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swer with confidence. This benificent change was wrought without ostentation or bustle, by the mild and unassuming dignity of cautious reproof. It was singular to observe the advocate, unacquainted with the character whom he addressed; to notice the changes wrought by these temperate checks, from headstrong confidence to reluctant and sullen acquiescence; and, at last, to a quiet submission, to a superior mind, without a mur

mur.

ORIGINAL LETTERS OF GENERAL GREENE.

THE events of our revolutionary war have of late acquired such an interest in the minds of our countrymen, that we are now anxious to be made acquainted with them in all their details. Of those which related to the southern campaigns, many particulars were wanting. General Lee turned the public attention to that quarter. We have now an opportunity to gratify this laudable spirit of inquiry, by giving the history of the southern campaign from the original letters of major general Greene. History proceeds hastily to the most brilliant periods of an army, neglecting or passing over with a slight notice, those events by which victory is in some measure disciplined to the conqueror's standard. The reader will here see the difficulties with which general Greene had to contend; and, he may rest assured, that the man who could so calmly face such difficulties, must be successful in the end. The following letters point out the sufferings and embarrassments of the American army, when every resource failed them, but the spirit and intrepidity of Greene. They are likewise a complete illustration of the character of that man; one which united the most endearing, affable, and friendly, with the most high and heroic. We shall devote a part of this journal regurlarly to the publication of them.

SIR,

HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON.

West Point, Oct. 16th, 1780.

YOUR excellency's letter of the 14th, appointing me to the command of the southern army, was delivered me last evening.

I beg your excellency to be persuaded that I am fully sensible of the honour you do me, and will endeavour to manifest my gratitude by a conduct that will not disgrace the appointment. I only lament that my abilities are not more competent to the trust; and that it will not be in my power to be as exten

sively useful as my inclination lead to wish; but as far as my zeal and attention can supply the defect, I flatter myself my country will have no cause to complain.

I foresee the command will be accompanied with innumerable embarrassments; but the generous support I expect from the partiality of the southern gentlemen, as well as the aid and assistance, I flatter myself, I shall receive from your excellency's advice, affords me some consolation in contemplating the dif ficulties.

I will prepare myself for the command as soon as I can; but as I have been upwards of five years in service, during all which time I have paid no attention to the settlement of my domestic concerns, and many divisions of interests and partition of landed property taken place in the time between me and my brothers, and now lie unfinished, I wish it was possible for me to spend a few days at home before I set out for the southward; especially as it is altogether uncertain how long my command may continue, or what deaths or accidents may happen during my absence to defeat the business. I beg your excellency's opinion upon the matter, and will regulate my conduct accordingly; however, it will not be possible for me to set out under five days from this place, if I put my baggage and business under the least degree of regulation; nor is my state of health in a condition to set off immediately, having had a considerable fever upom me for several days.

General Heath arrived last evening, and this morning takes the command. I will make him fully acquainted with all the orders and steps I have taken, which concerns his command, and will give him my opinion what further is necessary to be done for carrying into execution your excellency's instructions, and putting the garrison in a proper state of defence, and be prepared for the approaching winter.

General Mac Dougal is also here, and I have the pleasure to inform your excellency that he and I perfectly agree in opinion in what concerns the welfare of the garrison and its dependencies.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

Your excellency's

Most obt. humble servant.

HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON.
West Point, Oct. 19th, 1770.

SIR, Your excellency's favour of the 18th, was delivered me this afternoon. I had given up the thoughts of going home before the receipt of your letter, even if I could have been indulged with your permission. My affairs require it; but I was afraid it would take up too much time, considering the critical state of affairs to the southward.

The day that I marched from Tappan, I wrote for Mrs. Greene, and expect her here every hour. When I wrote for liberty to go home, it was my intention to have stopped her on the road and turned her back; but if I should set out before her arrival, the disappointment, added to the shock of my going to the southward, I fear will have some very disagreeable effect upon her health, especially as her apprehensions were very lively upon the subject, before there was even a probability of my going.

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I see the necessity for setting out, and feel the necessity for staying. I must beg your excellency's indulgence for one day longer; after which, if Mrs. Green don't arrive, I shall immediately set out for headquarters. My baggage sets off tomor. row, if I am not disappointed in getting horses, which colonel Hughes promises me shall not be the case. Nothing shall detain me longer than a couple of days from headquarters, unless I am very unwell indeed.

I thank your excellency for the double assurance you give me of support, and long to be upon my journey to meet lord Cornwallis, before he advances too far into the heart of Northcarolina.

I am, with great respect and esteem,

Your Excellency's

Most obedient humble servant.

-

THE HON. THE BOARD OF WAR, NORTH CAROLINA.

GENTLEMEN,

Camp Charlotte, December 6th, 1780,

It was said by a certain general, that in order to have a good army, you must begin by providing well for the belly, for that is the main spring of every operation. This business is not only important as it respects the army, but as it affects

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the inhabitants in its consequences: for if an army is not well provided, the people will soon begin to feel the hand of violence; nor is it in the power of a general to avoid it.

In a war like ours, conducted principally upon the defensive, and commonly with raw troops, and with numbers inferior to the enemy, it is difficult to fix the proper places for magazines; nor would it be political, under the present constitution of our army, to form very large ones in any place, as we have not a force to defend them, nor can we afford to lose them. We should have a plenty provided; but there should be a number of deposits, rather than one or two large magazines. Whenever the provisions are laid in, regard should be had to the means of transportation; for it cannot be expected that the army can go to the provision, and therefore the provision must come to the army. Nor is it consistent with national policy or military security to disperse an army over the country, either to collect or subsist upon the food provided, for them as too many seem to have an idea of.

Great events often depend upon little things, and the fate of empires have sometimes been decided by the most trifling inci dents: therefore, while we are contending for every thing that is dear and valuable, we should trust as little to chance or accident as possible. Magazines should, upon the common principles of war, be formed in the rear. From the present position of the enemy and that of our army, our principal magazines should be at Salisbury, Oliphant's mill upon the Catabaw, and several small ones upon the east side of the Pedee, as high up towards the narrows as possible, that the position of this army may cover them. As transportation is a difficult business, and very expensive, I should not recommend forming large maga. zines of beef, but putting up a large number of cattle to stallfeed. I would salt down as much pork as can be obtained, and have it deposited at places as favourable for water transportation as possible: for it is very seldom that an army is well sup plied unless it is furnished by a water communication from the remote magazines. At this place there should be about a month's provisions laid in. To have a larger stock in our present weak state, while the enemy are receiving large reinforce ments, will not be prudent; nor will it do to trust altogether for

supplies to be drawn from distant magazines. This place appears to be the most favourable for opposing the enemy's penetrating the country this way, and for checking their advances upon the lower route, unless it is quite upon the sea coast; for I cannot persuade myself that they will venture to cross the country below and hazard their line of communication, while we remain in a situation for piercing their flank, and intercepting their supplies. However, I am more afraid they will carry on a war of posts, than make long and sudden marches into the country. Should this be their plan, as I am persuaded it will, from its being evidently their interest and agreeable to their former mode, and if their collective strength is much superior to ours, they can establish a post almost where they please; and by laying in a large stock of provision, can easily hold them: for we have no heavy cannon to dislodge them; nor have we strength enough to set ourselves down before a work with secu rity, or confidence of obliging the garrison to surrender. And the idea of storming works, which many speak of with as much familiarity and confidence as they would talk of gathering a basket of fruit, unless it can be effected by surprise, affords but a poor prospect of success: nor would a post be an object un less we had a force sufficient to hold it after possessing our selves of it; and to make an attempt, and not succeed, will bring not only disgrace, but will be attended with the loss of our best troops; besides which, while so much depends upon the opinion of the people, both as to men and money, as little should be put to hazard as possible. Neither the army nor the country want enterprise, and if both are employed in the parti zan way, until we have a more permanent force to appear be fore the enemy with confidence, happily we may regain all our losses; but if we put things to the hazard in our infant state, before we have gathered sufficient strength to act with spirit and activity, and meet a second misfortune, all may be lost, and the tide of sentiment among the people, turn against you, which will put every thing afloat in this state, and even endanger its political existence. The people of Southcarolina had no idea of the fall of Charleston producing such serious consequences to their state; nor can you tell what an unfortunate stroke may

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