throats for a variety of reasons, religious and economic, and it was only the menace of a common enemy that at first drew and held them together. They came together as "sovereign and independent states," reluctantly, strongly suspicious of one another and inclined to act each in its own behalf. To meet an enemy strong, well armed, and well supplied, they had to provide an army with all that an army needs for effective effort in the field. And they had to create this provision out of practically nothing at all, to secure the very finances with which to create. From the beginning each state held to its right to perform its share of this work for itself and as it chose, without regard for, or any attempt at coöperation with, the other states. From the beginning each state failed to do its proper share, out of fear, largely, that it might be doing more than its share; and each state, correspondingly, complained of the inefficiency of the central authority, the Continental Congress. But the Congress was in effect a consulting and advisory body, becoming negligible through inaction,

and doomed to inaction because it was without real power. The war, indeed, was not truly one war but many wars, and the remoter states were colder to the issues and conditions of the conflict than those at its seat. These issues and conditions were the inevitable ones of finance, of the control of the food-supply, of the army commissariat. The lack of common action and unified authority on these points caused untold suffering to the soldiers and indefinitely prolonged the struggle.

To secure the necessary unity the Congress had discussed for a year and finally submitted to the legislatures of the states articles of a confederation without which the war could not successfully be carried on. These articles did not win final ratification till 1781. They were accompanied by a circular letter the following extract from which is relevant:

The business [of unification], equally intricate and important, has in its progress been attended with uncommon embarrassments and delay, which the most anxious solicitude and persevering diligence could not prevent. To form a permanent union, accommodated to the

opinion and wishes of the delegates of so many states differing in habits, produce, commerce, and internal police, was found to be a work with which nothing but time and reflection, conspiring with a disposition to conciliate [italics mine] could mature and accomplish.

Hardly is it to be expected that any plan, in the variety of provisions essential to our union, should exactly correspond with the maxims and political views of every particular state. Let it be remarked that, after the most careful inquiry and the fullest information, this is proposed as the best which could be adapted to the circumstances of all, and as that alone which affords any tolerable prospect of general satisfaction.

The Articles of Confederation were primarily a war measure, designed to make the efforts of many sovereign states effective against one common enemy. They were by second intention an instrument of security between the states themselves, designed to maintain lasting peace between them and to strengthen each with all and all with each. They provided therefore that the states were to retain all undelegated sovereignty; that they were to constitute an absolute military unity against the enemy assaulting any one of them; that the citizens

of one, moving to another, were to receive equal treatment with the citizens of that other; that each should have equal authority with the others, large or small, on the basis of one state, one vote; that no state might enter into special relations with another, or with a foreign power, except by general consent; that no state might ordain a tariff at cross-purposes with the general interest; that Congress alone, representing the general interest, might determine the armament of each state; that no state might go to war except by general consent; that hence treaties, alliances, the making of war and peace were to be the functions of Congress; that Congress was to be the "last resort on appeal on all differences now subsisting or that hereafter may arise between two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatsoever." Its proceedings were to be publicly recorded in a journal to be kept for that purpose. The Articles provided, please observe, for all the contingencies that liberal opinion finds it desirable to guard against in the relations between contemporary states.

They are a programme of internationalism. Under them the Revolutionary War dragged out to a successful conclusion. But with the coming of peace the force of the international authority, of the Congress they provided for, lapsed altogether. The states reverted to their aboriginal sovereignty, and worse. The central authority carried an enormous burden of debt, the states were destitute, the country disorganized. Patriotism, that is, local loyalties of the peoples to their different state governments, was intense.

The mutual antipathies and clashing interests of the Americans, their difference of governments, habitudes, and manners [wrote Josiah Tucker] indicate that they will have no center of union and no common interest. They can never be united into one compact empire under any species of government whatever; a disunited people till the end of time, suspicious and distrustful of each other, they will be divided and subdivided into little commonwealths or principalities, according to natural boundaries, by great bays of the sea, and by vast rivers, lakes, and ranges of mountains. Add dynastic and national interests, and the description absolutely dots the present