denizens, yet without the same cosmos and the same sun? If not, then does the writer thrust us upon the position we have accepted; and he meant to do so. He meant to be understood as he knew that we should perforce understand him. He meant clearly to indicate that this world, when before inhabited, had the same astronomical surroundings and the same astronomical habitudes as now the same sun and the same motions. What we claim more is, therefore, "by divine right." By this right we hold our position, and shall hold it, unless and until we find that our divine right is an illusion. Pending this catastrophe, we ask: What right has any one to hold and to teach that the world was not astronomically arranged when it was tohu and bohu? What right to hold and to teach that then there was no sun? Again and again and again have we met with these (expository!) assertions; but we cannot remember that we have ever met with a single reason given. ARTICLE IV. IMPLEMENTS OF THE STONE AGE A PRIMITIVE DEMARCATION BETWEEN MAN AND OTHER ANIMALS.1 BY JOSEPH P. THOMPSON, D.D., LL.D., BERLIN, PRUSSIA. WHEREVER on the face of the globe there is found an implement of any sort, we say, at once, Man has been here. It may be that, as in the caves in the Dordogne, there are rude sketches of art to associate the flint and bone implements with the handiwork of man; or, as in the lake findings in Switzerland, there may be traces of human habitations to identify. the stone utensils with the building of the pile-dwellings ; or, as in the shell-mounds (Kjokkenmöddings) of Denmark, a ruined hearth-stone and the bones of birds and animals of the chase, skilfully opened for their marrow, may point to man as the maker and user of the implements found in these heaps of refuse; and it may even happen that sometimes in the same place of deposit with the primitive implements of stone is found an indubitable relic of man himself, in a small fragment of the human skeleton. Yet in all these cases the implement itself, apart from its accessories, is an argument for the presence of man. The implement certifies the man as really as the man certifies the implement. This no one would think of disputing; but I give emphasis to the unanimity of science on this point, because of its bearing upon the primitive differentia of man as a species. We say, If man was indeed contemporary with these wild denizens of the caves, then these are the weapons with which he slew them, the implements with which he prepared them for his food; and the finding of the implements imbedded with the animal remains is evidence that man was contemporary with such animals. 1 A paper read at the "Congrès International d'Anthropologie et d'Archéologie préhistoriques," at Budapest, Hungary, September 1876. If we go back to the river-drift gravels, as, for instance, in the valley of the Somme, where we have no trace of human habitations or other works, and perhaps no authentic specimen of a human bone, but simply compare one stone with another, we say, again: Man was here at the remote period of this formation; for these flints are shapen, adapted to a use, and are no longer stones, but implements. We may raise the question whether the findings are genuine or forgeries, whether "the flint implements are of the same age as the beds in which they are found," or have come there by accident, or have sifted down from some later deposit; but if they are genuine, and of the same age with the drift, we hold them for conclusive proof that man was there in that age. But in making this decision, do we not unconsciously impose upon ourselves with the tacit presumption that only man is capable of making and using an implement? Science cannot admit a presumption, except as a tentative hypothesis; she must rest all her conclusions on the known basis of fact. But that only man is capable of making an implement is a fact of observation and experience, and not merely a presumption à priori from something in the nature of man. Such a presumption is, indeed, valid as against physical nature. Wherever we perceive adaptation to an end we do immediately ascribe such adaptation, or the thing so adapted, to an intelligent purpose. Whether this reference of adaptation to intelligence is intuitive, or the result of cumulative. experience, this is not the place to argue. Suffice it to say, that wherever adaptation is found, the conviction of the human mind is immediate, universal, and absolute, that there was enough of foresight and skill to produce that adaptation. But we never ascribe such foresight and skill, such intelligent purpose, to physical nature. Nature furnishes the stone and the iron; but nature does not make the hammer, the knife, the axe, the spear. Nature abounds in materials of which man can build himself a house; but beyond the cave in the earth and the leafy covert in the wood, she provides nothing for his habitation. The crude material lies in the lap of nature; but the shaping of this material to any use or end requires a degree of intelligent purpose of which we find in inorganic nature no trace nor suggestion. Hence, as against inorganic nature, the presumption does hold à priori, that man, as a creature of intelligence, is alone capable of making an implement, of transforming inorganic matter into a tool for usc. But this presumption from the nature of man does not hold as against other animals. For, though intelligence must be presupposed wherever we perceive adaptation, yet whether other animals than man possess the kind or degree of intelligence requisite to fashioning an implement for a specific purpose, is a question of fact that only observation can determine; and observation has decided this in the negative. There is no instance on record of any animal making an implement for a special use or end. There are animals and birds that use the materials of physical nature with much ingenuity and skill in building their houses and nests. It is enough to instance the intelligence of the beaver in adapting stone, wood, earth, and water to his wants, and in surmounting the obstacles to his task in some less favorable site. There are tribes of Simiae that use stones and sticks for cracking nuts or as weapons of defence. But all this is far removed from the making of implements for a purposed The beaver chooses his stones and breaks or twists his sticks; but he never shapes a stone with which to cut and shape a stick. The chimpanzee takes a stone to crack a nut; but he takes it up a stone, and lays it down again a stone; he never shapes it to a hammer, fits it with a handle, to be reserved for this special use. The baboon throws a stone to wound or frighten his enemy. He never shapes. the stone to a spear-head or a battle-axe, to be kept by him for the service of war. No animal goes beyond using the crude material that nature furnishes. He may use this skilfully and well, adapting it to his own necessities; but he docs not improve upon nature, does not change the form of use. her crude material, making of this an instrument for higher ends; does not make an implement in the sense which we attach to that word in the hands of man. Hence the implement is a line of demarcation between man and other animals. This fact, again, is well-nigh universally accepted by differing schools of scientists; though Mr. Darwin gives it but a qualified assent,1 and Sir John Lubbock suggests that tool-making was at first a matter of accident. But though the use of implements is acknowledged to be a line of demarcation between man and all contemporary animals, it is argued that existing species of Simiae have reached the limit of their development, but, there were prehistoric species which by natural selection attained higher and yet higher stages of progress, until the first type of man emerged, when the anthropoidal progenitor gradually became extinct. Hence it is said to be unfair to make the use of implements a demarcation between man and preexistent animals, or a characteristic of his standing in the scale of being. To this objection there are two replies. First, in the present state of scientific knowledge, there is no tangible evidence of the existence of any such higher kind of apes. The links between the highest known species and man must have been many and long; but no trace of these has yet been found. Truc, this is a merely negative reply. But the existence of such species of apes is a pure assumption based upon analogy. Now the want of data that is to say negative evidence-is logically valid against an assumption. Since then, the links of connection are wanting, this anthropoidal pedigree of man must be held in suspense as only an hypothesis. Darwin presents it with his accustomed modesty.2 But Пacckel goes so far as to say, "we must necessarily come to the conclusion that the human race is a small branch of the group of Catarrhini, and has developed out of long since extinct apes, of this group in the Old World." 3 1 Descent of Man, Vel. i. p. 49. 2 Ibid., Vol. ii. Chap. xxvi. 3 The History of Creation, Vol. ii. Chap. xxii. (The italics are his own). VOL. XXXIV. No. 133. 10 |