amount of evidence, drawn from a great variety of sources, which goes to illustrate the true nature of the soul.

We shall accordingly introduce here a few passages of the kind which has been mentioned, which, in connexion with the passages formerly introduced in the chapter on the subject now before us, will help to confirm the propriety of the proposed general division.-"Loyalty," says Junius in his First Letter, "in the HEART and UNDERSTANDING of an Englishman, is a natural attachment to the guardian of the laws."-Bishop Burnet, in speaking of Archbishop Tillotson, says, "He was a man of the truest judgment and the best temper I had ever known. He had a clear HEAD, with a most tender and compassionate In some comments which Boswell, in his Life of Dr. Johnson, makes on the writings and character of Rousseau, he has the following remark: "His absurd preference of savage to civilized life, and other singularities, are proofs rather of a defect in his UNDERSTANDING, than of any depravity in his HEART."+

HEART."*

These passages, and others like them, although they do not go to the full extent of the proposed General Division, evidently involve the distinction between the Understanding and the Sensibilities, or the intellective and sensitive states of the mind. Passages of this kind, which incidentally involve the distinction between the Intellect and the Sensibilities, and also others which involve the distinction between the Intellect and the Will, or between the Sensibilities and the Will, may be found so very frequently, that it must be quite unnecessary to repeat them.

There are other passages, less frequent indeed, and yet abundantly numerous for our present purpose, which in a * Burnet's History of his Own Time, Reign of William and Mary. + Life of Johnson, vol. i., p. 431.

single sentence, and apparently with entire unconsciousness on the part of the writer, imply the distinction under consideration in its whole extent. Such is the passage which was quoted in the volume on the Intellect from Lord Chesterfield, who, in giving directions to his son as to the manner of conducting negotiations with foreign ministers, makes use of the following language: "If you engage his HEART, you have a fair chance of imposing upon his UNDERSTANDING, and determining his WILL.”*. Such is the remark also, introduced in the same place, of Drake, the author of the Literary Hours, that the deficiencies of Sir Richard Steele, formerly well known as one of the popular writers of England, were neither of the HEAD nor of the HEART, but of the VOLITION.†

We do not propose, however, after what has already been said in the Introductory Chapters of the volume on the Intellect, to multiply extracts here. One or two instances more will suffice.

The author of a recently published Inquiry concerning the Indications of Insanity, in describing the condition of a person whose mind is disordered, expresses himself as follows: "His WILL is no longer restrained by his JUDGMENT, but is driven madly onward by his PASSIONS."

Nor are the passages, which incidentally involve the distinction in question, to be found in the more modern writers merely. Francis Davison, who wrote some poetical pieces as long ago as 1602, has the following

+ Drake's Essays, illustrative of the Tattler, Spectator, and Guardian, vol. i., p. 50.

Conolly's Inquiries concerning the Indications of Insanity, &c., London ed., p. 261.

"Where wit is overruled by WILL,

And will is led by fond DESIRE,

There REASON were as good be still,

As speaking, kindle greater fire."

In the first Book of the Novum Organum (Aphorism 49th), Lord Bacon, no mean authority in mental as well as in physical inquiries, makes the remark, as if it were a common and well-known fact, that the Intellect is susceptible of influences from the Will and the Affections. “INTELLECTUS HUMANUS luminis sicci non est; sed recipit infusionem a VOLUNTATE et AFFECTIBUS."

§ 7. Further proof from various writers on the mind.

The distinction in question has also been fully recognised, sometimes incidentally, and sometimes in a more formal manner, by various distinguished writers on the mind. In the volume on the Intellect, and in connexion with the same general subject which is now before us, we had occasion to quote the following somewhat striking passage from Mr. Locke: "Thus, by a due consideration, and examining any good proposed, it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon the will, and be pursued. For good, though appearing, and allowed ever so great, yet till it has raised desires in our minds, and thereby made us uneasy in its want, it reaches not our wills."* Here it must be obvious to every one that the threefold division in question is distinctly recognised. The due consideration and examining, which are spoken of, imply an act of the intellect; the desires, which are subsequently raised, are appropri

* Essay on the Understanding, book ii., ch. xxi., § 46.

ately ascribed to the sensibilities; and these last are followed by an act of the other part of our nature, viz., the will.

Omitting the other passages, which were introduced in the former discussion of the subject from Hume, Mackintosh, Thery, and some others, it will perhaps tend to strengthen the general argument, if we give in the present place a few extracts from other distinguished writers, all obviously looking in the same direction and of the same import. In the valuable writings of Dr. Reid, we have the following statement: "The distinction between Will and Desire has been well explained by Mr. Locke; yet many later writers have overlooked it, and represented Desire as a modification of Will.-Desire and Will agree in this, that both must have an object, of which we must have some conception; and therefore both must be accompanied with some degree of understanding. But they differ in several things."

"Our actions," says the ingenious author of the Light of Nature Pursued, "being constantly determined either by the decisions of our Judgment, or solicitations of our Desires, we mistake them for the Will itself."+

Bockshammer, speaking of the Desires and Passions, while he regards them of inestimable worth in their proper place, says, that they are subordinate powers," and should, therefore, never be released from the guardianship and guidance of the Understanding and Will."

"Whatever classification of the mental powers we may think proper to adopt," says President Day, "it is of the

* Reid on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, Essay I.

+ Tucker's Light of Nature Pursued, Art. Freewill, § 8.

Bockshammer on the Freedom of the Human Will, Kaufman's Translation, p. 36.

first importance to bear steadily in mind, that distinct faculties are not distinct agents. They are different powers of one and the same agent. It is the man that perceives, and loves, and hates, and acts; not his UNDERSTANDING, Or his HEART, or his WILL, distinct from himself."*

Passages similar to these, sometimes incidentally and sometimes more formally introduced in their writings, are not unfrequently found in the works of men, who are favourably known as mental philosophers; and whose opinions are justly entitled to great weight on any matter connected with mental operations. The extracts, which have now been made, are too easy and obvious in their application to the subject under consideration to require any

comment.

§ 8. A knowledge of the Will implies a preliminary knowledge of the Intellect.

Undoubtedly illustrations and proofs might be carried to a much greater extent. But probably enough has been said, in other parts of these inquiries if not here, to explain precisely the views which we entertain on this subject, to intimate and partially unfold the various sources of proof, and to shield us from the imputation of asserting what cannot be maintained. Supported by consciousness, the structure of languages, the incidental remarks of writers on a multitude of occasions, and by the opinions of many able metaphysicians, we felt ourselves justified in going forward in our inquiries, and we now feel justified in continuing them, with the distinction in question as their basis. And now we have further to remark, if there * Day's Inquiry respecting the self-determining Power of the Will, p. 40.

D