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It may be objected to MILTON, that he has traced

his caufes to too great a distance, and that the rebellion of the angels produces the fall of man by a train of events, which is both very long and very cafual. Not to mention that the creation of the world, which he has related at length, is no more the cause of that catastrophe, than of the battle of PHARSALIA, or any other event, that has ever happened. But if we confider, on the other hand, that all these events, the rebellion of the angels, the creation of the world, and the fall of man, refemble each other, in being miraculous and out of the common courfe of nature; that they are fuppofed to be contiguous in time; and that being detached from all other events, and being the only original facts, which revelation dif covers, they ftrike the eye at once, and naturally recall each other to the thought or imagination: If we confider all thefe circumstances, I fay, we fhall find, that thefe parts of the action have a fufficient unity to make them be comprehended in one fable or narration. To which we may add, that the rebellion of the angels and the fall of man have a peculiar refemblance, as being counterparts to each other, and prefenting to the reader the fame moral, of obedience to our Creator.

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THESE loose hints I have thrown together, in order to excite the curiofity of philofophers, and beget a fufpicion at least, if not a full perfuafion, that this

fubject

fubject is very copious, and that many operations of the human mind depend on the connexion or affociation of ideas, which is here explained. Particularly, the fympathy between the paffions and imagination will, perhaps, appear remarkable; while we obferve that the affections, excited by one object, país eafily to another connected with it; but transfufe themfelves with difficulty, or not at all, along different objects, which have no manner of connexion together. By introducing, into any compofition, perfonages and actions, foreign to each other, an injudicious author lofes that communication of emotions, by which alone he can intereft the heart, and raise the paffions to their proper height and period. The full explication of this principle and all its confequences would lead us into reasonings too profound and too copious for this enquiry. "Tis fufficient, at prefent, to have established this conclufion, that the three connecting principles of all ideas are the relations of Refemblance, Contiguity, and Caufation.

SECTION

SECTION IV.

SCEPTICAL DOUBTS concerning the OP ERATIONS of the UNDERSTANDING.

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PART I.

LL the objects of human reafon or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, viz. Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonftratively certain. That the Square of the hypothenufe is equal to the fquares of the two fides, is a propofition, which expreffes a relation between thefe figures. That three times five is equal to the half of thirty, expreffes a relation between these numbers. Propofitions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is any where exiftent in the universe. Tho' there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonftrated by EUCLID, would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

MATTERS

MATTERS of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not afcertained in the fame manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is ftill poffible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with equal facility and diftinctnefs, as if ever fo conformable to reality. That the fun will not rife to-morrow is no less intelligible a propofition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rife. We fhould in vain, therefore, attempt to demonftrate its falfhood. Were it demonstratively falfe, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be diftinctly conceived by the mind.

IT may, therefore, be a fubject worthy curiofity, to enquire what is the nature of that evidence, which affures us of any real exiftence and matter of fact, beyond the present teftimony of our senses, or the records of our memory. This part of philosophy, 'tis obfervable, has been little cultivated, either by the ancients or moderns; and therefore our doubts and er rors, in the profecution of fo important an enquiry, may be the more excufable, while we march thro fuch difficult paths, without any guide or direction, They may even prove useful, by exciting curiofity, and destroying that implicit faith and fecurity, which is the bane of all reafoning and free enquiry. The

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