Object of Resentment appears to deserve Punish

ment.

Chapter II. Of the proper Objects of Gratitude and Resentment.

Chapter III. That where there is no Approbation of the Conduct of the Person who confers the Benefit, there is little Sympathy with the Gratitude of him who receives it; and that, on the contrary, where there is no Disapprobation of the Motives of the Person who does the Mischief, there is no sort of Sympathy with the Resentment of him who suffers it.

Chapter IV. Recapitulation of the Foregoing Chapters. Chapter V. Analysis of the Sense of Merit and Demerit.

SECTION II. OF JUSTICE AND BENEFICENCE Chapter I. Comparison of those two Virtues.

Chapter II. Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and

of the Consciousness of Merit.

Chapter III. Of the utility of this constitution of nature. SECTION III. OF THE INFLUENCE OF FORTUNE UPON THE SENTIMENTS OF MANKIND, WITH REGARD ΤΟ THE MERIT OR DEMERIT OF ACTIONS

Chapter I. Of the causes of this Influence of Fortune. Chapter II. Of the extent of this Influence of Fortune. Chapter III. Of the final cause of this irregularity of Sentiments.

PART III. OF THE FOUNDATION OF OUR JUDGMENTS CONCERNING OUR OWN SENTIMENTS AND CONDUCT, AND OF THE SENSE OF DUTY

Chapter I. Of the Principle of Self-approbation and Self-disapprobation.

Chapter II. Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praiseworthiness, and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness.

Chapter III. Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience.

Chapter IV. Of the nature of Self-deceit, and of the Origin and Use of General Rules.

Chapter V. Of the Influence and Authority of General Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Diety.

Chapter VI. In what cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole principle of our Conduct, and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives.

PART IV. OF THE EFFECT OF UTILITY UPON THE SENTIMENT OF APPROBATION

Chapter I. Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility bestows upon all the productions of Art, and of the extensive influence of this species of Beauty.

Chapter II. Of the Beauty which the Appearance of Utility bestows upon the Characters and Actions of Men; and how far the perception of this Beauty may be regarded as one of the original Principles of Approbation.

PART V. OF THE INFLUENCE OF CUSTOM AND FASHION UPON THE SENTIMENTS OF MORAL APPROBATION AND DISAPPROBATION

Chapter I. Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon our notions of Beauty and Deformity.

Chapter II. Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion upon Moral Sentiments.

PART VI. OF THE CHARACTER OF VIRTUE SECTION I. OF THE CHARACTER OF THE INDIVIDUAL SO FAR AS IT AFFECTS HIS OWN HAPPINESS, OR OF PRUDENCE SECTION II. OF THE CHARACTER OF THE INDIVIDUAL SO

FAR AS IT CAN AFFECT THE HAPPINESS OF OTHER PEOPLE

Chapter I. Of the Order in which Individuals are recommended by nature to our care and attention. Chapter II. Of the Order in which Societies are recommended by Nature to our Beneficence. Chapter III. Of Universal Benevolence.

SECTION III. OF SELF-COMMAND

CONCLUSION OF THE SIXTH PART

PART VII. OF SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY SECTION I. OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH OUGHT TO BE EX

AMINED IN A THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS

SECTION II. OF THE DIFFERENT ACCOUNTS WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE

Chapter I. Of those systems which make Virtue consist in Propriety.

Chapter II. Of those systems which make Virtue consist in Prudence.

Chapter III. Of those systems which make Virtue consist in Benevolence.

Chapter IV. Of Licentious Systems.

SECTION III. OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS WHICH HAVE

BEEN FORMED CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF APPRO-
BATION

Chapter I. Of those systems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love.

Chapter II. Of those systems which make Reason the

Principle of Approbation.

Chapter III. Of those systems which make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation.

SECTION IV. OF THE MANNER IN WHICH DIFFERENT AU

THORS HAVE TREATED OF THE PRACTICAL RULES OF
MORALITY

With reference to this system of Moral Philosophy, I repeat, first, that the present argument is in no way concerned with supporting its specific contents. In detail it strikes the modern mind as naïve in many ways. The important matter for us is that it was an attempt to state life in the large, in moral terms, and that this attempt drew the broad outlines of the picture of life within which the economic technique afterward analyzed had to find its rating.

In the second place, we should further fortify our argument by pointing out that the main current of moral philosophy in the eighteenth century was essentially non-moral in our modern sense, because it was subjective rather than objective, individual rather than social. Adam Smith was a good illustration of this paradox. His moral philosophy was in the world, but not of the world, in the sense which makes the difference both between speculative and positive morals and between individualistic and social morals. Eight

eenth-century philosophy attempts to explain the world and its people either from a metaphysical ground outside of the world and people, or from a qualitative analysis of the individual mind. Smith's system of morals, for example, rested on the principle of approbation in the mental operations of the individual. For instance, he says: 17

When we approve of any character or action, the sentiments which we feel are, according to the foregoing system, derived from four sources, which are in some respects different from one another. First, we sympathize with the motives of the agent; secondly, we enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions; thirdly, we observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general rules by which those two sympathies generally act; and, last of all, when we consider such actions as making a part of a system of behaviour which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or of the society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility, not unlike that which we ascribe to any well contrived machine. After deducting, in any one particular case, all that must be acknowledged to proceed from some one or other of these four principles, I should be glad to know what remains; and I shall freely allow this overplus to be ascribed to a moral sense, or to any other peculiar faculty, provided anybody will ascertain precisely what this overplus is. It might be expected, perhaps, that if there was any such peculiar principle, such as this moral sense is supposed to be, we should feel it in some particular cases, separated and detached from every other, as we 17 Moral Sentiments, p. 479.