§ 2. The Will should be examined in connexion with other parts of the mind.

It must constantly strike the observer, who carefully contemplates the facts which the universe everywhere exhibits, that no object which exists is wholly disconnected from other objects. Accordingly, in attempting to examine the nature of the Will, and in considering it in the various aspects in which it presents itself to our notice, it is obvious that we must not regard it as standing alone, and apart from everything else. It is true that we speak of the Philosophy of the Will, in distinction from that of the Intellect and the Sensibilities, but it is certainly not the less true that the Will participates in the general nature of the mind, and that it has a close connexion and sympa thy with all its various modes of action. The general nature of the soul could not be altered, nor greatly affected in any way, without at the same time affecting the Will. Nor could a single susceptibility, even one of minor importance, be either struck out from the list of its attributes, or be greatly changed, without being attended with the same result. In the present discussion, therefore, we are naturally and urgently led to take a concise review of the general structure of the mind, for the purpose of more fully comprehending the relation which the Will sustains to the other parts.

§3. The states of the mind may be regarded in a threefold view.

Although we properly ascribe to the human soul the attribute of oneness or indivisibility, and it is very impor

tant that we should keep this leading truth in mind, still there is abundant reason for saying that its nature can never be fully understood by contemplating it solely and exclusively under one aspect. There are, accordingly, three prominent and well-defined points of view, in which the mind may be contemplated, viz., the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will; otherwise expressed by the phrases INTELLECTIVE, SENSITIVE, and VOLUNTARY or VOLITIVE states of the mind. Accordingly, as we have had occasion to remark in another place, whatever truly and appropriately belongs to the intellect, has something peculiar and characteristic of it, which shuts it out from the domain of the sensibilities; and whatever has the nature of a volition has a position apart both from the intellectual and the sensitive. And we repeat here, that this is a fundamental arrangement, which, when properly and fully carried out and applied, includes the whole soul; and that to the one or the other of these general heads everything involved in our mental existence may appropriately be referred.

§ 4. Evidence of the general arrangement from

Consciousness.

In the introductory chapters to the volume on the Intellect, it was assumed, as a sort of preliminary principle, that the mind, in order to our being enabled to give a satisfactory analysis of it, must be contemplated in this threefold view. Accordingly, we thought it proper to bring forward some proofs on the subject, to such an extent and in such a way as seemed to be necessary. And if we could be certain, that every one who reads this volume, had read or would be likely to read the passages

referred to, it might not be necessary to delay upon this topic here. But as this may not be the case, and as there are some reasons why the Philosophy of the Will should stand in a considerable degree complete in itself, we shall take the liberty to repeat here, with some modifications of expression and of illustration, the arguments already adduced in support of the General Division in question.

And in the first place, the general arrangement which has been spoken of, viz., into the Intellective, Sensitive, and Voluntary or Volitive states of the mind, appears to be confirmed by the facts of our Consciousness.

Mental philosophers very correctly assure us, that our knowledge of the human mind depends in a very great degree upon Consciousness; and that by means of it we are enabled to ascertain what thought and feeling are in themselves, and to distinguish them from each other. Certain it is, if we reject the authority of Consciousness, we shall be involved in great difficulty, and cannot reasonably expect to make much progress in this kind of inquiry. But if it be true that the existence and distinctive character of the mental acts is made known, in a good degree at least, by consciousness, and that we may justly and confidently rely on its testimony, we naturally inquire, What does it teach in the present case? And in answering this question, we may safely appeal to any person's recollections, and ask, Whether he has ever been in danger of confounding a mere perception, a mere thought, either with emotions and desires on the one hand, or with volitions on the other? Does not his consciousness assure him, that the mental states, which we thus distinguish by these different terms, are not identical; that the one class is not the other; that they as actually differ from each other as association does from belief, or imagination from memory?

It would seem, therefore, that we may rest in this inquiry upon men's consciousness; not of one merely, but of any and all men. The universal testimony from this source is unquestionably the same. And the announcement which it makes is, that the leading departments of the mental nature are in some important sense separated from each other. The understanding, standing apart and distinguishable from the rest, may be regarded as holding the incipient or preparatory position. The Sensibilities also, in their two leading forms of the Natural and the Moral Sensibility, have their appropriate place. And the same may be said with equal confidence of the other great department of the mind.

§ 5. Evidence of the same from terms found in different

languages.

It was further maintained in the volume on the Intellect, that we are enabled to throw some light on this subject from a consideration of the terms which are found in various languages. The train of thought was to this effect. Every language is, to some extent and in some important sense, a mirror of the mind. Something, consequently, may be learned of the tendency of the mental operations, not only from the form or structure of language in general, but even from the import of particular terms. There can be no hesitation in saying, that every language has its distinct terms, expressive of the threefold view of the mind under consideration, and which are constantly used with a distinct and appropriate meaning, and without being interchanged with each other as if they were synonymous. In other words, there are terms in all those languages which are spoken by nations considerably ad

vanced in mental culture, which correspond to the English terms, INTELLECT, SENSIBILITIES, WILL. If such terms are generally found in languages, differing from each other in form and in meaning, it is certainly a strong circumstance in proof, that the distinction, which we propose to establish, actually exists. On the supposition of its having no existence, it seems impossible to explain the fact, that men should so universally agree in making it. If, on the other hand, it does exist, it is reasonable to suppose that it exists for some purpose; and existing for some purpose, it must of course become known; and being known, it is naturally expressed in language, the same as any other object of knowledge. And this is what we find to be the case. So that we may consider the expression to be an evidence of the fact; the sign, an intimation and evidence of the reality of the thing signified.

§ 6. Evidence from incidental remarks in writers.

And it appeared further in our former examination of this subject, that there are yet other sources of evidence which have a bearing upon it. No small amount of mental knowledge, it was there intimated, may be gathered from the incidental remarks of writers of careful observa

tion and good sense. And accordingly, if we find remarks expressive of mental distinctions, repeatedly made by such men, when they are not formally and professedly treating of the mind, it furnishes a strong presumption that such distinctions actually exist. Their testimony is given under circumstances the most favourable to an unbiased opinion; and ought to be received into the vast