grasp of his understanding; but, if we carefully compare the statements given by his biographers, we shall probably be convinced, that there was not a perfect correspondence and proportion between his intellectual and his voluntary power; that he often exhibited no small infirmity and indecision of purpose; a gigantic strength of thought, united with a childlike uncertainty and flexibility of action. After he had completed his great work, the PRINCIPIA, and had placed the new philosophical creed on an immovable basis, we are told he was unwilling to give it to the world, probably through fear of the controversies it might occasion, and that he was induced to do so through the urgent importunity of some of his intimate friends.*_In_the case of Newton, however, it may not be necessary to assert positively, as in that of Goldsmith and many others, that there was a natural deficiency or weakness of the will, since we are at liberty to attempt another explanation. The Will, like the other mental powers, strengthens by exercise, and grows languid and weak by disuse. But this great philosopher was almost constantly employed in inquiries beyond the ordinary sphere of the world's motives and actions; and as he consequently had but little occasion for calling the voluntary power into exercise, we may well suppose that it lost in some degree its natural vigour.

§ 23. An energetic will sometimes found in connexion with limited powers of intellect.

And if, on the one hand, a great grasp of intellect is not always attended with a voluntary energy correspond

* Brewster's Life of Newton, chap. xi.-Cumberland's Memoirs, p. 9. -D'Israeli's Curiosities of Literature, vol. ii., p. 165.

ing to it, we find, on the other, that inferiority of intellect (we do not speak now of extreme cases, but of such as are of every day's occurrence) is not necessarily accompanied with diminished power of the Will. The sphere of the will's action is of course diminished in such instances; but it is possible for it to exhibit great vigour within that limited sphere. It has but a small field to work in, (not an empire, but a small enclosure which a man can cast his eye over,) but it does its duty faithfully, promptly, and sternly in the restricted limits allotted it.

It has been remarked of the renowned Marshal Ney, that he was scarcely capable of putting two ideas together. Although this is an exaggeration, it is very certain that his great celebrity does not rest upon his comprehensive views and powers of reasoning, but almost solely on his surprising promptness and resolution in action; in other words, on the promptness and force of the will. And it is well known that the Emperor Napoleon was accustomed to speak of some of his generals, (Murat, as well as Ney, was an instance,) as men of limited intellect but of great energy; as weak and microscopic, if we may be allowed the expressions, in all matters of perceptivity and reflection, but great and terrible in their volition.-But it will be necessary to resume this subject again. All that we wish to say now is, that, although there is a connexion between the understanding and the will, and the one is the basis of the life and activity of the other, there is not a perfect correspondence between the two; and that the mere power and activity of the one, since there are other things to be taken into consideration, does not furnish a perfect measure of the ability and promptness of the other

CHAPTER III.

RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES TO THE WILL.

§ 24. General statement in explanation of the term sensibilities.

HAVING proceeded thus far, in considering the relation which the Understanding sustains to the Will, we advance a step further into the interior of the mental nature, and consider more particularly the relation which the Sensibilities sustain to it. We have already had occasion to remark, that the doctrine formerly prevalent of the Will's being controlled by the last dictate of the Understanding is untenable, and that the Understanding is in no case in direct contact with the voluntary power. As to any direct and immediate connexion, we have no hesitancy in saying, that they are entirely separated from each other. The space between them, however, is not left vacant, but is occupied by another portion of the mind of the greatest interest and importance, viz., its sentient or sensitive states. It is this portion of the mind, and not the percipient or intellective, which sustains a direct connexion with the Will. But, before attempting to illustrate the nature of this connexion, it is necessary to state in a few words, although at the expense of some repetition, what is properly included under the term Sensibilities.

It may be said in general terms, without professing to be specific and exact, that everything is to be included under the word Sensibilities which properly and truly im

plies feeling. We suppose, moreover, that the term Sensibilities may be regarded, in its general and indefinite sense, as meaning essentially the same as the word heart does, in those numerous passages of English writers, some of which have already been quoted, where the heart is spoken of in distinction from the head or the understanding. When we say of an individual, that he has a vigorous intellect but a perverted heart, or, on the other hand, characterize him as possessed of a just and generous heart in combination with a weak intellect, we not only have a meaning, but we rightly count on such expressions being easily and readily apprehended. We never mistake. We not only know that a part of our spiritual nature is meant, but we know what that part is. We We say, therefore, in general terms, that we employ the word Sensibilities as meaning essentially the same with the word heart. But this statement of what is meant by the term in question, it must be admitted, is so general and indefinite, that it seems necessary to designate more particularly what is included under it.

§ 25. Of what are strictly included under the sensibilities.

It is true, that the general nature of the Sensibilities, including the subordinate divisions and the relations of those divisions, has been explained at some length in the volume on that subject. But as we approach the termination of our inquiries, and come nearer to that Department, to which is assigned the high office, not only of a general control of the mental action, but of realizing and sustaining the mind's unity, so that we can truly speak of ourselves as one mind or as one person, it seems necessary, in order to a full and clear understanding of our

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position, to take a concise view of the other parts of the mind, and to point out their relations to that which is before us. This, therefore, so far as it has not been done in the remarks already made, we proceed now to do. Accordingly, we proceed to remark, that the states of mind coming under the general head of the Sensibilities may be arranged under the three subordinate classes of Emotions, Desires, and feelings of Obligation; including under the class of the Desires certain complex states of mind, of which desire makes a prominent part, such as the APPETITES, PROPENSITIES, and AFFECTIONS.

I. Emotions. These feelings are very various in kind, such as the emotions of cheerfulness and joy, of melancholy and sorrow, of surprise, astonishment, and wonder; the emotions of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity; the emotions of the ludicrous, and the emotions of approval and disapproval. As the emotions are simple states of the mind, it would be of no avail to attempt to define them; but the knowledge of them must be left to the testimony of each one's consciousness. But it is to be presumed, that no one is ignorant of what is meant when we speak of cheerfulness, of wonder, of melancholy, of beauty, grandeur, and the like.

II. The Desires.-Originating in the Natural in distinction from the Moral emotions, we have also the subordinate class of Desires included under the general head of the Sentient states of the mind or the Sensibilities. The knowledge of the Desires as well as of the Emotions, must be had chiefly from consciousness. No mere form of words can illustrate their nature as distinguished from that of emotions, independently of that internal experience which is implied in an act of consciousness. There are, however, some accessory or incidental circumstances,