be meant by afferting, that felf-love, or refentment of injuries, or the paffion between the fexes is, not innate?

But admitting these terms, impreffions and ideas, in the sense above explained, and understanding by innate what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we affort, that all our impreffions are innate, and our ideas not innate.

To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinión, that Mr. LOCKE was betrayed into this question by the schoolmen, who making use of undefined terms, draw out their disputes to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in question. A like ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run thro' all that great philofopher's reafonings on this subject.

SECTION

III.

Of the AssoCIATION of IDE a s.

'TIS evident, that there is a principle of con

nexion between the different thoughts or ideas of the mind, and that in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or difcourfe, this is fo obfervable, that any particular thought, which breaks in upon this regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and moft wandering reveries, nay in our very dreams, we fhall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which fucceeded each other. Were the loofeft and freest converfation to be tranfcribed, there would immediately be obferved fomething, which connected it in all its transitions. Or where this is wanting, the perfon, who broke the thread of difcourfe, might ftill inform

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inform you, that there had fecretly revolved in his mind a fucceffion of thought, which had gradually led him away from the fubject of converfation. Among the languages of different nations, even where we cannot fufpect the least connexion or communication, 'tis found, that the words, expreffive of ideas, the moft compounded, do yet nearly correfpond to each other: A certain proof, that the fimple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by fome univerfal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind.

THO' it be too obvious to escape obfervation, that different ideas are connected together; I do not find, that any philofopher has attempted to enumerate or clafs all the principles of affociation; a subject, however, that feems very worthy of curiofity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, viz. Refemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Caufe or Effect.

THAT these principles ferve to connect ideas will not, I believe, be much doubted. A picture natu rally leads our thoughts to the original: The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or difcourfe concerning the others +: And if we think of a wound, we can scarce forbear

* Refemblance.

+ Contiguity.

reflecting

reflecting on the pain which follows it. But that this enumeration is compleat, and that there are no other principles of affociation, except thefe, may be difficult to prove to the fatisfaction of the reader, or even to a man's own fatisfaction. All we can do, in fuch cafes, is to run over feveral inftances, and examine carefully the principle, which binds the different thoughts to each other, never flopping till we render the principle as general as poffible. The more instances we examine, and the more care we employ, the more affurance fhall we acquire, that the enumeration, which we form from the whole, is compleat and entire. Instead of entering into a detail of this kind, which would lead into many useless fubtilties, we fhall confider fome of the effects of this connexion upon the paffions and imagination; where we may open a field of fpeculation more entertaining, and perhaps more inftructive, than the other.

As man is a reasonable being, and is continually in purfuit of happiness, which he hopes to attain by the gratification of fome paffion or affection, he feldom acts or speaks or thinks without a purpofe and intention. He has ftill fome object in view; and however improper the means may fometimes be, which he chufes for the attainment of his end, he never lofes view of an end, nor will he fo much as

*Caufe and Effect.

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throw