other hand,if my Will is not independent in the sense of being beyond the reach of law, then the hand of the Almighty is upon me, and I cannot escape even if I would. The searching eye of the great Author of all things ever attends my path; and whether I love or hate, obey or rebel, I never can annul his authority or evade his jurisdiction.

CHAPTER VIII.

NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES.

§ 121. Of motives and their bearing upon the general doctrine of the will's subjection to law.

In what has been said hitherto in this part of our work, our efforts have been directed almost exclusively to the single matter of showing THAT THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS. In connexion with the main subject, however, and in illustration of the principal topic of discussion, we have had occasion to point out specifically what some of the Will's laws are. We are aware that, in support of the leading doctrine which has been before us, we have given little more than the outlines of an argument, and that in its details it might have been prosecuted at much greater length. And yet we are unable to renounce the conviction, that it establishes the important position in question, even in the imperfect form in which it has been presented. Certainly, if we did not think so, we should not consider it worth while to advance any further in our investigations; for if we did not feel confident that our own Will is sub

ject to laws, we could not for a moment indulge the expectation of the accomplishment of any proposed purpose or plan whatever.

In enumerating the laws of the Will, it will be recollected as one of the positions laid down, that the Will never acts, and volitions never exist, except in connexion with Motives. We must here recur to the subject of Motives again, as presenting one of the most interesting and important matters of inquiry in mental philosophy, particularly in the philosophy of the Will. The doctrine of Motives is very closely connected, in a number of respects, with the general doctrine of the Will's subjection to law. In fact, motives seem to be at the foundation of the laws of Causality and Uniformity, and to reveal very naturally their precise nature and extent.

§ 122. Of the division of motives into Internal and External.

It is necessary, in order to have a thorough knowledge of Motives, to contemplate them in various points of view. Considered, in the first place, in reference to their origin, they are susceptible of being divided into the two classes of Internal and External.-By the INTERNAL We mean motives as they exist in the mind itself, the various forms of the appetites, those higher sentient principles which may be denominated the propensities, and the various kinds and degrees of the affections, together with all motives within us of a moral nature. It is certain, that, in some important sense of the expressions, all motives, at least before they can reach and effect the Will, must exist in the mind, although there are grounds for speaking of their antecedent and separate existence in

outward objects.-(2.) By EXTERNAL motives we mean all those which are placed external to the mind, and are located, if the expression may be allowed, in outward things. All external objects, which excite within us either approbation or disapprobation, joy or sorrow; all such outward objects as are supposed to have a connexion either with our worldly prosperity or our duty, operate upon us as motives.* It is true, they influence us through the medium of our mental nature, the emotions, passions, and moral powers; but as the influence exercised may be traced to them as the ultimate subjects, there is a degree of propriety in designating them as motives. Outward motives, in the sense of the term as just explained, are innumerable, presenting themselves to our notice on all sides, in all the various aspects of creation, and in all the endless forms of human enterprise.

§ 123. External motives derive their efficacy from the

mind.

Although all objects without us, and all external actions may, under different circumstances and in different degrees, exist as motives, still it is impossible for us to regard such external objects or actions as having a value to ourselves or a character of any kind, except it be in reference to those feelings which the contemplation of them

* NOTE.-External motives may also properly be called Objective motives; as, on the other hand, the Internal might perhaps be called Subjective. Objective motives are what we have in other places described as the OBJECTS of volition. And such is their precise nature. That is to say, they are in themselves mere objects, intellectually perceived, and nothing more. And it is only in connexion with, and in accommodation to certain subsequent mental facts, that they are called motives.

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excites in our own minds. Abstracted from the internal feelings, of which they are the antecedents and cause, they are all equally indifferent. It is our own emotions and desires, therefore, reflected back upon all external objects and actions of whatever kind, which infuse into them their qualities of beauty or deformity, of unworthiness or excellence, and give them their power, whatever it may be, in relation to the will.

It would not be a difficult task, it is presumed, to adduce instances illustrating and confirming these views. As an example, a war is announced in Europe, and the merchant winds up his accounts and detains his vessels at home. The war is his motive for so doing. Subsequently there is a false report of war in Europe, which he believes to be true, and he pursues the same course as before. In both these cases, the internal belief, combined with his fears, gives to the motive, as the war would be considered, its whole effect. In the latter case, it constitutes it entirely, as the reported war is only a fiction.

Again, RICHES, whether in the form of lands or of gold and silver, or in any other form, constitute a powerful motive. But it is vain to presume that the common dust on which we tread, or even the brightest masses of ore it contains, inherit and possess in themselves a power to keep men constantly in action, to carry them from land to land, and from sea to sea. It is the mind itself which invests them with attributes that render them so effective, Men see in them the means of the enjoyments they covet; the means of influence among their fellows; the source of honour and power. So that if riches are one of the most efficient motives that can be presented to the human Will, it is the heart, the soul, which makes them so. Since you have only to place the man, who desired them

so much, on his death-bed; you have only to show him that his piles of treasure can no longer purchase honour, influence, enjoyment, not even an hour of life, not even exemption from a single pain, and then riches are no longer a motive. He turns away from them with feelings of indifference, and possibly of disgust.

§ 124. The character of motives depends in part on the constitutional traits of the individual.

Although all objects, which are presented to the mind in the shape and relation of External motives, undergo a modification in their progress towards the region of the Will, it may not be unimportant to remark, that this modification will be very various in different individuals, according to their predominant mental traits. We will suppose, as an example, that the same object is presented to the notice of two individuals; the one possessed of dull and restricted, the other of quick and comprehensive powers of reasoning. The object may appear diminutive and unimportant to the former, and probably will appear so, because his powers of reasoning are not expansive enough to embrace it in all its relations and consequences; while the same object will appear, for an opposite reason, exceedingly magnified and important to the latter.

And again, select two other persons, whose reasoning powers closely resemble each other, and are, in fact, entirely the same, but whose SENSIBILITIES are constitutionally different; the one, a person intensely susceptible of vivid and strong emotions and desires; the other, on the contrary, possessed of a sluggish and phlegmatic temperament. Now we will suppose that the exciting object or motive, whatever it is, comes from the reasoning or in