of its bad effects. The application of this last condition to the English Statute Book, would tend much to its amelioration; it contains a vast number of dormant acts of parliament, and the fact that they are acts, is a sufficient reason for their abolition, without proof of positive mischief from them.

Whether man has benefitted by the introduction of civil society is a moral problem, which, like other problems not mathematical, can only be solved by inferential testimony. Two reasons make strongly, and, I think, decisively in favour of the affirmative conclusion. First, mankind had their choice, and it is contrary to human nature, to suppose that they would voluntarily have left the natural state, had not experience shown them that the social was better. Secondly, by the surrender of a portion of his natural freedom, man appears to have been well compensated by civil enjoyment. Civilization only divests man of a fraction, not the whole of his primitive liberty: all those acts that are personal to himself, he may continue to indulge in as freely as the savage, subject to no other control than public opinion, which he may defy if he pleases. The law restrains public deeds, and this it does because they are hurtful to others, not to the perpetrator only. Such restraint is civil liberty, and he who seeks greater licence, can neither be just nor rational; he can scarcely be a man, but something worse.

The establishment of civil rights entirely supersedes the operation of the natural rights, which previously governed the relation of individuals. The

right of revenge, of the strong to oppress the weak, and of all those powers which are supposed to appertain to the wild justice of nature, are abrogated by the institution of society. The law is then supreme arbiter: it may be a bad law, but while it continues unrepealed, it is the sole rule, the only tribunal of resort to establish a claim, or redress an injury.

It is unnecessary to illustrate further the distinction between natural and civil liberty. The first is a chimera, like the points and lines of mathema→ ticians; but, like them, it serves as a basis for reasoning, and enables us to deduce the real from the abstract. Alexander Selkirk might possess his natural rights in Juan Fernandez, but nobody else. Two men could not live a day on a desolate island,they could not meet at the fountain for a pitcher of water, without settling the question whether age, strength, or first comer, should have precedency; and the termination of the dispute would be the establishment of civil order between them.

CHAP. III.

CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

GOVERNMENT is the law and its administration, instituted for the maintenance of civil liberty, and includes among its functionaries, not only the exe

cutive and legislature, but the judges, magistrates, and all other public institutions established for the general peace and security. Under the authority of these is produced that state of society termed order, as contradistinguished from liberty, or man in a state of nature.

"Society," says Paine, "is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections; the latter negatively by restraining our vices." This is an ingenious distinction; but it would have been more correct to say, that society is produced by the wants of man, and government by the wants of society. Man would be helpless and miserable without the co-operation of his fellowcreatures; and society could not subsist without laws, and their ministers for its regulation and government.

The great problem in social institutions is to obtain the advantages of order with the least sacrifice of personal freedom. Human happiness consists in entire liberty of action; that is, in the perpetual doing of what is agreeable to our inclinations. Whatever abridges this liberty is an evil, but it is an evil which may be voluntarily incurred, like the taking of an unpalatable medicine, for sake of the greater compensating advantage which results from it. Government is that compensating advantage, the benefits of which may be easily established.

The great ends of life are freedom, security, and sustenance; in a state of nature these are all im

perfectly guaranteed. The savage is neither free nor secure; he is the slave of every member of his tribe stronger than himself, and may be sacrificed to his lust, his anger, or revenge. Sustenance, under which is included food, clothing, and lodging, is not less precarious than freedom and security. The rights of property not being recognised, no one can possess any thing which he can call his own; if he cultivate a plot of ground, he cannot be sure he will be allowed to reap the produce; if by superior toil and ability in hunting and fishing, he lay up a stock of provisions, he cannot be certain he will not be compelled to share them with a stranger; where things are in common, spoliation is not robbery, it is only partnership: hence there can be no industry, no provision for the future; the gratification of immediate wants is the sole object of exertion, and any thing beyond this is an unprofitable, because it is an unsafe, accumulation.

Contrast the evils of this uncertain state of existence, with the advantages enjoyed where civil rights are recognised, or those rights prescribed by law, and guaranteed by its administration.

The general principle of civil liberty, as explained in the last chapter, is to leave every one to act as he pleases, provided he does not injure his neighbour; the objects of law are actions which affect the community, not the individual. For example: a person has the entire liberty of locomotion, he may go to whatever place he thinks proper, but he must go on the highway, or other legal path, and not tres

pass over another's ground. He is also entire master of his own person, and may subject it to what discipline he thinks fit; for instance, he may, as used to be common in Catholic countries, flagellate himself, but not assault his neighbour; he may get intoxicated with impunity, provided it is done privately, and not so as to be an annoyance to the public. He has similar privileges in respect of his dwelling, and the government of his family. His house is his castle; for mere purposes of a private nature, it is wholly impregnable, and on public occasions, it can only be legally violated, in case of the more serious delinquencies. In the treatment of his wife and the bringing up of his children the law is equally scrupulous, leaving them to his own discretion, regulated by his affections and judgment, and only interfering for their protection in those extreme cases where the lien of the commonwealth on their future services is endangered.

Hence it may be concluded, that human liberty is augmented rather than diminished by social institutions; not only is a greater portion of the natural liberty of man guaranteed to him by civil order, but what is peculiar to that state is, that he is protected in the enjoyment of it.