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OBSERVATIONS.

The foregoing description of the battle of Zama differs from all existing accounts in one particular. All the descriptions of that battle state, that after having defeated Hannibal's two first lines, Scipio drew off his troops and formed them again before venturing to attack the formidable body of infantry in his front, which was nearly equal in number to his own and perfectly fresh; that having paused a considerable time to enable his men to effect their formation and to recover breath, he at length gave the signal to advance against Hannibal, who during all this period passively awaited his attack; and that while the infantry was engaged in an equal contest, the cavalry of Scipio fortunately returned in the nick of time to decide the battle in his favour.

On this it may be remarked that this account would make out both Hannibal and Scipio to be utter incapables.

Scipio was quite right in pausing, according to that account, to form his men and to give them breath for a new attack, if Hannibal was so accommodating as to allow him. But if the initiative really rested with Scipio, it was the height of rashness to attack 24,000 veterans in an equal field, when he was expecting the return of his cavalry which would have turned the scale deci

sively in his favour. Therefore if Scipio took the initiative, it may be regarded as certain that he was anxiously straining his eyes to catch sight of his cavalry, and when he did catch sight of them then and not till then did he give the signal for attack.

But a different version of the battle has been given in these pages, because, on the other hand, it is utterly incredible that Hannibal should have allowed Scipio to take the initiative. The reasons given by the historians for Hannibal's formation of his reserve so far in rear of the two first lines, are not only that the fugitives from the two first lines, if defeated, should have plenty of room to save themselves round the flanks of the reserve without running in upon and disordering it, but that the victorious Romans who would be pressing on in pursuit, disordered by the shock and the struggle, might then be assailed while in confusion by this fresh body of troops. And it must have been with this design that Hannibal's third line was made equal in strength to the other two lines together.

Can it be believed then that Hannibal, knowing the Roman cavalry was absent but that it might be expected soon to return, would fail to avail himself of the golden opportunity, and should wait tamely with his men like sheep to be slaughtered in a pen until the butchers had sharpened their knives?

The conduct of Lælius and Massinissa as cavalry commanders, is only one instance out of many of the necessity of coolness in the commander, and perfect discipline among the men. See "Theory of War," page 240.

It is remarkable that the manœuvre which turned the battle of Zama against him, was an exact counterpart of the one which decided the battle of Cannæ in Hannibal's favour.

Hannibal's genius as a general has hardly ever been equalled, never certainly surpassed.

His resolution to undertake the conquest of Italy with 20,000 infantry and 6000 cavalry, without any certain base of operations, manifests that confidence in himself which-although when ill-founded it is the sure mark of incapacity—when well-founded, is the highest proof of inspiration, and without which in war nothing great can be achieved.

His organisation of Cisalpine Gaul into a secure base of operations, and of its fickle inhabitants into allies. whose fidelity and devotion to him never swerved under the most adverse fortune, present that wonderful combination of personal fascination and knowledge of human nature which enabled him to influence his fellow-men in so remarkable a degree; and which, when joined to his complete mastery over all the mere physical agents in war, rendered him irresistible.

The Trebbia, Cannæ, and Thrasymene, were brilliant victories, but it is not by their light that the genius of this great man is most clearly revealed. The generals there opposed to him, though brave soldiers and in some respects able men, were ignorant of the art of war. But after Cannæ the Romans adopted a system of operations which was in general as skilfully executed as wisely conceived. Fabius, Marcellus, Fulvius, Gracchus,

Nero, all great men and good generals, surrounded him with their armies; harassed his outposts and foraging parties; cut off his supplies whenever they could; dogged him in all his marches; yet were never able to prevent him from coming and going at his pleasure and never once gained an important advantage over him personally. Even after the death of Hasdrubal, his numerous enemies, like dogs baiting a bear, only barked and snapped without daring to encounter his hug. When he at length quitted Italy his embarkation was undisturbed; and it is very doubtful if he would have been forced to quit that country at all had he not been recalled by Carthage. Even Scipio seems to have been unwilling to encounter Hannibal in Italy.

On more than one occasion, as has been already remarked, Hannibal violated the arbitrary rules of war by placing himself in situations, which to men of less transcendant ability would have been ruin. But he measured correctly the capacity of his adversaries and his own, and that which in another would have been rashness, was in him only the fruit of the most deliberate and just calculation.

In this respect he resembles Alexander and indeed all great generals. Alexander commenced the conquest of Asia Minor with a force little superior to that with which Hannibal descended from the Alps. He manifested the same ability in creating a base of operations and acquiring allies, or rather (in his case) subjects, whom his policy retained faithful to him. As instances of his contempt of mere rules as such, Alexander fought the battle of Issus with a narrow pass behind him and

the army of Darius interposed between him and his natural line of retreat.

He fought the battle of Arbela, having the Tigris, the Euphrates, and the desert in his rear, in the heart of an enemy's country, and having no depôt nearer than Tyre.

Napoleon says, in remarking on the campaigns of Cæsar: "Cæsar's principles were the same as those of Alexander and Hannibal to keep his forces united; not to be vulnerable in more places than absolutely necessary; to throw himself rapidly on important points; to employ largely moral means, viz. the reputation of his arms, the fear which he inspired, and politic measures calculated to preserve the attachment of the allies and the submission of his conquered provinces."

These great men, confident in their own powers, set at nought the rules of war whenever more was to be gained by neglecting than by observing them, and they were justified by success. But woe to that general who, overestimating his own abilities, seeks to imitate the great masters in this particular; he will meet only with failure and disgrace.

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NOTE. The reader is referred to "Theory of War," Chap. vi., on Moral Agents in War. He will there find an enumeration of qualities required in a general, which were all possessed by Hannibal in the highest degree, and the whole of his military career is moreover a striking illustration of all the further remarks contained in that chapter.

THE END.

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