Powell: "There is no doubt that we must continue to send our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines into harm's way. We must ensure, as we draw our forces down, that we don't end up with a force that is hollow or one that is unprepared for the dangers and challenges of the future." Powell Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the commission, for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will comment briefly on some of the many changes we've seen in the world over the last few years and how they led us to our current military strategy. Then, I will review how we've reduced and reshaped the armed forces to complement this strategy as it continues to evolve. I'll conclude with how the steps we're taking to reshape the force are reflected in recommendations for base realignments and closures. When I testified before the 1991 commission, I emphasized that we had seen "a period of tremendous change in the world, of new forces shaping the strategic landscape." That statement remains as true today as it was two years ago. Although I could provide an extensive list of changes that have taken place, I'll offer just a few examples of the changes we face because they are so fundamental to the base realignment and closure process. Over the last five years, we've seen the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain; the reunification of Germany; the dissolution of the Soviet Union; major arms control agreements on nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and conventional forces in Europe; and the emergence of democracies and market economies in areas formerly subject to authoritarian control. American military forces, highly trained and resolute in the commitment to freedom and democracy, have played a substantive role in influencing many of these changes. But even as the world political, economic and security environments were being altered, we were busy aligning our strategy with the new world and, concurrently, adapting our force structure to support this new strategy. The virtual disappearance of the global threat, which for almost five decades drove our strategy and our structure, caused us to formulate our current strategy, which takes into account the changing world. Our national military strategy, promulgated in 1992, evolved as profound changes continued throughout the world. It focuses more on regional threats rather than on global confrontation. It emphasizes the importance of effective coalitions to counter regional conflicts, development of hightechnology weapons to give our forces the fighting edge, the tremendous value of our highly trained and dedicated military men and women, the necessity to retain forces in forward areas, and the critical importance of strategic air and sealift in developing confidence and international cooperation. Our strategy provides our national leadership with ways and means to achieve national security objectives and facilitates United States global leadership in a rapidly changing world. and land-based naval aircraft. Finally, for the first time since the 1950s, all strategic bombers and all 450 Minuteman II missiles have been taken off alert. The impact of all these changes is that there will be a 75 percent reduction in nuclear warheads. The DoD share of the federal budget and of the GNP (gross national product) is heading toward the lowest percentage in over 50 years. Since 1985, we've cut the defense budget by roughly 30 percent in constant dollars. And although further reductions are expected, it is essential that the reductions be undertaken at a prudent and responsible pace. But the end of the Cold War has not meant an end to conflict nor an end to the risks facing American citizens and interests around the world. The emergence of new dangers and challenges and our regionally oriented strategy have placed increased emphasis on the need for both an overseas presence and ready military forces. Dynamic Process But strategy development is a dynamic process, and today we are working with Secretary Aspin to refine our strategy and modify our force structure in response to ongoing military, economic and political imperatives for change. With a strategy no longer aimed at fighting a global war, we have been able to plan and begin implementing a significant reduction in the size of our military forces. In 1990, we had slightly over 2 million men and women in our active duty force; we are reducing that to 1.4 million. We have dramatically reduced our inventory of nuclear weapons. As a result of presidential nuclear initiatives, the Army and Marine Corps no longer have nuclear weapons. Moreover, all tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from ships, submarines Cautious Reshaping I continue to advocate the cautious reshaping of our military to address the challenges of the future. As we execute reductions, we must maintain a highly trained and motivated force. Ultimately, our people are the military, not the tanks, not the ships, not the planes nor the satellites. We have the finest military in the world, primarily due to the incredible talent and dedication of the fine young men and women our nation entrusts to us. There is no doubt that we must continue to send our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines into harm's way. We must ensure, as we draw our forces down, that we “I empathize with those people and communities affected, but unfortunately we have no choice but to bring our base structure in line with our downsizing force structure, now, in BRAC 93 and in the future. ... In 1991 I said we must close bases; 1993 is no different." — Powell don't end up with a force that is hollow or one that is unprepared for the dangers and challenges of the future. As President (Bill) Clinton has said, “The men and women who serve under the American flag will remain the best trained, the best prepared, the best equipped fighting forces in the world." Let me turn to the 1993 base closure issues. At the end of every war in our history, we have gone through a period of turmoil as we adjusted to peace. The end of the Cold War is no different. Along with our force drawdown, we must reduce the number of bases we own and operate. What no one should expect is a base structure that has the capacity to fight World War III. It's not needed now, and we can't afford it. But while we are drawing down our forces, we must not sacrifice needed operational force structure in order to maintain unneeded base structure. In the two previous rounds of domestic base closures, the Congress has approved 11 Army bases, 13 Navy and Marine Corps bases and 18 Air Force bases for closure in the United States. These previously selected closures, coupled with those the secretary of defense is recommending in this round, amount to closing roughly 15 percent of our domestic bases. At the same time, we have announced for closure more than 700 facilities overseas, and by 1996 we expect to reduce our forward stationed forces by over 55 percent. The key question for the uniformed military is how these BRAC (Base Closure and Realignment Commission) 93 proposed closures and realignments impact our ability to respond to missions we may be called upon to perform. In reviewing the service closure lists, we have looked at potential impacts on warfighting capability to include such aspects as mobility; command, control and communications; training; and operations plan execution. The result of our review is that with the proposed closures and realignments we still retain our ability to operationally deploy and employ our forces. In short, we can continue to do our job! Base closures cause a significant effect on other aspects of the military establishment and on the local communities in which our military installations are located. Secretary Aspin has just detailed this administration's plan to help those affected by these recommended closures and realignments. | empathize with those people and communities affected, but unfortunately we have no choice but to bring our base structure in line with our downsizing force structure, now, in BRAC 93 and in the future. Mr. Chairman, commissioners, in 1991 I said we must close bases; 1993 is no different. We are responding to a changing threat, a steeply declining force structure and growing pressures in our overall economy. The key is to draw down our basing structure in a way that preserves our ability to respond to the dangers and challenges that lie ahead. I believe these recommendations do just that. Your task is difficult, but of the utmost importance to the nation. | wish you all the best of luck and wisdom in making the very, very tough decisions on these recommendations. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. O Published for internal information use by the American Forces Information Service, a field activity of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, D.C. This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission. Dear Mr. Chairman: In accordance with Section 901 This report is a useful step in an I have directed the OSD (Office In examining these and other How do the new post-Cold will direct implementation in these War dangers impact upon the areas once this additional work is assignment of service roles and completed. And finally, on the functions? Will the services need to remaining matters, I have accepted assume new responsibilities to meet General Powell's recommendation these dangers? that, for now, no immediate Do technological challenges changes are necessary. A list of all and opportunities require changes my decisions in response to the in the assignment of service roles chairman's recommendations is and functions? attached. Will proposed changes The following are representative produce significant cost savings? of the more important recommenAre proposed changes dations that I have directed the realistically achievable in light of appropriate components to move existing organizational arrange- quickly to implement: ments, sunk costs and political Designate a single comcircumstances? mander for readiness and training of Based on these considerations, CONUS-based (continental U.S.-) believe General (Colin) Powell's forces. This important proposal report provides a constructive first would make CINCLANT (comstep in assessing the roles, missions, mander in chief, Atlantic Comand functions of the military mand) responsible for ensuring that services for the post-Cold War era. forces that will fight together also Several of the report's findings hold train together. It also calls imporreal promise of achieving greater tant attention to new areas of efficiencies, affording significant concern, like peacekeeping operasavings and, most importantly, tions, that increasingly will occupy contributing positively to the our attention in the post-Cold War combat effectiveness of our armed era. forces. Consolidate fixed-wing aircraft training; attack helicopter Adopt, Study, Accept maintenance and aircrew training; My decisions on General and general support helicopter Powell's recommendations fall into maintenance training, simulator three categories. First, on several training and maintenance infraimportant matters, I will move structure. This very forthcoming quickly to implement the recom- proposal reduces overhead while mendation and have directed that protecting the combat diversity of implementing plans to be provided the military services. In an era of to me as soon as possible. Second, significantly constrained resources, on other matters, I have assigned this type of action helps free up the appropriate components tør RSITY resources for undertake fast-track studies to explore some additional alterna Consolidate airborne comtives and to develop detailed mand and control operations for proposals for implementation. I JUN súabegli nuclear forces in the OLOSTED BY La combat-relaterte important "Fielding similar capabilities in more than one military service is not necessarily a bad thing. It may be necessary to ensure that critical capabilities are available when and where they are needed. Cross-service diversity can foster greater innovation, seriously complicate enemy planning and hedge against possible breakthroughs in countering a particular capability." should be considered before reaching a final decision. Our goal will be to ensure that we can maintain the highest readiness standards with the most efficient organization possible. Finally, in some areas, such as tactical airlift and tankers, electronic jammer aircraft and electronic surveillance aircraft, I have accepted General Powell's recommendations. We plan to sustain the current distribution of responsibilities among the services along with the supporting force structure and practices in these areas, pending relevant changes in strategy or force structure that might result from the bottom-up review. Navy's E-6A aircraft. This is linked directly to the changing threat environment we now face. Our command and control requirements are no longer what they once were. We can now consolidate all these functions within a single service on a single aircraft. Assign close air support as a primary function to all services and account for the contributions of attack helicopters in close air support operations. Under direction from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services will develop joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. This will ensure that all services can provide safe, effective close air support to other service elements as circumstances warrant. Other promising recommendations require some additional study to determine the most effective means of implementation, and I have directed that findings be reported to me within 90 days. Important examples include: Merge U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Space Command and designate the Air Force the primary agent for design, launch and operation of satellites. Several details need to be worked out to ensure that the other services are properly represented, while eliminating needless duplication. Reduce excess depot capacity and consolidate management functions. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has recommended forming a new joint depot maintenance command. I believe other management approaches those capabilities involve the use of similar weapons systems or platforms, I will direct the services to adopt common approaches, to the extent possible, in several areas. This will include: Developing standard tactics and techniques, adopting common doctrinal approaches and carrying out joint training where coordination with other force elements is required. O Consolidating support and training infrastructures. O Exploiting opportunities to develop and field common subsystems, weapons and, in some cases, basic platforms, such as ground vehicles, aircraft, spacecraft and so on. Our focus will be on preserving the benefits that derive from competition, while eliminating the more wasteful associated practices. I will ensure that clear-cut responsibilities are levied on the appropriate elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the military services to develop and implement these standardization, consolidation and commonality practices. By imbedding our continuing examination of future roles, missions, and functions in the ongoing bottom-up review of defense needs and programs, our choices will be informed by several considerations. These will include the demands of U.S. strategy, the resources available for defense, changes in the threats that the U.S. may face, and increases in effectiveness and efficiency that might be realized through adoption of innovative operational approaches and new technologies. I look forward to working with you further in addressing these and other issues of great importance to our Nation's security. Some Duplication OK The issue of multiservice duplication merits a further note. I agree with General Powell that fielding similar capabilities in more than one military service is not necessarily a bad thing. It may be necessary to assign a particular function to more than one service to ensure that critical capabilities are available when and where they are needed. Moreover, cross-service diversity can foster greater innovation, seriously complicate enemy planning and hedge against possible breakthroughs in countering a particular capability. For these reasons, while we will look to eliminate duplication, we will not automatically assume that multiservice capability is necessarily wasteful or counterproductive. Where we do elect to maintain multiservice capabilities and where Published for internal information use by the American Forces Information Service, a field activity of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, D.C. This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission. I'm very glad to be at the NDU These are, to be sure, very, very Part of the context for that It was the focal point of every- It dominated our training. We always had training that we did and designed the training with the idea of fighting the Soviets in mind. It dominated our doctrine and our tactics. And it even dominated the way in which we designed the equipment. We designed the planes and the tanks and the other pieces of equipment with the idea of a war with the Soviets in mind. It just was the kind of thing that focused everything. Now if we had to use that force to go fight somewhere else, we did it as a lesser, included contingency. But basically the designing of it and the structuring of it came with a look at UNDENT SERIALS the Soviet Union. we know that the military in the The changes over the last three former Soviet Union has some very, years have swept all of that away, very severe problems — morale so it's gone. Gone, I would say, but problems, drafting of people, not forgotten. We now see that recruitment, retention problems, big there is an uncertain future in the problems in the military in the former Soviet Union. We have to former Soviet Union. watch events in Russia — that's So these things tell us, I believe, what we've got now, Russia — we that for now we can continue to have to watch very closely. And it bring down defense spending. We may be that, as President (Bill) have done that in the '94 bill. It's Clinton said the other day, that we lower than the defense spending in will have to respond to these events 1993, and it continues the downthat are going on in Russia with ward path. But, and this is an changes in the defense budget in important but, it's not all cuts. the future years. The picture for 1994 is mixed. What does all this say now, then, Some cuts, some adds. It is not all for how we ought to do the fiscal cuts because of the world we face year 1994 defense budget? On the in this new era. one hand, we were assuming that Again, looking at Russia for the the Soviet Union was gone or that instruction here. Russia is going to Russia was disintegrated. On the go forward. It's not going to go other hand, people are saying well, backwards. They're not going to go wait a minute. Keep your powder recreate the old Soviet Union with dry. Look what's going on. It's still the Warsaw Pact dominated by an uncertain world here. What do communist ideology. So it's going we do with the 1994 defense to go forward. But it could go budget? We've got to do something forward in a number of directions, with it. You can't wait for the and not all of them are good. whole thing to settle out. We've No.1, Russia could continue on a got to do something in the mean- course toward democracy and a time. market economy with a reformer like President (Boris) Yeltsin. We Irreversible Change clearly hope ... we in the United Here's what we propose to do: States and all over the Western In the short run, we know that some world hope that will be the case. big changes that have been going No. 2, it could go in an ultranaon in the former Soviet Union are tionalistic, hostile and authoritarian irreversible. We know, for ex form of government. ample, that the Warsaw Pact won't No.3, there could be a breakbe resurrected. We know that the down of authority, and nobody former Soviet Union won't UNIVERSITY0O#MICHIGAN reunited. Those Humpty Dumpties VPRABIS nited States. They are not going to get put back together again. We know that communism has lost its appeal, and we have to think about in this new DEPOSITEU BY |