak measures-extraordinary and vigorous expedients are necessary.

But if you

begin by asserting that Calabria is not in revolt, and that it has always been attached to you, your kindness, or, in other words, your weakness and timidity, will be very mischievous to Frauce."

"Aug. 9th. It pains me to see the system you pursue; those who surround you have no

knowledge of men. You do not listen to a man who has done much, seen much, and thought much. Do not carry out your scheme of a national guard; nothing can be more dangerous. You make me laugh, when you say that these men are fifty thousand enemies of the queen. [The queen whom he had dispossessed, and who was chief manager of her husband's affairs.] Naples is a country of intriguers, who change with every wind; you exaggerate their hatred of the queen; you do not know mankind. There are not twenty people who hate her as much as you think, and there are not twenty people who would not yield to one of her smiles, to one of her advances. What a nation most hates is, another nation. Your fifty thousand men all hate the French. Time, prudence, and family alliances, can alone bring them together. You raise fifty thousand men, and make them think themselves necessary; this is to put yourself in a false position.

"Of what use would Neapolitan regiments be to you, if I were beaten on the Isonzo? In all your operations, both civil and military, steer by this possibility, as if it were your polestar; all your proceedings should have refer ence to it. I only laughed at your fears for Naples during the late events; and although I saw that the army was extremely illplaced, I felt that when the danger came, instinct would teach you to make a better disposition. The only results were the loss of a few men, somo trifling landings of the enemy, and partial failures. But it would be otherwise if I were at war, and if I were beaten on the Isonzo.

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"I flatter myself that you have nothing to fear at present; you will be king of Naples and Sicily. But you must weigh seriously all your measures. Whenever you sign a document, do you ask yourself, Would the effect of this be good if the French army were driven back to Alexandria?' If you are not penetrated with this idea, you will not reign long, and you prepare misfortunes for yourself, and for all the Neapolitans who may join your

cause.

"What sort of troops ought you to have? I say Corsicans; who will get on better in Naples than in France, because they will agree better with the Neapolitans than with the French; as many Swiss as you like-they are good and faithful soldiers; perhaps a few German regiments, from Hesse Darmstadt, or from the other states of my German confederation; [the German empire had just been dissolved, and Napoleon had taken the title of "protector" of a new confederation, lately formed, of the German princes near the Rhine] also a few Neapolitans but introduced gradually, almost imperceptibly, and chosen from among the men who have served in France, and who formed part of the army of reserve in the eighth year of the republic, and who have since then been put to the proof; all others would fail you. If Italy wero once to raise the cry, Drive the barbarians beyond the Alps! all your army would abandon you. I wish you to consult me on such important matters. It will not do to say that you would take refuge in my camp. An exiled, vagrant king is a contemptible being."

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Aug. 17th. I should like very much to hear of a revolt of the Neapolitan populace. You will never be their master till you have made an example of them; every conquered

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country must have its revolt. I should see Naples in revolt as a father sees his children in the small-pox; the crisis is salutary, provided it does not too much weaken the constitution."

These specimens will show the tone of this correspondence, during the whole period of two years and a half that Joseph sat on the uneasy throne of Naples. It was, on Napoleon's part, made up mainly of military directions, how to protect the kingdom against the English and the revolting Neapolitans, and how to invade and conquer Sicily—an object on which both Joseph and Napoleon seem to have set their hearts, but which they were never able to accomplish. Indeed, it appears from these letters, that Joseph's pretensions to Sicily, rather than abandon which, Napoleon insisted that he would fight ten years, mainly prevented the English Fox ministry from agreeing to a peace. Interspersed, however, with these military directions, are sharp and bitter criticisms on Joseph's whole system of administration, and a perpetual spurring of him on to exactions totally repugnant to his good-natured soul. Nor was this all. Joseph was a great stickler for the respect due to his rank-a feeling inherited from their mother, and common to the whole family-and he complained bitterly to Napoleon, that he received rebukes not only from him, but from his ministers. To which Napoleon coolly replied:

"In your correspondence with my ministers, you must expect to be treated as commanderin-chief of my army, and to hear of my displeasure, whenever the rules are not fol lowed."

Even to Joseph's professions of personal attachment, pretty cool answers were returned, compared, at least, with earlier letters written while Napoleon was general of brigade. Thus Joseph wrote to Napoleon:

"Aug. 13. 1806. I remain here till your majesty's birthday, on which I wish you joy. I hope you may receive, with some little pleasure, this expression of my affection. The glorious emperor will never replace to me the Napoleon whom I so much loved, and whom I hope to find again as I knew him twenty years ago, if we are to meet in the Elysian fields."

To which Napoleon replied:

"Aug. 23. I am sorry that you think you will find your brother again only in the Ely sian fields. It is natural that, at forty [he was only thirty-seven], he should not feel towards you as he did at twelve; but his feelings to

wards you have greater strength and truth; his friendship has the features of his mind."

This last sentence was true enough. Napoleon's friendship for Joseph was exactly commensurate with the use be could make of him as the tool of his ambitious projects, in the accomplishment of which, the exaltation of his family formed a necessary part. He employed them in the erection of a family pyramid, of which he was to be the apex, and in which his own conspicuous elevation

was at least as much consulted as their wishes or welfare.

The return of Jerome from his naval cruise is thus mentioned by Napoleon.

"St. Cloud, Aug. 28, 1806. Le Véteran, commanded by Jerome, anchored, two days She was separated from her squadron twentyago, in the bay of Laforêt, near Quimper. five days ago in a storm. This news came by telegraph, which, at the same time, tells me that Jerome is well; as yet there are no further details."

The entrance of Jerome's vessel into the small port of Concarneau, to escape reckoned among the exploits of the the blockading English squadron, is French navy. But as French ships of war, since the battle of Trafalgar, could hardly keep the seas, Jerome was now transferred to the military service, in which, as general of division, he fol lowed Napoleon on his march against

the Prussians and Russians.

In a letter of Napoleon's to Joseph, written during this campaign, the following family allusions occur:

"Posen, Dec. 5, 1806. Your young aidede-camp is a rake; he will suffer for it in time. Give some news of Borghese to his family; he is at Warsaw, at the head of his regiment. All the strong places in Silesia will soon be in my power.

"Prince Jerome is in command of a German division. Although the declarations of Austria are pacific, I did not like to give precise orders to the queen [Joseph's wife] to join you at Naples. You may, however, do as you like about it; but she does so well in Paris, and I dislike so much to see women and children running into the midst of sedition and rebellion, that in truth I see no objection to her de laying her journey. I have written to tell her that you have sent for her, but that I think she had better pass some more of the winter in Paris.

"Now that you are more at rest, I suppose that you open your palace, and enliven the society of Naples: this is necessary, both for your sake and that of the town. You should have a large circle, and not live too quietly."

In a letter, dated Finckenstein, May 4th, 1807, written during the same campaign, and in the interval between the battles of Eylau and Friedland, Napo

leon, after finding fault with Joseph's disorganization of some of his French regiments, by culling from them the best men to serve in his guard, proceeds as follows:

"I will send you as many French conscripts as you like; but I entreat you to take care of the regiments belonging to the [French] army of Naples, and to keep them in good order. You must resent any chattering or manifestation of discontent. I think that the habit of governing well, with your natural good sense and abilities, will strengthen your character, and render you capable of conducting this vast machine, if it should be your lot to survive me.

"Prince Jerome is doing well; I am very much pleased with him, and am greatly deceived, if there is not stuff in him to make a first-rate man. You may be sure, however, that he has no idea that I think so: for in my letters, I do nothing but find fault with him. He is adored in Silesia. I place him there purposely in a distinct and independent com. mand; because I do not believe in the proverb, that it is necessary to know how to obey,

in order to know how to command.

"I am not ill-pleased with Louis; but he is too kind for the dignity of a crown. He does not pay much attention to my advice; nevertheless, I continue to give it to him, and experience will soon teach him that much of what he has been doing was wrong. I blamed the institution of his order, not that I objected to it itself, but it was premature. This remark is also for your benefit; you must feel its force. Wait till you know something of the men who surround you. Louis has also just permitted the Dutch ladies to reassume their titles;

they are given to them even by his chamberlains. I was very angry with him. Nor was I satisfied with his quoting to me your example, as if there were anything in common between a kingdom like yours and a republic which has undergene as many trials as France.

If you have occasion to write, say something to him about it; for, as all this is supposed to be done by my advice, it has a bad effect in France. As I do not intend to re-establish the old titles in France, I will not have them restored in a country to which I have guaranteed a constitutional government, and whose fortunes have so much resembled those of France."

Not long after the date of this letter, the treaty of Tilsit having been signed, Jerome, who had at length conformed to Napoleon's wishes, in taking a new wife, a princess of the Wirtemberg family, was made king of Westphalia-a new kingdom, erected by Napoleon out of the territory taken from the king of Prussia, and other German princes, and including that part of Northern Germany which lies between the Rhine and the Elbe. His capital was Cassel, where he lived in such a style of luxury as to obtain from his subjects the title of the new Heliogabalus.

It was not till Joseph had been a

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"St. Cloud, Sep. 2, 1807. My sister and sister-in-law, I wish you to start for Naples; the present season is the best. I think, therefore, that you should set out on the 15th of September, so as to reach Milan on the 23d or 24th, and to arrive at Naples during the first ten days in October. As this letter has no other object, I pray God, my sister and sisterin-law, that he may have you in his holy and honorable keeping."

It is amusing to see how, in his traveling orders, issued to Joseph and his wife, Napoleon is as exact and peremptory as if they were two marching regiments.

A letter, written by Napoleon during a visit to his kingdom of Italy, relates to a curious interview of his with Lucien, at this time an exile from the empire, and a resident in the Pope's territories. This interview had been arranged by Joseph, who, at Napoleon's request, had met Lucien at Modena, a few days before, and had strongly urged him, but in vain, to submit to Napoleon's wishes. His sister, Eliza, had also written to him in the preceding June, pressing him strongly on the same point. This letter is not given in the English collection; but we translate a part of it from the fourth volume of the Memoirs du Roi Joseph, affording, as it does, a curious exhibition of the light in which Napoleon was regarded by the other members of the family, except Lucien, and of their anxiety lest others, not of the Bonaparte blood, should come in for a share of the good things which Napoleon had to distribute:

"Do you not seo, my dear friend, that the only means of putting obstacles in the way of adoptions is, that his majesty should have a family of which he can dispose? In remaining near Napoleon, in accepting a throne from him, you will be useful to him; he will provide husbands for your daughters; and, whilo he finds in his own family the possibility of executing his projects and his system of policy, which to him is everything, he will not choose among strangers. The master of the world is not to be treated as an equal. Nature made us children of the same father; but his wonderful actions have made us his subjects. Though sovereigns [Eliza herself had lately been appointed duchess of Tuscany], we hold everything from him. I take a noble pride in avowing it; and it appears to me that our only glory ought to be to prove, by our manner of

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