HY do men disagree? Why is there not at the present time and why has there not been in the past more agreement among men regarding matters of common sense and every-day life, law and politics, art and literature, religion and theology, war and peace, science and philosophy? What strikes one is the fact, not of accord, but of discord in almost infinite variety in regard to nearly every question and problem in each of these aspects of civilization. But why is this so? Why should men not agree rather than disagree, especially when, after several thousand years of civilization, they have had, seemingly, every chance to reach a common understanding on at least many questions. Is it because disagreement is writ deep in the very nature of things? Are there in human nature ineradicable factors that produce disagreement, or, in the world outside of man, factors that make any supposedly possible basis of agreement, such as truth and fact, really but superstition and delusion? Certainly that one or the other of these causes, or both, is operative would seem to be the conclusion to which one is forced by the predominance of disagreement over agreement. Accordingly, one may ask if it would not, seemingly, be the course of wisdom to conclude not only that it is hopeless for men ever to seek to agree, but that it will forever remain hopeless, and to accommodate oneself to this conclusion. Indeed, one should perhaps go further and ask whether it would be fortunate if men did agree more than they do. Would this be conducive to human welfare? Would things move, evolve, or progress if the disagreement that is now rampant were displaced by agreement?

Is not intellectual discord after all a mo

undiscoverable whither th ing us?

These and other allied a been recently pondering. tion should come to me Perhaps if a psychoanaly at my subconsciousness he I surmise, however, that i have a "questioning comp cause I have been impresse and subconsciously, by the agreement that is at large in the present time, and by ce or recent developments in ogy, psychology, and philo result I confess that I begin tical of the tradition in which brought up. According to t there were facts which two sons could perceive; there wa consisting of a system of m that was one and the same for only be found. And there w getting at such common facts both by sensation and by rea men could see, and agree tha for example, the same color Two men could grant, on the b son, that, for example, the s angles of a plane triangle is eq right angles, and that the sun a earth and the earth the sun ac the law of gravitation as it w lated by Newton. These were truths. According to that trad ther, there was, as it were, such tion possible between fact and s truth and reason, that agreem possible at least in science, if no losophy, theology, art, and poli accordingly science began to be as the model for the others.

Now all is different. There is n agreement than ever in religion a ology. There is, of course, lack o

ment in all the arts and it is well

Disagree

AULDING

e Walls of the Past," etc.

coverable whither that change is tai ?

se and other allied questions I have ecently pondering. Why the ques hould come to me I hardly know. ps if a psychoanalyst were to ge subconsciousness he could find out ise, however, that it is because! "questioning complex," and be have been impressed, conscious consciously, by the welter of dis ent that is at large in the world at ent time, and by certain moder t developments in physics, bio chology, and philosophy. As a confess that I begin to be scep he tradition in which I have been up. According to that tradition re facts which two or more per d perceive; there was also truth of

a system of many truths, one and the same for all, could it ound. And there were ways of such common facts and truths, ensation and by reason. Two see, and agree that they saw, le, the same color or length ould grant, on the basis of rea for example, the sum of the plane triangle is equal to two , and that the sun attracts the he earth the sun according to gravitation as it was formu wton. These were absolute ording to that tradition, furis, as it were, such co-operabetween fact and sensation, ason, that agreement was st in science, if not in phiogy, art, and politics, and ence began to be held up or the others. ferent. There is more diseligion and the

their views. It is certainly impossible, also, to find any two men who are of the same opinion on such historical or political questions as who caused the war and how to settle the payment of reparations. But finally, in science itself to-day, not only is there the disagreement that has been long recognized as present in the making of observations, the forming of hypotheses, and the taking of measurements, but disagreement is now shown by science itself to be necessary and unavoidable. Thus, on the one hand, we have the biological sciences maintaining that no two individuals are ever quite alike, that all is change and evolution, and that reason is controlled by emotion and by various subconscious desires and wishes; and, on the other hand, we have physics, in the case of the Einstein theory, advancing the view, for example, that all measurement, upon which all exact science depends, is wholly relative to the observer, so that there is no such thing as the same size, the same weight, and the same time to any two observers. In the one case the view seems to be justified that no two individuals can agree in respect to their sensations, emotions, and reasoning operations; that a thing no sooner is than it is not; that there is no such thing as a fact unless it be the fact of change and the uniqueness of the individual; and that cold, emotionless, impersonal, objective reasoning does not exist. In the other case the conclusion is reached that there are no such realities as one space, one distance, and one time, as men have assumed there was ever since the Greeks. Thus it would seem that one must say that the tables have been turned, and that the fields in which disagreement has been and still is rampant are now the model for science rather than conversely. Indeed, fuel is added to the flame from philosophy itself. For out of the general theory of evolution there has developed that philosophy, calling itself pragmatism, which maintains that there is no such thing as truth in the old sense of there being just one truth to which men may approach nearer and nearer, but only in the sense of that which is useful in some way or other.

It would almost seem then tha dition to the disagreement whic with no effort, men were now 1 striving to disagree, but also end both to justify and to show the in ness of disagreement. Why sho disagree? Well, why should th Modern science discovers every re discord, none for accord. And y seems to be in this discovery a the grass somewhere. For if it demonstrated that there are cau make disagreement inevitable, th is agreement between two or mo viduals, at least within the limit beginning and the end of that den tion. For example, if evolution biological sciences lead to or imp plete individualism, then there i thing not individualistic in the acc of evolution as a premise, of indivi as a result, and of the several steps by the one follows logically from th In order to demonstrate to another the necessity of disagreement, the first be agreement. All indivi thus limits itself. And again, fo ple, when Professor Einstein and ciples demonstrate their theory tha and time are relative and peculiar and every observer, so that others this conclusion, then there is pres agreement in regard to the prem which the demonstration rests as to the conclusions to which thes ises lead. And among these con there is to be found the interest that, after all, not everything is but that there are non-relative of ant relations between or among that vary-"natural laws," we wo them. And there stands out, a fact that it is by reason, in differe viduals, that such invariant relat discovered.

Men, then, disagree. Of that, no doubt. But if they raise the o as to why this is the fact, then answer to this question, and, final reasons for their answer, two thi come evident. One is that agree possible where there is reason and stration, and the other is that ther

therefore, facts that are disclosed to reason. Thus the view that it is sensation alone that gives an acquaintance with facts, or that the only facts which are disclosed to our consciousness are the facts of sensation, is shown to be the unjustifiable assumption and prejudice of a naturalistic age. The very endeavor to demonstrate that this is the case but presupposes that it is not.

There is, then, in the affairs of men and in the make-up of men a basis for agreement and accord, and that basis is, first, reason, and, secondly, the facts that are accessible to reason. Indeed that this is the case has been, with few exceptions, the traditional and orthodox position in our Western way of looking at things, from the earliest Greek thinkers to relatively recent times. Euclid's geometry is the best and clearest example of a body of facts, disclosed to reason, and to reason alone, on which all men can agree. And men still do agree on the correctness of that geometry as a series of deductions from Euclid's original postulates, although other geometries are known to-day. But before Euclid there were others who maintained that it was upon the basis of reason that men could agree, and that reason could discover facts which were facts for all. Parmenides, Xenophanes, Zeno, Anaxagoras, and later, as a contemporary of Euclid, Plato, all took this position. These men are our intellectual forebears, the makers of that traditional point of view of the Middle Ages, the effects of which we all still inherit, that the things of the material world, the things of the body, are not so real as the things of the reason, the soul, or the spirit; indeed, that they are not only not so real, but are illusory, merely apparent, and, in fact, evil. Those early pioneers in the discovery of the means and methods by which men in our Western civilization still conduct their thinking were the first in the history of the race really to think, even as the Egyptians were the first to build pyramids, and the Phoenicians to sail the seas. Motivated by curiosity, impressed by the diversity of the facts of sense, and actuated unconsciously by the desire for a social standard, these first thinkers regarded and used reason as the only re

source of that which w changeable. For them would stand the test of itself to be consistent a tradiction was to be acc versity and change, si stand this test, were ac the limbo of the unre Thus it was that there w to our Western mode of the profoundest effect or theology, our philosoph art, the idea of the sup over diversity and differe lute over the relative, of and the permanent over and of the rational and th the sensational and the m

But to-day a different vails. If the Greek stood f reason as the revealer of that were common to all, a dle Ages and scholasticism appeal to spiritual and abso as claimed by the Church three hundred years, as m coming of natural science, tended more and more to tion as the only source of fac look more and more critica Thus the tables have been r whereas the Greek and the s ordinated sense to reason a tion, natural science and tha which has grown out of it bow to sense, to experiment servation. The result has be that men have disagreed mor but that disagreement is now both necessary in fact and ju philosophy.

This conclusion is the resul velopment of two branches science, biology and psychology the earlier development of a physics, mechanics, and chemis the outcome of the study, by p and biology, of what is present supposed in every endeavor to know, to have sensations of ob that is the man who thinks, who k is conscious in some way. The the early period of the develop their thought hardly seemed t that if there is knowledge there n

urce of that which was eternal and angeable. For them, only that vi uld stand the test of reason by shor elf to be consistent and free from: diction was to be accepted as rea sity and change, since they d nd this test, were accordingly put limbo of the unreal and the is it was that there was introduced pur Western mode of thought, to profoundest effect on our science. ology, our philosophy, and even the idea of the superiority of diversity and difference, of the over the relative, of the unchang the permanent over the chan of the rational and the spiritual sensational and the material. t to-day a different philosophy If the Greek stood for the appe n as the revealer of fact and tr vere common to all, and if the ges and scholasticism stood for I to spiritual and absolute author imed by the Church, then the 's hundred years, as marked by ; of natural science, have not on more and more to accept sens the only source of facts, but also ore and more critically on reas e tables have been reversed. F the Greek and the scholastic sub d sense to reason and to revel ural science and that philosop is grown out of it make reas ense, to experiment, and to ob . The result has been not on have disagreed more and more lisagreement is now found to be ssary in fact and justifiable

clusion is the result of the de of two branches of moder logy and psychology, following development of astronomy. chanics, and chemistry. It is of the study, by psychology of what is present and pre every endeavor to think, to e sensations of objects, and who thinks, who knows, wh The Greeks in

a reasoner. Actuated by intellectual curiosity they discovered problems concerning the natural objects that surrounded them, and they endeavored to solve these problems. They never doubted that it was possible to know or that there was truth, or that men could reach a common understanding. But they forgot the part that was played by themselves in this process, and never realized that the very fact that there was such a part itself presented a problem. Only when various attempts to solve some of the more general problems presented by nature had led to diverse solutions, and when social, religious, and political life in Greece were in anarchy, did it dawn upon the Greek mind that the human factor was present in all attempts to get knowledge, and that perhaps for this very reason knowledge was impossible and disagreement inherent in all endeavors to arrive at the truth. The recognition, or at least the claim, that this was the fact was due to Protagoras and his band of Sophists. Yet their claim was not unargued nor without a foundation. For out of the disagreement of the fifth and sixth centuries as to whether everything was not a mere flux with nothing permanent, or whether the flux and flow were a mere illusion, and the permanent alone real, there had come the naturalistic and materialistic philosophy of Democritus as a compromise between these two extremes. Could not material objects and there were none other for Democritus-consist of minute parts called atoms which were all alike in their qualities, differing only in shape and size? And, especially if space were identical with emptiness, could not these minute particles move without endangering or changing their identity, thus themselves remaining unchanged and permanent, while yet forming all sorts of combinations? And could not human beings, soul and all, be merely such chance combinations, with it most improbable that any two individuals would ever be just alike in either body or spirit, senses or reason? The answer of Democritus to these questions was "yes," and therewith the Sophistic philosophy of disagreement

sense, and all reason was der sense? Could aught else be exp than that all men should also ferently, and that there should 1 thing as common understandin sent?

Thus it was that in ancient fact that men disagreed was exp a theory concerning naturewhich, although lost sight of: centuries, was revived in the sev century and incorporated in ou physics and chemistry. It was also in accordance with which, with our modern naturalistic ph there was no difference of kind man and nature. Nature was in man nature, and human nature part of that nature which was restless, ceaseless, haphazard m minute particles.

The Sophists, however, made a when they endeavored to convin of the correctness of their conclus there was no use in men even t agree. For they were therewit men to agree to this conclusion a implicitly, to the grounds upon was based. They were presuppo only that men could agree, at lea gard to some things, but also th was some principle in human bein kind of a reality, that made su ment possible, and that guaran reality. This principle, this reali not therefore be of the same kind human body, the human senses, be a thing apart.

Socrates was the first to see and

use of this inconsistency in the position-which is also the inc cy that is present in all that mo terialism and naturalism which a variant of the ancient philosoph Sophists-and Socrates was there founder of a tradition that has orthodox view of our Western civ For from Plato and Aristotle to tine, from Augustine to Anselm, and Thomas Aquinas, and from t to Descartes, Kant, and Hegel t traditional view has been that in least there is a principle that is di