ment of the law of God by the law of

man.

It is not surprising that those against God should aim their biggest weapons at our schools. Our school years are our most impressionable. Eliminating the concept of God from education leaves the student with no basis for determining right from wrong.

Therefore, I feel that the argument presented by some political and religious leaders that the Court's decisions put religion back where it belongs-in the church and the home-is unrealistic. American youngsters between 7 and 21 spend more waking hours at school and school activities than they do at home and church combined. They need more-not less-emphasis on spiritual values in school.

The instigators of the school controversy, moreover, have not fought their cause on the basis of religion but rather on the basis of constitutional rights. They have won in the precise area where they should have lost.

In 6,000 years of recorded history, the American Constitution is the only document of government to be based on the law of God as defined in natural law, the decalog, and divine revelation. Its authors were believers: their faith is evident in the guarantees for individual freedom which they wrote into the Constitution. Furthermore, by their checks and balances on the three government branches (executive, legislative, judicial), they assured that no branch should overpower the others and that, while protecting the rights of minorities, government should remain in the hands of the majority of the people. This is the freedom of religion which the authors of the Constitution had in mind.

Constitutionally, no American can be forced to act against his conscience. In war, we respect the rights of conscientious objectors who refuse to bear arms. This same principle applies to activities in schools.

If parents, acting in conscience, decide they don't want their child to participate in religious observances, the Pledge to the Flag or, say, competitive athletics, they have the right to ask for him to be excused. The question is-do these minorities have the right to impose their judgment on all the other children?

The answer is an obvious no. Yet this has happened. Every parent, indeed every citizen, should ask: "What can we do about it?"

As a start, parents must reclaim control of their school boards, making their wants known and heeded, assuring that government in our country remains from the grass roots up instead of being imposed from the top down. By failing to speak out, parents are allowing a small vocal minority to establish the educational philosophy under which their children shall be trained.

Furthermore, Americans who wish to retain our God-centered civilization must themselves become more vocal in all areas of this controversy.

Members of Congress are now working on a constitutional amendment which would restate the first amendment to the Constitution to allow prayer and Bible reading in schools on a voluntary, nonsectarian basis. The amendment would also head off suits now pending to eliminate God from the Pledge of Allegiance and our coins.

I believe the great majority of American people are behind this action and should say so to their Congressmen in no uncertain words.

Meanwhile, the situation which was created by court action can be corrected by

court action. Those who have made the long, difficult, complicated, expensive journey to the U.S. Supreme Court to eliminate God from our schools traveled with the aid of organizations and individuals who shared their goal. Others who share opposite goals must be willing to travel a similar arduous

Actually the Court decision can become a challenge for a new spiritual creativity in schools and public life. From school board to the principals to the teachers there could be a rethinking of ways to teach children our basic concepts of morality and God. We are not concerned here merely with a legal debate on whether religion in the schools violates the words of the first amendment. We are concerned with a way of life, a philosophy and the spiritual character of our culture. We must decide what that character is, then take a stand on it before we have nothing left to stand on.

The human need to seek God, to know God, to love God, and to obey God is older than Abraham, and the effort since Abraham for men to live together under God for their spiritual salvation and the common good is both natural and necessary. This suddenly cannot be outdated and superfluous, men cannot suddenly become purer moralists than God, although even before Abraham there were men who thought they could.

Time and again throughout history, men driven by a lust for power or money have sought to destroy in others the natural response to Divine law-the individual conscience, and the result has been complete chaos. Americans who believe in God are now the prey of such forces, and we shall be their victims unless we do something now to prevent it.

Often I think of the young lawyer who wanted to have our national motto-In God We Trust-removed from our courtrooms. When we stop trusting in God, when we reject the principle that we are His creatures, subject to His laws, when we switch from morality under God to morality by government committees on ethics, we will witness more than the end of law and order in our country. We will witness the end of our country itself. This is a challenge to every one of us who loves freedom-and God.

A REPORT ON VIETNAM Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I was pleased to attend sessions on the annual meeting of the Association of the U.S. Army, held here in Washington during the week of October 21. In one of these sessions a very informative and in

teresting presentation was made on the use of American personnel and equipment in fighting Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam. The address, entitled "Report on Vietnam," was delivered on October 23, 1963, by Brig. Gen. Frank A. Osmanski, of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. He is a native of Nanticoke, Pa., and has been in Vietnam since March of 1963. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that this report be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of these remarks.

There being no objection, the report was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REPORT ON VIETNAM (Presentation by Brig. Gen. Frank A. Osmanski, J-4 MACV to annual meeting of the Association of the U.S. Army at SheratonPark Hotel, Washington, D.C., October 23, 1963)

This report on Vietnam will be neither profound nor prophetic but the optimism it will reflect sincerely is genuinely that of General Harkins, whose greetings I am charged to bring to this conference.

General Collins has explained this strategic importance of the Republic of Vietnam.

I shall report on the military situation there, under four headings: "Terrain,

TERRAIN, WEATHER, AND ENEMY

The Republic of Vietnam comprises three terrain regions: the central highlands, the central lowlands, and the Mekong Delta. The highlands are virgin country with tropical rain and bamboo forests and a broad grassy plateau at their center; inhabited by mountain migratory tribesmen; with a climate conducive to tea, coffee, and a little rice. The lowlands are a generally dry coastal plain with sand dune growths; a sedentary agrarian people; and insufficient rice for lack of water. The delta has bountiful rice paddies, a coastline of mangrove swamps, a central plain of reeds, and a maze of canals; is peopled by scattered ricefarmers and fishermen; and its heavy seasonal rainfall causes annual flooding. The nature of the counter-insurgency is vastly different in each of these regions.

The weather in the Republic of Vietnam is hot and humid, with two distinct seasons, wet and dry, which vary by region in response principally to two monsoons annually. Rainfall and sunshine are alternately intense, temperatures average 80° Fahrenheit, and there are about 10 typhoons a year and frequent high winds.

The enemy is the Vietcong, the VC, meaning Vietnamese Communist, for which cadres and arms caches were left behind when Ho Chi Minh ostensibly led his followers north in 1954. VC forces are of three strata: hardcore, guerrillas, and porters. Hard-core companies are outfitted in khaki twill with steel or bamboo helmets and carry modern United States or bloc-country arms. Guerrillas wear the standard dress of the Vietnamese peasant, black cotton or satin pajamas, and carry obsolescent French or self-manufactured weapons. Porters wear as little as a loincloth and are unarmed. VC nonexplosive weapons include caltrops, spike-traps, poisoned darts, and even enraged water buffalos. In a sense their physical endurance, patience, and ingenuity are also VC weapons, for they have been known to live in dark tunnels for weeks,

to remain underwater for long periods by breathing through hollow reeds, and to lie in ambush for as long as 48 hours. The VC wage their war from their ancestral strongholds in the U Minh Ha Forest, Plaine des Jones, war zones C and D, and the Do Xa area; and from trackless provinces which they dominate, myriad small hidden bases, deep caves and long tunnels, and other safe havens. VC-initiated incidents are of four types: propaganda, terrorism, sabotage, and armed attacks. Their logistic support is from five sources: levy on the peasantry, import from other countries, capture from Government of Vietnam (GVN) forces, local purchase, and self-production.

FRIENDLY FORCES

The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) consist of a regular army, air force, and navy (including a marine corps) and three paramilitary forces: the civil guard, self-defense corps, and special forces. In addition there are the civilian irregular defense groups (CIDG), including hamlet militia, mountain scouts, border surveillance units, and trail watchers; and then such semiautonomous but gun-bearing patriotic organizations as the Republican Youth, Catholic Youth, and Women's Solidarity Movement. Assisting and advising these are the U.S. Military Assistance Command of about 14,000 and a small Australian

Army Training Team. Collaterally the civilian field agencies of the GVN ministries, the U.S. Operations Mission and the U.S. Information Service contribute to the civil aspects of the counterinsurgency. In gross numbers the military, paramilitary, and police forces of the counter-insurgency outnumber the VC about 5 to 1.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS

The strategy of the counter-insurgency is three-pronged: the strategic hamlet program, field operations, and psychological operations and civic action.

These three methods intermingle. In essence, the strategy is to win battles and to win people.

The strategic hamlet program is the Republic of Vietnam's national program to physically and ideologically separate the people from the VC and to win their support and confidence by providing them security, democratic government, and social and economic development. The program consists of (1) clear and hold operations, (2) province rehabilitation, and (3) portions of the CIDG program.

Clear and hold operations clear the VC from, and deny them, a specified area intended as the site of a strategic hamlet.

Province rehabilitation executes Provinceprepared and nationally approved civil-military plans providing financial and supply support for the establishment of strategic hamlets.

Those portions of the CIDG program associated with the strategic hamlet program are designed to develop home-defense units for strategic hamlets.

Strategic hamlets, originally conceived as a defense against VC attack, now have become a means for effecting political, economic, and social progress. The Government of Vietnam has recognized this development and considers that the strategic hamlet is primarily the point of impact of a political and social revolution which will serve as a foundation for economic progress.

Field operations are directed variously at securing sites for strategic hamlets, destroying the VC logistic structure, killing or capturing VC's, or gaining or regaining control of Government of Vietnam territory. They are of three basic types:

(1) Clear and hold operations, executed in direct support of the strategic hamlet program, with the mission to clear an area of, and deny it to, the VC during the construction phase of a strategic hamlet.

(2) Fix and destroy operations, based on specific intelligence, with the mission to contact and destroy VC forces or installations; and

(3) Search and clear operations, with the mission to destroy or clear VC from an area of suspected activity. In addition, reconnaissance, security, and search and rescue operations and ambushes are conducted.

Psychological operations and civic action each consist of two related programs. Psychological operations are aimed, first, at supporting the strategic hamlet program by rationalizing the need for rural citizens to move to, or at least to organize into, a more secure locality and by providing them the incentive toward self-development for political, social, and economic improvement. The other aspect of psychological operations is directed at the softer strata of the VC, to whom radio and loudspeaker broadcasts and airdropped or artillery-fired leaflets are aimed, primarily to induce them to avail themselves of chieu hoi, the "open arms" or "welcome home" amnesty program.

Civic action is aimed at improving the socio-economic welfare, political integration, and personal security of the citizenry through Federal support, education, and selfhelp. Its two basic programs are civic action proper and medical civic action. Civic action proper advises, trains, and assists hamlet inhabitants in setting up local government and trains both the hamlet administrators and citizenry in building and establishing physical facilities such as marketplaces, schools, dispensaries, information centers, chapels, pagodas, and water supply points and in formulating and administrat

ing programs of self-help and scientific improvement in education, agriculture, stockraising, and disease control. Medical civic action trains local nurses and directly treats local people. To date almost 600,000 treatments have been given by medical civic action teams at an average cost of $1 each. Coordinated with the supporting U.S. military medical civic action program are the USOM medical projects as well as MedicoCARE and Hope.

The tactical principles and techniques which are proving successful in the counterinsurgency are essentially those, especially of small-unit tactics, which have been taught in U.S. service schools for years. The tactical problem remains to find, fix, and destroy the enemy. Of prime importance in the tactical operations of the counterinsurgency is the heliborne strike. To explain this here is a

short film.

(SB-6: "U.S. Army Helicopter Operations in Vietnam," edited to 131⁄2 minutes.)

RESULTS

The military events of this past year in the Republic of Vietnam have contributed substantially both to the development of improved counterinsurgency techniques and toward ultimate victory for the Republic of Vietnam.

In order that its training advice to the Republic of Vietnam AF may be effective and timely, MAAG-Vietnam publishes a series of "Lessons Learned," which are the after-action distillate from both the extollable and deplorable experiences of actual combat. In the main they reiterate and reemphasize the timetested fundamentals taught in current U.S. military doctrine at our service schools. With content particularly derived from counterinsurgency experience in Republic of Vietnam are lessons learned about U.S. Army helicopter operations, M-113 operations, Vietcong ambushes, organization and employment of artillery, province rehabilitation operations, psy war and civic action, the limitations of paramilitary forces such as the CG, SDC, and hamlet militia, and guidelines to U.S. advisers with Allied forces.

MAAG-Vietnam also has published and keeps current a manual on the "Tactics and Techniques of Counter-Insurgency Operations," which is excellent.

Under the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (Comusmacv) there is a Joint Operations Evaluation Group, Vietnam (JOEG-V), whose director has two functions: first, to represent the U.S. Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) in the combined U.S.-RVN Combat Development and Test Center-Vietnam (CDTC-V); and, second, to evaluate from the U.S. joint viewpoint the results of tests conducted by CDTC-V and the two U.S. service test agencies in RVN: the U.S. Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) and the U.S. Air Force Test Unit (AFTU). The more significant of their tests of equipment and tactics are the following:

In May of this year test was completed of a version of the C-123 aircraft, modified to shorten landings. This aircraft demonstrated improved capabilities to carry heavy loads into short fields.

Another test project completed by the Air Force, in which the Army was interested, was that of the U-10B helio-courier plane. Its report recommended that further test and evaluation be conducted to select an aircraft better suited to perform the counterinsurgency mission.

The AR-15 Armalite rifle is still being tested in the Republic of Vietnam. Prospects for its wider use are favorable.

Motor convoys in RVN are frequently subjected to costly ambushes, in some of which U.S. advisors have been killed. These ambushes are extremely short in duration and

characterized by murderous fire from VC automatic weapons. Countermeasures are being developed to enable troops to survive the withering fire of these ambushes and to launch a superior barrage of area fire in return. New techniques for moving and escorting convoys are being explored and new weapons systems are being developed.

Communications are often a problem in RVN because the terrain or atmospheric conditions tend to limit the range and performance of standard radio sets. A new family

of radio antennas, which can be fabricated locally and used with the standard radio sets already issued, is being developed to overcome this problem.

The U.S. Air Force Test Unit is also in the process of testing a tactical air positioning system (TAPS) and a tactical air control system (TACS), the results from which are still pending.

The ACTIV test program so far has been concerned with four general areas of operation: Army aircraft, armored personnel carriers, Army engineering know-how, and Army communications and electronics equipment.

In the field of Army aviation, there have been significant evaluations of the operation of armed helicopters, Mohawks, and the Caribous. It has been found that these aircraft substantially enhance the operational capabilities of the ground forces and that they can survive in a counter-insurgency environment, that indeed the losses have been remarkably low when measured against sorties and hours flown or missions successfully accomplished.

Perhaps the most interesting test conducted to date has been that of the armed helicopter, along the lines of the film just shown. shown. ComUSmac has on numerous occasions paid tribute to the outstanding accomplishments of Army and Marine helicopter units, both armed and transport, in support of the counterinsurgency.

The testing of the Mohawk in target acquisition continues in the southern part of Vietnam, following the completion of initial tests in a surveillance role in the north. The tests have demonstrated that a limited number of Mohawk aircraft, decentralized and placed under the control of the division, are compatible with ground operations and that this aircraft is well suited for the accomplishment of the full range of counterinsurgency reconnaissance missions, excepting those requiring large area coverage.

Caribou's, as used in RVN for tactical transport of troops and materiel, have proved to be exceptionally versatile because of their capability to take off and land on short, unimproved runways without damaging them. At present the Caribous in the Republic of Vietnam are assigned to the southeast Asia airlift system but so far some of them have invariably been further allocated to the direct support of the U.S. senior corps advisers. These Caribous are proving to be effective in both the forward area transport and centralized airlift roles.

In the field of armored personnel carrier utilization, both M-113's and M-114's were tested. M-113's are used in Republic of Vietnam both for their intended purposes and in the role of tanks, which is feasible because the Vietcong lack armor and antitank weapons. However, numerous modifications have had to be made to transform the M-113 into a more suitable counterinsurgency fighting vehicle. To protect machine guns mounted on it, the M-113 has been modified with a gun shield and cupola. The M-113 has performed well, particularly in the flat rice paddies of the Mekong Delta, where its cross-country mobility was hampered only by the many canals. To overcome this obstacle, several techniques have been developed, among them brush fill, block and tackle, capstan and anchor, aluminum balk

bridging, and push bars. On the other hand, the M-114, although present in Republic of Vietnam, has not been employed nearly so extensively as the M-113. As a first generation vehicle, several changes will be required before it will achieve full operational compatibility with the M-113, a third generation vehicle.

Among the most productive of ACTIV's evaluations has been the test of U.S. Army engineer teams, called engineer control and advisory detachments (ECAD's), which have been introduced to provide engineering assistance and direction for small construction projects of benefit to the rural population. Materials for the ECAD's projects were supplied by ACTIV, USOM, and the local government at minimal cost and labor was provided by local civilians. During the 120-day period of the test, 2 ECAD's supervised the construction of 96 projects ranging from simple pigsties to a 200-foot bridge. It has been concluded from their activities, as well as from the activities of the parallel U.S. Navy Seabee training advisory teams (STATS), that small, well-trained engineering teams can successfully implement civic action aspects of counter-insurgency operations.

In the area of communications and electronics, ACTIV has been engaged in confirming the suitability of current communications doctrine and developing new concepts, techniques, and hardware for use in counter-insurgency operations, such as a new heliborne command post utilizing the UH1B helicopter equipped with additional radio equipment, a heliborne public address set for psychological operations, a new navigation system for Army helicopters, and the introduction of high frequency single-sideband radios into Army aircraft.

Now, a note about U.S. Army helicopter maintenance, which plagued all Army personnel for the first 6 months after the introduction of the CH-21's into the Republic of Vietnam. The maintenance problems which have arisen have been concerned essentially with defective rotor blades, engines, and control cables in the CH-21's and, more recently, with drag-struts and magneto assembly arms in the CV-2B's and main mast bearings in the UH-1B's. These problems have all been solved so that, whereas a year ago the CH-21's were operating at about 50 percent average availability for about 25 hours average flying each per month, the present averages for all U.S. Army aircraft in the Republic of Vietnam are 70 percent and 50 hours, with twice the original numbers of aircraft now on hand.

About a year ago it was discerned that all programs necessary to the winning of the counter-insurgency would by spring 1963 be either completed or in process definitely toward satisfactory completion. The MAAG advisory detachments had in the preceeding year expanded manifold, had extended down to battalion level, and were being effective in advising, persuading, and assisting the RVNAF toward victory. The combat intelligence network was complete and tied together with adequate communications. Additional U.S. aviation units and MAP-provided armored personnel carriers had enhanced the mobility of the RVNAF. Adequate sealift and airlift systems would soon be established and operating on a combined basis for the movements support of operations. The formal training of the RVNAF was well underway, oriented on such subjects as security, shooting, small unit tactics, and lessons learned from recent operations. The program to resettle the Montagnards and train them into hamlet militia, strike forces, trail watchers, and scout detachments were in full swing. U.S. Special Forces detachments had been introduced in significant numbers and Vietnamese Special Forces were

being developed. The CIDG forces were being trained. Modern battle equipment was in country. The strategic hamlet program had been formalized and was beginning to be put on a planned basis with programed support. It all asked to be used in a concerted effort to beat the VC.

The national campaign plan was ceived to concert that effort. All ministries of the Government of Vietnam, branches of the Republic of Vietnam NAF, and allied supporting agencies were cooperatively and coordinately to intensify their actions to help defeat the Vietcong. Significant progress can now be reported.

The intensity of operations measured in terms of the percentage of available forces on the average engaged in daily combat, has been rising steadily, to the point where it is now about 22 times what it was a year ago.

In the last months Republic of Vietnam AF operations of battalion or larger size have at times doubled in number over what they had been when the NCP was initiated and small-unit actions have increased by 50 percent. On the other hand, Vietconginitiated actions have remained essentially unchanged in numbers. Republic of Vietnam-initiated operations outnumber Vietcong-initiated incidents about 10 to 1.

Secret bases of the Vietcong which had not been entered by other than the Vietcong in 14 years have since been reconnoitered, invaded, and fought through with signal success.

Vietcong casualties have been considerably higher than those of the Republic of Vietnam NAF, with an overall favorable ratio of about 4 to 1 for killed in action and 3 to 2 overall. Losses of weapons have averaged close to even on both sides. While, admittedly, the weapons being lost to the Vietcong are better quality than the crude home-made ones being captured from them, the loss of any weapon by the Vietcong is more nearly disastrous to them than is the loss of even a fine weapon to the Republic of Vietnam NAF because of the great disparity in supporting logistic systems.

Whereas the volume of Vietcong antiaircraft fire seems to be increasing and the quality of VC antiaircraft weapons may be improving, it is still limited principally to .30 caliber rifles and only a few machineguns.

The Vietcong are limited logistically for food and medicines in the highlands and for weapons everywhere; and they are gradually losing the support of the people as sources of funds, intelligence, and recruits.

Defectors from the Vietcong are surrendering themselves at a rate twice what it was a year ago. On the other hand, the rate of Republic of Vietnam AF desertions has steadily decreased. Moreover, villagers are now more readily disclosing information of the Vietcong to the Republic of Vietnam AF and the provincial administrators.

The Chieu Hoi program is swelling with returnees who wish to foreswear and repent their misadventures into communism.

While infiltration of Vietcong personnel and material is known to take place, the exact volume and trend are still imponderables. Nevertheless, large groups and quantities are not involved, the infiltration of cadres is dropping significantly, and smuggling is the biggest problem.

The strategic hamlet program has progressed from 40 percent of hamlets completed and 45 percent of population included as of January 1, 1963, to a present position of about 75 percent completion both as to construction and population included, with another about 15 percent currently under construction. Although the program will soon be completed, much still remains to be done to bring some of the earlier hamlet

construction and organization up to more recently established standards.

Most significantly of all, the Government of Vietnam gained in the year between July 1962 and July 1963 some 6 percent in effective control of the rural population whereas the Vietcong during the same period lost 10 percent. (The apparent discrepancy of 4 percent is a gain in the neutral or undecided category, wherein the population have switched at least from being Vietcongoriented to being neutral, in effect a further gain for the Government of Vietnam.)

The Government of Vietnam gain in area control is less spectacular, only 1 percent in the past year; in fact, in a sense, it is overshadowed by a Vietcong statistical gain of 5 percent in the neutral or previously uncontrolled areas. In simple terms, this signifies that the Government of Vietnam has gained in the populated areas-that is, has won people whereas the Vietcong have extended their control over relatively uninhabited areas—that is, has gained control of empty territory.

The security of road movement is a cogent index to gains by the Government of Vietnam. Many roads which a year ago were death traps by ambush are now traveled regularly by unescorted or lightly escorted Republic of Vietnam AF military convoys.

The railroad, too, is now more fully used. Whereas until September 1962 all night traffic had been suspended for fear of attack from ambush, trains now run 24 hours every day.

There are economic indicators also of Government of Vietnam gain in the past year; rice is again available for export and its price is stable.

Finally, despite some recent distractions caused by the Buddhist and student demonstrations and the rumors of coups, the attitude of the Government of Vietnam and of its public servants is definitely in the vein to solve, in this order of priority, its dominant problems of communism, disunity, and underdevelopment.

There have, of course, been costs for this progress, some of them serious. Whereas strategic hamlets are being built at an average cost of only about $5 per person accommodated, there are more than 1,000 Vietnamese casualties monthly; and U.S. casualties in personnel and aircraft have not been insignificant:

For the 21 months between January 1, 1962, and October 15, 1963, there were 63 U.S. killed, 348 U.S. wounded, and 5 U.S. missing; and for the 9 months between January 1963 and October 1963, while many U.S. aircraft were shot down or crashed, not all were lost.

Finally, what of the prospect for ultimate victory? In January 1963, Admiral Felt, CINCPAC, predicted here in Washington that the counterinsurgency in RVN would be won "within 3 years." General Harkins is on record as saying he considers that a "realistic target date" but "believes we can do even better." More recently, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor reported to President Kennedy "their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task (in the republic of Vietnam) can be completed by the end of 1965." General Don, Acting Chief of the Joint General Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, declared just 2 weeks ago that victory will be achieved in the war against the Vietcong in 1964. These stand as the authoritative predictions.

The remaining battles will be fought most savagely in the delta, the traditional stronghold of the Vietcong, where they are most numerous and deeply entrenched, where strategic hamlets are the most difficult to build and the program for building them got off to a late and sporadic start, and where counterinsurgency operations are the most strenuous

and the death throes of the Vietcong will be most violent. It is there that the toughest fighting and the fiercest Vietcong reactions are still in prospect before final victory will be

won.

RECESS

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the

CONFIRMATION

morrow.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 7 o'clock and 15 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess, under the order previously entered, until tomorrow, Thursday, November 7, 1963, at 12 o'clock meridian.

Executive nomination confirmed by

of October 22), 1963:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Douglas Henderson, of Massachusetts, a

Foreign Service officer of class 2, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of

the United States of America to Bolivia.

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Continues Record of Progress and Service in West Virginia-Morgantown (W. Va.)Dominion-News Commends Recent Improvements in Main Line Between Clarksburg and Parkersburg-President Jervis Langdon, and Many West Virginians Have Made Notable Contributions to Transportation

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. JENNINGS RANDOLPH

OF WEST VIRGINIA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, in 1838 the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad began construction of the first railroad tracks in West Virginia, building westward from Harpers Ferry. In the century and a quarter which has elapsed since then, the development of the railroad has provided significant contributions to the economy of West Virginia, and to the well-being of its citizens.

Among the responsible individuals who have been instrumental in the B. & O.'s success in the Mountain State were Charles W. Van Horn, of Lost Creek, W. Va., who was vice president in charge of operations for many years. Another leader was the former Governor of our State, the Honorable John J. Cornwell, of Romney, who for some time acted as general counsel of the line.

It is noteworthy that Charles R. Van Horn, the son of Mr. Van Horn, is now Washington representative for Government affairs of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.

And, the concern for progress and service which was so evident in frontier days has not diminished with the years, but continues to expand and to bring forth achievement and benefit. A notable example of growth is the recent completion of important main line improvements in the B. & O. system between Clarksburg and Parkersburg, W. Va.

This improved line will provide a direct route for major freight shipments to the Southwest, through the St. Louis gateway, and correspondingly improved service to the businessmen and citizens of the Mountain State.

It has recently been my privilege to correspond with the president of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, Mr. Jervis Langdon, Jr., congratulating his efficient

The prosperity-or lack of it-of this important railroad is of vital concern to every West Virginian because the B. & O. is a major taxpayer and in its continued progress all of us have a real stake.

This main line improvement makes it possible to haul all major freight items on the most direct route to the great Southis expected to greatly increase the revenues west through the St. Louis gateway. This of the railroad.

Adding this to the forward look the railroad has adopted in pioneering on unit coal freight trains and other projects designed to make the railroad a better facility for its customers and therefore a more profitable enterprise certainly is most desirable from all standpoints.

We in West Virginia salute the railroad

of the world and in doing so become more

tinues to make progressive moves designed to increase its service to the shippers of the world and in doing so become more valuable

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OCTOBER 29, 1963.

Mr. JERVIS LANGDON, Jr.,
President, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,
Parkersburg, W. Va..

Sincerely regret Senate business here prevents my participation in your programdiner today. Your company has contributed much to the economic development of West Virginia and to the well-being of the citizens of our State. It is especially appropriate that in this centennial year the old B. & O. is the new B. & O. as it meets its responsibilities for improved transportation vital to the movement of coal and other traffic across our State and throughout an important part of the country. Congratulations and please convey my greetings to all in attendance. JENNINGS RANDOLPH,

U.S. Senator.

THE BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD Co.,
Baltimore, Md., October 30, 1963.
Hon. JENNINGS RANDOLPH,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR: Thank you very much for your thoughtfulness in sending the telearrived at the end of a luncheon we held gram to me at Parkersburg yesterday. It on the special train which had come over from Clarksburg during the morning.

The project, I am sure, will be a great success and I look forward to a substantial increase in B. & O. traffic not only through stations in that great State. northern West Virginia but to and from our

Sincerely,

JERVIS LANGDON, Jr., President.

The Vast Amount of Money Gambled Every Year in the 24 States That Have Parimutuel Betting

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. PAUL A. FINO

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. FINO. Mr. Speaker, for the past several months, I have brought to the attention of the Members of this Congress the vast amounts of money gambled, legally and illegally, every year in each of the 24 States that have parimutuel betting.

I have discussed in a series of 24 statements inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, the panorama of gambling and crime in these States and how we have, because of our stubborn refusal to open our eyes to the bold print of commonsense, turned this Nation into a gamblers' paradise.

We have, Mr. Speaker, thanks to the hypocrites and the bluenose moralists, helped the underworld crime syndicates to fatten themselves from untapped gambling revenues and allowed them to expand their illicit activities into a nationwide web of dirt. We have permitted

gambling in the United States to grow into a gigantic tax-free $100 billion a year monopoly which has supported and will continue to support, unchained and uncontrolled, every filthy ramification of underworld activity.

We have, by permitting this tax-free business to fall into the hands of the crime syndicates, heavily subsidized the forces of organized crime which, in turn, has corrupted the processes of law enforcement and government.

We have paid and will continue to pay a steep price for the foolishness and blindness of those who refuse to recognize and control the natural human urge to gamble. We have made America the playground of crime syndicate operations.

Mr. Speaker, it is very difficult for our hard-pressed taxpayers to understand our Government's sanctimonious attitude about gambling when we know that gambling is a $100 billion a year industry which is the chief source of revenue to the underworld. Our entire ostrich

Only a Government-run lottery can legally satisfy the American thirst to gamble-only a Government-operated lottery can shut off this tremendous flow of billions of dollars to the underworld mob-only Government regulation and control of gambling through a national lottery can cut into these billions of dollars now siphoned off by the crime syndicates.

The time has come, Mr. Speaker, to exchange our rose-colored glasses of wishful thinking for the more accurate lenses of financial and social reality. Just as repeal of prohibition brought an end to the bootleg era and tremendous new revenues to our Treasury, so would the end of hypocrisy in our treatment of gambling strike a lethal blow at organized gambling and pump a substantial part of these moneys into our Government coffers.

In 1962 24 States, listed below, enjoyed a total parimutuel turnover of $3.7 bilTabulation on gambling in 24 States

legally, over $288 million. According to the testimony before the McClellan committee, 161⁄2 times as much money is wagered off the racetracks on horses as is bet on the tracks. The total national offtrack betting turnover allocated to these 24 States is estimated at over $281⁄2 billion. This, according to the McClellan hearings, represents only 42 percent of the total illegal gambling in these States. It can be estimated therefore, that the total illegal gambling in all 24 States approaches about $60 billion. Out of these funds, almost $6 billion-10 percent of the total turnover-goes right into the filthy pockets of the gambling crime syndicates.

How much longer are we going to continue to subsidize the forces of organized crime? How much longer are we going to keep the crime syndicates fat and happy? How much longer are we going to continue to make America the gamblers' paradise? What are we waiting for?

10 percent profit to crime syndicate

1. Arizona..

2. Arkansas

3. California.

4. Colorado

5. Delaware....

6. Florida...

7. Illinois.

8. Kentucky.

9. Louisiana.

10. Maine..

11. Maryland...

12. Massachusetts.

13. Michigan...--

Hawaii Sugar Workers Still Best Paid

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. SPARK M. MATSUNAGA

OF HAWAII

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, November 6, 1963

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, during the debate on the floor last Thursday, in speaking against the extension of Public Law 78, the Mexican Bracero Importation Act, I mentioned the high wages which sugar workers in Hawaii receive. According to comparative figures for 1962 recently released by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Hawaii's sugar workers are still the highest paid sugar workers in the world. Workers in Florida, the next highest paid, receive only half as much.

Hawaii's field hands last year received an average of $21.89 a day, including $16.02 in cash wages and $5.87 fringe benefits.

Cash wages in other domestic sugar areas ranged from $4.80 per day in Puerto Rico to $9.48 per day in Florida, where workers also receive a maximum of $1.52 per day in fringe benefits.

Hawaii also led in sugar yield per acre, getting more than three times as much sugar per acre of cane as Florida, the next most productive.

24. West Virginia..

Total...

Hawaii's sugar crop is a 2-year crop while others are 1-year crops but, even if cut in half, Hawaii's yields outstrip all others, the statistics showed.

The average daily earnings including both cash wages and fringe benefits, based on an 8-hour day were as follows:

Hawaii, $21.89; Florida, $11; the sugarbeet areas, $10.80; Louisiana, $8.19, and Puerto Rico, $6.32.

We in Hawaii are proud of the fact that while our sugar workers are the highest paid in the world, we are still capable of maintaining a competitive position in the sugar market.

Hungarian Revolt in 1956 (Seventh Anniversary)

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF

HON. HUGH L. CAREY

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Wednesday, November 6, 1963 Mr. CAREY. Mr. Speaker, in late October of 1956, the Hungarian people tried to shake off the inflexible Soviet tyranny imposed upon them by the Kremlin. They rebelled against their oppressors,

rose in mass revolt throughout the country, and, judged by their initial success, they seemed on their way of regaining their freedom. The Soviet garrisons in the country, even where they were of considerable size, surrendered to the rising forces of revolt, and new democratic leaders at once overthrew the Communist government in Budapest. For more than a week freedom reigned in many parts of the country.

In this hasty turn of events favoring freedom and independence, Hungarians expected quick and effective aid from the West. If this were not forthcoming, they feared that their own efforts would be doomed to failure against any serious Soviet effort to take over Hungary once more. This is exactly what happened. Most unfortunately, Hungary did not get the expected Western aid; Soviet forces were regrouped, and within a week most of the country was in the firm grip of the Red Army. By November 3, Communists were back in power in Budapest, and then they began their horrors of oppression, persecution, and terror. Thousands upon thousands of innocent and helpless people were victims of the biggest postwar terror perpetrated by the Kremlin. Once again the Hungarians were subdued and cruelly held down, and all freedom seemed vanished from Hungary. They paid heavily for their courageous and righteous deed of late October