INTUITION AND INDUCTION.

PART II.

HAVING traced the intuitive method of thought to its ultimate ethical development, we turn to the inductive method. The inductive, or as it is sometimes termed, the historical, method is well-known as the method adopted by modern science, and is the outcome of that long course of study of the phenomena of nature which, begun by the philosophers of ancient Greece, and continued by those of the middle ages, is bearing such rich fruit in our own days. The peculiar features of this method are familiar to most of us. It is based entirely on the investigation of the phenomena of any subject under examination. It admits hypotheses as tentative explanations, but subjects them to vigorous verification; and any hypothesis which does not accord with the facts as they come to light is immediately rejected. A speculative theory, as a fixed startingpoint of inquiry, is a thing unknown to induction.

The results of an investigation conducted on this method are manifestly purely historical. Phenomena form an endless chain of causes and effects, and the aim of induction-or using its synonym, science-is to give an accurate exposition of the order in which phenomena are observed to present themselves. Such an exposi tion is termed the law of the phenomena. And since phenomena are found to interact not singly merely, but in groups, the laws of one such group may again be considered as a single phenomenon, and compared with the laws of another group. Thus the phenomena of falling matter upon the earth, and of the revolution of the planets of our system round the sun, are united under the law of gravity; and heat, itself a generalisation of varied phenomena, is found to stand in a definite relation to motion, which again is the generalisation of other groups of phenomena. The final result of scientific investigation in any field would therefore be a grand sequence of causes and effects, in which each phenomenon would find its own proper place, its causes and its effects-in fact, its connection, forwards and backwards with all other phenomena, would be exactly known. From this knowledge would naturally follow the power of prevision; for knowing the phenomena that now are, we could, from our knowledge of the way in which like phenomena had acted in the past, infer their results in the future.

In the field of our special attention-ethics-such a result would take the shape of a complete code of conduct. Supposing the

aim of our conduct to be known, there would be no difficulty in ascertaining the lines of conduct which would in each individual case conduce most directly to that end. Such a code would, indeed, reduce the ascertaining of conduct to a simple mathematical process, there is no reason, in fact, why it should not be followed by a calculus, which should put it in the power of every man to deduce his own conduct from the general formulæ which had been ascertained for society.

Such an operation, however, is not likely to be performed for a long time to come. Descending from the lofty ground of possibility, let us inquire as to the probable practical value of science in ethics for us of the present and future generations.

Scientifically man admits of investigation from two points of view; as an organism in relation to society, and as an organism in himself. Man in relation to society is receiving treatment at the hands of the new science of sociology, whose province it is to investigate the phenomena of society as a whole. Sociology examines the origin and growth of social institutions; their foundations in the character of society, and the reaction produced on that character by the institutions. In fact, the work of sociology will be the study of the genesis and progress of human society. Thus will be collected a vast and ever-increasing amount of exact knowledge concerning the influences of various social habits and institutions in the past, knowledge which in those cases where individuals have a direct share in guiding social movements, cannot but be of great value in directing their judgment as to the value of existing or proposed institutions. And since no act can strictly speaking be said to have no influence, however remote, upon the evolution of society, it will perhaps be one of the greatest benefits of sociology that it will place in a far clearer light than at present the relation of the individual to the social life. Many actions which are commonly thought to have no meaning except for the individual doer of them, are really fraught with grave consequences to society. A striking illustration of this is shown in political economy, the study of which makes it clear that a matter so apparently quite of the individual as marriage bas a very direct influence upon the equilibrium of the laws of labour.

Viewed as an organism in himself, man is subjected to analysis by physiology and psychology. From physiology we learn the laws of the material side of the human organism. Conduct applies to the material as well as to the mental part of man; we cannot separate the one from the other. Already the effects upon the human frame of indulgence in gross passions are well-known and con. demned. What is true on a large scale is true also on a small; and the gradual advance of physiology will doubtless show us that

many things now deemed by us of little account, are really of great importance in making us better or worse members of society.

From psychology we learn the laws of our mental side. These laws directly affect questions of education and moral training. Though, from their very complexity, less cognisable than the laws of matter, some of the greater laws of mind are already known. For the most part, however, our methods are at present empirical; and we may, therefore, look for a corresponding impetus when psychology shall furnish us with more exact knowledge.

There is yet a kind of common or border-land between physiology and psychology, consisting of both sciences interwoven, and dealing with the important question of the mens sana in corpore sano. That is to say, of the influence of habits and condition of body on the development and healthful state of the mind; and of the influence, again, which regular or irregular exercise and control of the mind has upon the body.

The results of the investigation of man in himself, as an individual, form a necessary complement to sociology. With a knowledge of the end to be obtained, is necessary also a knowledge of the means best adapted for obtaining that end.

From this slight sketch some idea will, it is to be hoped, be gained of the important contributions which science will make to our ethical apparatus. Ethical science is like a map, on which at first only the more important conformations are shown, but on which more and more detail is gradually but surely added, till at last the picture is complete. And though in ethics perfection is, from the nature of the case, impossible, yet one cannot doubt that here, too, science will accomplish results as great as in the physical sciences. We are now in a position to face the question proposed at the outset the relation of science to intuition. What are the aims of science? Will she still keep to the old paths, or will she strike out new ones for herself? On the answer to this question depends our attitude towards this new learning.

In all human reasoning there must be some datum, some point of agreement from which argument can start. Such a datum in physics is Matter. Its origin, the reason of its mauifestation under certain laws and not under other conceivable ones, are questions unanswerable. Matter exists, and its laws are the highest generalisation yet known of all the varied phenomena of nature. Matter as at present known is the limit of scientific investigation in that direction; and because it is so, because to our present methods it presents the feature of finality, we accept it without question as the basis of our reasoning. It is possible, of course, to speculate on the origin of matter, or even to conceive of its non-existence. No one, however, would allow such speculations to lead him to act in

contradiction to the ascertained laws of matter. If any one did he would immediately receive punishment at the hands of the laws he transgressed.

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Such a fundamental datum in ethics is the idea of society. Of its antecedents" we know nothing. This only can we say that society is a law of human existence, of which the contrary is unthinkable. The transgression of the law of social existence would destroy the differentia between man and the animals: man unsocial would no longer be man. Different forms of society there are, and will no doubt continue to be; but the principle of organic gregariousness, if one may call it so, still remains.

There is, therefore, no alternative for science but to accept this principle as the basis of all ethical reasoning. This involves, as its corollary, the subordination of the individual to the social organism, without which society could not exist. The welfare of society, is then, the scientific aim of ethics. By society is meant, not that limited collocation of human beings which we term one's country, or neighbours, or family; but the whole race of mankind, of which each such collocation may be considered as a member. This is the society for whose welfare we are to act. Manifestly, our activity will chiefly lie among some smaller collocation; and the apparatus which science will put into our hands for directing ourselves we have already seen.

If now the reader will recall to his memory the results at which we arrived in discussing intuition, he will have little difficulty in apprehending the relation between it and induction. We saw intuition seize one after another the deeper springs of action; wo observed it passing by all minor matters of ethics, and concentrating its whole strength on the enunciation of right motive. We saw the final result of this in the command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." This we found to imply, under any inter. pretation of the words, that in the recognition of the claims of society lay the performance of our "duty," that which it is "right" that we should do.

Incidentally we saw that intuition provided a moral code,* and we perceived also the reason why the old code was never revised or replaced by a new one. Another reason, however, had great influence here. This is the slight change in social formations between the time of formulation of the code and the time of the end of intuition; so that the rules which applied to the earlier period applied almost equally well to the latter, and any deficiency in the code was consequently felt lightly, if at all.

In this paper we have traced the course of scientific procedure

* In this case, the "Ten Commandments."

in ethics, and have found it to result in the postulate of the welfare of society as the aim of conduct. The impossibility of any other basis of ethics than this has become clear. So far, therefore, as the basis of conduct, motive, is concerned, there is a complete agreement between intuition and induction. They view conduct from two different standpoints; but their conclusions, though differently expressed, are in substance, identical; and their two-fold view of conduct contains in it the reconciliation of the "good" and the "useful." The welfare of society is "good" from the standpoint of intuition; "useful" from that of induction. But both agree in making that welfare their aim.

At the confluence of these two mighty streams of thought we are now standing; and casting our glance forward into the future we can see them rolling on in unison. As the face of society changes more and more from the simple pastoral life which gave intuition its birth, the deficiencies of the old moral code will be supplied by science. The old commandments will ever remain as venerable landmarks of ethics, but they will be supplemented by inductive research. On the other hand, induction, when unable, as often it will be, to individualise its general rules sufficiently to make them applicable to individuals, will be supplemented by intuition, whose inner light, fed and strengthened by increased stores of knowledge, will illuminate with ever greater brilliancy the path of duty.

J. FENTON.