cially of the young, with lawlessness and contempt for authority which are fraught with danger and demand firm repression. The Babu's justification of social pressure in enforcing the boycott is a distinct encouragement of the criminal intimidation by which it has been accompanied. As one of the Bengalee papers says, "The boycott, when once the principle of coercion is admitted, becomes a reign of terror; and criminal violence is inseparable from its very nature." In this connection the recent revival of rowdyism in Calcutta is very significant.

In several towns in Eastern Bengal it would appear that public meetings in celebration of the boycott were forbidden. In Calcutta Sir Edward Baker contented himself with warning par rents and guardians not to allow their young men to participate in this mischievous demonstration. The fact that the assembly consisted mainly of young men and boys indicates that parents and guardians were either unwilling or unable to act on this warning. This is distinctly a disquieting fact. At the same time, it appears that the attendance was considerably smaller than last year, and that the enthusiasm was much less marked. This is only one of many indications of the revulsion of feeling occasioned by recent events. Another remarkable fact is the change of attitude of some who were very closely associated with this agitation. A most noteworthy instance of this is found in an article on the celebration in the Indian Mirror. Rai Narendranath Sen Bahadur, the editor of this paper, is a gentleman of whom all who know him believe that, though he may have been sometimes led into unwise action and speech by less disinterested and less scrupulous friends, his motives have always been pure and his intentions good. It was he, however, who was prevailed upon to move the famous resolution adopted by the Town

Hall meeting four years ago in which the boycotting of British goods originated. He now endeavors to explain that the terms of that resolution "were distinctly to the effect that the boycott movement was to be resorted to in order to attract the attention of the British public to Indian grievances. There was a tacit understanding that as soon as that object was attained, there would be no necessity to continue the movement." That object, he says, has been gained; and he, therefore, expresses a doubt whether any useful purpose can now be served "by continuing the boycott movement, especially when it has been found to develop certain features which are to be deplored by all honest-minded citizens." In his view, the only possible advantage in the boycott now is that it tends to promote local industries; but he points out that, "in spite of the absence of the boycott, Bombay has made much greater progress in swadeshism (encouragement of local industries) than the two Bengals." He closes with the significant remark, "How closely the boycott is allied with Extremism was seen plainly enough at the Greer Park meeting last Saturday. when, immediately after the conclusion of Babu Bhupendranath Bose's speech, Babu Arabindo Ghose gave his view of the boycott plainly enough. According to him, it is negation of co-operation with the Government."

It need hardly be said that it is the fixed and deliberate policy of Government to encourage and develop local industries. But it has opposed, and must suppress with determination every attempt to interfere by violence and coercion with the liberty of individuals to buy what they choose in the market which they may select. must keep the peace. In this it will now receive, I believe, not only the approval, but also the active co-operation of the great mass of the community. It is well that the real position of those

It

may produce the most serious consequences. This may well be the case as regards the Spanish war in Morocco. Far from being the storm in a teacup, which is too geuerally supposed, a private quarrel between Spain and the Riffs, there are all the elements of a long and fierce struggle in which the nations of Europe may be embroiled. So far little has been allowed to transpire as to the course of hostilities; the Spanish censor has been iron-handed; telegrams and correspondence have been strictly supervised, the Spanish Press has been battened down and only permitted to interest its readers with just such items of intelligence as served the purpose of the Civil and Military Authorities. Indeed, so fearful is the Government of the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, becoming known that the Military Attaches of the Great Powers are excluded from the theatre of war, whilst the editor of a Spanish journal, who dared to publish an adverse account of a recent engagement, was immediately imprisoned.

To those who have been at the theatre of war, who have studied the local conditions and have compared actual facts with experience gained elsewhere, hostilities appear likely to last. Spanish arms may be victorious in a dozen engagements but the Riffs will not be subdued in a hundred. Are they not fighting for their homes, the land of their birth, their traditions, their race, nay their very national existence? Indeed, except for the fact that Spain is fighting an enemy at her very gate, the Moroccan war bears a very close resemblance to the South African campaign. From the point of view of actual fighting they are as formidable as the Boers; their country offers every obstacle to an invading army and in addition is bare of the meanest necessities of life.

Melilla, the base of operations, is an

ancient Moorish fortress, which has been in the possession of Spain for well-nigh four hundred years. Times without number the Riffs have attempted to regain possession of their lost heritage, the last occasion being in 1893, when the town was closely besieged, and 25,000 troops were despatched to avenge Spanish honor. Built on a rocky promontory that juts out into the sea, the old walls-a dozen feet thick and more-are still intact. Until a few years ago they encircled the entire town. For some years Melilla was used as a penal settlement; later houses sprang up, trade increased, so that to-day the town has outgrown its walls to the extent of a mile from the sea. The tongue of land upon which it stands, together with the surrounding country, may be compared to a half opened fan. The actual fortress is situated at the top of the handle; the town itself covers the bare sticks; while beyond this-covering the silk as it were -the country is a succession of low hills, rising in ascending steps until they reach one great range, which stretches along the whole circumference of the arc. This mountainous background is known as the Gurugu. shape and form it bears a strong resemblance to a sleeping dromedary. There are the two peaks-close on 4000 feet high-in place of the humps; the lower ground, east and west, forms the shoulders and back; while the extremities of the mountain, which edge the sea, are the animal's tail and neck stretched flat and inclined inwards.

In

Up to within quite recent years the trade of Melilla was insignificant. The Riffs had nothing to barter and wanted less, added to which they desired as little intercourse as possible with the foreign invader whom they had detested from time immemorial. This last fact cannot be too strongly emphasized. It is not the European, so much as the Spaniard, that is the object of their

scorn. Nothing is too bad for him; he is hated with an intolerance and persistency that only Mahommedans are capable of. It will take many generations to eradicate this feeling. Some few years ago certain enterprising Europeans discovered the extraordinary mineral riches of the country round about Melilla and accordingly set to work to obtain a concession from the Riff ruler. At first all overtures were scouted. At length, however, their wishes for a price-were acceded to. The site for mining operations having been agreed upon, buildings and plant were very soon erected; the new industry attracted numerous Spanish settlers, and trade flourished. In short everything went as merrily as "marriage bells." Attracted by the success of the first company a second syndicate was formed to further exploit the minerals of the Melilla district. Again a concession was obtained and further operations commenced. But although things were well underground, though the iron ore extracted surpassed every expectation, and experts prophesied an immediate discovery of gold, up above, in Gurugu itself, the Riffs watched with increasing anxiety the commercial invasion of the foreigner, never ceasing to curse the Spaniard who had settled on the land. Silently, very patiently, they awaited the day when feelings might give place to action. The opportunity came at last. Briefly stated it happened as follows: A light railway has been laid down connecting the mines with Melilla. One day some Spanish workmen were engaged in repairing operations near a Riff village when of a sudden they were fired on. Two were killed. Not unnaturally the Spanish authorities demanded that the culprits should be given up. Of course the Riffs refused: having bared their swords they meant to drive them home, no matter what the consequences. Then Spain declared

al

war, and the trouble began. This, in brief, is the story of recent events which has led up to the present crisis.

As a matter of fact the mine incident was only the result, not the root cause of hostilities. Sooner or later a storm was inevitable and if anything was needed to complete the chain of discord, the last link was supplied by the signing of the Algeciras Treaty. When that instrument was duly agreed upon, the Riffs-rightly or wrongly-felt that they had been sold for a "mess of pottage." They argued that if the Sultan of Morocco was incapable of holding his own, they, at least, would show the two Powers directly implicated that they had been no party to the bargain. An opportunity of revenge was eagerly looked for: it was found on the Melilla railway line.

It says much for the knowledge and foresight of the Riffs that they grasped the consequences of their action and laid their plans accordingly. Arms and ammunition were, of course, vital necessities, and they set themselves to work to obtain a full supply. The course pursued is interesting, inasmuch as it opens up a vista of Spanish official life as typical as it is incredible. But first as regards the Riff himself. A native of the mountain, he knows every side-path, track, and stream; his dwelling is a stone-built hut, surrounded by a cactus hedge. Here the Riff is in his element. The steepest ascent has no trials for him, nor is it any obstacle to his inordinate agility. With few wants and fewer possessions, half a dozen goats supply him with all the necessities of life.

Like the Boer, to the Riff shooting is an amusement. A heap of stones, or some other mark is set up, and matches, for small wagers, are indulged in with a neighbor whenever the opportunity offers. Every man is thus a born marksman. The eye of an eagle and the adaptability of a chameleon;

the agility of a goat and the endurance of a camel; the tenacity of a hound and the courage of a leopard-combine all these sterling characteristics and the sum total is the Riff. One thing. and one thing only, has Nature denied him and that is a rifle; she left it to others to supply the deficiency. In this respect Spain is largely responsible.

Of artillery the Riffs know nothing; there is not a gun in the field. On the other hand, every man has a rifle and a suppy of ammunition. Where did he get it? The answer is not creditable to the Spanish authorities. In the first place, "gun-running" has been carried on for years past in more or less broad daylight. That no stringent measures were adopted to prevent this contraband trade is bad enough. But what can be said of officials, at certain Spanish seaports, who have openly sold rifles to the Riffs? Yet such is the case. It is perfectly true that a large number of those disposed of had been condemned as useless. But the Riff is an excellent gunsmith, and as often as not corrected the slight damage. More than this, inconceivable though it may appear, up to within a few weeks of the outbreak of hostilities there were Riffs in Malaga purchasing arms, and that at the hands of the authorities themselves.

In connection with the present campaign, it is a great question whether or no the Riffs are under the command of

any one leader. It is fairly evident that their tactics in the field are the result of careful thought: there is nothing haphazard in their attacks, which are always directed against the weakest points of the Spanish armor. The general opinion at Melilla is that one Chadley has been the guiding spirit from the outset of the war. Little is known about him, beyond the fact of his being an influential and much respected chief, who for years past has foreseen the Spanish storm, and en

deavored to arose his fellow tribesmen to the dangers of the situation.

Now as regards the Spanish preparations for war. To begin with, there is not the least doubt that the war is not, and never has been, popular. From the outset the opinion has prevailed that the Riff country was not worth fighting about, particularly as few people had any interest in it. It was a short-sighted view of the case, and not very patriotic. But there it was and there it is to-day. However, war having been decided upon, preparations were hurried forward with a will, and wonders have been accomplished. Within a few months an army of over 40,000 men has been transported to Melilla; supplies collected and hostilities commenced. At the outset, it is true, there were glaring deficiencies. To take but one instance. During the first weeks of the campaign the troops had nothing but forage caps to protect them from the blazing sun. A con tract, however, was quickly placed with an English firm for the supply of khaki helmets, which have now been delivered and distributed.

Again, the transport and commissariat until lately were very defective; time and experience have improved matters. At the same time matters are far from satisfactory even to-day. Thus, although the materials of war are now at hand, they never arrive until just too late at the place where they are most needed. As a well-known British official, lately in the Egyptian service, expressed it, "there is a lack of driving power; everything misses by an ace." And so it is. There is the long pull and the strong pull, but never the pull altogether.

Another great mistake which has cost the army dear is the fact that until recently the officers wore uniforms distinct from the men. The Riffs very' soon learnt to distinguish the difference, with the result that the casual