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"If I knew where to find a needle and thread," said the authoress, with a half look at the bridesmaid.

"I know. Let me sew it up for you," said Cynthia.

Her pride had left her. She felt humbled to the dust. It would be a relief to do something for this woman-better than herself whom Frank preferred to her.

"Let me do it," she said earnestly. "Mr. Handy, I shall depend upon your escort."

Frank Handy bowed, and the girls went together into a bed-room.

Escort? was it his escort to the city? He had told her he should go there. Cynthia sewed up the hole in the blue dress, very sadly and quietly.

The animation faded from the young authoress's face, as she looked down on Cynthia's quivering lip, and saw a big tear fall upon her sewing. She had heard some one say, she had been the victim of false hopes raised by Seth Taggart; and had in her heart despised her for it; but now she felt as if the sad, heart-broken love bestowed on him endorsed him as far better than he looked. It was a woe, however, to which she could not openly allude. But, as Cynthia set the last stitch in her dress. she

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stooped down and kissed her. Every sorrow has its lesson," she said, "as every weed has a drop of honey in its cup. Blessed are they who suck that drop, and store it for good uses."

She had gone, and Cynthia was left alone. Yes, she had much to learn. This night's experience had taught her that her reign was over, and her career of bellehood run. She, who was not good enough to keep a good man's heart when she had won it, would set herself to her new task of self-improvement. She would

have her dear old father's love, and live at home, and little children, too, should learn to love her. And then, perhaps, some day, when they both grew old, Frank Handy might, perhaps, see that he had judged her hastily, and not be glad, as he was now, that she had rejected him. At least, every improvement in her would be due to his influence, though unseen; and so, even in her lonely life, he would not be altogether dissociated from her. She sat in the dark, with her hands clasped tightly over her burning forehead.

She heard voices in the passages. The party was breaking up. People

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were beginning to go. Oh! why had she staid alone so long! Perhaps during that hour Frank might have changed his mind. She had deprived herself of the opportunity.

She started up and hurried out amongst the company. They were all getting their cloaks and shawls on. Frank, in his great coat, was standing impatiently at the house-door.

Please to tell her that my buggy has come up first," he said to some one, as Cynthia presented herself in the passage.

"I am ready," said the lady in blue, presenting herself.

Frank raised his hat to the company; and took her on his arm.

"Shut up that door," ," said somebody; "and don't let the night air into the house."

So the door closed with a jar that went to Cynthia's very heart. She turned aside and tried to help some of the girls to find their shawls and hoods. "Every lassie had her laddie," Cynthia only had no one to take her home. She asked Tommy Chase to walk home with her, and he said he would as soon as he had had some more cake and some more supper.

Cynthia went back into the empty parlor, and sat down by an open window looking on the yard. She hid her face in her hands. All sorts of thoughts went singing through her brain; but the one that presented itself oftenest, was an humble resolution that she would try to be such a woman as Frank Handy wisely might have loved.

There was a stir among the vines that draped the window-frame. She did not look up. It was the wind. She heard it sigh. She felt its warm breath near her cheek-warmer, surely, than the night wind. She lifted her head quickly.

"Snip!" said Frank's voice at her side. It trembled; and he trembled as he stood with a great hope and a great fear contending in his breast. His selfpossession was all gone. The struggle had unnerved him.

"Oh! Snap!" cried Cynthia. suddenly. And then, drooping her head, crowned with the hop bells, lower and lower-more and more humbly, till it rested on the window sill,—she said in a broken voice: "I know I am not worthy, Frank; but you must teach

me."

THE MALAKOFF MARSEILLAISE.*

HREE times the Frenchmen charged, with cheers, to win the Malakoff;

What's to be done? their hearts grow cold, that Vive l'Empereur
Falls faint and dead-a broken spell, a battle-cry no more.

Ah, one there was-remembered still-of glory's brighter days-
They murmur, they pronounce a name-that name, the Marseillaise !-
From man to man,

The whisperings ran:

"Long live the Marseillaise!"

The murmur grows; they talk aloud: "Our fathers' song!" they cry,
"Heard round their lovely tricolor, in the gallant times gone by;
O'er battle-fields and battered walls they sung it, marching free
From the Alps and the Pyrenees, all round, to the rolling Zuyder Zee.
We'd try the conquering charm, this day, and, though its port-holes blaze,
We'll give you that bloody Malakoff-but give us the Marseillaise!"
Says a brown zouave:

"My Chief, let us have

One touch of the Marseillaise !"

Grave looks the stout Pelissier, when he hears that startling word,

Says, "Nonsense! Go!" but well I know his Frenchman's heart was stirred: Those English fly from yon Redan; they're quashed, and, on my soul,

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Unless I win our Malakoff, good-by, Sebastopol!

Well, form them, in God's name afresh, and let the bands," he says,
If they've recovered wind enough, lead off the Marseillaise.

What can I say?

'Tis our Frenchmen's way;

So, sound their Marseillaise!"

'Twas done: zouaves and voltigeurs, and soldiers of the line,

Chimed in with the old Republic's March-the war-song of the Rhine-
And then the charge-the last, wild charge! down tumbles Bosquet bold;
Heaven rest the dead-on, soldiers, on! Mac Mahon's in the hold!
Ne'er sung that air to nobler feat, through battle's fiery haze;
Well may the Czar, and his men of war, lament the Marseillaise!
Says Gortschakoff:
"Tis time to be off-

They're singing the Marseillaise!"

Brave song, be heard, all undeterred, an omen and a sign,
Beyond the despot's guarded camp, beyond the leaguering line;
Lead yet a wider, worthier strife-a mightier fortress far,
Against our banner still holds out, on the deadly heights of war;
And sound again, bold melody! for baffled millions raise
The last, victorious rallying-cry-the nations' Marseillaise!

Once more advance

In the vanward, France,

To the roar of thy Marseillaise!

The fact stated in the text, though hushed up as much as possible by the government, was mentioned in Paris by the soldiers lately returned from the Crimea. After their repulses before the Malakoff, the troops demanded the Marseillaise air, and the general did not venture to refuse them, at such a moment. The bands played the tune; and the soldiers, under Bosquet and Mac Mahon, took the place.

OUR SEA-COAST DEFENSE AND FORTIFICATION SYSTEM.

WAR is no obsolete or decayed tradi

tion. The millennium still perversely lingers in the caves of Apocalyptic vision, and mighty, indeed, must be that faith which accepts universal peace as an impending reality. Mars is not yet a fossil for moral palæontologists to speculate upon, but, from his old Olympian home, he even now looks down on a contest more stupendous and destructive than any before waged on this earth. The year in which Sebastopol was taken; the year in which pestilence and sword have celebrated their new entente cordiale in the Tauric Chersonese with human holocausts, unequaled in numbers and nobility; such a year is no time for denying that war is an ever possible contingency, which each independent nation is bound so far to anticipate as by all just and honorable means to avert its oncoming, and to be forearmed against its disasters.

Most sincerely do we deprecate war. The appeal to brute force in any form, as an arbiter of rights, is abstractly bad logic, and worse humanity. Yet who can doubt that such appeals will continue to be made? As a plain question of fact, what is there in the present state of the world to give even the most shadowy hope of our being forever at peace with all nations?

As wars have been our national portion, so are we still bound to regard their coming as possible. The United' States have no privilege of exemption from the casualties of national existence. With whatever fidelity we may cultivate international amity, the time may arrive when no choice is left us but war. We appear even now to owe no thanks to England's prime minister and prime newspaper for the peace which we enjoy, despite the formidable fleet lately dispatched to bathe its sides in the Gulf Stream. Canada, Cuba, Central America, Mexico, the Northwestern boundary, the Sandwich Islands, the Sound dues, our commercial policy, our resistance to search, our doctrine of naturalization, violated neutrality, and sundry other points, present contingencies which may easily provoke the dialectics of war. The Eastern Allies, whether flushed with victory or enraged by failure in their

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strife with Russia, are less likely to maintain a pacific and conciliatory deportment towards us. Nor can We deny that our own nation, if not, as Lord Ellesmere declared, the most warlike power on earth, is by no means meek or gentle under insult, menace, or dictation; we are not yet millennium saints, and shall scarcely become so, while the cool audacity of frontier life continues to leaven the sobriety of our commercial and manufacturing elements. Thus, while deprecating, and because we deprecate all needless strife, we hold it to be the part, both of prudence and of duty, to foresee and provide against the disastrous effects of any breach of peace, come from what source it may. It is an imperative duty to maintain our country in such an attitude of defensive preparation, as not to invite hostility and spoliation by leaving bare, to petty invasion, the vital points of our national strength.

The situation of our country is such, that any formidable war must especially involve the maritime element. No neighbors on this continent need be taken into the account, except as auxiliaries to European powers. No transatlantic enemy can operate against us, except by effecting what, in military parlance, is called a grand descent, or by bombardment from shipboard. Petty descents may be prevented, and could not much influence the result of hostilities. A grand descent involves the embarkation of an army on shipboard, its transportation across the seas, and its debarkation on an enemy's shores, either rapidly, to effect a local object, or to conduct one or more campaigns from a seacoast base. A bombardment from shipboard usually requires only a naval armament, and no landing need be forced. Now, it is almost exclusively to the one or other of these forms of attack that we are exposed. It is true that Great Britain, or, especially, Great Britain and France combined, could attack us effectively by the Canada route, which, therefore, necessitates some special precautions along our inland frontier. But, for us, the main problem of home defense consists chiefly in our being able successfully to repel grand descents and naval bombardments.

In a war with France or England, we should be subject to far more formidable grand descents than would have been attempted at any past time. There has been no period of the world's history when transmarine expeditions could assume such gigantic proportions, or wield such formidable power, as now. The great advances in ship-building-the rapid expansion of commercial transportation, and especially the general introduction of steam-power, both for military and commercial operations, have removed much of the difficulty incident to sending expeditions across the Atlantic. Powerfully as our inferior naval force and privateering militia could operate against the transportation of supplies for such an expeditionary force, success in landing, and in putting under contribution a portion of our country, would secure subsistence for the troops thus thrown among us, and the conflict would become one for superiority in the field-that field being some devoted section of the sea-board states. England, with her small available land force, could not long sustain such a conflict; but France, with her plethora of excellent soldiers, could give us a severe trial.

One chief obstacle to grand descents is, the danger and difficulty of effecting a landing, when this is contested with any vigor. Unless some town, furnished with available wharves, can be seized, the landing of men, guns, and materials, must be effected by the aid of small boats-a process slow, laborious, inadequate, and especially precarious when no good anchorage is secured. It has always been held essential, in landing an expeditionary force, quickly to make sure of some harbor, where the fleet and transports can ride in safety. The recent increase of draft, in merchant ships, has augmented this difficulty, and much restricted the number of harbors which would suffice as bases of operations, in grand descents.

Another obstacle to great expeditions, which is of recent date, is, that by the aid of rail-roads and steam-boats, our local troops can be concentrated with great rapidity, to contest the landing, and obstruct the operations of a transatlantic invading force. Our sea-coast strategic points are chiefly those where these facilities for concentrating troops exist in full vigor. As against grand descents, this element is of great importance; but it is absolutely null for

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A glance at the history of grand descents, will show how difficult they have always been found to be; and yet, that they have been a not infrequent resource. Ancient history presents some remarkable examples of such enterprises, on a scale of great magnificence, both in organization and in results. Xerxes is said to have had 4,000 vessels, when he invaded Greece. At the same time, 5,000 vessels are said to have landed 300,000 Carthaginians in Sicily, where they were defeated by Gelon. Three expeditions, under Hannibal, Himilco, and Hamilcar, ranged from 100,000 to 150,000 men, each. Pyrrhus landed 26,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry at Tarentum. Regulus is related to have taken into the naval battle of Ecnon 340 large vessels, with 140,000 men, while the Carthaginians had fifty more vessels, and from 12,000 to 15,000 more men. Regulus then descended, with 40,000 men, on the African coast. The Romans lost 28,000 men and 100 vessels, at Drepanum. Lutatius took 300 galleys and 700 transports into the battle of the Egean Isles, and the Carthaginians there lost 120 vessels. Scipio Africanus compelled the Carthaginians to burn 500 ships. Paulus Emilius descended on Samothracia, with 25,000 men. In the third Punic war, 80,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry were transported from Lilybæus to Utica. Mithridates had a fleet of 400 vessels-of which 300 were decked. In Cæsar's second descent on Britain, he had 600 vessels, and about 40,000 men. also transported 35,000 men into Greece, and 60,000 into Africa. Augustus transported 80,000 men and 12,000 horses, to meet Antony in Greece, who had 170 ships of war, 60 Egyptian galleys, and 22,000 infantry, beside the rowers. Germanicus took 60,000 men, on 1,000 vessels, from the Rhine to the Ems. Genseric descended from Spain, on Africa, with 80,000 Vandals. In 902, Oleg is said to have embarked 80,000 men, in 2,000 barks, on the Dnieper, proceeding thence through the Black sea, to Constantinople. William the Conqueror made his descent with from 60,000 to 70,000 men. Louis IX. made a crusading descent on Egypt, with over 1,800 vessels, and with about 80,000

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men.

Our

since amounted to 120,000 men.
own descent on Vera Cruz was among
the most remarkable, in its events and
results. But no previous descent has
ever compared, in magnitude of means,
and in the numbers finally debarked,
with that which has passed, as it were,
under our immediate notice-the descent
of the Allies in the Crimea. The
Carthaginian expedition to Sicily alone
claims to equal it in numbers; but this
claim is exceedingly apocryphal. Pro-
bably a real effective land force of over
200,000 men was never before transport-
ed over seas. No age of the world
has seen such an example of the im-
mense mechanism of a first-class de-
scent, as this expedition has afforded.

Mahomet II. is said to have sent 100,000 men in the expedition for the second siege of Rhodes. Edward III. debarked 40,000 men from 800 vessels, to besiege Calais. Henry V. also descended en France, with 30,000 men, 6,000 being cavalry. Charles V. took Tunis by an expedition of 30,000 men, in 500 ships. Soliman I. besieged Rhodes, with 140,000 men. Mustapha, in 1565, descended on Malta, with 32,000 Janizaries, and 140 vessels. In 1527, an expedition of 200 galleys and 55,000 men proceeded against Cyprus. The Invincible Armada consisted of 137 armed ships, 2,630 bronze guns, 20,000 soldiers, and 11,000 sailors. The Turks sent 55,000 men, in 350 galleys, to Candia, in the war of 1615, and, again, 50,000 men in 1667. Charles XII. descended on Denmark, with 20,000 men, in 200 transports. In 1775, an expedition of 15,000 to 16,000 Spaniards attacked Algiers. In 1779, Count d'Estaing, with 25 ships of the line, landed 6,000 troops in the United States, while Orvilliers, with 65 ships of the line, was covering a contemplated descent of 40,000 men, in 300 transports, from Havre and St. Malo, on the British coast. Hoche's frustrated expedition against Ireland consisted of 25,000 men. Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition consisted of 23,000 men, 13 ships, 17 frigates, and 400 transports. The AngloRussian expedition against Holland, in 1799, was raised, by successive debarkations, to 40,000 men. Abercrombie's expedition into Egypt carried 20,000 men. Cathcart's expedition against Copenhagen, in 1807, contained 25,000 men. Moore's army, in Spain, amounted to 25,000, and Wellington had 30,000 English at Oporto. The British Antwerp expedition, in 1809, consisted of 40,000 land troops and 30,000 sailors, or, according to some authorities, a total of 100,000 combatants. The British Ostend and Antwerp descent, in 1813, was scarcely less extensive. The British expedition against Washington consisted of 7,000 to 8,000 troops, and that against New Orleans, in 1814, of near 10,000; which was also about the force sent to Canada, the same year. The great expedition which Napoleon had organized against the English coast, consisted of 150,000 men, in 3,000 transports. The French descent on Algiers was made with 30,000 men; and the French army, in Algeria, has

Many minor descents might be cited; but the general place of such operations in history is sufficiently indicated by these examples. We should be very liable to such operations in a war with France; for, with its now powerful navy and its unequaled army, it would require but a slender accession of means to reproduce its Crimean army on our shores. The consummate military skill of the French, vigorously directing such an army against our chief seats of power, would give a severer shock to our national fabric than any other external force to which we are liable. In brief, a war with France would bring upon us overwhelming descents; while war with England would lead to naval conflicts at sea and naval bombardments along our shores, beside field operations in Canada.

Bombardment is the peculiar liability of a marine frontier whose towns are not effectively defended by sea-coast batteries. If we suppose our coast destitute of such defenses, a hostile fleet or even a single vessel of war might lay city after city in ashes, or exact the extreme of tribute. The shipping and ship-yards of each harbor in turn might be destroyed or seized; until our whole coast and commercial marine should be utterly laid waste. Our sea borders, wherein so large a portion of our wealth and strength is gathered, might thus be shorn of every element of vital power, by a force in itself totally insignificant, but cased in an unassailable floating citadel. We must either entirely drive an enemy from the seas, or, by local defenses. close our harbors against his approach; or else we must patiently endure the

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