Mind, Oct., 1882: 567-" Kant seems to be in quest of the phantasmal freedom which is supposed to consist in the absence of determination by motives. The error of the determinists from which this idea is the recoil, involves an equal abstraction of the man from his thoughts, and interprets the relation between the two as an instance of the mechanical causality which exists between two things in nature. The point to be grasped in the controversy is that a man and his motives are one, and that consequently he is in every instance self-determined..... Indeterminism is tenable only if an ego can be found which is not an ego already determinate; but such an ego, though it may be logically distinguished and verbally expressed, is not a factor in psychology." Morell, Mental Philosophy, 390-" Motives determine the will, and so far the will is not free; but the man governs the motives, allowing them a less or a greater power of influencing his life, and so far the man is a free agent."

=

Harris, Philos. Basis of Theism, 349-407-" Action without motives, or contrary to all motives, would be irrational action. Instead of being free, it would be like the convulsions of epilepsy. Motives sensibilities. Motive is not cause; does not determine; is only influence. Yet determination is always made under the influence of motives. Uniformity of action is not to be explained by any law of uniform influence of motives, but by character in the will. By its choice, will forms in itself a character; by action in accordance with this choice, it confirms and develops the character. Choice modifies sensibilities, and so modifies motives. Volitional action expresses character, but also forms and modifies it. Man may change his choice; yet intellect, sensibility, motive, habit, remain. Evil choice, having formed intellect and sensibility into accord with itself, must be a powerful hindrance to fundamental change by new and contrary choice; and gives small ground to expect that man left to himself ever will make the change. After will has acquired character by choices, its determinations are not transitions from complete indeterminateness or indifference, but are more or less expressions of character already formed. The theory that indifference is essential to freedom implies that will never acquires character; that voluntary action is atomistic; that every act is disintegrated from every other; that character, if acquired, would be incompatible with freedom. Character is a choice, yet a choice which persists, which modifies sensibility and intellect, and which influences subsequent determinations."

See also H. B. Smith, System of Christ. Theol., 236-251; Mansel, Proleg. Log., 113-155, 270-278, and Metaphysics, 366; Gregory, Christian Ethics, 60; Abp. Manning, in Contemp. Rev., Jan., 1871: 468; Ward, Philos. of Theism, 1: 287-352; 2: 1-79, 274-349; chapter in Lotze's Outlines of Philosophy, vol. 3; Bp. Temple, Bampton Lect., 1884: 69-96; Row, Man not a Machine, in Present Day Tracts, 5: no. 30; Santayana: "A free man, because he is free, may make himself a slave; but once a slave, because he is a slave, he cannot make himself free." Richards, Lectures on Theology, 97-153; Solly, The Will, 167-203; William James, The Dilemma of Determinism, in Unitarian Review, Sept., 1884; T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, 90–159.

CHAPTER II.

THE ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN.

In determining man's original state, we are wholly dependent upon Scripture. This represents human nature as coming from God's hand, and therefore " very good" (Gen. 1:31). It moreover draws a parallel between man's first state and that of his restoration (Col. 3:10; Eph. 4: 24). In interpreting these passages, however, we are to remember the twofold danger, on the one hand of putting man so high that no progress is conceivable, on the other hand of putting him so low that he could not fall. We shall the more easily avoid these dangers by distinguishing between the essentials and the incidents of man's original state.

Gen. 1: 31-"And God saw every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good"; Col. 3: 10-"the new man, which is being renewed unto knowledge after the image of him that created him"; Eph. 4 : 24-"the new man, which after God hath been created in righteousness and holiness of truth."

Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2: 337-399-"The original state must be (1) a contrast to sin; (2) a parallel to the state of restoration. Difficulties in the way of understanding it: (1) What lives in regeneration is something foreign to our present nature ("it is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me "-Gal. 2: 20); but the original state was something native. (2) It was a state of childhood. We cannot fully enter into childhood, though we see it about us, and have ourselves been through it. The original state is yet more difficult to reproduce to reason. (3) Man's external circumstances and his organization have suffered great changes, so that the present is no sign of the past. We must recur to the Scriptures, therefore, as well-nigh our only guide."

Lord Bacon: "The sparkle of the purity of man's first estate." Calvin: "It was monstrous impiety that a son of the earth should not be satisfied with being made after the similitude of God, unless he could also be equal with him." Prof. Hastings: "The truly natural is not the real, but the ideal. Made in the image of God-between that beginning and the end stands God made in the image of man." On the general subject of man's original state, see Zöckler, 3: 283-290; Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, 1: 215-243; Ebrard, Dogmatik, 1: 267-276; Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 374-375; Hodge, Syst. Theol., 2: 92–116.

I. ESSENTIALS OF MAN'S ORIGINAL STATE.

These are summed up in the phrase "the image of God." In God's image man is said to have been created (Gen. 1: 26, 27). In what did this image of God consist? We reply that it consisted in 1. Natural likeness to God, or personality; 2. Moral likeness to God, or holiness.

Gen. 1: 26, 27-"And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. . . . . And God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him." It is of great importance to distinguish clearly between the two elements embraced in this image of God, the natural and the moral. By virtue of the first, man possessed certain faculties (intellect, affection, will); by virtue of the second, he had right tendencies (bent, proclivity, disposition). By virtue of the first, he was invested with certain powers; by virtue of the second, a certain direction was imparted to these powers. As created in the natural image of God, man had a moral nature; as created in the moral image of God, man had a holy character. The first gave him natural ability; the second gave him moral ability. The Greek Fathers

emphasized the first element, or personality; the Latin Fathers emphasized the second element, or holiness.

1. Natural likeness to God, or personality.

Man was created a personal being, and was by this personality distinguished from the brute. By personality we mean the twofold power to know self as related to the world and to God, and to determine self in view of moral ends. By virtue of this personality, man could at his creation choose which of the objects of his knowledge-self, the world, or God—should be the norm and centre of his development. This natural likeness to God is inalienable, and as constituting a capacity for redemption gives value to the life even of the unregenerate (Gen. 9:6; 1 Cor. 11:7; James 3:9). For definitions of personality, see notes on the Anthropological Argument, page 45; on Pantheism, page 57; on the Attributes, pages 121, 122; and in the chapter on the Person of Christ: "The Real Nature of this Union. D. No double personality." Here we may content ourselves with the formula: Personality self-consciousness + selfdetermination. Self-consciousness and self-determination, as distinguished from the consciousness and determination of the brute, involve all the higher mental and moral powers which constitute us men. Conscience is but a mode of their activity. Notice that the term 'image' does not, in man, imply perfect representation. Only Christ is the "very image" of God (Heb. 1 : 3), the "image of the invisible God" (Col. 1: 15-on which see Lightfoot). Christ is the image of God absolutely and archetypally; man, only relatively and derivatively. But notice also that, since God is Spirit, man made in God's image cannot be a material thing. By virtue of his possession of this first element of the image of God, namely, personality, materialism is excluded.

This first element of the divine image man can never lose until he ceases to be man. Even insanity can only obscure this natural image-it cannot destroy it. St. Bernard well said that it could not be burned out, even in hell. The lost piece of money (Lake 15: 8) still bore the image and superscription of the King, even though it did not know it, and did not even know that it was lost. Human nature is therefore to be reverenced, and he who destroys human life is to be put to death: Gen. 9: 6—" for in the image of God made he man"; 1 Cor. 11: 7-"A man indeed ought not to have his head veiled, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God"; James 3:9-even men whom we curse are made after the likeness of God." This possession of personality involves boundless possibilities of good or ill, and it constitutes the natural foundation for the love for man as man which is required of us by the law. See Porter, Hum. Intellect, 393, 394, 401; Wuttke, Christian Ethics, 2:42; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 2:343.

2. Moral likeness to God, or holiness.

In addition to the powers of self-consciousness and self-determination just mentioned, man was created with such a direction of the affections and the will, as constituted God the supreme end of man's being, and constituted man a finite reflection of God's moral attributes. Since holiness is the fundamental attribute of God, this must of necessity be the chief attribute of his image in the moral beings whom he creates. That original righteousness was essential to this image, is also distinctly taught in Scripture (Eccl. 7:29; Eph. 4:24; Col. 3 : 10).

Besides the possession of natural powers, the image of God involves the possession of right moral tendencies. It is not enough to say that man was created in a state of innocence. The Scripture asserts that man had a righteousness like God's: Eccl. 7: 29 -"God made man upright"; Eph. 4: 24-" the new man, which after God hath been created in righteousness and holiness of truth"-here Meyer says: Kaтà veóν, "after God," i. e., ad exemplum Dei, after the pattern of God (Gal. 4 : 28-xarà 'loаák, "after Isaac" as Isaac was). This phrase makes the creation of the new man a parallel to that of our first parents, who were created after God's image; they too, before sin came into existence through Adam, were sinless-'in righteousness and holiness of the truth.'"

Meyer refers also, as a parallel passage, to Col. 3: 10-"the new man, which is being renewed unto

knowledge after the image of him that created him." Here the "knowledge" referred to is that knowledge of God which is the source of all virtue, and which is inseparable from holiness of heart. On Eph. 4: 24 and Col. 3: 10, the classical passages with regard to man's original state, see also the Commentaries of DeWette, Rückert, Ellicott, and compare Gen. 5: 3— "And Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his own likeness, after his image," i. e. in his own sinful likeness, which is evidently contrasted with the "likeness of God" (verse 1) in which he himself had been created (An. Par. Bible); 2 Cor. 4: 4-" Christ, who is the image of God" -where the phrase "image of God" is not simply the natural, but also the moral, image.

This original righteousness, in which the image of God chiefly consisted, is to be viewed:

(a) Not as constituting the substance or essence of human nature,—for in this case human nature would have ceased to exist as soon as man sinned. Men every day change their tastes and loves, without changing the essence or substance of their being. When sin is called a "nature," therefore (as by Shedd, in his Essay on "Sin a Nature, and that Nature Guilt "), it is only in the sense of being something inborn (natura, from nascor). Hereditary tastes may just as properly be denominated a "nature as may the substance of one's being. Moehler, the greatest modern Roman Catholic critic of Protestant doctrine, in his Symbolism, 58, 59, absurdly holds Luther to have taught that by the fall man lost his essential nature, and that another essence was substituted in its room. Luther, however, is only rhetorical when he says: "It is the nature of man to sin; sin constitutes the essence of man; the nature of man since the fall has become quite changed; original sin is that very thing which is born of father and mother; the clay out of which we are formed is damnable; the fœtus in the maternal womb is sin; man as born of his father and mother, together with his whole essence and nature, is not only a sinner but sin itself."

(b) Nor as a gift from without, foreign to human nature, and added to it after man's creation,—for man is said to have possessed the divine image by the fact of creation, and not by subsequent bestowal.

As men, since Adam, are born with a sinful nature, that is, with tendencies away from God, so Adam was created with a holy nature, that is, with tendencies toward God. Moehler says: "God cannot give a man actions." We reply: "No, but God can give man dispositions; and he does this at the first creation, as well as at the new creation (regeneration).

(c) But rather, as an original direction or tendency of man's affections and will, still accompanied by the power of evil choice, and so, differing from the perfected holiness of the saints, as instinctive affection and childlike innocence differ from the holiness that has been developed and confirmed by experience of temptation.

Man's original righteousness was not immutable or indefectible; there was still the possibility of sinning. Though the first man was fundamentally good, he still had the power of choosing evil. There was a bent of the affections and will toward God, but man was not yet confirmed in holiness.

(d) As a moral disposition, moreover, which was propagable to Adam's descendants, if it continued, and which, though lost to him and to them, if Adam sinned, would still leave man possessed of a natural likeness to God which made him susceptible of God's redeeming grace.

Hooker (Works, ed. Keble, 2: 683) distinguishes between aptness and ableness. The latter, men have lost; the former, they retain-else grace could not work in us, more than in the brutes. Hase: "Only enough likeness to God remained to remind man of what he had lost, and to enable him to feel the hell of God's forsaking." The moral likeness to God can be restored, but only by God himself. God secures this to men by making "the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God, . . . dawn upon them" (2 Cor. 4:4). See Edwards, Works, 2: 19, 20, 381–390; 3: 102, 103; Hopkins, Works, 1: 162; Shedd, Hist. Doctrine, 2: 50-66; Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 14: 11.

In the light of the preceding investigation, we may properly estimate two theories of man's original state which claim to be more Scriptural and reasonable:

A. The image of God as including only personality.

This theory denies that any positive determination to virtue inhered originally in man's nature, and regards man at the beginning as simply possed of spiritual powers, perfectly adjusted to each other. This is the view of Schleiermacher, who is followed by Nitzsch, Julius Müller, and Hofmann.

For the view here combatted, see Schleiermacher, Christl. Glaube, sec. 60: Nitzsch, System of Christian Doctrine, 201; Julius Müller, Doct. of Sin, 2: 113-133, 350-357; Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, 1: 287–291; Bib. Sac., 7:409–425. Julius Müller's theory of a fall in a preexistent state makes it impossible for him to hold here that Adam was possessed of moral likeness to God. The origin of his view of the image of God renders it liable to suspicion. Raymond (Theology, 2: 43, 132) is an American representative of the view that the image of God consists in mere personality: "The image of God in which man was created did not consist in an inclination and determination of the will to holiness.” This is maintained upon the ground that such a moral likeness to God would have rendered it impossible for man to fall-to which we reply that Adam's righteousness was not immutable, and the bias of his will toward God did not render it impossible for him to sin. Motives do not compel the will, and Adam at least had a certain power of contrary choice.

In addition to what has already been said in support of the opposite view, we may urge against this theory the following objections:

(a) It is contrary to analogy, in making man the author of his own holiness; our sinful condition is not the product of our individual wills, nor is our subsequent condition of holiness the product of anything but God's regenerating power.

To hold that Adam was created undecided, would make man, as Philippi says, in the highest sense his own creator. But morally, as well as physically, man is God's creature. In regeneration it is not sufficient for God to give power to decide for good; God must give new love also. If this be so in the new creation, God could give love in the first creation also. Holiness therefore is creatable. "Underived holiness is possible only in God; in its origin, it is given both to angels and men." Therefore we pray: "Create in me a clean heart" (Ps. 51: 10); "Incline my heart unto thy testimonies" (Ps. 119: 36). See Edwards, Eff. Grace, sec. 43-51.

(b) The knowledge of God in which man was originally created logically presupposes a direction toward God of man's affections and will, since only the holy heart can have any proper understanding of the God of holiness.

Ubi caritas, ibi claritas. Man's heart was originally filled with divine love, and out of this came the knowledge of God. We know God only as we love him, and this love comes not from our own single volition. No one loves by command, because no one can give himself love. In Adam love was an inborn impulse, which he could affirm or deny. Compare 1 Cor. 8: 3-"If any man loveth God, the same [God] is known by him "; 1 John 4: 8-He that loveth not knoweth not God." See other Scripture references on page 3.

(c) A likeness to God in mere personality, such as Satan also possesses, comes far short of answering the demands of the Scripture, in which the ethical conception of the divine nature so overshadows the merely natural. The image of God must be not simply ability to be like God, but actual likeness.

God could never create an intelligent being evenly balanced between good and evil"on the razor's edge "-" on the fence." The preacher who took for his text "Adam, where art thou?" had for his first head: "It is every man's business to be somewhere." A simple