destitute of the sanctions which attach to royal prerogative and it inspired no awe. Within the limit of its constitutional powers, Congress might decide for itself how it would treat the President. The matter would be determined wholly by its own disposition. That disposition was not hostile, but it was very suspicious. In addition to the usual fear of subjects as to what rulers might do if given the opportunity, there was a strong apprehension that the Federal leaders were hankering after something grand and splendid in the way of government, as close to the monarchical standard as possible.

We have a vivid picture of this attitude of mind in the diary kept by William Maclay, one of the senators from Pennsylvania, an honest, well-meaning man, who came to Congress without any previous share in the councils of the Federal managers. The bent of his mind was critical from the first. The measures to which the national politicians were forced to resort in managing Congress offended him and inspired personal dislikes which he records with amusing simplicity. "a rambling and vacant look" and partook of his personal demeanor." long enough abroad to catch the tone of European folly." Knox has "a bacchanalian figure." "Hamilton has a very boyish, giddy manner, and Scotch-Irish people could well call him a 'skite.' John Adams, who had been so much abroad that he felt warranted in giving the Senate occasional

Jefferson has "his discourse "He had been

instructions on the way things were done in Europe, the diarist cannot mention without an expression of disgust. He "has a very silly kind of laugh." There "sat Bonny John Adams ever and anon mantling his visage with the most unmeaning simper that ever dimpled the face of folly." Madison is "His Littleness." "There is an obstinacy, a perverse peevishness, a selfishness, which shuts him up from free communication." General Washington himself, as the associate of such men, becomes an object of increasing suspicion. At last the diarist declares: "If there is treason in the wish, I retract it, but would to God this same General Washington were in Heaven! We would not then have him brought forward as the constant cover to every un-constitutional and ir-republican act."

With such a temper in Congress, attempts to establish usages requiring a habit of deference on its part, were doomed to failure. The design of using the Senate as a privy council was baffled as soon as tried. Maclay gives a lively account of the affair. Washington entered the Senate chamber and took the Vice-President's chair. Не informed the Senate that he had called for their advice and consent to some propositions respecting the treaty with the southern Indians and had brought the Secretary of War along to explain the business. General Knox produced some papers, which were read. Washington's presence em

barrassed the Senate. Finally a motion was made to refer the papers to a committee, and there was some debate for and against. Maclay spoke in favor of doing business by committee. The diarist continues: "As I sat down, the President of the United States started up in a violent fret. 'This defeats every purpose of my coming here,' were the first words that he said. He then went on that he had brought his Secretary of War with him to give every necessary information; that the Secretary knew all about the business, and yet he was delayed and could not go on with the matter." Finally, the President said that he would have no objection to postponing further consideration until the ensuing Monday, but he did not understand the matter of commitment. There were awkward pauses. "We waited for him to withdraw," says the diarist. "He did so with a discontented air."

It did not take much of such business to deter Washington from treating the Senate as his privy council. He finally had to do what every Presi dent has done since - make his treaties first, and submit them to the Senate afterwards, for ratification. The comfortable seclusion of this practice, once enjoyed, would not willingly be given up. In 1813 the Senate invited the attendance of the President to consult on foreign affairs, but Madison declined the invitation.

The breakdown of the privy council functions of the Senate had an important result in clearing

It

the way for the development of the Cabinet. was generally supposed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution that the administration would practically consist of the President and the Senate acting in conjunction.1 If the President had found in the Senate a congenial body of advisers, so that treaties and appointments to office would have been made in conference with it, so much of the policy of the administration would thus have been brought within the habitual purview of the Senate that the natural tendency would have been to draw in the rest likewise. The language of the Constitution would favor that tendency, while on the other hand the Constitution is altogether ignorant of the President's Cabinet, which actually became his privy council. The idea that the heads of the executive departments are the personal appointees of each President, the chiefs of party administration, did not at first exist. It was assumed that their position was

1 Mason, of Virginia, refused to sign the report of the constitutional convention because it provided for the rule of an aristocracy. He objected to "the substitution of the Senate in place of an executive council and to the powers vested in that body." Madison's Works, Congressional edition, Vol. I., p. 355. In the South Carolina convention James Lincoln said: "Pray who are the United States? A president and four or five senators."

2 This explains why neither Jefferson nor his opponents thought there was anything dishonorable in his retention of office while stirring up opposition to the policy of the administration. Jefferson continued in office from a sense of public duty for some time after he wanted to retire. The idea that by so doing he precluded him

non-partisan and that their tenure of office would be the same as that of other officials, which was then regarded as one of permanency during good behavior. Hence the Constitution conferred upon the President as a special privilege, authority to "require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices." The incongruous superfluity of that provision, since constitutional usage has made the selection of Cabinet officers the President's individual prerogative, and has made their tenure of office subject to his pleasure, shows that the actual course taken in the development of the government was not altogether anticipated, although the intentional flexibility of the Constitution, as regards executive power, gave it an easy permission.

All the members of Washington's Cabinet except Hamilton were of the opinion that Congress could not communicate with the heads of departments

self from carrying on an agitation in support of his views of public policy did not occur to him or his friends, even the most highminded of them. The theory was that the president, like the king, was above party, so that the idea of treachery towards him or breach of obligation in party behavior had no place. It was the same way in England at the same period. Ministers in the same Cabinet might represent opposing party interests and endeavor to undermine one another. But conduct like Jefferson's in a statesman of our own times would be thought basely dishonorable. The same observations apply to Hamilton's conduct in maintaining a secret control over Adams' administration by his influence with the Cabinet officials.