Commonwealth vs. Skeggs, &c. CASE 7-INDICTMENT-DECEMBER 6. Commonwealth vs. Skeggs, &c. APPEAL FROM LARUE CIRCUIT COURT. 1. The testimony of jurors is not competent to explain the grounds of their decision or to impeach the validity of their finding. (Taylor vs. Geiger, Hardin, 587; Heath vs. Conway, 1 Bibb, 398; Johnson vs. Davenport, 3 J. J. Marshall, 393.) 2. An indictment returned in proper manner, by a competent grand jury, is valid, and it was error in the circuit court to permit the jurors to be examined with reference to the finding of the indictment. 3. If for any cause the indictment is defective and liable to be quashed' that fact will not render the recognizance void. JOHN RODMAN, Attorney General, CITED Criminal Code, sec. 80. For Appellant, JUDGE HARDIN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT: An indictment against James Skeggs and Jeremiah Skeggs for breaking into and robbing a store-house was returned in the Larue circuit court, indorsed "a true bill" by the foreman of the grand jury; and afterwards, during the same term of the court, Jeremiah Skeggs appeared and moved the court to continue the prosecution, which was done; and, thereupon, said Skeggs, with Field Skeggs and Stephen Corum, his sureties, entered into a recognizance in the sum of three hundred dollars for the appearance of said defendant to answer the charge at the next term of said court. Said Jeremiah Skeggs having failed to appear in discharge of said recognizance, at the November term, 1866, Commonwealth vs. Skeggs, &c. a summons was awarded against said Field Skeggs and Corum to enforce their liability on said recognizance. And in May, 1867, they appeared and filed an answer, and moved the court to quash the recognizance, which motion being heard, was sustained, and a judgment was rendered quashing the recognizance and dismissing the indictment, from which judgment the Commonwealth prosecutes this appeal. It appears from the answer and a bill of exceptions in the record that the court sustained the motion to quash the recognizance, because, in the opinion of the judge, the indictment was invalid, in consequence of the fact that, as the grand jury was at first organized, one of its members was a civil officer, notwithstanding such incompetent juror was discharged and his place supplied by another before the indictment was returned. It is alleged in the answer that the evidence was heard by the grand jury, and their decision upon it was formed, while one of their number was incompetent as aforesaid, although it was returned afterwards by a competent grand jury; and to sustain this singular ground of objection the court permitted the defendants to swear and examine several of the grand jurors as to the facts proved before them, and the time at which they decided to find the indictment. This ruling was excepted to by the Attorney for the Commonwealth, and it is now complained of as error, as well as the final judgment of the court upon other grounds. It is a well-settled principle, and one which is applicable to the action of all juries, that the testimony of the jurors is not competent to explain the grounds of their decision or impeach the validity of their finding. (Taylor vs. Geiger, Hardin, 587; Heath vs. Conway, 1 Bibb, 398; Johnson vs. Davenport, 3 J. J. Mar., 393.) Commonwealth vs. Skeggs, &c. This court said, in Johnson vs. Davenport, just cited, that "the dangerous tendency of receiving testimony of the jurors for such a purpose is too obvious to require comment. It would open a door so wide, and present temptations so strong for fraud, corruption, and perjury, as greatly to impair the value of, if not eventually to destroy, this inestimable form of trial by jury." In our opinion the court erred in permitting the jurors to be examined with reference to the finding of the indictment, which, having been returned in proper manner by a competent grand jury, was valid. It seems to us, moreover, that if for any cause the indictment was defective and liable to be quashed, that fact did not render the recognizance void. Wherefore, for the reasons indicated, the judgment quashing the recognizance is reversed, and the cause. remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Little vs. Commonwealth. CASE 8-INDICTMENT-DECEMBER 6. Little vs. Commonwealth. APPEAL FROM M'LEAN CIRCUIT COUrt. 1. In a proceeding on a forfeited recognizance, by summons in the circuit court, on motion of the defendant, who was surety in the recognizance, the court quashed the indictment, and forthwith rendered judgment for execution for the amount of the adjudged forfeiture. By quashing the indictment, the pending prosecution was closed, but the recognizance did not thereby become functus officio, and the judgment of forfeiture was not thereby stifled. 2. The quashal of the indictment did not bar a continuance or renewed prosecution for the same offense; nor did it deprive the surety in the bail bond of his right to surrender or arrest the accused and put him in the custody of the court, subject to trial under such prosecution, and thus bring himself within the 94th section of the Criminal Code. LUCIUS P. LITtle, CITED For Appellant, Criminal Code, secs. 88, 185, 69, 150, 80. 7 Dana, 244; Starr vs. Commonwealth. 1 Duvall, 244; Johnson vs. Commonwealth. 3 J. J. Marshall, 642; West vs. Commonwealth. 3 Marshall, 456; Commonwealth vs. Mason. JOHN RODMAN, Attorney General, For Appellee. Little vs. Commonwealth. JUDGE ROBERTSON DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT: In this proceeding by summons against the appellant as surety in a forfeited recognizance for his principal's appearance in the circuit court to answer a criminal charge, the court having, on the appellant's motion, quashed the indictment, forthwith rendered judgment for execution for the amount of the adjudged forfeiture; and among all the alleged errors urged for reversal by the appellant's counsel, no one of them is deemed available. But the untouched question, as to the legal effect on the recognizance of the quashal of the indictment, may be worthy of grave consideration. As the circuit court, by quashing the indictment, closed the then pending prosecution, did the recognizance become functus officio, and was the judgment of forfeiture thereby stifled? As adjudged by this court in the case of The Commonwealth vs. Rowland (4th Met., 225), no such consequence could have resulted. According to the law existing before the enactment of section 94 of our Criminal Code of Practice, providing, that "if, before judgment is entered against the bail, the defendant be surrendered or arrested, the court may, at its discretion, remit the whole or part of the sum specified in the bail bond." And, in the same case, this court also adjudged that either the surrender or arrest of the accused is indispensable to the judicial exercise of the remitting discretion thus delegated. The sole object of requiring bail was to secure the trial of the accused, and as that end might be attained by his surrender or arrest, so as to be tried under a subsisting or a new indictment, the Legislature wisely provided that, in that event, the bail might be entitled to remission. |