SECTION V. SCEPTICAL SOLUTION of thefe DOUBTS, THE PART 1. HE paffion for philofophy, like that for religion, feems liable to this inconvenience, that, tho' is aims at the correction of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only ferve, by imprudent management, to fofter a predominant inclination, and push the mind, with more determined refolution, towards that fide, which already draws too much, by the byafs and propensity of the natural temper. 'Tis certain, that, while we afpire to the magnanimous firmness of the philofophic fage, and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds, we may, at laft, render our philofophy, like that of EPICTETUS, and other Stoics, only a more refined fyftem of felfifhnefs, and reafon ourfelves out of all virtue, as well as focial enjoyment. While we ftudy with attention the vanity of human life, and turn all our thoughts on the empty and tranfitory nature of riches and honors, we are, perhaps, all the while flattering our natural indolence, which, hating the buftle of the world and drudgery of bufinefs, feeks a pretext of reason, to give itself a full and uncontroled indulgence. There is, however, one fpecies of philofophy, which feems little liable to this inconvenience, and that because it strikes in with no diforderly paffion of the human mind, nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or propenfity; and that is the ACADEMIC or SCEPTICAL philofophy. The academics talk always of doubts, and fufpenfe of judgment, of danger in hafty determinations, of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding, and of renouncing all speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice. Nothing, therefore, can be more contrary than fuch a philofophy to the fupine indolence of the mind, its rafh arrogance, its lofty pretenfions, and its fuperftitious credulity. Every paffion is mortified by it, except the love of truth; and that paffion never is, nor can be carried to too high a degree. "Tis furprizing, therefore, that this philofophy, which, in almost every inftance, must be harmless and innocent, fhould be the fubject of fo much groundless reproach and obloquy. But, perhaps, the very circumftance which renders it fo innocent, is what chiefly expofes it to the public hatred, and refentment. By flattering no irregular paffion, it gains few partizans: By oppofing so many vices and fol follies, it raifes to itself abundance of enemies, who ftigmatize it as libertine, profane, and irreligious. NOR need we fear, that this philofophy, while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life, fhould ever undermine the reafonings of common life, and carry its doubts fo far as to destroy all action, as well as fpeculation. Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any abstract reafoning whatsoever. Tho' we fhould conclude, for instance, as in the foregoing fection, that, in all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind, which is not fupported by any argument or procefs of the understanding; there is no danger, that these reasonings, on which almost all knowledge depends, will ever be affected by fuch a difcovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this ftep, it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the fame. What that principle is, may well be worth the pains of enquiry. SUPPOSE a perfon, tho' endowed with the strongeft faculties of reafon and reflection, to be brought on a fudden into this world; he would, indeed, immediately obferve a continual fucceffion of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover any thing farther. He would not, not, at first, by any reafoning, be able to reach the idea of cause and effect; fince the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the fenfes; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one inftance, precedes another, that therefore the one is the caufe, and the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and cafual. There may be no reason to infer the existence of the one from the appearance of the other. And in a word, fuch a perfon without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reafoning concerning any matter or fact, or be affured of any thing beyond what was immediately prefent to his memory and fenfes. SUPPOSE again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived fo long in the world as to have obferved fimilar objects or events to be conftantly conjoined together; what is the confequence of this experience? He immediately infers the existence of the one object from the appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowlege of the fecret power, by which the one object produces the other; nor is it, by any procefs of reasoning, he is engaged to draw this infeBut ftill he finds himfelf determined to draw it: And tho' he should be convinced, that his underftanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the fame courfe of thinking. rence. There There is fome other principle, which determines him to form fuch a conclufion. THIS principle is CUSTOM OF HABIT. For whereever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propenfity to renew the fame act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding; we always fay, that this propenfity is the effect of Cuftom. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reafon of fuch a propenfity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is univerfally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects. Perhaps, we can push our enquiries no farther, or pretend to give the caufe of this caufe; but muft reft contented with it as the ultimate principle, which we can affign of all our conclufions from experience. 'Tis fufficient fatisfaction, that we can go fo far; without repining at the narrowness of our faculties, because they will carry us no farther. And 'tis certain we here advance a very intelligible propofition at least, if not a true one, when we affert, that, after the conftant conjunction of two objects, heat and flame, for inftance, weight and folidity, we are determined by cuftom alone to expect the one from This hypothefis feems the appearance of the other. even the only one, which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a thousand inftances, an inference, which we are not able to draw from one : |