any desired measure to be taken up and put upon its passage, but it takes a two-thirds vote to do this, and in such a case debate is limited to forty minutes. The regular channels of legislation are always so hopelessly clogged that the last six days of the session are devoted to legislation under suspension of the rules, and then a legislative crevasse takes place.1

Instead of securing deliberation, the practical effect of the committee system, with its numerous entanglements, is to incline Congress towards hasty and violent methods of despatching business. It is difficult to know what is being done in the hurly-burly. The mass of members record their votes for measures about which they know little or nothing, counting in return on a similar indulgence towards the measures in which they are interested.2 The inevitable consequence is that legislation is frequently crude, obscure, and uncertain. The courts are kept busy construing and

1 Of the 433 pages of general legislation enacted at the last session of the Fifty-first Congress, 284 pages are covered by the enactments of the last day.

2 Here is a typical instance culled from the Congressional Record:

Mr. Broderick. - Do you see any objection to the bill with that feature in it?

Mr. Brosius. I do not care anything about the bill. I think I will support the bill because you say it is all right; but I have given it no attention at all. I only rose to reply to some statements of my friend from Ohio. Congressional Record, February 23,

...

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interest except the public interest,1 but just that is implied by the attitude which Congress takes with regard to public demands. It disclaims the position of a trustee, and seeks to confine its responsibility to the faithful discharge of ministerial functions. It insists that, before anything can be done, the public shall reach definite conclusions and create specific political interests such as Congress is able to take cognizance of. That is what Speaker Reed told the delegation which waited on him, March 26, 1897, to urge financial legislation. The Associated Press despatches report him as saying: "Congress rarely moves faster than the people in matters of legislation, and when public sentiment became crystallized in favor of ny particular form of financial legislation, Conress would be apt to respond with little delay. 'f the people demanded changes in the banking ystem, and brought pressure to bear upon Conress, they would secure the changes."

In thus avoiding the responsibility of determing legislative policy, Congress really abandons self to the control of special interests but re

1 In the course of a debate in the Senate, Mr. Allen remarked: n the imposition of tariff taxes the interests of all persons conned must be considered. The senator from Kentucky (Mr. ndsay) says to me, 'except the consumers.' The consumers m largely to get the worst of it in the framing of a tariff bill. at is true largely, possibly, because they have nobody here lookafter their interests particularly. They are not organized." gressional Record, June 29, 1897.

interpreting the laws. The litigation that ensues after every tariff act, before its exact meaning is settled, involves millions of dollars, and affects business interests to an incalculable extent.

Where, in this struggle of interests, this jostle of legislation, does the government come in? Writing home about the manner in which he negotiated the reciprocity treaty of 1854, Lord Elgin said: "There was no government to deal with. . . . It was all a matter of canvassing this member of Congress or the other."1. By "government" Lord Elgin meant a responsible management, defining national policy and shaping legislative proposals. For such a government, our present constitutional system makes no provision. Government is supposed to be a by-product of the normal activities of Congress. The theory is that Congress reflects with tolerable fairness, subject to correction when it fails to do so, the interests, opinions, and desires of the people. This theory blinks such an awkward circumstance as the oligarchic constitution of the Senate, and it quite ignores the fact that public opinion is for the most part a static force, while force in action is the only kind which Congress notices. It may seem like a sarcasm to say that Congress represents every

1 Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin, p. 121. Laurence Oliphant, who was Lord Elgin's secretary on this diplomatic mission, gives a very racy account of this transaction in his Episodes of a Life of Adventure, pp. 43, 44.

interest except the public interest,1 but just that is implied by the attitude which Congress takes with regard to public demands. It disclaims the position of a trustee, and seeks to confine its responsibility to the faithful discharge of ministerial functions. It insists that, before anything can be done, the public shall reach definite conclusions and create specific political interests such as Congress is able to take cognizance of. That is what Speaker Reed told the delegation which waited on him, March 26, 1897, to urge financial legislation. The Associated Press despatches report him as saying: "Congress rarely moves faster than the people in matters of legislation, and when public sentiment became crystallized in favor of any particular form of financial legislation, Congress would be apt to respond with little delay. If the people demanded changes in the banking system, and brought pressure to bear upon Congress, they would secure the changes."

In thus avoiding the responsibility of determining legislative policy, Congress really abandons itself to the control of special interests but re

1 In the course of a debate in the Senate, Mr. Allen remarked: "In the imposition of tariff taxes the interests of all persons concerned must be considered. The senator from Kentucky (Mr. Lindsay) says to me, 'except the consumers.' The consumers seem largely to get the worst of it in the framing of a tariff bill. That is true largely, possibly, because they have nobody here looking after their interests particularly. They are not organized." Congressional Record, June 29, 1897.