a sideration. Prussia was far more than “a geographical expression.” It was little less than an implied state of war against the rest of the world. This Prussian ideal it had created and had imposed upon Germany. It took but little persuasion to convince Saxons and South Germans of their superiority,* even a superiority which they shared with the Prussians, and they had come to accept the notion. Grotesque and fantastic as it seems, it was nevertheless the motive force in recent history. It was the delusion not of a few dreamers but of millions of the subjects of the Kaiser. This superiority must make itself felt. Not until Deutschland should in esse and in posse have erected herself über Alles would Deutschtum be realized. It is for this reason that Prussia's leaders were quite sincerely able to speak of the intolerable pressure upon her boundaries. There was pressure, but it was not pressure from without. Were Holland or Belgium or France or Switzerland or even Russia* practising or pondering aggression ? Hardly. The pressure was very real, but it was pressure from within. * Throughout the nineteenth century one of the main activities of German historians and philosophers had been to reinterpret the history of the world, of Europe and Germany, in order to give Germany a greater and more important rôle. The movement received an immense impetus along this line after the victories over F-dce in 1870. Cf. the study by the Swiss, A. Guilland, “L'Allemagne nouvelle et ses historiens ”; also Munroe Smith, “Militarism and Statecraft,” pp. 211–223. * The German Government had carefully fostered the idea of a “Slav peril," and we shall see that later its official legend of the “War of Self-Defense” threw the blame upon Russia. If there was in reality a “Slav peril” it is safe to say that it was not as serious as the German Government attempted to make it appear, and that in every case it was not the cause of the war. The inconsistency of this contention is plain from the attitude of the German population in August, 1914. People enter upon defensive wars with determination, but not with enthusiasm or exultation. The German attitude was not one of determination, it was one of very general enthusiasm. When we couple willingness to accept authority with such an ideal and programme we can begin to understand what happened in 1914. For we must not imagine that the Prussian “loved evil for its own bitter sake." To him Prussia and the war that made for her glory were the highest good on earth. This fanaticism, this mysticism which was expressed in Das Deutschtum and this autocratic conception of the state and militaristic theory of the army, with their aggressive programme, we were fighting. It was necessary, if we were to maintain our liberties, to change the German attitude, and it could not be changed until the militaristic policy which had begotten it and which had been so successful had been defeated. These, then, were the true roots and causes of the great conflict. This will explain why the Germans were our potential enemies in 1914. How they became our declared and open enemies will be plain as we trace the earlier stages of the World War, each phase of which will merely bring to the surface one more implication of their theory and programme. CHAPTER II THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD WAR TH HE ideas which prevailed in Germany on the civilizing mission of that country, on the purpose of states and the function of the army, implied the necessity of war. This necessity was regarded by her leaders not as something dire to be forfended and deferred, but as a consummation which, though it might involve hardships and sacrifice, was none the less devoutly to be wished. War was as natural and desirable for the state as healthy exercise for the individual. It kept the body politic in strength and vigor. According to Hegel, wars are as salutary to the nations as the ocean winds that sweep and stir the waves are to the restless seas.* They prevent stagnation. This idea was repeated by great teachers like Clausevitz and Treitschke, and recently it had been * Cf. J. B. Scott, “A Survey of International Relations Between the United States and Germany, 1914–1917.” Pp. xxxv-cxiv contain excellent digests of the more important German theories of the state and its mission. much more widely spread and reinforced by the application of ideas of biological evolution.* Since the state is force, “der Staat ist Macht, the supreme test of the right of survival among states is their ability to make war successfully and to conquer their competitors. “Success alone justifies war."† To understand German diplomacy and German psychology we must understand that every other state was regarded therefore as a rival and an enemy. States live not on their own inner strength, but on other states. Such conceptions Mr. Vernon Kellogg found to be very generally accepted by the members of the German General Staff, and naturally they assumed that all other countries held the same views but merely lacked the logic to formulate or the sincerity to avow them. Too long a peace was to this highly important and advanced wing of German thought a national calamity, and Germany had been at peace in Europe for over forty years. The time had come for the great catharsis which would restore the * Cf. Vernon Kellogg, "Headquarters Nights,” in Atlantic Monthly, vol. 120, pp. 145–153. † General von Moltke, quoted by Jules Cambon in the “French Yellow Book," Document No. 3. Harden has also said: "Our success will absolve us.” > |