our own personal interests are concerned, or those of our family or political party. Our love has woven itself so closely around those partial interests, that even the keen eye of the understanding can scarcely penetrate its folds. And when it does, it beholds everything under a false medium; all that is excellent, magnified and made prominent; and all that is evil, diminished and kept out of sight. And what love has done for our own interests, jealousy and ill will and hatred have done for interests adverse to our own. These last, as well as the more amiable passions, hinder the approach of the searchings of the intellect; and when this is no longer possible, they distort the objects of its examination.

CHAPTER IV.

VOLITIONS, OR VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND.

§ 36. The necessity of that controlling power which

exists in the will.

In the remarks hitherto made, although enough has been said to evince clearly the distinct existence of the Will, very little has been said in illustration of its appropriate nature. This will now be made a distinct subject of consideration. But, before entering directly upon its examination, we take this opportunity to say something of the great necessity of that regulative and controlling power, of which the will is justly deemed to be the depository.

Destitute of the power of willing, is it not evident that

man would be an inefficient and useless being? He would indeed be possessed of the Intellect and the Sensibilities; but it is well understood, and has already been remarked in respect to the intellect, that the value of these depends, in a great degree, upon action; in other words, upon the practical results to which they lead. But the doctrine, that man can bring himself into action, without the power of willing, seems incomprehensible. And if we could suppose it to be otherwise, and if it were possible to try the experiment of basing human action directly upon the emotions and passions instead of the Will, it would soon show itself to be a species of action of the most perplexed and desultory kind. Like the passions themselves, it would be addicted to unforeseen obliquities, and would everywhere be characterized by indications of violence and change. No language could fully express its unfixedness, its versatility, its movements hither and thither, in various and contradictory directions. Unrestrained by any superintendent influence, the whole outward life and activity of man would be impelled blindly forward, like ships driven in storms without a rudder, or the heavenly bodies, urged onward in all their rapidity of motion, without an observance of the principles of gravitation.

It follows, therefore, necessarily, that there must be somewhere in the mind a power, which, amid the complicated variety of mental impulses, exerts a regulative and controlling sway.

The question then arises, what the internal regulative power is. And we point at once to the volitive or voluntary principle. In other words, it is the authoritative voice of the Will, which, seeing the conflict within, and calmly contemplating the claims of interest and passion

on the one hand, and of conscience on the other, pronounces the decisive and final arbitrement.

The Will, therefore, may be spoken of with some degree of propriety as the culminating point in man's spiritual nature. It sits the witness and the arbitress over all the rest. It is essential alike to action and accountability, to freedom and order and virtue. Without this, all else is comparatively nothing. It is in reference to this that all other susceptibilities keep their station and perform their functions. They revolve around it as a common centre, attracted by its power, and controlled by its ascendency.

§ 37. Remarks on the nature of the will.

Having seen that the mind is to be contemplated under the threefold aspect of INTELLECTUAL, SENSITIVE, and VOLUNTARY, and having considered the relation which the Intellect and the Sensibilities bear to the Will, we are now prepared to pass to the consideration of the precise nature of the last-named power.

And here let us interpose a word of caution. It is not to be inferred, when we speak of one part of the mind in distinction from another, and of passing from one part or power to another, that the mind is a congeries of distinct existences, or that it is, in any literal and material sense of the terms, susceptible of division. Varieties of action do not necessarily imply a want of unity in the principle from which they originate. The mental principle, therefore, is indivisible. In itself it is truly and essentially a unity, though multiplied, in a manner calculated to excite the greatest astonishment, in its modes of application. It is merely one of these modes of its application, or, rather,

one of these modes of its exercise, which is indicated by the term Will. Accordingly, the term Will is not meant to express anything separate from the mind; but merely embodies and expresses the fact of the mind's operating in a particular way.

And hence the Will may properly enough be defined the MENTAL POWER OR SUSCEPTIBILITY BY WHICH WE PUT FORTH VOLITIONS.—And in accordance with this definition, if we wish to understand more fully what the nature of the power is, we must look at its results, and examine the nature of those states of mind which it gives rise to.—“ It is necessary," says Mr. Stewart very justly, "to form a distinct notion of what is meant by the word volition, in order to understand the import of the word will; for this last word properly expresses that power of the mind, of which volition is the act, and it is only by attending to what we experience while we are conscious of the act, that we can understand anything concerning the nature of the power."*

§ 38. Of the nature of the acts of the will or volitions.

Of volitions, which are the results of the existence and exercise of the voluntary power, we are unable to give any definition in words, which will of itself make them clearly understood. They are simple states of the mind, and that circumstance alone precludes the possibility of a definition, in any strict and proper sense of the term. It is true, we may call them determinations or decisions of the mind, or resolutions of the mind, or acts of choice, and the like, but this is only the substitution of other terms, which themselves need explanation; and, of course,

* Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Appendix i., § 1.

it throws no light upon the subject of inquiry.

And hence we are thrown back upon our consciousness, as we are in all cases where the nature of the simple states of mind is the matter of investigation. And whenever we have made this appeal to the internal experience, and have received its testimony, we are then placed in the possession of all that knowledge which the nature of the case seems to admit of. And we must suppose that every one has, in some degree, done this. It is not presumable, at least it is not at all probable, that men who are constantly in action, pursuing one course and avoiding another, adopting one plan and rejecting another, accepting and refusing, befriending and opposing, all which things, and many others, imply volitive action, are still ignorant of what an act of the Will is.*

§ 39. Volition never exists without some object.

Although we are obliged to depend chiefly upon consciousness for a knowledge of the nature of volitions, it is still true that we can make some statements in respect to them which may aid us in forming our opinions. Among other things, it is an obvious remark, that every act of the will must have an object. A very slight reflection on the subject will evince this. It is the same here as in respect to the act of thought, of memory, and of association, all of which imply some object, in reference to which the mental act is called forth.

*NOTE. It seems desirable, on some accounts, to retain the old English epithet Volitive, in its application to the Will. It is rather more definite than the epithet Voluntary. A volitive act is simply an act of the Will, and nothing more. A voluntary act may mean, according to the connexion in which it is found, either an act of the Will, or some act which is performed in consequence of an act of the Will.