Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, Volumen5Williams and Norgate, 1905 Contains the papers read at the Society's fortnightly meetings in London throughout the academic year, and short discussion notes on these papers. Papers are drawn from an international base of contributors and discuss issues across a broad range of philosophical traditions, including those which are of greatest current interest. |
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Página 51
... apprehended idea of the whole is no more the whole itself than a structure can be said to be complete when only its foundations have been laid . When we want to see an oak tree with its mighty trunk , its spreading branches and its ...
... apprehended idea of the whole is no more the whole itself than a structure can be said to be complete when only its foundations have been laid . When we want to see an oak tree with its mighty trunk , its spreading branches and its ...
Página 58
... apprehended , with at least some degree of clearness and intensity . The value of an object therefore is its relation , whether merely felt or reflected upon , to the activity of the individual as a whole - a relation which may lie ...
... apprehended , with at least some degree of clearness and intensity . The value of an object therefore is its relation , whether merely felt or reflected upon , to the activity of the individual as a whole - a relation which may lie ...
Página 138
... apprehended states of mind , or they are the copies , the repro- ductions , of such directly apprehended mental states . Minds are not known as objects ; we have no " ideas " either of our own mind or of other minds . A mind is an agent ...
... apprehended states of mind , or they are the copies , the repro- ductions , of such directly apprehended mental states . Minds are not known as objects ; we have no " ideas " either of our own mind or of other minds . A mind is an agent ...
Página 141
... apprehended in my notion of it . But if the esse of those realities which I am conscious of through the contents of " notions " does not consist in my being conscious of them , what ground have I for supposing that the existence of the ...
... apprehended in my notion of it . But if the esse of those realities which I am conscious of through the contents of " notions " does not consist in my being conscious of them , what ground have I for supposing that the existence of the ...
Página 148
... apprehended by him , * Kant's Werke , iii ( Hartenstein ) , p . 120 . † See , for example , Sidgwick : Philosophy , its Scope and Relations , p . 102 . through the process of knowing . I do not think 148 G. DAWES HICKS .
... apprehended by him , * Kant's Werke , iii ( Hartenstein ) , p . 120 . † See , for example , Sidgwick : Philosophy , its Scope and Relations , p . 102 . through the process of knowing . I do not think 148 G. DAWES HICKS .
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Absolute actual admit affirmation appearance apprehended argument ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY assertion aware Berkeley Berkeley's Boole Bradley calculus Carr conception contradiction Dawes Hicks Descartes distinction doctrine doubt element emotion ethical existence experience F. C. S. SCHILLER feeling finite G. E. Moore HASTINGS RASHDALL Hegel human idea idealism individual infinite mind Introspection Jevons judgments of value Kant Kant's knowledge Logic of Relatives logician mathematical means mental merely metaphysical criterion mode moral judgments motion nature objective validity observe pain perceived perception personality phenomena philosophy pleasure point of view position possible postulate present principle problem Prof Professor proposition propositional logic psychical matter question realisation reason recognise reference regard relation scepticism seems self-consciousness self-contradictory sensation sense Shadworth Shadworth Hodgson simply Stanton Coit subjective activities supposed Symbolic Logic symbolist Taylor theory Thing-in-itself things thought tion true truth ultimate reality unity universal Venn whole