er of the law. But realize that justice d that fair play can ist when a large eleth a crushing handi

such discords, is not unfit to devote itself to a problem vast and complex beyond definition. The problem will grow under their hands, and they will grow to meet its challenge. They will make their path, straight or winding, according to the lay of the land: all that is required is a beacon light on the horizon. The early Capetians were pitifully weak: if they had not felt, however, that in their regal title lay a claim to the whole of ancient Gaul, modern France would never have come into being. France is the result of an act of faith prolonged through countless generations. Such a pregnant faith Mangin's Greater France may prove to be.

testimony that matters, but the testimony of their classical age. A race which,
of the Frenchman who quotes his words patiently-unconsciously-has resolved
with pride. For that man is Albert Sar-
raut, in his book: "A Plan for the De-
velopment of the French Colonies." Now
Albert Sarraut is a politician, no doubt; he
even belonged, at one time, to the Radical
Party. But he has long specialized in co-
lonial questions; he has been Governor of
Indo-China and brilliantly successful as
Colonial Secretary. His book is a new
edition of a Parliamentary Report which
may be accepted as the official manifesto
of the French colonial school. That the
conditions described by Asmis are excep-
tional may be taken for granted: what is
significant is that such conditions should
be looked upon by the French as desirable.
"Militarization, and public education
in the service of militarization," says
Asmis again, "are the means employed
for this vast and methodical Frenchifica-
tion of the native masses; a process which
is destined, through imperceptible but
continuous approximation, to incorporate
with France all parts of her colonial
empire."

a few days in Paris nown Soldier" picked e glorified under the opened to be a negro, ietly reinterred. The ntradicted, with the nce made no distincildren." The negroes egal have full citizenare Mohammedans: it The four lawful widows eave would be entitled en some jazz palace at d admittance to a ne displease its American unishment was swift h it came a letter from 1 Premier, reasserting e in these matters. To French negro should ⚫ than patronize a disartre resort, and the aces are labelled "For the better for all conalso M. Poincaré was ive American fingers a uestion of true democ kles were fairly bleed >us castigation of him. roduced by the French ost conservative, with al. of my travels through ions," says a German remember seeing black s judging white men trative and other offed women legitimately renchmen, and, on the women acting as do › natives." I do not smis. He was Consu nan Empire in the Bel rites in the Preussisc h to the good. His re dibility; he may

agains

Note the words: "imperceptible but continuous approximation." This sounds un-French: do we not know that the French are pitiless logicians and therefore reckless radicals? Who was it maintained that such an expression as unFrench (or un-English) was a perfect example of a fallacy in a single word? Nothing human, for good or evil, can be un-French, for the Frenchiness of the French is made up of innumerable contrasts. And especially it changes from moment to moment, without losing its complex identity. We are always talking as though all Frenchmen throughout the ages had been so many Robespierres. As a matter of fact, they preserved the same dynasty, with an unwritten constitution and with "custom law," for nearly a thousand years. By infinitesimal degrees, they pieced together and welded, materially and morally, the heterogeneous elements that made up the closest national unity in the world. They managed to combine loyalty to Rome, attachment to the liberties of the Gallican Church, reverence for the wisdom and virtue of

in antiquity, and confidence in ab

There was, no doubt, a time when the French believed that, as human nature is everywhere and forever the same in all essentials, differences due to tradition are superficial and may easily be swept aside. They have realized since that love and hatred concentrate in those trivial differences; Catholics and Huguenots were ninety-nine per cent. alike in their beliefs, but they were ready to hang, behead, quarter, or burn one another for the sake of the contentious one-hundredth. sole definition of a "fundamental point" is: a point for the sake of which we are willing to kill or die. The French are not converted to "the wisdom of prejudice" preached by Burke, but they have had to recognize the infinite potency of prejudice, and they will not ignore it again in their calculations.

The

Their rationalism has received another sharp lesson since the end of the eighteenth century. Much of its cocksureness has disappeared. So fierce has been the battle between irreconcilable principles, and so bewildering the enrichment of human experience, that it is a sadder and a wiser rationalism now. Just as Montaigne's scepticism was the fruit-the bitter-sweet fruit-of the religious wars, so the Renanism which has slowly permeated the French mind results from a century of conflict.

Thus the French have lost at the same time their faith in the easy adaptability of all races and their faith in the transcendent value of their

tivists; that is to say, the reverse of radi-
cals. The radicals, i. e. the men who have
a simple faith in simple dogmas, are found
on the other side-among those who be-
lieve that religious orthodoxy was formu-
lated once for all in the Westminster
Confession of Faith, political orthodoxy
in the American Constitution, and eco-
nomic orthodoxy in "The Wealth of Na-
tions." To the same class belong the men
who affirm that races are forever limited
by bonds of adamant. The one great con-
quest of the nineteenth century, the his-
torical spirit, seems to have affected them
not at all. There is nothing permanent in
history, not even change itself, which
slackens or accelerates constantly.

The new policy of the French consists
in recognizing the differences of all the
peoples under their rule; not only to tol-
erate them with good-natured contempt,
as the British have done in India, but
genuinely to respect them. The French
are more desirous of preserving the an-
cient monuments of Morocco or Cam-
bodia than are the natives themselves.
They want to foster native art, even
though, as in Western Africa, it is ex-
ceedingly crude, rather than impose Euro-
pean patterns. What? Deliberately to
prefer the worse when you have the
better in your gift? Yes, because a genu-
ine product of the artistic faculty, how-
ever primitive, is capable of growth,
whereas a mere reproduction, even
though without a fault, is without life.

But if all parts of the French Empire thus grow in their own direction, upon the basis of their own traditions, will they not grow further and further apart? The French do not think so. They still believe that differences in traditions are not fundamental, but only the result of isolation, destined to wane slowly when isolation is broken down. There was a time when every village in England had a dialect of its own: human nature has not been made over, yet the King's English has prevailed. France and her colonies are already living in many ways a common life. Modern scientific methods, at any rate, can be introduced everywhere; and nowhere is it necessary that they should crush the local spirit, any more Tenen There

or doctors, just as there are
Mormon engineers or doctors
elements are insinuating the
the interstices of the local tr
they will color it, blend wi
absorb it. To such a process
be set.

Will the result be a deadly
We think not. First of all,
is infinitely distant-or rath
result that does not become
turn. What lies ahead of
from which not picturesqu
but the fierceness of exclusiv
been eliminated. And, as
comes from communication
hension, it means mutual
No race loses by learning fro
what is learned be worth wh
be more picturesque if e
mained true to type; if En
stood nothing but "mudd
somehow," and France not
stract principles divorced f
But could not each maste
gift without losing her own

At any rate, France is ver
old cry: Perish the colonies,
principle! But she is as far
the other cry: Perish all prin
we keep the colonies! Wh
or the other perish?

As late as 1848 and ev French granted full citize European type to unassimila like the Hindus of the Five or the Jews of Algeria. Th that the French Hindus beca in the hands of political New Yorkers themselves; a rible insurrection nearly sh of the French in North A mistakes are not likely to The policy of immediate as been superseded by that of ciation. And the new princ been reduced to a single administration is an experi logical, science; above all, There are no two groups of nies, nor even two coloni same group, that are gov alike. The five principal pa Indo-China have five diffe ranging from a fairly close

Cock

here are Methodist or
r doctors. These new
ating themselves into
e local tradition; then
blend with it, almost
a process no limit can
e a deadly uniformity?
rst of all, the "result"

or rather there is no
t become a cause in its
head of us is a world
cturesque differences,
f exclusive pride, have
And, as this process
unication and compre
s mutual enrichment.
earning from another, ii
worth while. It might
sque if everybody re
pe; if England under-
it "muddling through
France nothing but ab
divorced from realities
ach master the others
g her own?

ince is very far from the
e colonies, rather than a
he is as far as ever from
ish all principles, if only
nies! Why should one
ih?

18 and even 1870, the
full citizenship of the
unassimilated elements.
of the Five Settlements
geria. The results were
indus became as passive
political bosses as the
mselves; and that a ter
nearly shook the hold
North Africa. These
likely to occur again
nediate assimilation has
y that of gradual ass
new principles have ne
a single code: coloris
an experimental, not
bove all, it is an art
groups of French col
colonies within t
overned exacty
of French

loose protectorate over primitive tribes
in Laos. Even Algeria, which was too
hastily assimilated with France and is
administered by the Ministry of the In-
terior, has communities of three different
kinds: under purely French law, mixed,
and purely native. The franchise is grad-
ually extended, as a reward for military
service or progress in education, but it
is not made the object of a sweeping mea-
sure, and the Berbers are now learning in
village administration lessons which their
sons will apply to Algerian and even to
Imperial problems.

The success of such a policy depends
upon two conditions: the guiding power
must have faith, but not too arrogant a
faith, in its present superiority; and it
must also have faith in the unlimited po-
tential development of its associates.
Whatever distance there may be between
guardian and ward, there must be no
barrier. That is where Anglo-Saxons fail.
They know of a surety that no one can
ever be like unto themselves; nor, being
different, can be just as good. It is self-
evident that upon the principle of race
supremacy you can build an Empire, but
you cannot weld an Empire into a Na-
tion. All Britishers know that the parts
of their dominions that are not predomi-
nantly Anglo-Saxon are held precariously.
The problem which now faces England is
no longer how to associate Egypt or India
more closely with herself, but how to let
them go without injustice to all con-
cerned. The best that we plan to do with
the Filipinos is to fit them for the inde-
pendence we have so solemnly promised
them. We do not expect that they should
ever feel themselves true Americans, co-
equal with us in every respect. We find
it hard enough to fuse heterogeneous ele-
ments in our midst; to amalgamate large
blocks of distant and completely alien
populations is neither our hope nor our
desire.

The French are trying it. With what success, it is too early to tell. Their new Empire (they retained but shreds of the old) came into being barely fifty years ago, with the exception of Algeria. It was not until the Fashoda crisis that it became a real factor in national preoccupations. In that short time—a minute in

achieved, yet enough to increase our confidence in the principles and the methods of the French. A colonial school that can boast of such names as Faidherbe, Brazza, Galliéni, Lyautey can face the future with a stout heart. The son of Abd-el-Kader welcomed President Millerand in Algiers; he voiced fearlessly the grievances of his people; but what he wanted was a closer approximation to French citizenship, not independence. The American negro is infinitely better off than the Senegalese, but he has the sense that arbitrary limits have been set to his development, and that is enough to turn material progress to gall. In a Congress of the Negro Race, American apostles of "race emancipation" were disappointed to find so little response from the French West Africans

one of whom, M. Diagne, was a deputy in the French Parliament, and had held a Cabinet position. What can you do with people who say: "We don't want to think of ourselves primarily as negroes: we are French"?

Once more, it is a philosophy we are discussing, not a tale of achievements. According to your spectacles, these will be found marvelous or pitiful; on the whole, among foreign observers as well as among the French, optimism prevails. It is a formidable enterprise: there are only two at present that can at all be compared with it. One is the federal system of Soviet Russia, with its self-determined component Republics and its autonomous areas. It reads well, but what we do not know about Russia already fills a large library. The other is Brazil, in which three races, white, negro, and Indian, seem to commingle without creating bitterness. But in both these cases, the domain in which the experiment is tried is continuous, self-contained: the French Empire is scattered through the seven seas. In Russia, the leading element enjoys an enormous numerical as well as cultural predominance: the French are a minority in their "nation of a hundred million." In Brazil, the negroes and the Indians have no cultural tradition of their own to oppose that of the Portuguese; under the French flag, the Annamites, the Arabs, the Berbers, even the Mala

well as among the classes; to b
ward or isolated populations i
world-citizenship! What a ca
and adventure for the best yo
France, what an enrichment
tional life, what a breaking do
parochialism! If the attem
least it will have done good to
and to the French. So we sha
great enterprise with bated
wish it godspeed.

NATION without
myths would be im-
poverished in a most
important element of
culture, but it does not
thereby follow that a
nation may not have
too many. Myths are
salutary or inspiring, or examples of what
not to do, on the whole. We treat them
with more respect than we used to, calling
them more often than not a legitimate
part of a nation's history. At one time
the iconoclast was wont to think he had
ruined a myth's reputation for good when
he proved that a certain number of stories
could be found, with slight changes, in the
lore of every land. Now we merely re-
mark that the human race is to a large ex-
tent cut off the same pattern mythologi-
cally as it is physically, and that the same
basic situations have a way of popping up,
over and over, since the days of the cave.
If we were to discover a race with an en-
tirely brand-new set of myths, we should be
righteously suspicious that some one was
trying to spoof us, like the man who made
the Cardiff Giant.

Myths have been classified learnedly by
divers students. A large number are hero
tales, very useful for inspiring the young,
and around election time, when the great
and glorious principles of the Republic
the party or the conscript fathers are

brought out from the inno
tude of the lumber-room, bru
declaimed from every auto-t
hustings. The practice bega
tribal fire, when the ancien
press the young with the in
regularity. To do as some
had been a mighty man in
course carried the unspoke
of similar eminence.

A second large class of my
personifications of evil, fea
known, of destiny, when it
to ambition. Such, for exa
well-known myths of Loki
navian arch-villain; of Anan
owy Greek personification
fate, more powerful than
Olympus; the Flying Hu
Wandering Jew, and, perh
widespread of all, the W
course the last is the most v
cause it personifies the co
most universally observed
manity, the struggle betw
evil which takes place in
good in the worst of us, an
soul, the paradox that "th
in the best of us."

Probably every one is superstitious. A certain clared herself emancipate yet was known to put her on first and to cut her