for gathering electronic intelligence. Eliminating either type or replacing one with the other would be costly and would contribute nothing to effectiveness. Support structures already in place for the large fleets of Navy P-3s and Air Force KC-135s make the operation and maintenance of 12 EP-3Es and 14 RC-135s a small fraction of overall costs.

Eliminate the Air Force EC-135 program. Use funds planned for EC135 upgrade to pay for transition to the Navy's E-6A and assign the function to the Navy.

Continue to give each service responsibility for its own combat search and rescue. Use standard equipment to support interoperability while implementing joint doctrine to enhance training and operational effectiveness.

Improve management of operational support aircraft and reduce their numbers to only those required.

Retain attack helicopters in the Army and the Marine Corps. Consolidate aircrew and maintenance training where practicable. The Army and Marine Corps pursue developing and procuring common airframes to fulfill future requirements.

O Consolidate maintenance training, simulator training and maintenance infrastructure for general support helicopters. Study the feasibility of consolidating overlapping service support functions within certain geographic regions.

O Retain C-130 tactical airlift aircraft and KC-130 tanker support aircraft structures as currently configured. Review showed that consolidating these heavily tasked aircraft under one service would not be cost-effective, would degrade efficiency and would greatly complicate their management and support.

a Retain and modernize the aircraft currently used by the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force to jam enemy radar systems. The Navy/ Marine EA-6B and the Air Force EF111 airframes are optimized for the "from the sea" and "global reach" roles assigned to their respective services. Both derive significant economies of scale from the fact that they share parts, support and training procedures with the large fleets of A-6s and F-111s managed by the Navy and Air Force. Consolidating jammer aircraft into one airframe would degrade effectiveness and require purchase of additional aircraft.

a Retain current types of electronic surveillance aircraft in the Navy and the Air Force. Existing quantities of Navy EP-3Es and Air Force RC-135s are barely sufficient to handle peacetime requirements

Other Key Questions

Forward Presence. Forward presence is the totality of U.S. instruments of power and influence employed overseas. Forward stationing is one element of forward presence and is a key underpinning of U.S. diplomacy. It contributes to conflict prevention and lends credibility to alliances. As the global security environment changes, additional reductions in forwardstationed forces may be appropriate. However, as forward stationing decreases, other forward-presence operations will increase in importance. A new concept is being developed which envisions using geographically and mission-tailored joint forces to conduct forwardpresence operations.

These "adaptive joint force packages" could contain a mix of air, land, special operations, space and maritime forces tailored to meet the supported CinC's requirements, potentially at a lower cost than today's deployments.

Contingency and Expeditionary Forces. With its emphasis on rapid response to regional crises, the national military strategy places a premium on the expeditionary capabilities of the Marine Corps and the contingency capabilities of Army airborne and light infantry forces. Both types of forces should be

retained; however, the review of requirements is continuous and may in the future include the possibility of further reductions in the Army's light infantry forces.

Tanks and MLRS for the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is structured to integrate armor and artillery units into its maneuver elements. Severing armor from the organic structure of the Marines would markedly reduce unit cohesion and warfighting capability and produce negligible costs savings. The Marine Corps must retain enough tank battalions to support amphibious operations and outfit three maritime pre-positioning squadrons. Any requirement for additional tank support will be provided by Army armored units.

There do appear to be advantages in making the Army responsible for all MLRS (multiple launch rocket system) support; however, taking away the Marine Corps' organic general support artillery and having the Army take on the additional function of supporting the Marines is a major step that requires in-depth cost and effectiveness analysis before implementation can be considered. We will perform that in-depth analysis in the near future.

Theater Air Defense. All four services currently operate theater air defense systems. Study showed there would be substantial nearterm costs and personnel disruption associated with transferring these systems and associated functions between services. No long-term savings were identified.

A comprehensive review of theater air defense is needed to ensure the planned mix and quantities of air and missile defense systems are appropriate. The Joint

nearing completion of a study that is examining additional consolidation of some service-level intelligence production responsibilities.

Force Structure. As part of a continuing review, the Department of Defense will continue to work with Congress to determine the proper active and reserve force mix. As additional ways are sought to consolidate functions and reduce defense spending, a study of National Guard and Reserve headquarters and staffs should be conducted to identify duplication that may be unnecessary.

Staff will head a joint mission area analysis to review theater air defense requirements, capabilities, and deficiencies. The results of this analysis will determine if further refinements to service roles and functions are appropriate.

Training, and Test and Evaluation Structures. The extensive array of training and test and evaluation facilities built for World War II and maintained throughout the Cold War can be restructured in keeping with the changed world. An integrated test and evaluation range structure will be developed under the management of an executive agent as part of the effort to lower costs and increase effectiveness. As an example, integration and electronic linking of the many service training and testing ranges in six western states and off the California coast would provide a land, airspace, sea area and offshore supersonic operating domain to accommodate a large portion of our joint training, test and evaluation needs well into the next century.

Construction Engineers. Each service has its own construction engineering capability, sized and structured over the years to support combat forces in a global war and maintain a worldwide array of bases and facilities. In view of the smaller requirements of our new military strategy, the services are reducing their engineer structures by 34 percent, the Air Force by 39, the Marine Corps by 20, and the Navy by 11 percent. The possibility of having one service provide all wartime construction units was evaluated; however, such a consolidation was rejected because of the uniquely tailored support each service's construction engineers provide to its operational units.

Operating Tempo. "Optempo" is a term describing the pace of operations and training. Optempo determines the rate at which funds are spent from the Operations and Maintenance accounts to buy the fuel, repair parts and supplies consumed during normal operations. When we examined whether additional O&M savings could be achieved through prudent reductions in optempo, we came to several conclusions.

First, increased use of simulation helps train commanders and leaders

in operational art and tactics, and weapons crews in engagement techniques. But the requirement to be ready to go on an instant's notice still demands that people be trained in the field, at sea and in the air on their weapons and support systems.

Second, new forward presence concepts will reduce some optempo rates during routine peacetime operations. However, reduced overseas basing and increased emphasis on resource-intensive operations like peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance may mean an actual increase in optempo.

Finally, for a smaller force, increasingly based in CONUS, keeping units fully trained is the only certain way to ensure they are ready to respond as part of a winning team when called.

Initial Skills Training. Current training establishments reflect Cold War training requirements - they are big, expensive and overlapping. While some training has already been consolidated, more training installations and facilities can probably be closed or consolidated to reduce costs. Toward that end, and as part of the continuous process of internal review and self-appraisal, the services, with Joint Staff support, are conducting a comprehensive scrub of all military skills.

Chaplain and Legal Corps. Chaplains and judge advocates are military officers, subject to the performance standards, regulations, policies and particular customs of their parent services. Consolidating all chaplains and lawyers under a single service, which some have suggested, would result in insignificant cost savings and have a negative effect on the quality of pastoral care and legal support provided to the men and women of the armed forces and their families. Consolidation is therefore not recommended.

Intelligence. Despite steps taken to implement lessons learned in Desert Storm and centralize management functions, the existing intelligence structure still largely reflects its Cold War origins. The Defense Intelligence Agency is assessing available intelligence resources with a view toward creating intelligence support units to provide joint task force commanders a fully operational intelligence support organization. DIA is also

The Main Point

As U.S. national security needs have changed, so has the U.S. military. The recommendations in this report advocate the need to continue to reshape our military to address the challenges of the future, while recognizing that it must be done intelligently, prudently and responsibly.

With the guiding premise of doing what's right for America, the tough issues facing the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps have been addressed head-on.

These thorough, frank and frequently challenging appraisals have yielded concrete results. The 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States outlines new approaches to how the services intend to do business. The report represents a clear expression of our commitment to change. But above all, it documents the armed forces' firm recognition that the main purpose of assigning roles, missions and functions is to protect America.

the Army

Published for internal information use by the American Forces Information Service, a field activity of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Washington, D.C. This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission.

night, while the Iraqi tank crews were frantically trying to figure out where the fire was coming from. We need to make sure our forces have comparable technological advantages in the future.

thrust areas, areas where we expect a high payoff and where we can project clear military applications in the future.

We don't yet know for sure which technologies will pan out or which will prove to be the most important, but we can already see some important trends which I can best describe as things we want to move away from. We are moving away from systems that are so inflexible they cannot be easily upgraded to exploit new technologies. We are moving away from systems which do not have high strategic or tactical mobility. We are moving away from systems so highly specialized that they can only be used against a narrow threat or in a unique environment. We are moving away from systems that lack low-observable or stealth technologies. We want to get away from systems that need large, vulnerable logistical tails. And in the end, we may very

well move away from expensive, highly sophisticated platforms in favor of cheaper "trucks" or "barges" crammed with state-of-the-art, long-range weapons, sensors and communications gear.

makes our day-to-day grip on technological superiority all the more fragile. Our position is similar to that of the Royal Navy roughly 100 years ago, when the British introduced a new class of large, fast, heavily armed warship. Overnight, the new Dreadnought class, essentially the first modern battleship, made every other type of surface combatant obsolete.

The irony for the British was that this made the rest of the Royal Navy, the strongest Navy in the world, obsolete as well. The British had to start over like everybody else, and this meant that competitors could take a shortcut. Nations like Germany, which had never dreamed of challenging the Royal Navy before, could capitalize upon their industrial strength to become formidable sea powers simply by building fleets of new dreadnoughts as fast or faster than the Brits.

Today, we are by far the strongest military power in the world. But our superiority no longer depends on outproducing our enemies as we did in World War II. Nor does it depend upon superior design in aircraft, ships and tanks like we had during the Cold War. Increasingly, our superiority depends on having the latest microchip, the latest superminiature sensor or the most advanced information processing software.

As we saw in the Persian Gulf war, a technological edge in one small area can sometimes be turned into a huge battlefield advantage. Consider tank combat. The Iraqis had many modern Soviet-made tanks. The best of these Soviet tanks were comparable to our Abrams tank in many performance categories. But they lacked long-range thermal sights. As a result, our tanks could detect and bring deadly accurate fire to bear on Iraqi tanks, especially at

Technology and Acquisition

That brings me to the second area in which new technology is having a major impact-namely, our acquisition system. About a month ago, I was out in San Diego to speak at the convention there put on by AFCEA and the Naval Institute. In my remarks there, I pointed out that we have an acquisition system that is not designed to meet our future technological needs. That seemed to strike a pretty responsive chord, as many of the members of the AFCEA community had a lot to say about it in subsequent panels and remarks.

The problems with our acquisition system are very troubling, and so I hope that any of you who were out there will bear with me and allow me to go over the issue once again.

Today's acquisition system is a product of the Cold War. It was designed to give us large numbers of advanced systems as rapidly as possible. This was costly, but it served us well during a time of great national danger. Over time, however, that acquisition system also became risk-averse. We became so concerned about scandals that we loaded it down with checks and audits. These helped us avoid procurement scandals, but at the price of driving up costs and impeding rapid technological progress. As a result, we have lost much of our technological agility.

We need to streamline our defense acquisition system. Right now, we have an acquisition cycle that's this long but a technology cycle that's only this long - and getting shorter. We need to compress the time from concept to final product so our acquisition cycle can keep up with state-of-the-art technology, and we need to do all this within the constraints of future defense spending.

To get there from here, we need to strip away some of the legislative and regulatory barnacles that encrust our acquisition cycle. We probably even need to reverse the historical relationship between defense and commercial technologies.

In the past, commercial applica

No Longer Center Stage

This does not mean we are about to sound the death knell for the major capital systems of our services, the main battle tank, the large surface combatant and the manned aircraft. These will have their place in the armed forces of the future, although, and this is important, that place may not be the central position they have held for the past half century or more. It is not yet time to kill all the sacred cows, but they should be put in a very selective breeding program.

We cannot be too beholden to any outdated or obsolete system, because technological change

tions were often spinoffs of defense R&D. In the future, we may have to rely more on adapting the latest commercial technologies for military use as we do now with computers.

blitzkrieg crushed the French and British armies in a matter of weeks.

We should heed such lessons and aggressively seek the new applications that get the most out of our current and future systems. Otherwise, it will be like hitching a shiny new Corvette behind a draft horse we will not be using our new hardware in a way that truly exploits its capabilities.

Finally, let me say a few words about Cʻl. Good weapons, advanced tactics and flexible, efficient organizations will give us a superb military instrument. But we have got to know where to point that instrument, and we need to know how to control it. This is where command, control, communications, computers and intelligence comes in.

Faster, Cheaper, Better

This change promises to yield new military applications faster, cheaper and better than from the old Cold War process. At the same time, it gives us a way to reconstitute larger forces rapidly, much as we did prior to and during World War II, should the need arise.

We also need to find a way to separate technological progress from costly full-scale development. We can now tolerate more "unique" units as a way to quickly integrate new technology and keep a warm industrial base while holding down overall acquisition costs.

Instead of insisting on a uniform force structure made up, say, of a single type of air superiority aircraft, we may "sequence" new acquisitions through the force. While, overall, this would produce a heterogeneous force, we could draw from it the right mixture of sophistication and mass appropriate to any particular crisis. The result may be a series of programs like the F-117, in a technologically advancing series rather than a long production line like the F-16.

The third area in which technology is going to make its impact felt is in the way we integrate new systems into our forces. Technological superiority doesn't just come from having new hardware, it also comes from being able to use that hardware effectively. We also saw this in the gulf. In some areas, our technological superiority over the Iraqis seemed greater than it really was because our forces used their equipment so much more effectively. This will be a big challenge for us in the future. With so much new technology out there on the horizon, our forces will have their hands full figuring out new tactics, organizations, training programs and warfighting doctrines.

A good example is that of the Germans at the beginning of World War II. They had fewer tanks than the British and the French, and the tanks they had were technically inferior. But because they had new tactics and new organizations which allowed them to use their technology more effectively, the German

Shifting Strategy, Shifting Needs

The end of the Cold War presents us with a whole new set of C^I problems. When the Soviets were our primary worry, we needed lots of expensive systems to meet specialized needs. We bought whole new networks of hardened, redundant, focused systems to give us strategic warning or to enable us to fight a global war against a nuclear-armed adversary.

These assets have not become irrelevant. They are still important capabilities to have. But in shifting from a global strategy for global war to a global strategy for regional crises, we now have a new menu of C requirements.

For example, strategic warning now takes on a new meaning. The theater, the adversary, even the nature of the problem, whether it is a military conflict or a humanitarian crisis, can change rapidly and may be much tougher to sort out than in the days of the old East-West rivalry. Many of our current systems are not designed for that kind of work. For example, satellites cannot tell

whether a crowd is going to a soccer match or a civil war - admittedly sometimes the same thing in many parts of the world.

In order for us to act quickly and effectively in future regional crises, and especially with our smaller force structure, more of which will be based here in the states, we need a global C'I capability. It must be able to alert us very early to a potential problem, focus on a trouble spot as events develop, surge in capacity when needed and respond to the peculiar operational needs of the joint combined task force commander.

No one else does this as well as we can. Our experiences in Grenada, Panama and the gulf war taught us a lot, and the advances we have made in just the past two years are eyewatering. But technology is spawning a new problem, an information explosion that threatens to choke our Col systems with more data than we can analyze or use. We need to make sure that our future efforts give us not only more, but also better, more usable information when and where we most need it.

We also need to understand that such systems fundamentally change the way we command and control forces. Our traditional methods have emphasized the flow of information along vertical paths information up, orders and inspections down, but increasingly we have architectures in which information flows laterally as well. As a result, knowledge is more pervasive and control functions more decentralized. We have not yet come to grips with what that means organizationally, but we need to soon. The traditional military chain of command may need some new thinking.

Superior military power in the future will depend upon superior C^I. Our adversaries may have access