the difference is in kind and not in degree.
The railroad corporation is invested with governmental power to take private property against the will of the owner. In some States the roadway is exempted from local taxation. The reason for this is manifest. The public welfare, nay, the existence of our present civilization, is de- pendent upon the existence and mainte- nance of railroads. A stoppage of railway transportation to-day would quickly bring starvation to millions and the destruc- tion of inland industries. The people, or what was left of them, would relapse into the conditions of Colonial times. To the man in the street, and generally to the man in the easy chair, the railroad is nothing but a somewhat inconvenient means of transportation of himself or his family when the Ford or the limousine is not available. They both are apparently oblivious of the fact that practically every bit of food that enters their mouths, every garment they wear, the materials of the buildings they inhabit and in which they spend their working hours, not to mention the Ford and the limousine, have been transported on some railroad. The railroads, therefore, are not merely clothed with a public interest, they are the public interest itself. Everybody is dependent upon their operation. We talk about public utilities, but no other utility affects every one in the whole country.
In the early days of railroad building, the problem was presented whether the community should build the railroads it- self or intrust that function to individ- uals. As early as 1828 the Legislature of Massachusetts appointed a commission to survey routes for railroads and to re- port "whether the said roads should be constructed by the State alone, whether in part by the State and in part by indi- viduals or corporations, or whether by the latter alone." Massachusetts finally determined upon the policy of intrusting the construction of railroads to corpora- tions chartered for the purpose, although frequently contributing largely from the public purse, but always reserving the right of retaking the roads when the holders had been reimbursed with cent and
late rates. Massachusetts was thu with full power in the Legislature to tinuing its practice of Colonial times it frequently expended public mo the construction of highways and b and later, when charters were gran toll roads, the Legislature invaria served the right to dissolve such co tion "whenever it shall appear t satisfaction that the income arisin the said toll shall have fully comp the said corporation for all money may have expended in purchasi taking care of said road, togeth interest thereon at the rate of twe centum by the year, and thereup property of the said road shall be in this Commonwealth and be at th posal."
Whether the railroad was to b by the State or by a private corp was purely a question of finance." one case the State raised the mon the public by pledging its credit, the other the corporation sold its s pledged its credit to the same pub very likely to the same individu was, in effect, the same money w It seems clear that in the early the method adopted to procure i railroad building, the choice fe private individuals rather than th not through any belief in the efficiency of private managem because the steam railroad was an either system was wholly untri ment the success of which was f assured, and the community, as preferred to offer the bait to pri vestors of a large return rather t a risk to the public credit.
This bait was nothing more than a farming out of the power ation of the State; that is, the p exacting from the public the mo essary for the maintenance of service. The late Charles Francis Jr., in his first report as Railroa missioner of Massachusetts, in this out most clearly. He say sums exacted from the commu transportation, whether of perso property, constitute an exaction nature of a tax-just as much water rates, or the assessments erty, or the tariff duties on in
ature to regu- vas thus con- al times, when lic money in s and bridges, re granted for invariably re- such corpora- ppear to their Le arising from compensated 1 moneys they urchasing and together with e of twelve per thereupon the shall be vested be at their dis- as to be built te corporation inance. In the
he money from credit, and in old its stock or me public, and ndividuals. It oney whatever 'ocure it.
e early days of oice fell upon than the public n the superior nagement, for y untried, but was an experi- a was far from ity, as a whole, : to private in- ather than run more nor less : power of tax- s, the power of the money nec- ce of a public Francis Adams, Railroad Com- ts, in 1871, set He says: "All community for persons or of
vestments as may from time to time be required to meet the demands for increased service. In the early days this object was reached by legislative limitation of the dividend rate in Massachusetts ten per cent. Later, railroad commissions were appointed to control rates, and more recently the Transportation Act has partly revived the earlier plan of limiting the dividends to be paid. Local communities through which the road runs are permitted to help themselves to portions of the tax so levied by what is termed the imposition of taxes on the property of the railroad, but what is, in reality, an application to local needs of a portion of the tax collected from the public as a whole. The so-called "recapture" provision of the Transportation Act (Sec. 15a), by which all earnings over a six per cent return are divided between the earning road and a public fund, has been upheld by a judge of a United States court as an exercise of the power of taxation, and his decision has been sustained by the Supreme Court. It is taxation in the sense that it is a division of an exaction from the public for the performance of a public function.
The public can no more avoid its contri- bution to railroad rates than it can to the internal revenue taxes on the tobacco it smokes. Inasmuch as the tax affects everybody it makes little real difference how it is levied or collected. With all public service the method of payment therefor is wholly a question of expe- diency. The collection of ashes and refuse in cities, for example, is sometimes at the public expense, and sometimes a charge is made to the householder. Should the State see fit to restore the toll houses to the highways and charge a toll for their use, such an exaction would clearly be a tax. The railroads might well give free service were it not for the maxim of tax- ation that the best system is the one that plucks the most feathers with the least squawking and, in consequence, the bur- den is less easily perceived if it is borne in the first instance by passengers and ship- pers. The direct incidence of the tax is thus shifted, although the ultimate burden is not widely different when the expense of transportation is paid from the public treasury. In European states where state ownership of railroads prevails, the gross receipts from railroad operation go into the public treasury and are often pledged to secure foreign loans, while the operat- ing expenses are paid from the general tax levy, and whether the railroad is operated at a profit or a loss is purely a matter of governmental bookkeeping. Clearly, where no dividends are paid, rates are strictly an exaction from the public to pay for a public service.
The tax collected is thus limited, but in so doing the public have seemingly forgotten that the railroads must increase their facilities to meet the requirements of growing communities, and the money therefor must come either through the public credit or directly from the public. Money is not to be coaxed from the pockets of the investing public unless a satisfactory return is assured. This return must, of course, vary with the risk assumed. For a railroad in a new and sparsely settled community a high bid for money must be made, while a thickly settled and highly industrialized community may secure money on practically its own terms. Only about ten years ago New England railroads could secure additional funds at as low a rate as the cities which they served. Shares in the Boston and Providence railroad, paying a dividend of ten per cent, sold in the market for some years at three hundred dollars per share, returning to the purchaser three and a third per cent on his investment. Not even the State bettered that
It is evident that such farming-out cannot safely be left unrestricted. In the farming-out days of the Roman Empire, the governor of a province was required to pay a fixed sum to the central government as the share of the province of the imperial budget, and the governor received his compensation as tax gatherer in whatever he could exact above that sum. The railroad corporation, on the contrary, reserves a limited sum and holds any surplus of receipts to the order of the public. The Transportation Act aims to permit the railroad corporation to collect enough to maintain the road and equipment and return to the security holders
adopted to secure this result. At one time all new issues of stock were sold at auction to the highest bidder. At another time, the public service commission fixed the price below which new stock could not be issued. If the commission fixed too low a price, valuable "rights" accrued to stockholders. All these methods were aimed at securing the necessary funds for railroads at the lowest cost to the community, and scant attention was paid to claims of stockholders that they should be allowed to make their own investments on their own terms.
The bait to the investing public was twofold-the somewhat shadowy protec- tion of the fifth amendment to the Consti- tution of the United States, and the self- interest of the public that nothing would be done to discourage further investments At the present time, when needed. neither of these has sufficient force to in- duce investments in new issues of railroad shares, and loaning money through the purchase of bonds is becoming more haz- ardous.
But to go back to the functions of the railroad corporation. The appointment of the management of the operations of the road was delegated to the stock- holders, as it seemed only just that the persons who furnished the money should control those to whom they were to look for the return on their investment; but the managements, that is the presidents and boards of directors, are none the less public officers though privately ap- pointed. Mr. Adams insists on this, say- ing, "they are essentially trustees," not only for the security holders to secure a return on the investment, but also for the public to see that it gets the efficient service so necessary to its welfare. This doctrine of trusteeship does not rest on Mr. Adams alone. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has on various occasions considered the relations of the railroads to the public. Chief Justice Shaw re- marked, in one opinion: "It is true that the real and personal property necessary to the establishment and management of the railroad is vested in the corporation; but it is in trust for the public. The com- pany have not the general power of dis- Dosal incident to the absolute right of obliged to use it in a
particular manner, and for the plishment of a well-defined public Chief Justice Taft used similar la A trustee holds the legal title 1 in the recent "recapture" decisio erty for management, but the rea is his beneficiary for whom he ma The railroad corporation is a mental device to secure the n money with which to build and e railroads, and is a convenient i diary between the general and the additional function of holding off ing public. Nowadays it perfor ment ownership with the attenda of political interference, althoug that function is near the vanishin and whether political or labor uni ference is the most harmful ma open question. The combination deadly.
At the present time, and with m roads, the stockholders have, in no control of the managemen Pennsylvania Railroad, for exam ports that nearly one half of it holders are women, holding one the stock, with an average ho forty-seven shares. Of the one and forty thousand stockholders t age holding is only seventy share manifestly out of the question vast number of people with sm vidual interests to unite in any c movement, and boards of direc usually self-perpetuating. As a writer has said, "authority to largely delegated to executive com and the entire directorate meets stated intervals and then pretty to felicitate the officers and emplo to approve the work of the manag The stockholders are a pitiably lot, and it has long been a financi that a minority of a third, or even always control the election of d This minority is not infrequen trolled by banking interests, an sarily and properly so. The gre of stockholders cannot or, at leas provide the money for extension pansion, and such money is, and under existing conditions raised investing public through bank purchase, or underwrite, new issu curities and place them with the
r the accompublic object." milar language decision.
title to propthe real owner he manages it. is a governthe necessary and equip the nient intermeand the investperforms the ing off governattendant evils although even anishing point, Dor union interful may be an ination is most
with most railve, in practice, gement. The r example, ref of its stockg one third of ge holding of e one hundred lders the aver7 shares. It is stion for this th small indiany concerted directors are As a recent ity to act is re committees, meets only at pretty largely mployees and nanagement. iably helpless nancial axiom even less, can of directors. quently con5, and necese great body least, do not sion and ex
who take them, in many cases, through their confidence in the knowledge and good judgment of the bankers who offer them.
From the nature of the case the bankers are selfishly interested to see that their customers are not disappointed in their investments, and to that end the banker seeks representation on, and is interested in the choice of, the boards of directors, and frequently dictates their financial policies. A few years ago the bankers who raised the money for the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad stipulated as a condition that no dividend should be paid for a term of years so that all net earnings should be reinvested in the improvement of the road, thus increasing the earning power without increasing the amount of securities upon which a return must be paid.
sorbed by further investment in plant or by increased wages of operatives or, under the Transportation Act, to improve transportation on less fortunate railroads.
The wage problem has been too long neglected by the public, who still do not seem to realize that the wages are paid from public taxation just as directly as the wages of the post-office employees. The management resists increases in wages if the effect of such increases is to imperil the payment of dividends, but if the dividend is assured, there is little incentive to the management to oppose wage increases in the absence of strong popular support. Controversies with employees are never agreeable, and it is only human nature to avoid them.
The public is vitally interested in its every-day life in efficient service and low rates, and so far as rates represent excessive returns to capital or abnormal wages to labor, self-interest is opposed to both. Selfishly it is its interest to pay no more to capital than is necessary to secure further needed supplies. Altruistically it seems to desire that railroad labor should receive a return sufficient to secure that shadowy and illusive thing known as the American standard of living, and in that altruistic spirit it is ready to close its eyes to all sorts of excessive demands. It awakens no general interest to be told that Rule 60 of the national agreements with the Federated Shop Crafts, issued when the roads were under federal control, requiring the roads to pay their employees for an hour a week extra for punching the time clock "regardless of the number of hours worked during the week," cost the Boston and Maine Railroad some one hundred and fifty thousand dollars in a single year. It is of no personal interest that the United States Labor Board awarded an employee of a Western railroad thirty-four dollars and eighty-four cents for one hour's work when he travelled to an outside terminal, slept there, did his hour's work, and travelled back. His claim under "the rules" was for time and a half and double time for overtime for the period of his absence
Bankers, as a rule, are not trained railroad men, and the main function of a board of directors is to select a competent president and support him in his policies and appointment of subordinates. Managerial ability is rare and competition for it is keen, and the public must expect to pay for it. The railroad problem to-day is largely a question of management, and, as the president of the General Electric Company has recently stated, the conflict to-day, and particularly with railroads, is not so much between labor and capital, as between labor and the management, where management is as much an employee as labor itself. The active management rarely has any substantial holding of stock. The executives, being, as has been pointed out, public officers privately appointed, have a double obligation and allegiance. It is their duty to use their utmost exertions to see that the investors in the railroad securities, both bonds and stock, secure an adequate, or the stipulated, return, and they also owe a duty to the public whose road they are operating to furnish cheap and efficient service. The time is now past, if indeed it ever existed, when railroad corporations could pay dividends commensurate with those paid by wholly private enterprises. It must not be forgotten that, however profitable the operations of a railroad mav
editorial articles in the Boston Herald some two years ago, but the readers could not be induced to comprehend that these absurdities were paid for by the public and every one paid his share, minute in each instance, but colossal in their sum total. There still persists a feeling that these payments are the spoils of a war between capital and labor and represent justifiable loot from rapacious capital in which the public as a whole has no interest except to cheer on the victor. The time may, nay must, come when the public worm will turn and the railroad labor unions will find this elaborate structure of absurd and selfish rules toppling about them like a house of cards.
The disinclination to controversy over wages has been heightened by the attitude of the National Government, particularly during the war-time administration. The Adamson Act and the action of the direc- tor general in encouraging and approving agreements with the various labor unions have fettered the hands of the railroad executives to such an extent that there is left little incentive to resist further en- Now that croachment by the unions. these agreements have been turned back to the managements and unions to re- adjust, the unions show little inclination to surrender the advantages they have gained. The provisions of the Transpor- tation Act tend to make these conditions permanent. The attitude of the unions is that of the famous remark about the public attributed to Commodore Vander- bilt.
One alarming condition is the insistence of the unions on the right of promotion by seniority. It is true that the agreements provide that, ability and merit being equal, seniority shall prevail in promo- tions in the classified service, but the man- agement is no longer allowed to settle questions of ability and merit, as all de- cisions are ultimately appealable to the Labor Board, sitting in Chicago, who fre- quently upset the judgment of the execu- tive officers, laying down as a principle that "the intent of this rule is to es- tablish seniority as the first consideration in selecting the successful applicant for a bulletined position." Vacancies must be on the local bulletin boards.
agement of a transcontinental rail appointed a man, not an employee of railroad, to have charge of the shippi wool at Miles City, Mont., as that was sharply competitive and the pointee was personally acquainted the shippers of wool and could at business. The wool-shipping seas short, so that the office was open fifty-five days and the appointment necessarily temporary. An employ the road, who was entitled to the pla the basis of seniority, applied the and was rejected because the position temporary, he was already employed he had no personal acquaintance wit district. On appeal, the Labor Boar clared him entitled to the job and, a office had long since been closed fo season, ordered the railroad to pay the difference between the salary he received in his regular job and wha would have received had he obtaine desired place.
The deadening thing about this a cation of the seniority principle is th puts upon the railroads much the burden that encumbers the army, v a second lieutenant has been reason sure of becoming a colonel, and perh general, if he lived long enough. In of peace that may do no harm, but eral Pershing's main task in France weeding out the incompetents and re ing them with men of energy, capa and leadership. The railroads sorely authorities should take steps to see all three of these qualities, and the p The American Telephone and the railroad managements secure th graph Company, a rival in magnitud capitalization of any railroad sys annually sends its agents to colleg interest young men of promise in te ony as a career. The General Ele Company and the larger New York b also make special efforts to enlist b and enterprise, but we do not hear o railroads making any such adva Educated young men of promise ar entering the service of our railroads what is even more disheartening, ar encouraged to do so by the active agements. This somewhat rigid doc of seniority interferes with holding inducements to such men, as, in the
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