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ship, &c., are perpetually going on, and, to a superficial glance, are similar one to the other.

But, if we would see the truth of things, they must be stripped of this fallacious appearance of uniformity. In truth, no one action has, when considered in its whole extent, any essential resemblance with any other. Each individual, who composes the vast multitude which we have been contemplating, has a peculiar frame of mind, which, whilst the features of the great mass of his actions remain uniform, impresses the minuter lineaments with its peculiar hues. Thus, whilst his life, as a whole, is like the lives of other men, in detail it is most unlike; and the more subdivided the actions become; that is, the more they enter into that class which have a vital influence on the happiness of others and his own, so much the more are they distinct from those of other

men.

"Those little, nameless unremembered acts

Of kindness and of love,"

as well as those deadly outrages which are inflicted by a look, a word-or less-the very refraining from some faint and most evanesent expression of countenance; these flow from a profounder source than the series of our habitual conduct, which, it has been already said, derives its origin from without. These are the actions, and such as these, which make human life what it is, and are the fountains of all the good and evil with which its entire surface is so widely and impartially overspread; and though they are called minute, they are called so in compliance with the blindness of those who cannot estimate their importance. It is in the due appreciating the general effects of their peculiarities, and in cultivating the habit of acquiring decisive knowledge respecting the tendencies arising out of them in particular cases, that the most important part of moral science consists.

The deepest abyss of these vast and multitudinous caverns, it is necessary that we should visit.

This is the difference between social and individual man. Not that this distinction is to be considered definite, or characteristic of one human being as compared with another, it denotes rather two classes of agency, common in a degree to every human being. None is exempt, indeed, from that species of influence which affects, as it were, the surface of his being, and gives the specific outline to his conduct. Almost all that is ostensible submits to that legislature created by the general representation of the past feelings of mankind-imperfect as it is from a variety of causes, as it exists in the government, the religion, and domestic habits. Those who do not nominally, yet actually, submit to the same power. The external features of their conduct, indeed, can no more escape it, than the clouds can escape from the stream of the wind; and his opinion, which he often hopes he has dispassionately secured from all contagion of prejudice and vulgarity, would be found, on examination, to be the inevitable excrescence of the very usages from which he vehemently dissents. Internally all is conducted otherwise; the efficiency, the essence, the vitality of actions, derives its colour from what is noways contributed to from any external source. Like the plant, which while it derives the accident of its size and shape from the soil in which it springs, and is cankered, or distorted, or inflated, yet retains those qualities which essentially divide it from all others; so that hemlock continues to be poison, and the violet does not cease to emit its odour in whatever soil it may grow.

We consider our own nature too superficially. We look on all that in ourselves with which we can discover a resemblance in others; and consider those resemblances as the materials of moral knowledge. It is in the differences that it actually consists.

ION;

OR, OF THE ILIA D.

Translated from Plato.

SOCRATES and IoN.

SOCRATES.-Hail to thee, O Ion! from whence returnest thou amongst us now ?-from thine own native Ephesus?

ION. No, Socrates; I come from Epidaurus and the feasts in honour of Esculapius.

SOCRATES.-Had the Epidaurians instituted a contest of rhapsody in honour of the god?

ION.-And not in rhapsodies alone; there were contests in every species of music.

SOCRATES.-And in which did you contend? And what was the success of your efforts?

ION. I bore away the first prize at the games, O Socrates.

SOCRATES.-Well done! You have now only to consider how you shall win the Panathenæa.

ION. That may also happen, God willing.

SOCRATES.-Your profession, O Ion, has often appeared to me an enviable one. For, together with the nicest care of your person, and the most studied elegance of dress, it imposes upon you the necessity of a familiar acquaintance with many and excellent poets, and especially with Homer, the most admirable of them all. Nor is it merely because you can repeat the verses of this great poet, that I envy you,

but because you fathom his inmost thoughts. For he is no rhapsodist who does not understand the whole scope and intention of the poet, and is not capable of interpreting it to his audience. This he cannot do without a full comprehension of the meaning of the author he undertakes to illustrate; and worthy, indeed, of envy are those who can fulfil these conditions.

ION. Thou speakest truth, O Socrates. And, indeed, I have expended my study particularly on this part of my profession. I flatter myself that no man living excels me in the interpretation of Homer; neither Metrodorus of Lampsacus, nor Stesimbrotus the Thasian, nor Glauco, nor any other rhapsodist of the present times can express so many various and beautiful thoughts upon Homer as I can.

SOCRATES. I am persuaded of your eminent skill, O Ion. You will not, I hope, refuse me a specimen of it?

ION. And, indeed, it would be worth your while to hear me declaim upon Homer. I deserve a golden crown from his admirers.

SOCRATES. And I will find leisure some day or other to request you to favour me so far. At present, I will only trouble you with one question. Do you excel in explaining Homer alone, or are you conscious of a similar power with regard to Hesiod and Archilochus?

ION. I possess this high degree of skill with regard to Homer alone, and I consider that sufficient. SOCRATES. Are there any subjects upon which Homer and Hesiod say the same things?

ION.-Many, as it seems to me.

SOCRATES.-Whether do you demonstrate these things better in Homer or Hesiod?

ION. In the same manner doubtless; inasmuch as they say the same words with regard to the same things.

SOCRATES.-But with regard to those things in

which they differ ;-Homer and Hesiod both treat of divination, do they not?

ION. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Do you think that you or a diviner would make the best exposition, respecting all that these poets say of divination, both as they agree and as they differ!

ION. A diviner probably.

SOCRATES.-Suppose you were a diviner, do you not think that you could explain the discrepancies of those poets on the subject of your profession, if you understand their agreement?

Ion. Clearly so.

SOCRATES.-How does it happen then that you are possessed of skill to illustrate Homer, and not Hesiod, or any other poet in an equal degree? Is the subject matter of the poetry of Homer different from all other poets'? Does he not principally treat of war and social intercourse, and of the distinct functions and characters of the brave man and the coward, the professional and private person, the mutual relations which subsist between the gods and men; together with the modes of their intercourse, the phænomena of Heaven, the secrets of Hades, and the origin of gods and heroes? Are not these the materials from which Homer wrought his poem ?

ION. -Assuredly, O Socrates.

SOCRATES. And the other poets, do they not trea of the same matter?

ION. Certainly; but not like Homer.

SOCRATES.-How!

ION.-Oh! far worse.

Worse?

SOCRATES.-Then Homer treats of them better than

they?

ION.-Oh! Jupiter!-how much better!

SOCRATES.-Amongst a number of persons employed in solving a problem of arithmetic, might not a person know, my dear Ion, which had given the right answer?

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