requirement interfered with freedom of contract which the employer would have enjoyed except for the mandate of the statute. The provision of the Act continuing the relationship of employer and employe in the case of a strike as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current labor dispute is a regulation of the same sort and within the principle of our decision.

Seventh. The affirmative relief ordered by the Board was within its powers and its order was not arbitrary or capricious.

As we have held in National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U. S. 261, the relief which the statute empowers the Board to grant is to be adapted to the situation which calls for redress. On the basis of the findings, five men who took part in the strike were discriminated against in connection with a blanket offer to reinstate striking employes. The Board enjoined further discrimination against employes by reason of union affiliation, but it could not grant complete relief in respect of the five men short of ordering that the discrimination be neutralized by their being given their former positions and reimbursed for the loss due to their lack of employment consequent upon the respondent's discrimination. The order is criticized as arbitrary in that it is said to award back pay to date of reinstatement with deductions only for what was earned to the date of the order. We do not so read it, and the Board admits that credit must be given for all sums earned to date of reinstatement, and so construes the order. It is further said that the order arbitrarily and unreasonably requires the notices to be posted to state that respondent will not discharge its reinstated employes for any reason whatever. This clause of the order is inartificially drawn, and counsel for the Board admit that it should be read in connection with the remainder of the order forbidding discharge on the ground of union activity.

Eighth. The respondent was not denied a hearing with respect to the offense found by the Board. The respondent says that it was summoned to answer a complaint that it discriminated by discharging the five men and that, after all the evidence was in, this complaint was withdrawn and a new one presented asserting that its refusal to re-employ the five men was the head and front of its offending. Then it is said that when the Board came to make its finding it reverted to the position that what the respondent did had not been a failure to employ but a wrongful discharge. Thus the respondent claims that it is found guilty of an unfair labor practice which was not within the issues upon which the case was tried. The position is highly technical. All parties to the proceeding knew from the outset that the thing complained of was discrimination against certain men by reason of their alleged union activities. If there was a current labor dispute the men were still employes by virtue of § 2 (3), and the refusal to let them work was a discharge. The respondent says that as the Board failed to find, in so many words, that there was a current labor dispute, its conclusion of fact that the men were discharged has no basis. But the Board found that the strike was called because the strikers were informed that the negotiations for a working agreement in New York were not proceeding satisfactorily. We think its action cannot be overturned for the mere reason that it failed to characterize the situation as a current labor dispute. The respondent further urges that, when the amended complaint was filed and the original one withdrawn, the charge it had to meet was a refusal to re-employ; that the phrase "re-employ" means "employ anew"; that if the Board had found a failure to employ the five men because of discrimination forbidden by the Act, the findings would have followed the complaint, whereas the Board, in its conclusions of fact, referred to respondent's action as "refusal to reinstate to

employment" and as a discharge; and the argument is that the findings do not follow the pleadings.

A review of the record shows that at no time during the hearings was there any misunderstanding as to what was the basis of the Board's complaint. The entire evidence, pro and con, was directed to the question whether, when the strike failed and the men desired to come back and were told that the strike would be forgotten and that they might come back in a body save for eleven men who were singled out for different treatment, six of whom, however, were treated like everyone else, the respondent did in fact discriminate against the remaining five because of union activity. While the respondent was entitled to know the basis of the complaint against it, and to explain its conduct, in an effort to meet that complaint, we find from the record that it understood the issue and was afforded full opportunity to justify the action of its officers as innocent rather than discriminatory.

At the conclusion of the testimony, and prior to oral argument before the examiner, the Board transferred the proceeding to Washington to be further heard before the Board. It denied respondent's motion to resubmit the cause to the trial examiner with directions to prepare and file an intermediate report. In the Circuit Court of Appeals the respondent assigned error to this ruling. It appears that oral argument was had and a brief was filed with the Board after which it made its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The respondent now asserts that the failure of the Board to follow its usual practice of the submission of a tentative report by the trial examiner and a hearing on exceptions to that report deprived the respondent of opportunity to call to the Board's attention the alleged fatal variance between the allegations of the complaint and the Board's findings. What we have said sufficiently indicates that the issues and contentions of

the parties were clearly defined and as no other detriment or disadvantage is claimed to have ensued from the Board's procedure the matter is not one calling for a reversal of the order. The Fifth Amendment guarantees no particular form of procedure; it protects substantial rights. Compare Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 478. The contention that the respondent was denied a full and adequate hearing must be rejected.

Ninth. The other contentions of the respondent are overruled because foreclosed by earlier decisions of this court.

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO and MR. JUSTICE REED took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

TAFT, EXECUTOR, v. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

No. 746. Argued April 25, 1938.-Decided May 16, 1938.

1. A decedent in her lifetime promised educational institutions to establish an endowment fund and to pay salaries of orchestral musicians and a director of art. The promises were accepted and acted upon, and under the state law were binding upon her estate. Held that in valuing the estate for taxation under the Revenue Act of 1926, the executor was not entitled to deduct the amounts payable under the promises, as being claims contracted "for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth," § 303 (a) (1), or as "transfers," to or for the use of the promisee corporations, id. § 303 (a) (3). Pp. 355, 357.

2. The legislative and administrative history of § 303 (a) (1) of the Revenue Act of 1926, shows that a promise by a decedent to pay money to a charitable or educational institution, where the only consideration was a stipulated application of the amount received, does not constitute a claim against the estate contracted for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, notwithstanding the fact that under local law the promise is enforceable. P. 355.

3. A binding promise by a decedent to pay money to a charitable or educational institution, not attended by any allocation of funds in decedent's lifetime, is not a "transfer" within the meaning of § 303 (a) (3), Revenue Act of 1926; and payment by the executor does not make it such by relation. P. 357.

4. Only such transfers inter vivos as are testamentary in character are deductible under subsection (3), supra. P. 358.

92 F. 2d 667, affirmed.

CERTIORARI, 303 U. S. 631, to review a judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals which affirmed a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals, 33 B. T. A. 671, sustaining the disallowance of certain deductions in the valuation of an estate for taxation.

Mr. Robert A. Taft for petitioner.

Mr. Warner W. Gardner, with whom Solicitor General Jackson, Assistant Attorney General Morris, and Messrs. Sewall Key and L. W. Post were on the brief, for respondent.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether the petitioner, as executor, may deduct from the gross estate amounts payable pursuant to the decedent's binding promises as claims against the estate incurred bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth within the meaning of § 303 (a) (1), or as transfers to charitable or educational institutions under § 303 (a) (3), of the