who receives the benefit of the payment to reimburse the party paying, interest from the date of payment is recoverable." Then it is stated there were immediate benefits accruing to the defendant in the land being relieved from tax sales and the attending penalties. All of this supposes an obligation by defendant to keep fully advised as to his duty to the government and his knowing that the act of plaintiff had wrought relief in his behalf.

In Shipman v. Miller, 2 Root (Conn.), 405, there was a case of overpayment of fees by bondsmen of a claimant, made by them on supposition that they had not been paid by the claimant. The person receiving them was held liable for the amount and interest, though they were innocently received. But this case is understandable upon the theory that it was the business of the recipient to know whether he had been paid

or not.

But it has been held that, if payment is made under mistake of law, interest may be recovered only from date of demand. Northrop v. Graves, 19 Conn. 548, 50 Am. Dec. 264.

There is found an interesting note in 6 American Decisions, pp. 188 to 199, on the theory of interest and discarded theories in regard to same, but out of these theories there arose the idea that only is interest to be allowed on express or implied contract. Under this kind of view, it is hard to evolve a conclusion of implied contract by one who is the innocent holder of money he thought himself to be the true owner of. If he was benefited by its being paid to him, he believed he was entitled as much to that benefit as to the money itself. However, it would seem that the great bulk of decision supports the in

the meeting of the Association. Addresses will be delivered by Hon. Walter M. Provine and Hon. Arthur C. Fort of Eureka, Ill., on the subject, "County and Probate Court-Every Man's Court."

Hon. Elbert S. Smith of Springfield will dis cuss "The 1919 Session of the Illinois Legis lature." There will be a symposium of papers read on the question of the new state constitution. Hon. John H. Marshall of Charleston, will discuss "What Ought to be Eliminated"; Hon. David F. Matchett of Chicago, "What Ought to Remain"; Hon. Sam Welty of Bloomington, "What Ought to be Added." The discussion will be led by Hon. Orrin N. Carter, Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court.

The annual dinner will be on Wednesday evening, May 28th; tickets, $2.50 each, and members may bring their guests, ladies as well as gentlemen.

In order to discover what is a successful lawyer in Illinois, the Association has offered first, second and third prizes, amounting to $50, for a definition not exceeding twenty-five words in length. Every member of the Association registering is expected to compete, and each member may submit not to exceed three definitions. We do not know just what sort of a lawyer would be successful in Illinois, but we have never thought of the definition as being a hard one and await with interest the result. The Justices of the Supreme Court of Illinois will be the judges in the contest. They ought to know.

ITEMS OF PROFESSIONAL

INTEREST.

PROGRAM OF THE MEETING OF THE ILLINOIS BAR ASSOCIATION.

The forty-third annual meeting of the Illinois Bar Association will occur May 28th and 29th at Decatur.

The President's address will be delivered by Mr. Walter M. Provine of Taylorville. The annual address will be delivered by Hon. Selden P. Spencer of St. Louis, Senator from Missouri, on the subject, "Post War Problems."

The following subjects will be discussed: "The Proposed Practice Acts," by Mr. Frederic R. DeYoung of Chicago; "Character and Fitness of Applicants for Admission to the Bar," by Mr. Silas H. Strawn of Chicago.

The usual committees will report.

The Judicial Section of the Illinois Bar Association will hold its meeting in connection with

CORRESPONDENCE.

MEETING OF THE ARKANSAS BAR ASSOCIATION.

Editor, Central Law Journal:

I noticed in the issue of the Journal just received that you have the date and place of the meeting of the Arkansas Bar Association wrong. The meeting will be held in Little Rock, May 29th and 30th. Please make this correction and oblige.

I might add that Judge Geo. T. Page, president of the American Bar Association, and Hon. Edw. J. White of St. Louis, will deliver addresses.

Yours very truly,

ROSCOE R. LYNN, Secretary.

payments received from him will effect a preference, is not a mere suspicion or surmise, but knowledge of facts of a character calculated to induce a belief in the mind of an ordinarily intelligent and prudent business man.-Smith v. Powers, U. S. D. C., 255 Fed. 582.

5. Jurisdiction.-That the allegations of an involuntary petition are insufficient, as vague and general, does not deprive the court of jurisdiction, and it may properly permit amendment. In re Havens, U. S. C. C. A., 255 Fed. 478.

6.

Banks and Banking-Notice.-Where note was procured by the bank's president in his individual capacity, notice of failure of consideration and settlement were not brought home to the bank, even though its president, knowing thereof, recommended that bank's board of directors purchase note.-Farmers' Bank of Grandview v. Ozias, Mo., 209 S. W. 580.

7. Special Deposit.-Where bank did not have knowledge that deposit was made for specific purpose of paying a check to be drawn later in favor of plaintiff, bank was entitled to offset its matured indebtedness against such deposit.-Porter Auto Co. v. First Nat. Bank, Iowa, 171 N. W. 121.

8.

Bills and Notes-Coupon Books.-Employer's coupon books, redeemable only in merchandise, and not transferable, were not negotiable. -Ashless Coal Co. v. Davis, Ky., 209 S. W. 532. 9. -Renewal.-A bank, which in the usual course of business discounted a note made payable to the maker and indorsed by him, has the rights of an innocent purchaser for value with respect to a note taken in renewal and payable to itself. Enslen V. Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank of City of New York, U. S. C. C. A., 255 Fed. 527.

10. Without Recourse.-That plaintiff took the note indorsed without recourse by the payee is not a badge of guilty knowledge of fraud in procurement of note.-Downs v. Horton, Mo., 209 S. W. 595.

11. Brokers-Dual Agency.-A broker may be the agent of both principals, if that be the understanding between all parties, but he cannot be openly the agent of one and secretly the agent of the other, and claim compensation from both.-Empire Securities Co. v. Webb, Ala., 81 So. 51.

12.- Reasonable Time.-Repudiation by a client of an unauthorized deal for him by his broker need not be immediate, but only within a reasonable time, which is a matter for the jury.--Martin v. W. W. Lanahan & Co., Md., 105 Atl. 777.

13. Cancellation of Instruments-Equity.Equity may grant relief by canceling the deed of an aged person, who, in consideration of promise of support, has conveyed his property to promissor, on account of promissor's fraud in intending not to furnish support, and in failing to do so, whether consideration of support be considered a condition precedent or subsequent, or no condition, but as a mere covenant; the legal remedy being inadequate.-Johnson v. Chamblee, Ala., 81 So. 27.

14. Carriers of Goods-Loss by Fire.-A railroad, in possession of goods by reason of their

being placed in a car by a shipper, but not ready for immediate shipment, something remaining to be done by shipper, is a warehouseman, and not liable for destruction of the goods by fire, unless negligent.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Edwards' Adm'x, Ky., 209 S. W. 519.

15. Chattel Mortgages-Conditional Sale-A contract, specifically providing that title shall not pass until full amount of purchase price has been paid, is a conditional sale contract, and not a mortgage; there being nothing in contract or circumstances surrounding transaction to indicate a different intention.-Kammeier v. Chauvet, Iowa, 171 N. W. 165.

17.- -Public Policy.-Any agreement entered into for the purpose of obstructing or interfering in any manner with the administration of justice is void as against public policy, and the court will leave the parties in the positions in which they have placed themselves without giving aid to either.-Archie v. Brown, Ky., 209 S. W. 522.

18.- -Third Person. Generally, an entire stranger to the consideration is not regarded as a party to, and cannot maintain an action on, a simple contract.-Alabama City, G. & A. Ry. Co. v. Kyle, Ala., 81 So. 54.

19.- -Uncertainty.-A contract to put a barge in good repair was not too uncertain and indefinite to form the foundation of the owner's suit for damages for delay, etc., against the contractor; "repair" meaning restoration to a sound, good, or complete state.-Ollinger & Bruce Dry Dock Co. v. James Gibbony & Co., Ala., 81 So. 18.

20. Corporations-Charter.-The charter of a corporation, read in connection with the general laws applicable to it, is the measure of its powers, but whatever under the charter and other general laws, reasonably construed, may be fairly regarded as incidental to the objects for which the corporation is created is not to be taken as prohibited. Alabama City G. & A. Ry. Co. v. Kyle, Ala., 81 So. 54.

contracting

21. Estoppel.-A corporation under an assumed name may be sued by such name, and is estopped to deny its existence for the purposes of litigation.-Simpson v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, W. Va., 98 S. E. 580.

22. Foreign Corporation.-The statutes of another state cannot prescribe status in Alabama of a corporation of such other state.— State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., Ala., 81 So. 60.

23.- Partnership. -No valid partnership agreement can be made between a corporation and an individual and it is immaterial that individual is owner of most of stock of corporation.-Vineyard v. Miller Land Co., Tex., 209 S. W. 693.

24. Criminal Law-Appeal and Error.-Where the instructions in a criminal case invade a constitutional right of the accused, it is not

necessary, in order to have such error reviewed, that an exception be taken and called to the attention of the trial court.-State v. Warwick, Wash., 178 Pac. 977.

25. Circumstantial Evidence.-To render evidence admissible in a case depending on circumstantial evidence, it is enough that it tends to prove the issue or constitute a link in the chain of proof, though standing alone it might not justify a verdict; and in such cases incidents may be legitimate evidence, which would be deemed irrelevant in a case depending on direct testimony.-Haley v. State, Tex., 209 S. W. 675. 26. -Coconspirator.-The acts and declarations of each coconspirator are admissible against all the conspirators if made and done before the object has been consummated.-State v. Herbert, N. J., 105 Atl. 796.

27. Inciting to Crime.-Where officers of the law have incited a person to commit the crime charged, and lured him on with the purpose of arresting him in its commission, the law will not authorize a verdict of guilty.-Peterson v. United States, U. S. C. C. A., 255 Fed. 433.

28. Probative Evidence.-In determining whether there is evidence to support any particular theory, the court should reject as of no probative value a statement at variance with universally recognized laws.-Hatris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 209 S. W. 509.

29. Damages-Measure of.-For breach of contract in absence of showing of bad faith or fraud, the measure of damages is compensation for losses naturally resulting or following, and which the parties might have reasonably contemplated as a probable consequence, and which are capable of being estimated with reasonable accuracy.-Bugg & Franks v. Jones, Ky., 209 S. W. 514.

30. Divorce Abandonment.—“Abandonment" must be the deliberate act of the party complained of, done with the intent that the marriage relations should no longer exist.-Heinmuller v. Heinmuller, Md., 105 Atl. 745.

31.- -Action for.-Actions for divorce are not like ordinary civil actions, and in a great number of instances are not governed by the same rules; being in many respects sui generis. -Milster v. Milster, Mo., 209 S. W. 620.

32. Alimony.-A suit for alimony may be obtained independent of and without regard to a divorce, where the husband treats the wife with cruelty and compels her to leave him, and although the abandonment may not have continued long enough to entitle her to a divorce. -Williamson v. Williamson, Ky., 209 S. W. 503.

33. Desertion.-Where wife was determined to permanently leave husband, the fact that husband, after using reasonable remonstrance and endeavoring to persuade her not to leave him, succumbed to the inevitable and allowed her to go without creating a useless scene, does not show his consent to the separation.-Nunn v. Nunn, Ore., 178 Pac, 986.

34. Desertion.-Where a divorce is sought on ground of desertion, it should not only be shown that alleged desertion is willful and obstinate, but also that such desertion has continued for statutory period of one year.-Powell v. Powell, Fla., 81 So. 105.

35. Embezzlement-Intent.-In prosecution of street car conductor for embezzlement of fares, the intent to defraud was necessary to be shown.-State v. Larmer, Del., 105 Atl. 789.

a

36. Eminent Domain-Election.-Where county takes property for a highway before paying or tendering compensation therefor, owner need not resort to injunction to prevent opening of road, nor appeal from judgment of county court, but may elect to sue county for trespass.-Bushart v. Fulton County, Ky., 209 S. W. 499.

37.-Waiver.-Conceding that the several defendants, in condemnation proceedings, to acquire right of way for telegraph line might have objected to the petitions because of failure to locate more definitely the line to be installed, the defect was waived by failure to object on that ground, and on collateral attack judgment is valid.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., Ala., 81 So. 44.

38. Equity-Laches.-Delay without neglect, or which does not operate to the prejudice of the rights of opposite party, is not sufficient to constitute laches.-Norfleet v. Hampson, Ark., 209 S. W. 651.

39. Estoppel-Contingent Interest.-Heirs of owner of contingent interests in estate, who had conveyed his interest by deed with covenants held estopped, with owner, from claiming any interest in estate on contingency becoming vested.-Fulton v. Teager, Ky., 209 S. W. 535.

40. Executors and Administrators-Foreign Executor.-Foreign letters of administration authorizing administratrix to administer "personal property, goods, chattels, and credits" of an intestate dying resident in foreign state are special, and do not authorize her to sue in Georgia to enjoin cutting of timber and for damages for trespass in cutting and removing timber from land.-Brookman v. Rennolds, Ga., 98 S. E. 543.

41. Explosives - Inherent Danger. When there are successive sales of an article inherently dangerous and harmful, such as gasoline, and the first vendor must have known the oil was bought ultimately to retail to the public, any one of the latter injured has the right to claim the original vendor owed him a duty of inspection, violation of which created a liability in tort.-Kearse v. Seyb, Mo., 209 S. W. 635.

42. Forgery-Material Alteration.-For an alteration of a writing to be the basis of a prosecution for forgery, the alteration must be a material one.-McIntosh v. State, Ga., 98 S. E. 555.

43. Fraud-Exchange of Lands.-Representations by plaintiff, party to exchange of lands, that he had received request from makers of notes which he proposed to turn over as part consideration, asking him to let them know balance due, and where to send money, etc., held a statement of facts constituting actionable fraud, not a mere expression of opinion by plaintiff.-Ozias v. Paustian, Mo., 209 S. W. 587.

44. Misrepresentation.-In an action for misrepresentation as to acreage and value in trade of lands, that plaintiff was also guilty of misrepresenting the qualities of his property did not constitute a defense available to defendant for misrepresentation by him.-Billick v. Davidson, Iowa, 171 N. W. 181.

45. Fraudulent Conveyances Creditor. A conveyance cannot be said to be in fraud of the rights of one who is not shown to have a claim against the grantor or his property at the time the conveyance was made.-Le Sell V. Mendenhall, Iowa, 171 N. W. 152.

46. Husband and Wife.-No creditor has a right to the personal services of his debtor, and a husband, as against his creditors, may lonate to his wife his services in running her arm.-Pocomoke Guano Co. v. Colwell, N. C., 98 S. E. 535.

47. Guaranty-Discharge of Guarantor.-To discharge a guarantor, payment by the principal must be a legal and valid one.-Smith v. Powers, U. S. D. C., 255 Fed. 582.

48. Guardian and Ward-Contract.-A guardian has no power to make a contract binding upon his ward or upon his estate, however prop

er or beneficial contract may be, but guardian's contract imposes a personal liability upon him, and his protection from loss lies in his right to charge expenditures to ward's estate in his account.-Jones v. Johnson, Okla., 178 Pac. 984.

49.- -Foster Parent.-A natural or foster parent, who is also legal guardian, may, in proper cases, maintain child and ward out of corpus of child's estate, if interest or income thereof is not sufficient or adequate, and parent is not financially able to maintain child according to its station in life and necessities.Williams v. Williams, Ala., 81 So. 41.

50. Husband and Wife Alimony.-To sustain a bill for permanent alimony, it was incumbent upon plaintiff wife to allege and prove a state of facts which constitutes a cause for divorce either a vinculo or a mensa.-Heinmuller v. Heinmuller, Md., 105 Atl. 745.

51. Antenuptial Agreement.-An oral agreement, entered into and reduced to writing before marriage and signed after marriage, settling on intended wife a lot owned by intended husband and such personal property as he might possess at his death, if she was then living as his wife and survived, in lieu of all rights, was in effect an antenuptial contract.-Haraldson v. Knutson, Minn., 171 N. W. 201.

52. Consortium.-Right of either husband or wife to consortium of their respective spouse, as distinguished from right of service belonging to husband or right of support belonging to wife, is property, although of a somewhat sentimental character.-Larisa v. Tiffany, R. I., 105 Atl. 739.

53.- Duress.-Common-law presumption that wife acted under duress of her husband in committing crime, except murder or treason, was weak, and might be rebutted by very slight circumstances.-Morton v. State, Tenn., 209 S. W.

644.

54.- -Personal Injury.-Under Gen. St. 1906, § 1368, a married woman whose husband has deserted her for six months may maintain an action for personal injury to herself.-Saunders Transfer Co. v. Underwood, Fla., 81 So. 105.

55.

Insurance Mutual Benefit Society.-Unlike ordinary life insurance or membership in a mutual benefit society, a beneficiary named in an industrial accident policy has no vested rights.-Fitzgerald v. Baltimore Life Ins. Co. of Baltimore, Md., 105 Atl. 775.

56.- -Rescission.If applicant for life policy did not know that he had Bright's Disease, his answer that he did not would not entitle the company to rescind.-Lewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., Mo., 209 S. W. 625.

57. Judgment-Adversary Parties.-Where a city and a wrongdoer who is primarily liable are jointly sued by an injured party, the two defendants are adversary parties, and a judgment in favor of the property owner is res adjudicata in an action by the city against him, if the petition stated a cause of action against the property owner, but otherwise not.-Kansas City v. Mullins, Mo., 209 S. W. 558.

58.- -Collateral Attack.-Domestic judgment in court of general jurisdiction cannot be collaterally attacked unless want of jurisdiction affirmatively appears in record. Taylor v. Asher, Ky., 209 S. W. 533.

59. Finding of Fact. Whatever may be state of evidence, a judge cannot base a judgment upon a finding of fact contrary to verdict of jury upon the issue.-Vineyard v. Miller Land Co., Tex., 209 S. W. 693

60.-Res Judicata.-It is no answer to doctrine of res adjudicata to allege that facts were not as adjudged or decreed.-Williams v. Williams, Ala., 81 So. 41.

61. Landlord and Tenant-Merger.-Where a lessee after date of lease acquires an undivided one-half interest in leased premises, the lease does not by mere operation of law merge in the fee subsequently obtained.-Patterson v. United Natural Gas Co., Pa., 105 Atl. 828.

62. Life Estates-Remainderman.- Generally the remainderman is not chargeable for permanent improvements which the life tenant places upon the land.-Wagner v. Ruhl, Md., 105 Atl. 770.

court has no authority to do anything that shall expressly or impliedly bind anyone by warranty. -General Electric. Co. v. Interstate Electric Co., Mo., 209 S. W. 562.

64. Master and Servant-Simple Duties.-The master may trust the servant to perform the intermediate, ordinary and simple duties incidental to the servant's employment and resting upon the servant's knowledge and skill. - Kube Northwestern Coal & Mining Co., Mo., 209 S. W.

614.

V.

65. Mechanics' Liens-Materialman.-The lien a materialman or mechanic acquires is by virtue of the statutes only, and the statutory requirements as to acquiring and enforcing it must be pursued, else it is lost or does not exist; it being neither a right in nor to property, but simply a right to charge property.-Sorsby v. Woodlawn Lumber Co., Ala., 81 So. 68.

66. Mortgages-Power of Sale.-Where mortgage contained the usual power of sale, but did not authorize mortgagee to purchase at the sale, mortgagee might have bought at his own foreclosure sale, subject to mortgagor's right of disaffirmance.-Hicks v. Dowdy, Ala., 81 So. 37. 67. Municipal Corporations-Obstruction in Street. No citizen may with impunity willfully

or

negligently destroy property of another, which causes him no injury, and which under a claim of right, and with the sanction of a municipal government, occupies part of the street administered by such government.-Lambert v. American Box Co., La., 81 So. 95.

of

69.- Last Clear Chance.-The doctrine "last clear chance" presupposes that the engineer or motorman had actual knowledge of the injured person's peril in time by the exercise of ordinary care to have avoided the accident.Carr v. Interurban Ry. Co., Iowa, 171 N. W. 167. 70. Parent and Child-Support of Parent.It is the duty of a child to support his parent if parent is unable to support himself and child is. Williams v. Williams, Ala., 81 So. 41. 71. Partnership-Evidence.-In an action against defendants as partners for materials furnished to one of them, evidence held insufficient to sustain a finding that a partnership existed.-People's Lumber Co. v. McIntyre & Peters, Cal., 178 Pac. 954.

72. Patents—Infringement.-In infringement suit, the complainant, who seeks to recover profits made by the infringer, who carried on other business, has the burden of showing apportionment, though this duty is often one of making a prima facie case of profit, casting on the defendant the real duty of apportionment.-Coffield Motor Washer Co. v. Wayne Mfg. Co., U. S. C. C. A., 255 Fed. 558.

73. Principal and Surety-Voluntary Surety. -While the contract of an individual or voluntary surety will be strictly construed, and doubts and technicalities resolved in surety's favor, contracts of companies acting as surety for compensation must be construed most strongly against the insurer and in favor of the indemnity.-Cambria Coal Co. v. National Surety Co., Tenn., 209 S. W. 641.

74. Railroads-Crossing Accident.-If one is guilty of negligence in attempting to cross a railroad, and is killed by an approaching train. the negligence is the proximate cause of the death.-Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Harrington, Tex., 209 S. W. 685.

75. -Trespasser.-Railroad tracks, except at public crossings or on highways, are the exclusive property of the railroad company, and persons who go upon such tracks without permission are trespassers.-Hoyer v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, U. S. C. C. A., 255 Fed. 493.

76. Receivers―Judicial Sale.-No warranty of title is implied in a judicial sale, as by a re

77.

Reformation of Instruments-Covenant of Warranty.Where grantor deliberately prepared and executed the warranty deed, without excepting outstanding mortgage from covenant of warranty, realizing that grantee could recover for breach of covenant, notwithstanding knowledge of incumbrance, deed will not be reformed, on ground of mutual mistake by excepting mortgage from covenant.-Stokely V. Bessemer Coal, Iron & Land Co., Ala., 81 So. 78. 78. Remainders--Life Estate.-Owners of property in remainder or reversion after a life estate may recover for a trespass which causes permanent damage to same, and to extent that it wrongfully affects or impairs the value of their estate or interest, and this without making life tenant a party.-Balcum v. Johnson, N. C. 98 S. E. 532.

79. Sales-Essence of Contract.-Time may be essence of a contract to deliver chattels, although contract does not in terms make time essence thereof. -Western Silo Co. v. Gogerty, Iowa, 171 N. W. 176.

80.-Impossibility of Performance.-Where the impossibility of performing a contract of sale is due to a circumstance existing at time of contract, and relating to subject-matter, without knowledge of either party, it is a mutual mistake, excusing performance to extent that subject-matter has no potential existence. -Paxton Lumber Co. v. Panther Coal Co., W. Va., 98 S. E. 563.

81. Installments.-Where chattel is hired for stipulated sum, part cash down, while remainder is to be paid in installments according to promissory notes given as collateral security, each of which is for amount of installment, but title is not to pass until payments of whole price, and on default in payment of any installments lessor has right to immediate possession, transaction is a "conditional sale," not a lease. -Russell v. Martin, Mass., 122 N. E. 447.

82. Rescission.-One buying automobile upon misrepresentation that it would give satisfaction in the jitney service, who was able to use car only 13 out of 21 days following purchase, was entitled to a rescission.-Fuller v. Cameron, Tex., 209 S. W. 811.

83. Trespass-Quare Clausum Fregit.-Owner of standing timber, by entering upon land for the purpose of removing the timber after the expiration of the time prescribed for removal, is liable to an action of trespass quare clausum fregit.-Long v. Nadawah Lumber Co., Ala., 81 So. 25.

84. Vendor and Purchaser—Good Faith.— Good faith means good faith; it means an honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms and technicalities of the law.-Mueller v. Bohn, N. D., 171 N. W. 255.

85. Wills-Condition Precedent.-A provision in a will that devisee could not take the estate, unless her mother surrendered her to another, made such surrender a condition pre. cedent.-Hoffman v. Arnold, Ky., 209 S. W. 506. 86.-Executory Devise.-An executory devise can be limited on a defeasible fee by a will, and is a valid estate.-Fulton v. Teager, Ky., 209 S. W. 535.

87. Evidence Aliunde.-Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show testator's intention was different from that disclosed by his will. -Farmer v. Quinn's Trust Estate, Md., 105 Atl. 763.