with reference to specific plays which have not yet had time enough to be evolved by the children themselves. The object of the control is to let the children play freely. The method is the control of those elements in the environment which are new and too complex and difficult to be handled by the children themselves.

The principle obtains wherever the conditions under which people play become rapidly changed. For example, the present situation with reference to college athletics in general and college football in particular shows the inadequacy of the uncontrolled free-play idea as applied to college students under the present conditions of intercollegiate athletics. There is a general and very old feeling among educational authorities that the recreation of all college students is much better when directed by the students themselves, that this direction is in itself a part of the play, that it affords useful training in various directions, to all of which I most willingly assent, but during the past few years new elements have been introduced into the college athletic situation which make the college student almost as unable to have general free play in his athletics as the city pupil is to have free play on his uncontrolled and limited city playground. The amounts of money involved are very great. The games have acquired a commercial significance which is altogether new in college sport. There are funds available which were never dreamed of in the earlier and more simple days of college sport. The intense rivalry between institutions is only one of a number of factors which has tended to change the notion of sport for the fun of it to sport for the sake of victory,-victory being thus augmented from a very desirable incident to an end in itself. This case, then, like that of the city school child, demands trained technical control. The problems are too difficult of solution by the men themselves; their life in college is too brief to permit of these large questions being worked out satisfactorily during the experience of any student.

If we grant the principle, the application will be that this control must be of such a nature, and to such an extent, as will most truly give that freedom in athletics that will most truly restore sport as a means of recreation and health to its natural place. This control must be, as in the case of the city pupil, to restore freedom in play rather than to take it away. The elements which are to be controlled and managed are the new ones rather than the old ones.

We are at present undergoing a storm of discussion as to the changes in the rules that will cure the present football disease. We are not in a position to pass upon cures at the present time. What we need is to establish the principle and the nature of control. The changing of rules will not alter ethical relations. The chief needs at present, with reference to athletics, are ethical rather than physiological.

To reduce this discussion to a definite proposition, let me say that I believe the athletics of educational institutions should be under the absolute control of a man whose relation to the faculty is the same as that of any other head of a department whose training for his work, both in practical knowledge and scholastic attainment, is as extended and technical as is demanded of a professor in any other branch, and whose tenure of office is as certain as that of other college professorships. The primary qualifications of this man, so far as practical work is concerned, must be the ability to get a very large number of the students actually engaged, voluntarily, in wholesome out-of-door athletics rather than to defeat other collegiate teams upon the gridiron or the cinder path.

College football needs to be controlled and remodeled, but this can only be wisely done by men who continuously administer the college sports; who administer the games as a means to exercise rather than as an intercollegiate means of contest. We need continuous trained control of the situation by high-grade men whose positions are not dependent upon victory.

was considerably stronger on the part of the dignitaries in Macedonia than of those in Constantinople, the former fully realizing that their acknowledgment of the commission meant an end to their robbery for all time. They wisely and very cleverly appealed to the Sultan's pride and honor, and convinced him that the loss of the financial control of Macedonia meant the first step to the loss of the entire province, as had been proven in the case of eastern Roumelia. They stated that Macedonia constituted the pearl of his empire, and that its loss was equivalent to the end of Turkish rule in Europe.

In order to prove their absolute unity on this question, the six powers decided to take an unusual step. The six ambassadors in Constantinople had requested a joint audience, in the course of which they desired clearly to state the ideas of their sovereigns, and particularly to prove the entirely friendly purposes toward Turkey on which their propositions were based. The Sultan replied to this unusual step by taking one even more exceptional. He simply refused to receive the ambassadors. In this manner a situation had suddenly been created which made a purely diplomatic settlement quite impossible. The necessity for immediate action brought about the decision to enter upon a joint naval demonstration of all the powers concerned, which should primarily result in the seizure of certain custom-houses, and in its eventual course in a blockade of the Turkish coast. Merely the passing of this resolution, one had every reason to suppose, would prove to the Sultan the uselessness of further resistance.

The Padishah, however, remained immovably obstinate. The motives prompting his resistance are not difficult to surmise. The events in Russia could naturally not remain unnoticed in Constantinople. The military humiliation of that empire on land and on water perchance betokened to the Sublime Porte that Russia was no longer a dangerous opponent even for Turkey. That Austria-Hungary was loath to enter upon any military action at that time was also well known. Moreover, the Sultan felt perfectly secure in the possession of the frequently emphasized friendship of Germany,-in fact, felt encouraged thereby to continue his resistance. When it finally became known that Germany did not intend to participate in the joint naval demonstration, this was interpreted as a direct summons to stand firm and unyielding. This, however, was a fatal error. I believe that my information regarding Germany's attitude in this matter is as reliable as it is authentic. That the entire incident was unwelcome to Ger

William II. for the Sultan, as well as the special commercial position which Germany secured for herself during the past ten years in European and Asiatic Turkey, would naturally influence his course of action. In the question of Macedonian finance reform, however, he is in complete accord with the other great powers. This

is proved by the fact that his commissioner is jointly at work with the others. Moreover, the German Government has defined its point of view in an official notice in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, as follows:

The attitude of the Turkish Government in the question of the Macedonian financial control will call forth the sincerest regret. The refusal to grant the desired joint audience sought by the ambassadors of the nations concerned, purposing a last appeal to the wisdom of the Sultan, has unfortunately proved that influences have gained prevalence at the Golden Horn which have turned a deaf ear to sane and pertinent judgment of the situation. The course of events up to the present time should have aroused the conviction that there can remain no doubt as to the unity in the purpose of the powers to carry out this feature of the Muerzsteg programme.

Moreover, the German ambassador in Constantinople, Freiherr von Marschall, again emphasized in a special audience accorded to him by the Sultan, whose particular favor he enjoys, the ad visability of granting the desired concessions, stating that Germany shared, without reserve, the opinion of the other powers as to the necessity of the reforms in question. The failure to participate in the naval demonstration is attributable solely to practical considerations, inasmuch as there was no German man-of-war in the Mediterranean at the time, and, in the limited time for action, its dispatch would not have proved feasible.

Be this as it may, the Porte remained unrelenting even when the sailing orders had been issued to the united fleet, the chief command of which had been unanimously intrusted to the Austrian admiral, Ripper. The purpose of this action was to acknowledge the particular interests of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan peninsula, as well as to emphasize the more important fact that the monarchy demanded the execution of the Muerzsteg programme irrespective of any selfish interests whatsoever, merely purposing the preservation of the Sultan's sovereign rights.

The international fleet had already assembled in the Piræus when the Sublime Porte finally deigned to send a reply to the powers, and again a purely negative one. The attitude taken by the Turkish authorities was substantially this:

They held the commission of finance to be in direct opposition to the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and claimed that it would result in a loss of his prestige and

ence is also made to the Muerzsteg programme, which insured complete independence and integrity to Turkey. The appointment of the delegation of finance, however, was in complete contravention of this agreement. Finally, should the ambassadors persist in carrying out their purpose of bringing greater pressure to bear, the Porte declined to assume any responsibility for all events which might result, as well as for the consequences of the discontent in Ottoman public opinion following upon the infringement on the rights of the empire.

This unveiled threat of revolt and massacre of Christians was about the most unwise decision at which the council in Constantinople could have arrived. It is a matter of common knowl. edge that not only is the expression of popular opinion in Turkey not tolerated, but it is cruelly suppressed. The breaking out of hostilities, which, of course, did not occur, could therefore have resulted only at the direct instigation of the Turkish Government.

The most important feature of this message was an appeal to the signatories of the treaty of Berlin with particular reference to the fact that Turkey had conscientiously performed all the obligations which it imposed, whereas as much. could not be said of the other high contracting parties. As it may be of importance, in considering the future development of events in Turkey and in the Balkans, to test the justification of this accusation, a short summary of the articles in question in the treaty of Berlin may not be out of place. Beyond a doubt it must be acknowledged that partially, at least, the reproaches of Turkey are based upon fact. Articles XIII. to XXII. of the treaty of Berlin contain a guarantee for the establishment of the sovereign province of East Roumelia, subject to the military anthority of the Sultan and independent of Bulgaria. This guarantee was annulled by the revolt of Philippopolis in 1885 and the ensuing union of East Roumelia and Bulgaria. Similarly all the guarantees failed of performance by which Bulgaria was obligated to pay tribute to Turkey, Servia, Montenegro, and, furthermore, to assume a portion of the Turkish national debt-all of which resulted in the loss of great financial advantages to Turkey.

On the other hand, it cannot be said that Turkey more conscientiously performed the obliga tions resting upon her. The duties with regard to Crete which she assumed in Article XXIII. remained unperformed until enforced by the powers after the war with Greece. Further. more, by reason of the same paragraph, special provision was to have been made for all European possessions, and this by means of special commissions, with the assistance of the native

the "Macedonian question would no longer exist, and Turkey would have been spared this last humiliation. Finally, bearing in mind the contents of Article LXI., which minutely speci fies the reforms for the Armenian provinces, and on the other hand remembering the outrages which the Porte visited upon these same Armenians, thereby losing the sympathies of all civilized nations, her present reference to her conscientious performance of treaties must be stigmatized as quite as unfortunate as her threats of new massacres. The international fleet went to sea and occupied the customhouses of Mytilene and Tenedos. In the interim, to be sure, there were days of inaction, by reason of the fact that the powers had agreed to continue to treat the Sultan with the utmost consideration. To be perfectly frank, it must be admitted that the powers were in dread of the moment which would necessitate the decision for a determined step, a step which necessarily exceeded the conception of a peaceable blockade. The opposition of Turkey had developed to such an extent that the military honor of six powers appeared to be involved.

Once more the Padishah resorted to the wellknown artifices. He declared his approval of the "finance control," provided it was exercised only by Austria-Hungary and Russia, a proposition promptly declined by the latter powers.

Eventually an agreement was reached,-obstreperous Turkey had to bow entirely. To pass judgment on the real importance of these concessions would be useless. A common-sense view can but approve of them. The Macedonians will now attain their rights. Had any one of the powers actually intended to carry out the destruction of the Ottoman Empire at the present time, more energetic measures would have been adopted.

As it is, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire is taking a most unusual course. Paradoxical as it may sound, Turkey will be ruined by reforms which arc being forced upon her by degrees. These reforms cannot be obstructed, as they will progress automatically, one from the other. The incidents of the last few weeks are surely not the last of their kind. The Armenians will follow the Macedonians. On the pres ent occasion the various small powers of the Balkans were given to understand in a trite communication that the antagonistic attitude toward Turkey was not to be deemed an encouragement to them. It may be stated, however, that the future of Turkey will not be decided in Constantinople, but will be dependent upon the outcome of the present chaotic conditions in