the control of the national finances, the regulation of the army and navy, the appointment of public officials, and in fine the entire administration of public affairs. The only practicable way in which a body of notables, equal in rank and importance, opinionated and contentious, could handle such a fund of patronage was by continual bargain and intrigue. Congress sat in private, and it was secluded from the control of any public opinion save that of its own circle. The possession of such opportunities in a position of irresponsible control subjected character to a dangerous strain, and there is evidence that deterioration did take place. Expressions of the sharpest censure might be collected from contemporary writings. In the summer of 1778 a letter written by Henry Laurens, then president of Congress, in which he referred to "scenes of venality, peculation and fraud," was intercepted by the British and published in the London papers. There was always profusion and waste at the seat of government however the army might suffer. The festivities which enclosed the sittings of Congress were never more extravagant than during the darkest period of the struggle. Washington wrote that "party disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the day; whilst the momentous concerns of an empire, a great and accumulating debt, ruined finances, depreciated money and want of credit, which in its consequences is the

want of everything, are but secondary considerations and postponed from day to day and from week to week, as if our affairs wore the most promising aspect. . . . And yet an assembly, a concert, a dinner or a supper, will not only take men off from acting in this business, but even from thinking of it." The low repute of Congress injured the patriot cause in foreign estimation and repelled sympathy. The mainstay of American credit abroad was the great personal reputation of Benjamin Franklin and the marvellous ability with which he managed the interests of the infant republic. But had it not been for the energetic remonstrances of the French court, by representations made through its minister at Philadelphia, Congress might have removed Franklin from his post at a most critical juncture. The generalship of Washington was admired by the ablest European critics, among them Frederick the Great; but Washington, too, had to endure the hostility of a congressional cabal which came near removing him from command.

Still it would be a great mistake to infer that the inefficiency of Congress was due to any lack of honesty or patriotism. Its evil tendencies were the result of a defective organization. It was impossible for a body so constituted to act with the resolution and consistency necessary for successful administration, and in every branch of the public service the results were deplorable. Taxes

H

being unpopular, the members eagerly caught up the idea that they could make money out of paper. Between June 23, 1775, and November 29, 1779, bills to the amount of $200,000,000 were emitted and made a legal tender. Severe laws against the advance of prices, and refusal to accept this paper in lieu of money, were enacted. In effect, such financiering was a vast confiscation of property for public use. Jefferson remarked, "It was a mode of taxation, the most oppressive of all because the most unequal of all." The chief sufferers were, of course, the producers, the laborers, the mechanics, the farmers. They were constantly being defrauded of their just dues, and the natural consequence was the rapid spread of disaffection. Goods were secreted, provisions hid away, and supplies withheld. In 1777, while General Washington, with wretchedly inferior forces, was striving to keep the field against General Howe in Pennsylvania, he said that he felt as if he were in an enemy's country. The commissary department, which Congress insisted upon keeping under its thumb, seemed unable to do anything. Washington's troops were left to starve, while Howe was able to obtain fresh provisions in abundance. The paper-money plague cheated the troops, as it did all who gave service at a fixed rate of compensation. It became impossible to obtain recruits, and disaffection became prevalent in the

1 Writings, Vol. IV., p. 165.

army.

"No day, nor scarce an hour passes," wrote Washington, "without the offer of a resigned commission.' There was desertion from the American camp to the British army.

"1

Meanwhile any reform in administration was stubbornly resisted. The chief solicitude of Congress was to keep the army under civil control. Dread of the rise of a Cromwell haunted their minds. Hence, above all things, they resolved to control military appointments and prevent the organization of a regular army. In 1776, John Adams, referring to the promotion of officers by Congress, said: "That interest, favor, private friendship, prejudice, may operate more or less in the present assembly is true. But where will you lodge this power? To place it in the general would be more dangerous to the public liberty and not less liable to abuse." In 1777, he "hoped that Congress will elect annually all the general officers." Wharton remarks that "the leaders of the opposition, by holding the great military appointments in the hands of Congress, by refusing adequate compensation to the soldiers, had much to do with protracting the war." The behavior of Congress was such as to invite the very evil they feared. In letters written by confidential agents of the British government it was said that Washington's only course in order to sustain himself would be to follow the example of

1 Works, Vol. V., p. 201.

Cromwell. Not until the cause of independence had been brought to the brink of ruin did Congress consent to the creation of independent executive departments for the management of finances, war, the marine, and foreign affairs. The triumph of the Revolution soon followed.1

By an ordinary law of political development, the efforts made to strengthen executive authority and the resistance thereto made by interests disturbed by change, tended to produce parties in the government, and doubtless would have done so had the government of the Confederation possessed a stable basis. As it was, there were antagonistic factions the one administrative, the other parliamentary, which served as centres of party forma

1 Wharton regards the decisive victory over Cornwallis at Yorktown as the direct consequence of the improved financial administration. A department of finance was established, and on March 13, 1781, Robert Morris was placed at its head. "He started with the position that on taxation, full and equal, must the country depend for its ordinary income; that until it showed its readiness to impose such taxation, it could not either honorably or successfully borrow; that the issue of paper money must be stopped, and that a national bank should be established to equalize exchanges and meet sudden governmental exigencies. To the comparative success of his administration, in the face of an opposition the most bitter, is the final triumph of the Revolution to be largely attributed. Our income from taxation was greatly increased, the bank was prosperous, and France, encouraged by this, continued to make loans and forward supplies, without which the campaign of 1781-1782 could not have been effectively conducted." Vol. I., p. 289.