latter country into the arms of France's matic, that accrued to Germany from enemies. Italy's passage over the Rubicon could hardly be exaggerated, her friendship bore no comparison, as a permanent political investment, to the Russian alliance, which was still only a pium desiderium. But to the first chancellor nothing was impossible. He knew how to turn his country's sworn enemies into trusty friends without an apparent effort, and could, without ill effects, chastise her allies with a wholesome severity which, employed by any other statesman, would have infallibly caused a rupture. His curious methods of winning over the late czar, who had an inborn dislike of Germany, were of a piece with all his diplomacy, and remind one of the bold, confident style in which Gloucester woos Lady Anne in "Richard III." Bismarck set about isolating Russia, and so well did he accomplish the task that he not only drew little powers, like Servia, Roumania, Spain, etc., within the charmed circle of German influence, but actually obtained the hearty co-operation of France under Jules Ferry, and left Russia with no more powerful friend than Montenegro. At last the czar, who still persevered in his policy of sentiment and preferred the triumph of Conservative principles to the acquisition of new provinces, "knuckled down" and signed that secret defensive treaty with Germany, the existence of which has but recently been disclosed, and the immorality of which is still so emphatically condemned. The German chancellor might well regard this fresh accession of strength to the Triple Alliance as a flattering testimony to his marvellous statecraft; but he must have been utterly purblind, had he viewed it as a serious set-off against Russia's coldness. As a matter of fact, nobody was better able to gauge the net value, from a military and political point of view, of each of his actual and possible allies, than Bismarck. He must have known, therefore, that the motives which moved the Italian people, or rather the house of Savoy, to break with France and throw in its lot with the Teuton element in Europe, sprang less from a sincere love of peace than from fear of an impending war, hope of political advancement, and thirst of commercial profit. There was a general feeling at the time in Europe that war was imminent, and there was a specific conviction on the part of Italy's statesmen that France might pay off old scores for alleged ingratitude, in which case Germany's military co-operation would stand them in very good stead. The cost of maintaining three superfluous army corps was, therefore, in some sort the insurance money paid in view of positive risks and possible losses, and would have proved a profitable investment, had the event come off within a reasonable time. But it was hardly to be doubted that as years went on, and the peace of Europe remained undisturbed, a feeling of disappointment must result, and produce a revulsion of Italian sentiments. For while it is quite reasonable, and may be highly profitable to pay a the smooth-faced, oily-tongued, openheavy premium for the insurance of a minded, Ogniben-was a clumsy tyke house during the actual bombardment as compared with this rough-and-ready of the city in which it is situate, it German. Here, if ever, it was a case of smacks less of business than of mad- the wolf dwelling with the lamb, the ness to go on paying the same premium leopard lying down with the kid, and in piping times of peace. Moreover, it the calf and the young lion together, was no secret that Italy's financial and but it was no little child that tried to military resources, whatever the num- lead them. The fatling alone, in the ber of her army corps might be, were guise of Great Britain, kept prudently considerably greater on paper than in aloof-a circumstance that would seem reality. While, therefore, the tempo- to have furthered the chancellor's inrary advantages, political and diplo- terest quite as much as her own. No more marvellous spectacle than this had ever yet been witnessed in the history of diplomacy. Ogniben himself It seems unethical to foment distrust of doubt on the subject-is a point that and discord among nations, even though has but little interest for Englishmen.1 the ultimate end in view be peace and Certain it is that thls all-round arrangeunity. But it would also appear that ment conferred inestimable advantages this is the quintessence of modern upon Germany, for she could, in impordiplomacy. At any rate the wonderful tant cases, control Austria's relations transformation scene brought about by towards Russia, and influence Russia's the German chancellor in 1883, was to policy towards Austria, by means of a a great extent accomplished by these convenient interpretation of the words means. Distrust or dislike of Russia "attack and defence." Thus, there is had brought one of the allies to the arms no doubt whatever, that if we had gone of Germany, jealousy of Austria an- to war with Russia in 1885, after the other, and apprehension of France a defeat of the Afghans by General third It was a case of extremes touch- Komaroff, we should have found the ing each other, and attraction being clauses of the Secret Treaty enforced caused by dint of mutual repulsion. against us. This is an undeniable fact. But if that un-Christian motive was Whether it is also a deterrent one, is, strong enough to unite these States for considering the conditions of such a a time, it was powerless to keep them struggle, a moot question. But this, together for long, and Bismarck cast and not an understanding with Great about for something in the nature of Britain, is Germany's true policy, and political cement. He found it in the no cheaper price was ever yet paid, for possible "triumphs of diplomatic strat- an inestimable and indispensable egy," and embodied it in the doctrine alliance than was given by Bismarck that Great Britain should be forced to for Russia's stipulated attitude towards feed his lions and his lambs. "En- France. For if, instead of Russia driftgland, the lightning-conductor of ing towards war with Great Britain in Europe," was the terse way one of his 1885 about the Afghan misunderstandpress organs put it. It is not a theory ing, it had been France who attacked that one can feel very enthusiastic Germany in 1887, in consequence of the about, however "objectively" one may imprisonment of Schnäbele, the French regard it; but it was certainly very ad- frontier-agent, the republic would have vantageous from the German point of been in as pitiable a plight as in 1875, view, and not incorrect from the stand- when a German attack was feared. point of latter-day diplomacy, in which "everything" is as fair as in love or Our relations with Russia were anything but satisfactory at this conjuncture, and it was oil, not water, that the German press poured on the flames. Afghanistan was the apple of discord just then, and for a considerable time longer, and Bismarck had little difficulty in persuading Russia that Great Britain and France were the prospective enemies of the peace of Europe, against whose pranks it would be prudent to prepare. It was against an attack of one or both of those states that the secret Russo-German alliance was supposed to provide. Whether an AustroHungarian attack was likewise kept in view-theoretically, there is no manner One of the last acts in which Germany and Russia stood side by side under Prince Bismarck's régime, was the protest made by the former state and supported by the latter, against the alleged encouragement extended by the Swiss republic to foreign socialists and international conspirators. Bismarck's dismissal was followedso far as one may judge by his recent "disclosures" and by facts accessible to all-by the reversal of his policy in 1 essential features. That Gene Caprivi sought to compass the sa ends, as his illustrious predecesso there can be no two opinions. But, as the scholastic saw puts it, quando duo faciunt idem, non est idem, and in this case their methods were radically different. The one, refusing to lean with Germany's full weight upon the Triple Alliance, had set great store by Russia's friendship and co-operation, to purchase and preserve whic. he was ready to deliver up Great Britain to the tender mercies of her enemies, to overawe Bulgaria, and to put the socialists beyond the protection of the law. The other, content to have but one string to his bow, definitely threw in Germany's lot with the Triple Alliance, refused to renew the secret treaty with Russia, made friendly overtures to England, relaxed the legislation against the socialists, and manifested a certain amount of mildness towards the Poles. From a British point of view it is impossible to withhold our sympathies from General Caprivi and the "new course"-if, indeed, British sympathies can as yet be expected to go forth to any statesman, or other person who nas the misfortune to be а German. But whether the policy pursued by Bismarck's successors is equally beneficial to their own country, is a question about which there are two radically opposite opinions in the Fatherland itself. One of Caprivi's first acts was to conclude the Anglo-German Convention which gave us the Protectorate of Zanzibar and Wituland, in return for Heligoland and hopes. From a British point of view the agreement seems to many open to serious criticism and has in fact been severely criticised over and over again. But from a German angle of vision, it must appear infinitely more distasteful. For Germany, if she is ever to become a World-Power in the sense in which Russia, Great Britain, or the North American Republic is a Weltmacht, must, among other conditions, possess extensive colonies for her superfluous population. Russia's surplus humanity colonizes Siberia, consumes Russian products, pays for Russian institutions, and fights Russia's battles. Our own emigrants, with the exception of a large contingent of the Irish, settle in our colonies, spread a knowledge of our language, import our manufactures, and generally strengthen our empire. The quarter of a million emigrants-mostly admirable colonistswhom Germany annually produces, who set sail for North or South America or some British colony, and are lost forever to the mother country. Since 1870, therefore, it has been the ardent desire of German statesmen, to obtain for their country extensive tracts of territory suitable for colonizing purposes. Now the only visible chance of realizing this patriotic scheme was in Africa, and the Convention of 1890 virtually annihilated it. This, of course, may seem but a temporary check on Germany's colonial enterprise, and may have been intended to be the price of England's friendship. But is our friendship nearly so advantageous to Germany as Germany's diplomatic hostility might, under Bismarck's régime, have become for us? All the known facts seem to point to a negative reply. Commercially the two countries are uncompromising rivals, and in the struggle between them Great Britain has everything to lose, while Germany has everything to gain. Therefore the freedom that springs from open rivalry, rather tan the fetters that are forged by political friendship, would seem calculated effectually to further the interests of the younger competitor. It is difficult to imagine what Germany could gain by our friendship, sufficiently worth having to warrant her in jeopardizing interests that are admittedly vital. It would be very different, if our government wielded a weapon as formidable as a customs' tariff. If we had it in our power to levy prohibitive duties on German goods coming into Great Britain, India, and our Colonies, the responsible adviser of Kaiser Wilhelm would assuredly have a very powerful temptation to come to a definite understanding with us. But as we compete with all our rivals on equal terms, this motive has no existence. On the other hand, from a political point of view, friendship with Great is some reason to believe that in the same year the Emperor Franz Josef was informed of this Secret Treaty at Rohnstock, where he met Kaiser Wilhelm. At all events it was the Triple Alliance, and not the Russo-German treaty, that was renewed, and it was followed by the commercial treaties concluded with Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Belgium, which won for their author the title of count. This was Caprivi's way of inaugurating the new foreign policy. The czar's reply was somewhat similar, but far more emphatic, and in less than a month after the renewal of the Triple Alliance, the French Squadron steamed into Cronstadt, and the foundations were ostentatiously laid for that Franco-Russian Alliance which, for fifteen years, it had been Germany's endeavor to hinder at all and every cost. This event Bismarck maintains, undid the work of generations, reversed the policy of the first chancellor, and changed the political face of Europe.1 Britain must-as things now stand- the two dynasties lapsed win it. There prove barren of results. A country like ours, whose army can no longer be spared for extra-imperial purposes, and whose navy is destined solely for the protection of our commerce and our possessions, can hardly be expected to fight the battles of allies whose needs and aims have nothing in common, and much that clash, with our own. And however sincerely our government might by the time sympathize with those objects, it would never venture to engage the nation to sacrifice men or money in their pursuit. Friendship with Great Britain, therefore, in the sense of a conviction such as existed between Kaiser Wilhelm and the Czar Alexander, down to 1890, would, if it were feasible, confer no solid advantages upon Germany. In 1890 it was calculated to damage her interests, owing to the soreness that still existed between Russia and England. For it must have seemed a priori probable to M. de Giers and the czar, that Germany's motive in attempting to take this step was the formation of a European league tending to paralyze Russia's influence in Europe. At all events, the construction put upon it by certain organs of the British and German press was eminently fitted to arouse the suspicions of Russia, who had grown morbidly sensitive since the dismissal of Prince Bismarck. The remainder of what may be termed the personal-confidence-policy inaugurated by General Caprivi, whose plain honest ways commanded the respect of all who had dealings with him, was in thorough keeping with the beginning. The pièce de resistance was the Triple Alliance; in comparison with this all else was but a hors d'oeuvre. Thus to Austria's repeated request that Germany would choose between her and Russia and embody the choice, if favorable, in a treaty of commerce, he gave a satisfactory reply, not in words only, but in deed. On the other hand, Russia's proposal that the Secret Treaty should be renewed between her and Germany, was rejected, and apparently the traditional intimate friendship of VOL. XIII. 634 JIVING AGE. The present German secretary of state for foreign affairs recently intimated, in an ingenious and well-considered speech on this subject, that Bismarck's system of political re-insurance was abandoned in 1890 for the best of reasons. Among others, for instance, because it was held to weaken rather than strengthen the guarantee of peace, and because the intrinsic value of the defensive treaties, concluded by any one country, must needs fall off in proportion to their number. Another objection lay, he said, in the difficulty of determining, in case of a breach of the peace, what is really attack and what defence. This, however, if it means anything at all, would seem to deprive of all concrete significance the solemn assurances given by the two imperial founders of the Austro-German Alliance, that they would never impart to it an aggressive tendency. If aggression can always clothe itself in the garb admits, but only in the sense in which Germany 1 Germany and Russia are still "friends," he and Great Britain were friends when he signed the Secret Treaty with Russia. of self-defence, an undertaking of that kind is not worth the paper on which it may happen to be written. At the same time, it is quite true that one good alliance on which the country can implicitly rely is worth twenty which may possibly fail when tested-always provided that the one in question is really sufficient for the needs of the State that thus insures itself. Whether Austria. Hungary, Italy, and Roumania combined can be trusted to accomplish this as efficaciously as Russia alone would, depends not, perhaps, so much upon the military and financial resources of the respective States as upon their attitude and disposition towards Germany. And of this, the ministers pro tem would seem to be the most competent judges. But whether any alliance, which does not include Russia, can in the long run prove beneficial to Germany is a question of international politics on which Prince Bismarck, one would think, has the best right to be heard. Baron Marschall's contention is that the dispositions of, say, Russia towards Germany are of infinitely more importance than her written promise of help in this circumstance or in that, because, if favorably disposed, her co-operation is certain even without any stipulation; and if unfavorably, it will not be efficaciously given, no matter how solemn the undertaking. And Russia's friendliness towards Germany, avers, is as great to-day as when the first chancellor piloted the ship of State. On this statement Bismarck's friends join issue, and what they urge may be briefly stated as follows. The dispositions of one country towards another are best shown by its overt acts, and those of Russia towards Germany are no longer suggestive of the spirit of comradeship which the two nations manifested for each other down to 1890. The intimate relations entered into by Russia with Germany's one implacable enemy, the treaty concluded between them which regards the Teuton as the prospective foe, can hardly be taken as indicative of Russia's friendly disposition towards her former ally. True, it he is only a defensive treaty that links her to France. But who will undertake to point out the shadowy line of demarca tion where defence begins and aggression ends? No doubt, if Germany under Bismarck had a right, while remaining in alliance with Austria, to enter into intimate relations with Austria's prospective enemy, Russia under Lobanoff or Shishkin has the same right of concluding a defensive treaty with Germany's presumptive foe, while entertaining the most friendly feelings for Germany herself. This is undeniable; and yet the consequence usually drawn from it does not by any means follow. For Russia always enjoyed that right, yet refused to avail herself of it as long as Bismarck remained in power. Why? Because of her almost insurmountable aversion to strike up friendship with a State which had identified itself with revolutionary or democratic ideas, implying the negation of everything that Russia cherished and revered. This is so true that, in 1887, when Bismarck's press organs caused German capitalists to sell out Russian scrip, and brought about a financial crisis in Russia, the czar, indignant though he felt, would not hear of a rapprochement with France. The gulf between the two countries seemed to him impassable. The czardom had always been the champion of Conservatism abroad as at home. Divine right and administrative order, as opposed to constitutionalism and law, were the ideals in pursuit or support of which she had never hesitated to sacrifice men and money. In Hungary she had crushed the "monstrous rebel;" in Prussia she had helped to COW down the popular movement. With France, the apostle of revolution, she had refused to combine at a time when combination meant the immediate realization of a portion of her Oriental programme, which is still a pium desiderium. There could and should be no compact, it was felt, between the children of darkness and those of light. It was this ideal current in Russia's policy which never once changed until |