ted in all time to come in the same way, they will, of course, be conformed to the law of Uniformity.

In connexion with what has now been said, we proceed further to remark, if there is any difficulty in the mind of any one, we suppose it must be in connexion with the law of Motives. The law of Motives is this. The Will acts in view of motives, and never acts independently of them. In other words, although its acts are truly its own, and are to be regarded and spoken of as its own, yet Motives furnish the condition or occasion (and, we may add, the indispensable occasion) on which the ability to put forth those acts is exerted.

The question, then, arises here, Does the law of Motives necessarily perplex the doctrine of the Will's freedom? We think not. It is particularly worthy of notice in respect to this Law, that we are obliged to rest satisfied with it, as it comes to us in its general form, and as it is stated in general terms, without the ability of going within the circle it draws around the Will and seeing it carried into effect in particulars, in such a way as to render the action of the Will a fixed and necessary one in any particular direction.

§ 154. Remarks in continuation of this subject.

The closing remark of the last section will be better understood by briefly recurring to some views which have already been taken. We refer to the important fact, that Motives, although they are the necessary conditions and preparatives of the Will's action, are oftentimes essentially different from each other, being various in KIND as well as degree, so much so as not to admit of a direct comparison. It is in connexion with this important view that we are able

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distinctly to conceive how the Will may act in connexion with motives, and yet have a true and substantive power in itself; how it may be subject to law, and yet be free. In other words, although motives are placed round about it, and enclose it on every side, still, as they differ from each other in kind as well as degree, there is evidently an opportunity for the Will, in the exercise of that power which it has in its own nature, of choosing, (or, if other expressions be preferable,) of deciding, determining, or arbitrating among them. Although, repeating the idea in another form of expression, its operations are confined within a sphere of action which is clearly and permanently marked out by its Maker, yet, within that sphere, (the general proposition of the Will's subjection to law still holding good even there,) its acts may be regarded as emanating in itself, and as possessing the attribute of freedom. Although, in some important sense, the Will is the creature of God, and is dependent upon God, and all its acts may perhaps be regarded as God's acts, yet, at the same time, taking the facts just as they are presented and stand in the light of any mere human analysis, it has also a vitality of its own, a theatre of movement appropriate to itself, and all its acts are its own acts. This is the position, undoubtedly, in which God has seen fit to place the subject before the human mind, as if He would instruct us at the same moment, both in our weakness and strength, our power and dependence.

But when we have stated this, we have stated all; we have arrived at an unfathomable mystery; one which the limited mind of man will probably never penetrate. How law and freedom can exist together within that sphere, into which human vision cannot penetrate, as we have neither the disposition nor the ability to travel be

yond the record of the knowable, we are unable to say. We speak now in reference to our knowledge, and not in reference to the possibility of the fact. Human philosophy, which sometimes is never more philosophical than when it confesses its ignorance, stands rebuked and humbled here. We see the evidences of Law, and we know, beyond all doubt and question, that laws of the Will, particularly the law of Motives, exist; but, at the same time, if the distinction of motives into NATURAL and MORAL, or, more specifically, into DESIRIVE and OBLIGATIVE, be correct, we are not able to bind the ligatures of law so closely around the domains of the will, as to shut out the possibility either of its power or its freedom. That is to say, while the human mind can establish and prove to demonstration the proposition that the will is subject to law in every mode of its action, it is unable, by any exercise of fair reasoning, so to apply the principle of law to the Will, either in its general or more specific forms, as not to leave an ample sphere both for its liberty and its power. How God operates within that sphere, and how the human will operates, or how they operate together, we repeat that we know not. But, so far as we are permitted to know, we perceive that everything is characterized by great wisdom and goodness; and that there is no opportunity for reasonable doubt or cavilling. We are permitted, for wise purposes, to see that God is our sovereign and our master; to see that not only the hairs of our head are numbered, but that even our inmost purposes are under his control; and to see it clearly, distinctly, and undeniably; but in such a way as to leave it both possible and demonstrable, as the subject is presented in the light of human reason, that we possess in ourselves the elements (and to an extent involving the most sol

emn responsibility) of power, of freedom, and of moral accountableness.

§ 155. Objected that the will is necessarily governed by the strongest motive.

But it will perhaps be said by way of objection, that the Will is necessarily governed by the strongest motive, or at least, that it necessarily acts in view of the strongest motive, of whatever kind it may be. In this way, it is supposed, we can penetrate within the sphere or circle of liberty, and distinctly see how law will degenerate into slavery. We are aware that this has often been alleged, and not unfrequently by men whose suggestions are entitled to the most respectful consideration. But the proposition, in order to have any weight as an argument, must be shown to be of universal application. If there were only one kind or class of motives, there would undoubtedly be some plausibility in the view proposed. Perhaps it would be a conclusive one.

Motives of the same kind can be directly compared together; and as our consciousness assures us of a difference in the strength of such motives, even in themselves considered, there is a propriety in speaking of them as more or less strong. But, as we have already had occasion to remark in speaking on this very subject, motives, which differ in kind, can be compared not in themselves, but only in their effects. In respect to all such, therefore, the proposition that the Will is governed by the strongest motive is an identical one. That is to say, the proposition can mean nothing more than simply, that the Will is governed by the motive by which it is governed. If we were to admit this, we should admit

only an obvious truism, which could have no weight, either one way or the other, in resolving the matter under consideration.-(See the remarks on this subject in chapter viii., part ii.)

CHAPTER IV.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN MAN'S MORAL NATURE, $156. Remarks on the nature or mode of the argument.

THERE are various other considerations connected with the general subject of the Freedom of the Will, all of which have weight, although they may not be closely connected with each other. Hence the argument on the subject of the freedom of the will, as well as on that of its subjection to laws, has a sort of miscellaneous appearance, which may be less pleasing than it would otherwise be to those who have been accustomed to the invariable consecution of parts and the strictness of mathematical demonstration. But it will be perceived, that the nature of the subject renders this in some degree unavoidable; and it is to be hoped, that suitable allowance will be made for it. If the question before us were, whether the Romans occupied the island of Great Britain at some period previous to the Saxon conquest, we probably should not rest the conclusion on one circumstance or fact alone; but employ all which might have a bearing on the inquiry, however diverse they might be from each other in themselves. We should refer to the testimony of the