occupied during the night by 2000 of his light troops; but next day Minucius attacked the height, drove off its defenders, and encamped there with his whole army. A D B GERON IUM This approximation of the two armies persuaded Hannibal that a general action, which he so much desired, was at hand, and, in expectation of being attacked by the Romans, he kept his whole force united within his entrenchments. But Minucius on this occasion acted both with skill and judgment: he made no movement; and at length, after vainly waiting for several days, Hannibal, unwilling to consume his provisions and desiring to collect sufficient supplies against the approaching winter, resumed his practice of sending out daily two thirds of his force to forage and to pasture his numerous cattle. Minucius, whose inactivity was designed for the very purpose of inducing his opponent so to act, instantly seized the opportunity afforded by the dispersion of so large a portion of the hostile force, to launch the whole of his cavalry to cut up the foraging parties, while he marched at the head of his infantry to assault the weakly defended Carthaginian camp. Hannibal was too weak to leave the shelter of his entrenchments, and he had enough to do to defend his camp against the determined attacks of the Roman infantry; but he was at length relieved by the arrival of 4000 of his foragers who had sought refuge in the camp at Geronium, and whom Hasdrubal now led to his support, and the Romans retired, not however until they had inflicted considerable loss on their adversaries.* The day after this check, Hannibal, fearing, from the ability and boldness shown by Minucius in this affair, that the Romans might turn the Carthaginian position in the night and surprise the town of Geronium which was his depôt, returned to his old camp near that town; and Minucius immediately occupied the.position (B) which Hannibal vacated. With the people of Rome, as with our countrymen of the present day, the only test of military merit was success: the Romans had been previously dissatisfied with Fabius and impatient of his caution, which they pronounced timidity; and now this success of Minucius, magnified doubtless by the advocates of a bold policy, came to increase their discontent with the dictator. Minucius was raised from the position of a subordinate to that of a colleague, and his authority was declared equal to that of Fabius. This notable measure soon bore the fruit that might *See Observation 6. have been expected; for Minucius, elated by his elevation, proposed to Fabius either that they should command the whole army on alternate days, or that each should permanently command one half. Fabius chose the last, because he felt certain that the impetuosity of his colleague would sooner or later get him into trouble with such an adversary as Hannibal, and it was better to risk the destruction of two legions than of four. The Roman force was accordingly divided, and Minucius, withdrawing the troops allotted to him, encamped in the plain at D, at the distance of a mile and a half from Fabius. Hannibal, apprised of this separation, resolved to play on the lively and impatient disposition of Minucius, and to employ even the success which that general had lately gained to draw him into a snare now. Between Minucius and himself was a hill whose possession might be advantageous to either party; this hill Hannibal designed to seize on ostentatiously, and, by the weakness of the force there stationed, to tempt his adversary to attack it, hoping thus to draw the Romans by degrees into a general engagement, and to defeat them by means of a previously concerted ambush. The plain which surrounded the hill in question was level, and at first sight did not seem favourable for the concealment of troops, being destitute of wood and of hedges. But Hannibal in a careful examination of the ground had observed several cavities or hollows, some of them capable of concealing several hundred men; and in this broken ground he posted during the night 5000 infantry and 500 cavalry, whose position was such as to enable them to take the Romans in flank and rear, if these last should be tempted to attack the hill in question. At daybreak on the morrow, Hannibal occupied the hill with his light infantry; and Minucius immediately despatched his light troops supported by cavalry to endeavour to take the height. Hannibal constantly reinforced his Carthaginians by small bodies, and the fight was so obstinately maintained that at length Minucius, whose blood was up, marched towards the hill with his legions in order of battle. Hannibal, on his side, advanced with the remainder of his troops; the battle became fierce and general, and, while at the hottest, he gave the preconcerted signal to his ambush, which charged the Romans in rear and flank. The destruction of the latter appeared certain, and the rout of the Trebbia would have been repeated, had not Fabius, in his anxiety as to the result of the day, held his troops in readiness to support their comrades and led them up at this critical moment to protect the broken legions of Minucius. Fabius now offered battle, but Hannibal, content with his advantage, and unwilling to commit his army against fresh troops, withdrew to his camp. The Roman loss in this affair was very considerable, and it was so palpable that Fabius had saved his colleague from entire destruction, that Minucius generously acknowledged his obligation, and confessed his inferiority by placing himself once more under the orders of the dictator. The period of the dictator's office having expired, the two consuls, viz. Servilius, just returned from a success |