As soon as he begins, the press agencies send a bulletin to their clients, announcing that the speech is "released "- that is to say, that it may be published. Afternoon papers will come out with as much as they choose to give of the speech, most of which may have been unspoken at the time they went to press. Now and then wrangles take place and spiteful remarks pass between members, communicating to the proceedings something of the interest which attaches to the cockpit or the prize-ring; but the rule is to prearrange everything said and done. The proceedings are quite formal, the object being not debate, but to accomplish what is called "making up the record."

In recent times the powerful influence of party has been prominently displayed by the way it keeps shaping the rules of the House of Representatives so as to compel obedience to its behests. In proportion as rules designed to secure consideration of legislation are used by minorities to obstruct the passage of party measures, partisan ingenuity has been stimulated to find a remedy, until finally expedients have been devised by means of which the avenues of legislation, crowded as they always are, may be temporarily cleared so as to give an open way to the passage of measures to which party urgency is conceded. A measure, which in the regular course of procedure it might take weeks or

months to reach, if it could be reached at all, can be called up and put to vote at any time, if the Speaker of the House and his two party colleagues, constituting the majority of the Committee on Rules, decide to have it so. Thus the bill which the Senate substituted for the Wilson Tariff bill was taken up in the House and passed, and then four supplemental tariff bills were reported and passed, all in one day. The various devices of filibustering have been met by modifications of the rules, until it is impossible to prevent a majority in the House from proceeding with any business it is determined to transact. The Senate has not been subjected to the same control, for the reason that it is a body which until recent times possessed more self-control than the House, and was less impeded by its rules in the despatch of business. But since experience has shown that it is no longer to be trusted to act with party honesty, the same pressure of party organization for control of proceedings to which the House has been subjected is rising against the Senate.

CHAPTER XXI

THE SENATE

The

THE Senate has had a singular career, and its character was slow in taking definite form. Originally intended to combine the functions of a privy council and a House of Lords, the first part of the scheme was soon found to be impracticable. only instance of any exercise of such a function since Washington's unsatisfactory experience was during Polk's administration, and his action was a political manoeuvre rather than a sincere consultation. There had been a good deal of party jockeying over the Oregon boundary question, but the President pulled the Senate up sharp by inviting its advice whether he should accept or decline Great Britain's proposition to settle upon the forty-ninth parallel from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific. The Senate shrank from advising rejection, and thus it precluded itself from blaming the administration for the surrender of the extreme claims which demagogues in Congress had been making. In the ordinary procedure of the Senate, all that remains of its privy council function is the fossil imprint preserved in the phrase

"the Senate advises and consents" used in ratifying treaties or confirming appointments.

As an adaptation of the House of Lords, the Senate soon bettered the model in grasp of authority. It had not been expected that it would equal the House in political weight. "Against the force of the immediate representatives of the people," wrote Madison, "nothing will be able to maintain even the constitutional authority of the Senate, but such display of enlightened policy and attachment to the public good as will divide with that branch of the legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the people themselves." 1 This expectation had much to do with reconciling the larger states to the admission of the smaller on an equal footing with them in the Senate. At the outset the course of legislation seemed to verify the forecast. The Senate was quite unable to control the situation. Its schemes for surrounding the presidency with monarchical ceremonial were brushed aside by the House in a way that made it appear ridiculous. But it soon regained its poise, and before the first session was over it had manifested in its relations with the House those superiorities of address and management which have since become its recognized characteristics, and to which the House of Lords can offer no parallel. In this respect the framers of the constitution were entirely out in their calculations. They had as

S

1 The Federalist, No. 63.

sumed that the Senate, as the institution corresponding with the House of Lords, would encounter the same resistance from the popular branch of the government. But the case was quite different. The House of Lords represented a distinct order in the state. Its natural disposition was to use its influence and opportunities in behalf of its own. class, and this fact insured the jealous antagonism of the body representing the mass of the people. The political position of the Lords was unassailable, so that their political privileges could be confined only by the collective weight and dignity of the House of Commons. On the other hand, aristocratic influence was so strong in the House of Commons that it could pursue its interests there with the advantage of avoiding jealousies and resentments that would be excited by the same measures if proposed by the House of Lords. But the Senate and the House of Representatives did not represent different orders. At the most they represented only gradations in the general class of politicians. The official tenure of senators was different from that of members of the House, but it was likewise based upon party interest. State attachments established groups of senators and representatives united by bonds too powerful to be seriously disturbed by jealousies and antagonisms arising out of the parliamentary relations of the two Houses. It was an early practice for the members of state delegations to meet together