THIRTEENTH CAMPAIGN.

The public voice pronounced that the fittest man to choose as consul was Claudius Nero, who had already held important commands during several successive years. And as his colleague, was chosen after some hesitation, Marcus Livius, a stern and sullen old man, who had done good service as consul against the Illyrians twelve years before, but who at that time had been unjustly accused of peculation and fined for the offence. The sense of the shame and the wrong were intolerable to him, so that he had lived from that time in sullen enmity with all men of his own class, and he nourished an especial feud against Nero.

Livius at first flatly refused the consulship, saying that if he had been justly condemned, he was not a fitting man for that office. But his opposition was at length overcome by the senators, who then besought him to be reconciled to his colleague. This he also resisted, but finally the authority of the senate prevailed, and they were publicly reconciled.

There are pages of English history yet to be written, which will show that the government charged with the selection of the men destined to uphold the honour of England in the command of her armies, did not imitate the wise conduct of the Roman senate on this occasion; and thought it a little matter that officers appointed to high commands, who must be in constant official communication with each other, should yet be on terms of the most rancorous private hostility.

Livius was destined to arrest the progress of Hasdrubal in the north. Besides his own two legions, a second army of two legions commanded by L. Porcius, already in Cisalpine Gaul, was to be under his orders, while a third army of equal strength was in Etruria under Varro.

In the south Hannibal was opposed by three armies, viz. by that which Marcellus had commanded, under Nero in Apulia; by that of Crispinus, under Q. Fulvius; and by the two Tarentine legions, under the exprætor Q. Claudius. One legion remained at Capua, and two others formed the garrison of Rome, so that fifteen legions were employed this year in Italy alone.

By this time Hasdrubal had entered Italy; he made an unsuccessful attempt to reduce Placentia, and having waited before that place long enough to be joined by the Gaulish and Ligurian levies, he advanced towards Ariminum, the prætor Porcius retiring before him.

Livius hastened up with his army and joined Porcius at Ariminum, but they afterwards abandoned that place and fell back before Hasdrubal behind the Metaurus, and subsequently behind the Sena River.

Meanwhile, Nero having incorporated the army of Fulvius with his own, commanded an army of 40,000 men; his head quarters were at Venusia, and his task was by any and every means to prevent Hannibal from moving northwards to join his brother.

The movements of Hannibal and the early events of the campaign are involved in doubt; but it is stated that he moved forward from his winter quarters near Locri, first into Lucania, then into Apulia, that he then

fell back into Bruttium, and finally advanced once more into Apulia to the neighbourhood of Canusium; that in all these movements he was closely followed and harassed by Nero, and that he lost 15,000 men in several engagements with that general; which last statement may be dismissed as unworthy of belief.

The explanation of these movements probably is, that Hannibal, having 40,000 men in his front, and 20,000 at Tarentum in his rear, besides 10,000 at Capua on his left flank, was not strong enough to move forward into the heart of Italy for the purpose of meeting his brother, without first assembling his garrisons and raising additional soldiers in Bruttium; and he flew from one province to another to effect that object as speedily as possible, as he knew from rumour that Hasdrubal was already on the Po, although he had received no direct tidings from him. It was absolutely necessary that he should receive those tidings before he marched northwards, as Hasdrubal might choose to march from Placentia, either through Etruria or Umbria, and Hannibal's movements must conform to those of his brother.

It was therefore in the hope of receiving those tidings that Hannibal halted at Canusium; and there remained while the decisive blow was struck in the north, which now at length deprived the great Carthaginian of all hope of obtaining that prize for which, during twelve years, he had striven with so much constancy.

Hannibal's object was to fight his way to Hasdrubal, to organise the malcontents of Etruria and Umbria, and to form a new base of operations in the north. The messengers so anxiously looked for were sent, but they

*

never arrived. Hasdrubal, when he left Placentia, sent off six horsemen to make their way to his brother, with the tidings that he was marching by Ariminum, and with a proposal that they should effect their junction in the plains of Umbria. With marvellous good fortune these horsemen made their way through the whole length of Italy, but were all made prisoners near Tarentum, to which place they had wandered in search of Hannibal, who was at the moment in Bruttium. They were the bearers of a letter from Hasdrubal, not written in cypher but in the common Carthaginian language, which contained the whole plan of his future operations. The messengers and letter were sent to Nero, who had the writing translated into Latin by one of the African deserters. That consul took his resolution on the instant. This was to leave the mass of his army to oppose Hannibal, and to prevent him by all means from moving northward, while he, with 6000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, all picked men, went by forced marches to join his colleague Livius, who was then, according to the report of messengers from that consul, in position behind the Sena River. He hoped thus by a sudden blow to destroy one brother, and to return to his army in the south before the other should become aware of his absence, and while Hannibal still awaited in Apulia that letter which he was destined never to receive.†

Nero having sent forward horsemen along his intended route bearing orders for the collection at stated spots of all the provisions, carriages and horses which

*See Observation 2.

† See Observation 3.

the surrounding districts could furnish, set out on an enterprise which was to change the destiny of the world. To prevent the possibility of his design being divulged to Hannibal, he ordered his selected detachment to prepare for a secret expedition into Lucania; and it was not until he had accomplished a considerable distance in his northward march, that he divulged to his soldiers the magnitude of the interests which depended on their speed and courage. His march was like a triumphal procession in everything but the pace, for the troops, worked up to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, would scarcely halt to take refreshment. The entire population of the districts through which they passed, lined the roadside blessing the deliverers of their country. In seven days the distance, about 270 miles, was accomplished, which could only have been effected by transporting the soldiers in carts for the greater part of

the way.

Nero's numbers had received a considerable increase during the march from volunteers, most of them old soldiers. Livius was forewarned of his approach, and Nero entered the camp of his colleague by night, by which means the arrival of the reinforcement was as successfully concealed from Hasdrubal as its departure had been from his brother; and to prevent suspicion being excited by an increase in the size of the camp, the new were received in the tents already

standing.

comers

A council of war was held, and though Livius pressed Nero to allow his men some rest, the latter so urged the necessity of not losing a single day lest the dreaded