XIX JUDGES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN OFFICE AT THE TIME THE DECISIONS IN THIS VOLUME WERE RENDERED. HON. BELVARD J. PETERS, CHIEF JUSTICE, MT. STERLING. During the recess in the Summer Term, 1868, the term of CHIEF JUSTICE PETERS expired, on the first Monday in August, 1868, on which day he was re-elected from the First Appellate District, for the constitutional term of eight years. The Court, at the meeting in September, 1868, was constituted as follows: HON. RUFUS K. WILLIAMS, CHIEF JUSTICE. HON. GEORGE ROBERTSON, JUDGE. HON. MORDECAI R. HARDIN, JUDGE. JOHN RODMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL. CHARLES HAYDON, DEPUTY CLERK. V. SULLIVAN, JANITOR. TERMS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. SUMMER TERM commences 1st Monday in June. WINTER TERM commences 1st Monday in December. AN ACT to amend section eight hundred and seventy-nine of the Civil Code of Practice. § 1. That it shall be the duty of the appellants or their counsel, upon filing the transcript of a record in the Clerk's office of the Court of Appeals, to indorse thereon, or on some paper to be filed therewith, the names of all the parties, appellant and appellee, as the case is desired to stand on the docket of the court; and no case shall be docketed by the Clerk until such indorsement be made. § 2. It shall be the further duty of the appellants or their counsel to refer, in said indorsement, to the judgment sought to be reversed, designating the page of the record where it may be found, and the term at which it was rendered, and state whether an appeal was granted in the court below or not. Approved March 6, 1868. AN ACT to repeal section nine hundred and six of the Civil Code. "That section nine hundred and six of the Civil Code be, and hereby is, repealed, and the following is substituted in lieu thereof: "In the publication of the reported decisions of the Court of Appeals, it shall be the duty of the Reporter to state the names of the counsel appearing in the case, and a reference to the authorities upon which they respectively rely." Approved February 28, 1860. By appending at the end of their briefs a full list of the authorities upon which they rely, Counsel will much oblige THE REPORTER. DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY. WINTER TERM, 1867. CASE 1-INDICTMENT-DECEMBER 4. Commonwealth vs. Branham. APPEAL FROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT. 1. Betting on any game of chance is now a statutory offense, punishable by fine. 2. An indictment charging "a game of chance called pigeon-hole," played for "greenbacks" in defendant's house, substantially and clearly imports a violation of law. 3. Although the court does not know judicially that "pigeon-hole" is a game of chance, yet a demurrer to the indictment admits that it is, and also, that, on a game of chance, property was illegally won and lost; and thus a statutory delictum is defined and charged with sufficient precision for all the purposes of pleading in penal cases. VOL. III-1 Commonwealth vs. Branham. JOHN RODMAN, Attorney General, CITED For Appellant, 3 J. J. Marshall, 134-5; Montee vs. Commonwealth SPALDING & CHAPEZE, CITED For Appellee, 3 J. J. Mar., 133-4; Montee vs. Commonwealth. JUDGE ROBERTSON DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT: Betting on any game of chance is now a statutory offense, punishable by fine. The indictment in this case, charging the appellee with permitting "a game of chance called pigeon-hole," to be played for "greenbacks" in his house, substantially and clearly imports a violation of law. Naming the game was not essential to the validity of the indictment under the now existing law. Consequently, although this court, as said in the case of Montee vs. The Commonwealth (3 J. J. Mar.), does not know judicially that "pigeon-hole" is a game of chance, yet the demurrer to the indictment admits that it is; and also that, on a game of chance, property was illegally won and lost. Thus, a statutory delictum is defined and charged with sufficient precision for all the purposes of pleading in penal cases. Seeing no substantial defect in the indictment, it seems to this court that the circuit court erroneously adjudged it bad on demurrer. Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Dye vs. Commonwealth. CASE 2-INDICTMENT-DECEMBER 4. Dye vs. Commonwealth. APPEAL FROM PULASKI CIRCUIT COURT. As the personal attendence of Metcalfe on the final trial was not shown to be impossible, the circuit court erroneously admitted as competent the testimony of Compton and others, reciting the evidence of Metcalfe hefore the examining court, as to what the defendant said to him concerning the charge of stealing Compton's mare. This error was not cured by instructing the jury to disregard such hearsay evidence, "except so far as it harmonized with facts afterwards developed." JUDGE ROBERTSON DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT: As the personal attendance of Metcalfe on the final trial of this case was not shown to be impossible, the circuit court erroneously admitted as competent the testimony of Compton and others, reciting the evidence of Metcalfe before the examining court, as to what the appellant said to him concerning the charge of stealing Compton's mare, and did not cure the error by afterwards instructing the jury to disregard that hearsay, except so far as it harmonized with facts afterwards developed. In making this exception, the judge inadvertently misapplied the principle applicable to testimony extorted by duress. What the appellant said, if he said anything, to |