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In the Middle West the Chicago "Herald " stands prominent. It

of readers of yesterday's newspapers. It is difficult to imagine a quicker or greater response than he has received from every direction.

The newspapers of the South and West echo this. The Louisville" Courier-Journal," one of the best known of all the Southern papers, says:

The elimination of competition, the co-ordination of transportation systems, and the subordination of all other purposes to that of making the resources of the United States mobile for the prosecution of the war should make the transfer of the railroads to government control of decided constructive value.

The experiment cannot succeed without serving as an objectlesson in government ownership. .. a bridge which a majority of Americans will be willing to cross when they reach it. At present the prosecution of war occupies every American's mind. . . . All else must be made subordinate to it and where possible contributory to it.

says:

After noon to-morrow Uncle Sam will be at the throttle... This relief will probably be appreciated by no one more than the railroad managers themselves .. If Government control is the only way of bringing the Government to afford that relief which the roads have long been clamoring for, it will have certain advantages over the semi-Governmental control which regulates the income drastically but permits the outflow to flow unchecked. In conclusion, the opinion of the "Kansas City Star," whose opinions are Nationally respected, forms a suitable summary of the whole matter: "It is testimony to the immense changes worked in the National spirit that such a revolutionary movement is carried out with little opposition in any quarter. The American people are solidly behind any measure necessary to help win the war."

SOME REFLECTIONS UPON A MEETING OF POLITICAL

SCIENTISTS

SPECIAL CORRESPONDENCE BY FREDERICK M. DAVENPORT

As some of our readers who have read in The Outlook Mr. Davenport's lively observations on public questions, and who know of his acquaintance with the practical workings of government through his experiences in political office, may need to be reminded, the writer of the following special correspondence is Professor of Law and Civil Polity at Hamilton College.-THE EDITORS.

T

THE City of Brotherly Love during the holidays was full of college professors-historians and classicists, sociologists and economists-and political scientists of the university persuasion. And, naturally, the most war-shocked and war-bewildered of all were the political scientists. What about the future of responsible democracy? Is there to be any future? Not unless democracy can be made to work far better than it has worked hitherto. Beard, sometime protesting Professor of Politics at Columbia, offered a scathing indictment of the legalistic political philosophies of recent generations, and openly confessed for himself and his comrades that there had been neither adequate vision nor political health in any of them. Dodd, of the University of Chicago, defined a reformer as a well-meaning person, usually a college professor, who believes that things ought to be different and who has a panacea to make them different, which fails because he has no conception of how things actually are done in the politics of the country or what the underlying forces are with which he has to deal.

Actual government is more and more looking to political science for ideas of reorganization. There is no doubt about that. A good representation of the political intellectuals of the United States were gathered at Philadelphia; but they recognized that the country had asked of them bread and that they had given it a stone. They hadn't put it across. Treitschke put it across. For a generation he fed the sources of power in the German state with the political nutriment craved by the law of its sovereign being. As an inspirer of autocracy to do its ablest and its worst he is without a peer.

When will the political intellectuals of America begin to inspire democracy to do its noblest and its best? Certainly not until they get in touch with the human nature of American democracy and begin to understand the great sub-conscious forces of its being. Political science in the United States knows what Aristotle thought and Machiavelli and the Federalists. It can describe governments that have existed and it begins to have a vision of certain concrete particulars in which government and society in the future must be different from government and society in the past. But it has in places of power no Bismarcks, no Treitschkes, no Hamiltons, and no Madisons, and no powerful intellects of action who see the whole thing in the large and are able to put it across.

The great body of political intellectuals in America are doing very little to make democracy responsible and efficient and powerful, because they are not in touch with the motives and sources of action. They are not in touch with the great currents of human nature, with men and things as they are. They are groping around just now for an economic interpretation of politics, which is all right as far as it goes. But very few of them are practical political psychologists, which is an important

matter for a political scientist. They have no broad, corporate political philosophy, and no way of putting it across if they had the philosophy. It was easy for Treitschke. The organization of the German state was eager and ready for his ideas. But it is a far harder task to inspire and lead into action the inchoate and chaotic American democracy.

What is to be done about it? How shall the political scientist become more competent, and by what methods shall he put it across? In the first place, no man ought to be allowed to teach political science who doesn't spend part of his time in the world outside of his college class-room in the laboratory of practical political activity. You cannot inclose a laboratory of political science within the four walls of a building on the cam pus. Every political scientist should have his roots deliberately and practically in the world outside, and boards of trustees and faculties should come to see the very great need of it in this particular department of knowledge. Dry-as-dust disquisitions about days that are done or about Utopias that never dawned are no help whatever to the American democracy.

And the whole system of public school and college education needs to be revolutionized on the side of preparation for citizenship. The place to put practical political ideals in a democ racy is in the plastic and impressionable minds of boys and girls who to-morrow are to have the voting power and the control absolute of the country's future-a great new programme of concrete citizenship worked into the school curriculum at an early period and required of every boy and girl to the end of the educational career; no paltry civics nor skeleton. studies in government, but concrete community experiences. directly participated in under the school roof or near by-voting, naturalization, parliaments, courts, the manifold community activities that function in a city or county or State. Nothing can stop the universal suffrage of both men and women in a democracy; nothing must stop their preparation for it when the age of duty comes.

The great need of the leaders of democracy is a better knowledge and a better appreciation of human nature in politics. Now everybody votes and everybody reads and democracy has broken loose from its swaddling-clothes. It is impossible to control democracy from above by checks and balances and weights and hobbles, as the revered Federalists did in the early days of the Nation. Democracy resents such inhibitions, and ought to resent them. It is too late even benevolently to coerce democracy in this country, in any event. Real leaders with ideas and deep and genuine sympathy with the masses of the people are henceforth to be the most reliable checks upon the mob spirit in America and throughout the world.

But how are you going to sympathize with democracy and lead it straight, no matter how much of a political intellectual

you are, unless you sit down with democracy humbly and learn its inner nature and the great and more or less sub-conscious forces which determine its action? The intellectuals and natural leaders are under bonds to live with democracy, to sit down patiently in all the political club-houses, trade-union gatherings, and farmers' associations, and learn what democracy is thinking about and how democracy feels about it.

Why, in New York City, does Al Smith last longer than John Purroy Mitchel? Why does Tammany outlast all its Fusion foes and grow slowly better in the process? From the standpoint of democracy, it is a matter of the survival of the fittest. Al Smith knows the human nature of every man, woman, and child on Manhattan Island. That has always been the strength of Tammany. The cold corporate method, no matter how efficient, applied to politics without recourse to human nature or appreciation of it, is doomed to failure. The last Fusion campaign in New York City will long remain a classical illustration of the futility of selling good government from above to a democracy. It cannot be done, not even with the most enormous overhead charges. The last attempt at a new and far better Constitution for the State of New York failed precisely at this point. A group of thoroughly able and sincere men planned, more or less in camera, after the manner of Federalists, a better instrument of government than New York had ever known. I do not know that the inspectors of election are through yet with counting the overwhelming majority in opposition. Those modern Federalists forgot that you must let modern democracy know at every point what you are doing, patiently, determinedly, sympathetically, or you cannot put it across.

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Through sympathy and the humble spirit of getting acquainted with things as they are, perhaps by and by the whole American public cant about men who interest themselves practically in politics will cease. The right leaders will come, though, will be recognized, and will be influential. As the result of many a sad experience there is now a public tone of opprobrium against men who persistently seek to become influential in public affairs. They are "self-seekers " office-seekers," at best to be tolerated and suspected, defeated soon, and changed often in order to insure political security and the public welfare. Their salaries are usually fixed at amounts which Mr. Murphy, of New York, once rightly affirmed to be only "chicken feed." The only alternative has seemed to be to depend, as England has done, upon the leadership of a benevolent aristocracy of wealth and position. But the American democracy does not take kindly to this alternative. Neither will any democracy in the long run.

There is a better way, and perhaps the American democracy will follow it when its sympathethic intellectuals make themselves well enough acquainted with the common mind, so that the common mind begins to trust them. Great numbers of young men in the colleges of America ought to be under instruction to look forward to practical politics as a means of livelihood as well as of service. The most practical politics is enlightened self-interest, modified by the spirit of service and of sympathy with the ideals of the mass of mankind. Not all of this was said at the meeting of political scientists in the City of Brotherly Love, but the substance of what is here written lay back of all that was said.

Philadelphia, December 29, 1917.

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SHOULD like to lay a "sprig of Western pine" upon the bier of Francis G. Newlands. He was a noble man. Throughout a long life of active political struggle he never made an enemy whom he would not have chosen as an enemy, and he drew to himself all men of fine aspiration. Some of those with whom he worked thought him a dreamer-and he was. He had that obsession, so unbelieved in by the practical politician, that the world was eventually ruled by thought; that the man who kept his head clear and open to the incoming of the highest impulses would find himself gradually surrounded by those who come up slowly to the same high plane. It was this great optimism which was the foundation rock of his nature. He believed that the innate secret of democracy was its sureness in the end to do the right thing. He was a dreamer, and he saw some of his dreams come true. It took twenty years of agitation to gain the consent of Congress to look at the problem of our rivers and deserts and forests as one National problem. It is fifteen years and more since his effort resulted in the Reclamation Act; and only at the last session was he able to tie the problem of irrigation to the problem of flood control and water transportation.

It was on Mr. Newlands's resolution that the Hawaiian Islands came into the Union. He labored tirelessly on behalf of the railway men to secure protection for their lives upon freight trains through the passage of the Safety Appliance Acts. He believed in the Constitution as a living instrument quite equal to the responsibilities and duties of a growing Nation. Indeed, a review of his political career will show him to have been a forwardlooking man from his earliest day in Congress. He saw clearly, and before others saw or dared to speak, the things which threatened and which must be met; and, splendidly lacking in what one of his colleagues called "a sense of opportuneness." he battled in season and out for measures which promoted the making of an American nation that was more serviceable to the world in its physical strength and in its physical beauty. He challenged the finest qualities in men; never their smallnesses, their petty personal likes and dislikes, and, as a result, drew from all those whom he knew their noblest qualities, revealed their finer selves; and only in his death all realize how much they respected him and how real their affection for him was.

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JAPAN'S WAR PROBLEMS: HER NEW RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND CHINA

T

HE growing friendly relations of Japan and the United States are signalized by the visit to this country of two important Japanese commissions. The first, of which Visount Ishii is the head, was a diplomatic mission. Its function and its reception in this country have already been noted in these pages. It was signalized by the Ishii-Lansing agreement concerning the rights of Japan and the United States in the Far East. One of the questions which the Ishii Mission dealt with was the part that Japan had in the war. It is this subject that the first of the two following articles discusses.

The second commission is known as the Finance Commission. While it is officially appointed, authorized, and sent by the Imperial Government of Japan, it is not at all political. Its function is rather social, industrial and economic. Viscount Ishii's mission may be likened to an official call of the Government of Japan upon the Government of the United States. Baron Megata's mission may be likened to a call of the Japanese people upon the people of the United States.

In the second of the two following articles Baron Ito, of the Finance Commission, tells our readers something about the commercial relations of Japan and America. The Imperial Finance Commission, of which he is a member, and which arrived in San Francisco about November 1 last, is making a study of the industrial and economic development of the United States by visiting and observing the work of American manufacturers, industrialists, and merchandisers. For many years the balance

of trade between the two countries has been in favor of Japan, as the phrase goes. That is to say, Japan has exported more to this country than she has imported from us. The balance has been paid by us in specie by exchange on London. But Japan would much prefer to take this balance in commodities rather than in money. Steel, forexample, is very necessary to Japan as a manufacturing country, and she would like to import more steel from the United States; and Japan needs the steel to finish the ships which she is building, and which we and our allies need. An increase of exportations from this country to Japan of raw materials and manufactured goods would be, of course, an advantage to American commerce.

Baron Megata, who is the head of the Finance Commission, was born in 1853, the year when Commodore Perry first opened the gates of intercourse between Japan and the United States. The Baron was the first Japanese to graduate from an American university, having received his degree of Bachelor of Arts from Harvard in 1874. He has had a long public career in Japan, beginning in the educational department and later serving as a justice in the law courts. But his chief and longest work as a publicist and officer of the Government has been in the Department of Finance. The Commission consists of eight members besides himself, Four of these members are Government officers, and four of them represent important and influential financial or industrial houses. They deserve a cordial welcome in this country.-THE EDITORS.

I-WHY JAPAN HAS NOT SENT AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO

EUROPE

BY T. IYENAGA

Dr. Iyenaga is Director of the "East and West News Bureau," an organization of Japanese citizens for promoting a better understanding between America and Japan. He is also associated with the University of Chicago as a professorial lecturer.-THE EDITORS.

J

APAN'S position in the world war is unique. She entered the war in obedience to the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which imposed upon her the duty of conducting military operations in common with her ally in the regions of eastern Asia and of safeguarding mutual interests therein. Japan also joined the solemn agreement entered into between the Entente Powers to make no separate peace. So long, therefore, as peace in conformity with the wishes of her allies is not concluded, Japan is of course a belligerent warring against the Central Powers.

But since the capture of the German stronghold in the Far Cast on November 7, 1914, and the sweeping of enemy warships out of the Eastern seas, with the exception of her recent naval activity in the Mediterranean, Japan has apparently been standing aloof from the great conflict. The question is therefore often asked, "Why is this aloofness on the part of Japan? Why is she not fighting on the European battlefields, whereas the United States, who joined the ranks of the Allies half a year ago, is to-day mustering all her military resources and sending to Europe her sons by hundreds of thousands?"

The geographical position Japan occupies and the peculiar international situation she finds herself in have determined the part she should play in the war. In view of these circumstances, to Japan was assigned by her allies the task of destroying the German power in the Far East and of preserving peace and safeguarding the Allied interests therein. That this duty has been, and is, being discharged by Japan with fidelity and thoroughness is patent to those who have closely followed the course of events in the Orient during the past three years. What is not generally known, however, is the fact that since the reduction of Kiaochau and the capture of German naval bases in the South Seas, the Japanese navy has been keeping a vigilant watch over the wide expanse of waters from the Red Sea to the Yellow Sea, and a large portion of the Pacific, involving in the operations an enormous extent of cruises made by the fleets

and a corresponding heavy expenditure. Furthermore, Japan has subscribed to the loans of her allies to the full extent of her financial capacity, and supplied them with much-needed munitions and other war materials. And especially to Russia has Japan assured an uninterrupted flow of ammunition, guns and rifles, foodstuffs and clothing.

In examining the question of despatching Japanese troops to Europe, it must be noted, in the first place, that it was neither the wish of her allies nor that of Japan that she should thrust herself upon the European stage. The writer is aware that the subject has been discussed by certain publicists of some Allied countries, but he has no knowledge of any formal request having been made to Japan by any of the Allied Governments to send an expeditionary force to Europe. The reason is not far to seek. Japan's proper sphere of activity is in the Orient and on the eastern Pacific. It was for this reason that, when she entered the war, Japan by an agreement with her ally limited her naval and military activities to the Far East and its waters. True, the sphere of her naval operations was gradually extended. It was first extended to the South Seas, then to the Indian Ocean, then to the Cape of Good Hope, then to embrace the Pacific, and finally to certain parts of the Mediterranean, where a fleet of Japanese destroyers is to-day co-operating with the Allied fleets in the operations against the enemy submarines. But so far as the movement of Japan's land forces is concerned the basis of action first agreed upon still remains intact, for cause that justifies its alteration has yet appeared.

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As The Outlook well remarks: "Just as the United States must be the leader in affairs on the American continent, so Japan must sound the dominant note in the East. Let, then, Japan use its vast influence in the Orient, and in the Occident let the United States on one side of the Atlantic and the democratic countries of Europe on the other side take the lead." It seems, then, but proper that, so far as purely military opera tions are concerned, the war in the Occident should be met by

the European and American Allies. It is, in fact, none of Japan's part to intrude herself upon the European fields. Such an enterprise is entirely out of harmony with the wise and farsighted policy that should guide Japan, for in undertaking it she is bound to face the dilemma of either impairing her hardwon military prestige or of reawakening the cry of " Yellow Peril," which is now fortunately on the point of being committed to oblivion. Would it not, furthermore, be a mark of discourtesy, to use a mild word, on the part of Japan to think of sending troops to the assistance of her European allies? Those who advocate in an easy fashion the despatch of a Japanese force to Russia for the purpose of rehabilitating the morale of Russian troops completely ignore the psychology of the Russian people. In the next place, there are almost insurmountable difficulties in the way of despatching an expeditionary force from Japan to Europe. There is first the question of difference in race, language, habit, and diet existing between the Japanese and European troops, which would by no means be easy to adjust. There is next the question of the tremendous cost involved in the expedition. According to some authorities, such an expedition would cost Japan $2,000,000,000 a year Rich as she has suddenly grown to be, Japan is still burdened with a heavy debt, bequeathed as a heritage of the costly Russo-Japanese War Japan cannot bear the burden of a distant oversea expedition.

But the foremost of all difficulties is that of transportation. The Trans-Siberian Railway, although it may have seen a considerable improvement through the efforts of American engineers, is still in a paralyzed condition, or at least overtaxed in hauling across Siberia the military provisions piled up moun

tain high in Vladivostok. The only alternative would, then; be to transport Japanese troops by sea. But where can we secure the required ships? In transporting a million Japanese soldiers nothing short of this number would prove of any effective value-with all the necessary paraphernalia of war, it would probably require four millions of tonnage-in other words, one thousand ocean-going ships of four thousand tons each; and :. constant flow of munitions and foodstuffs must also be provided for The construction of Japanese guns and rifles and the peculiar dietary needs of Japanese soldiers would make it impracti cable for her European allies to supply the ammunition and provisions for the Japanese army. Were Japan to commandeer for the purpose of transportation the entire fleet of her merchant marine fit for ocean voyage, not only would much timeaccording to some estimates it would take two years and a half— be expended before the completion of the transportation programme, but in the meantime the commerce of the Far East with America and Europe would be completely paralyzed.

The foregoing will suffice to explain why Japan has not sent an expeditionary force to Europe and to convince any one that it would be of far greater benefit to her allies that Japan devote her energies in other directions than the one touched upon. There are many ways for Japan to serve the Allied cause. It would of course be foolish for one to predict that no emergency will ever arise when it may become an imperative duty for Japan to surmount every obstacle in her way, to risk all, sacrifice all, at the altar of the common cause. It need not be emphasized that Japan stands ready to do everything within her power to see victory perch over the banners of the Allied nations.

II-AMERICA AND JAPAN IN THE TRADE OF CHINA

HE vastness of the market

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BY BARON BUNKICHI ITO

OPECIAL FINANCE COMMISSIONER OF JAPAN TO THE UNITED STATES

sibilities of China has never been recognized by the American people. Once the Chinese field is reasonably opened up for the reception of foreign goods and the people educated to use them, Japan will not have the power to supply one-hundredth of the Chinese demand. There is room in China for the trade, not only of the United States and of Japan as well, but also of the socalled competitors from Europe.

An impression prevails in the United States that the interests of Japan and America in China are incompatible, that they are fundamentally antagonistic and are destined to collide right along, and more especially over the trade of China.

The impression is wrong as far as I can see, it is about as wrong as most fashionable impressions are very apt to be.

Let us view this theme from the standpoint of the trade of the two countries with China. It is true that the American cottons have shown a decrease of late in the amount of sale to the Chinese customers. People at once jumped at the conclusion that the reason of all that was the Japanese competition. In the past there may have been instances where the American cotton goods were crowded out of a certain section of the Chinese market through the competition of the Japanese goods. But things are quite different at present. The weaving industry of China itself has gone ahead at a rather remarkable pace in late years. As a result, the native products naturally have cut down the amount of foreign importation of cottons. They drove out the American cottons. They also drove out the Japanese goods of similar grade. They work impartially against the Japanese and American goods alike. The Chinese products do not compete with a fine grade of cottons (some of the British makes, for example), for the simple reason that the Chinese do not produce the higher-grade goods. Therefore, unless the American cotton mills specialize in the high-grade articles, they are compelled to face the competition from the output of the native mills.

As a matter of statistical fact, the United States has made greater progress in the Chinese trade than Japan has since the beginning of the world war. In 1916 the United States sold to China goods amounting to 53,824,000 haikwan taels, and her imports from China amounted to 72,081,000 haikwan taels in value. Therefore the total trade of America with China

amounted to 125,905,000 taels. These are the figures of the maritime customs of China. Now compare these figures with those of the pre-war year-those of 1913. The result will be seen to be nothing less than sensational. American exports to China gained something like fifty-two per cent, and American imports from China about ninety-two per cent. It is not difficult to account for this change, of course. With the outbreak of the great war China could not get from Europe the things she was wont to get from there. She had to turn to the United States and other countries. The Chinese demand for American goods increased markedly as the result of this situation. And at the same time the United States found it necessary to buy a good deal more of materials from China, largely owing to the tremendous activity of her factories in getting out goods to supply the belligerent Powers.

Japan's trade with China of course has grown apace since the beginning of the war. But the ratio of growth of her China trade falls below that of the United States. Last year Japan exported to China goods amounting to 160,490,000 haikwan taels in value, and imported from China 112,922,000 taels' worth of goods. The total trade, therefore, amounted to 273,412,000 haikwan taels. In the total it is far above that of the American trade with China; but when one compares these figures with those of 1913-the year before the opening of the war-he will readily find that Japan has gained only thirty-four per cent in her exports to China and seventy-two per cent in her imports from her...

And this comparatively disappointing showing of Japan's Chinese trade is not so astounding, after all. Japan has many advantages over the other great trading powers as far as the Chinese market is concerned-her geographical position with reference to the Chinese market, a more intimate knowledge of China, and a greater facility in accommodating the demands of her Chinese customers, etc. At the same time, it is equally true that the development of her industries is still far from attaining a position of filling the Chinese demands for a thousand and one articles of foreign manufacture.

Most of us know that the China trade will increase with the years. What we are rather unmindful of is the awakening of industrial China. All over China spinning-mills and factories for the manufacture of textiles, matches, knitted goods, soap, glass, and other simpler forms of industries are springing up at a really remarkable pace. Japan, naturally, feels the effect

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Left to right, bottom row: Baron Bunkichi Ito, Secretary in the Extraordinary Industrial Investigation Bureau, Department of Agriculture and Commerce"; Mr. Chozo Koike, Director of the Kuhara Head Office, Osaka; Baron Tanetaro Megata, member of the House of Peers; Dr. Seiji Hishida, Secretary Interpreter to the Government General of Cho-sen (Korea); Mr. Takenosuke Sakaguchi, Technical Inspector in the Extraordinary Investigation Bureau, Department of Finance. Top row: Mr. Osamu Matsumoto, Secretary in the Department of Finance; Mr. Kenjiro Matsumoto, Representative of the Yasukawa Mining Co., Fukuoka; Mr. Yoshitaro Yamashita, General Manager of the Sumitomo Firm, Osaka; Mr. Umekichi Yoneyama, Managing Director of the Mitsui Bank, Ltd., Tokyo all this more keenly than any other exporting country. Unless the industrial activity of Japan takes a tremendous forward step in the near future, the Japanese exports to China will be gradually crowded out by the native products, for the simple reason that the large proportion of Japan's exports to China are products of a simpler form of manufacturing industry-the very kind which China can herself produce now or very soon. It is different with the United States. The steady advance of industrial China is a good thing for America. It will be some time before China attains the height of complex industrial activity which prevails in the United States. Meanwhile, the more China develops her simpler forms of industrial activities, the greater would be her demand for machinery, steel products, chemical products, drugs, dyestuffs, and such other things as the United States is able to furnish. And these are the very articles in which Japan cannot hope to compete with the United States.

In the past the chief articles of American export to China were kerosene oil, cottons, wheaten flour, timber, iron and steel, paper, and cigarettes. In the years preceding the world war the American trade with China was not exactly in a flourishing condition, but after the coming of the world war all was changed. American goods have taken the place of European supplies in the Chinese markets to a very large extent; iron and steel manufactures, machinery, leather goods, cars, chemical products and drugs, and various other goods have been imported from the United States. The result of all this was the remarkable growth of the American trade with China.

Now Japan did not get much benefit out of this sudden stoppage of the European supplies to China and to the rest of the Far East. This does not accord with the general impression prevailing in the United States; nevertheless, it is true. And the reason for it all is not far to seek, for in many departments of iron and steel manufactures, in chemical industries, Japan had not attained any marked advance. It was more than she could do to supply her own needs in some of those products. Indeed, she had to import a major portion of these things from abroad. And the point is that these steel products and the fruits of chemical industries are the very things which China will demand more and more of with her economic advance. There is little room for doubt that the American wares which have taken the place of the European ones in the markets of China will be amply

It will be seen, therefore, that America and Japan can, and will, naturally be forced to get along in harmony and side by side as far as the Chinese markets are concerned. Japan will for some years to come keep on supplying China with the products of the simpler forms of industry-with the comparatively cheaper grades of goods. And at the same time the United States will play the title rôle of purveyor of the higher grade of manufactures and more expensive wares to China. Therefore there should be little room for collision between the activities of the two countries.

Of course it goes without saying that Japan is straining her every sinew and will in the future exert herself to the utmost to develop her own industries. She expects confidently, indeed, to rank with the best of the manufacturing nations of the earth at no distant day. Some day she will be putting out the same high grade of wares as the United States is to-day producing; she will come in keen competition with the American products when that time arrives. But at the same time what one should bear constantly in mind is this all-important fact: China is a huge country.

The market possibilities of that land are very great. Let her perfect her transportation facilities, let her open up her now dormant natural resources. All that will be bound to result in an immense increase of her purchasing power; which, in turn, would mean the increase of her demands for goods and prod ucts of every sort. Japan has not the slightest doubt that the expansion of the Chinese market possibilities will outrace the Japanese ability to supply her demands. In short, she believes that there will be more than ample room in China for both American and Japanese goods when the industrial activity of Japan attains the height where she will be an active competitor of America in the higher grade of wares.

Heretofore the one fundamental cause of the faltering advance of the foreign trade of China has been her utterly inadequate transportation facilities. With the perfection of her transportation lines, therefore, we shall see a remarkable advance in her trade. And this all-important factor-the building of railways and other means of communication in China-is dependent altogether on foreign capital. China has no funds or technical ability to build them, any more than she can open up her own resources without outside help.

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