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stead we are shown an acorn. In the same way, the completion of science (Wissenschaft), the crowning achievement of mind, cannot be found in its first beginnings." Each stage of the growth, each movement as it were away from the first inspiring vision, reveals truth, not less, but more completely.* .* "The bud vanishes when the flowers break forth, and one might say that the former was negated by the latter, just in the same way as the fruit declares the flower to have been a false existence and steps into its place as the truth. These forms are not only distinguished from each other, they crowd each other out as mutually incompatible; yet their fluent nature determines them at the same time as moments or stages of the organic unity in which, so far from contradicting each other, they are one as necessary as the other; and it is in and through the equally necessary character of all the stages that the life of the whole is first constituted."

Waiving, however, this essential difference in method, we return to the essential similarity in starting-point which characterises the two philosophies. Hegel's conclusion as to the essential nature of that perfect experience with which the Logic starts, † and of which it is the systematic articulation is identical both with that of Descartes' Cogito, ergo sum and with that which we reach through a psychological analysis of selfconsciousness. It is, as Hegel repeatedly puts it, that form of experience in which thought is at home with itself, since its object is felt to be unreservedly one with itself. And surely only one meaning can be given to this unreserved absolute oneness of subject and object. It is that unity in which the so-called object of thought is really no object at all, a content present indeed to the experiencing self but not presented to it. It is that immediate oneness of thought and being in which self-realisation consists.

* Phenomenology, p. 4.

+ This oneness of thought and being is, as we have said, presupposed (not asserted of course), in the very first page of the Logic.

IV.-VALUE-FEELINGS AND JUDGMENTS OF
VALUE.

By J. L. MCINTYRE.

THERE appears to be a conviction widely-spread among students of all branches of philosophy that a new classification of mental facts or phenomena is called for, one that shall do justice to a fundamental feature of psychical life, found in all concrete mental activities, -the fact of "appraisement" or " valuation." For example, Groos suggests that there are two chief phases or aspects of consciousness to be distinguished :-The Presentative, including sense-data, memory images, associations and assimilations; and the Valuative (if the term may be allowed), in each of the three sub-divisions of which, emotional (and æsthetic), voluntary (ethical), and logical valuation, the distinctive phenomenon of "polarity" is found-pleasant, painful; beautiful, ugly; good, bad; true, false. In all actual processes of consciousness the two phases or aspects are present, although, in some, one aspect predominates, in others another. Judgments of value have played a conspicuous part in theological controversy, as in that between the school of Ritschl and their opponents; in psychological theories as to the basis of Economics; while in ethics, æsthetics, and metaphysics generally the claim has been pressed in different ways that our conception of the universe, as a whole, of man's place within it and of his destiny, "must rest in the last resort upon a judgment of value." On the other hand, theologians and philosophers of more rationalistic tendency indignantly repudiate the attempt to reduce the objects of religious faith, the ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty to postulates of "merely subjective" judgments of value, or to deprive theoretical knowledge of her rights as the only source of objective truth.

In the present paper I have tried, in the hope of throwing some light upon these ultimate questions, but without seeking to offer any substantive contribution towards their solution, to give a psychological description or analysis of the valuephenomenon, and to consider its relation to the processes, feeling, desire and presentation, with which it is most closely connected.

Value and Feeling. - Perhaps the most natural starting-point for our consideration is the relation of value to feeling. If in every human experience there may be distinguished the three phases-presentation, feeling-tone, conation-and if, as is obviously the case, value has reference both to an object valued ("object" being taken in the widest possible sense), and to an activity resulting from the valuation, then it appears almost self-evident that the value-element is the feeling-tone, which somehow intermediates between the presentation and the striving. And so, in fact, we find some writers (e.g., O. Ritschl, Kreibig) holding that all feelings are feelings of value, positive value corresponding to pleasure-feeling, negative value to pain. The greater the pleasure which an object is capable of giving, or does in actual experience give, the higher its value; and as pleasure-feelings, in themselves, differ only in the measurable characters of intensity and duration, we secure through the feelings a test by which the relative valuecoefficients of different presentations, or representations, may be determined. In the case of complex presentations and ideas, a more delicate measuring-apparatus is necessary ;the interaction between ideas or systems of ideas, their strengthening or inhibiting of one another; the relation of the feeling-tone of the resultant system of ideas to the feelingtones of the elementary presentations which enter into or constitute the whole; - these and other factors must be con✔sidered in any attempt to appreciate the feeling-value of any possible but as yet unrealised situation. Underlying this view and the elaborate calculus which has been built upon it, is the conviction that feeling alone is at once the motive-force and the goal of activity; that it is the nature of pleasure to be pursued and of pain to be avoided. But no feeling as such ever points beyond itself, it is essentially a self-dependent, passive, inert experience or feature of experience. The correlation of feeling with striving is a construction upon experience; an action does habitually succeed upon a feeling of a certain degree of intensity, but there is no necessary connexion between the one and the other, except that both are parts, abstractly separated from each other, of a single continuous psychical event.*

Feeling and Presentation. - Neither is there any necessary connection between a presentational element or complex and its feeling-tone. Not only would it be impossible to say à priori of a new sense element, supposing such were given, that its tone would be pleasant or unpleasant; but it is clear also that many of the constituents of our ordinary experience might have had quite different feeling co-efficient, without our existence being thereby imperilled to any appreciable degree. Many feel as unpleasant certain colour-shades or groupings, certain tone-qualities or intensities or sequencesnot to speak of more complex systems of colours and toneswhich to others are pleasing. It would be difficult to prove in such cases that the presentation or its object is fraught with any further danger to the subject than is contained in the fact that it is unpleasant, therefore inhibitive of his activity mental or bodily. It is injurious because it is unpleasant, not unpleasant because it is injurious. Perhaps the majority of our feelings, as of our convictions, are conventional, habitual or traditional, rather than grounded in the nature of things: it is a platitude that objects continue to please long after they have ceased to be advantageous, if they ever were so. In other cases again it is easy to point to an advantage which the pleasurable object brings to the individual or race, but it is at the same time quite clear that this advantage had no part in determining the feeling. Thus the pleasure which many of the lowest savages take in vermin as delicacies for the palate is in strong contrast with the attitude of the cultured European. Nor is it likely that the latter would feel the taste pleasant, even if he were able to overcome his prejudice sufficiently to try. The utility of the practice of consuming vermin can hardly be denied, but it is one which might easily have been secured by any one of several less drastic means.

* Eisler, Studien zur Wert-theorie, 1902.

Feeling and Need.-It would seem to follow that the connection between feeling-tone and presentation is mediated through some third thing: and this can only be a need or a want: that which satisfies a need, blind or conscious, becomes pleasant: that which negates or inhibits the satisfaction of a need becomes painful. Later, both in the individual and in the race-life, the object remains pleasant or painful even although its relation to the satisfaction of needs has been inverted or modified. Conversely, in our complex human life, a need may persist which has become habitual, although its satisfaction neither brings advantage to the individual or the race, nor is fraught with pleasure; both the states of unsatisfied need and of satisfied need are marked by a negative feeling-tone. Supposing that at the moment of yielding to such a desire there is full realisation of how much the yielding involves, we can only assume that the painfulness of the unsatisfied state is greater than that (hypothetically realised) of the satisfied. A subject's activity is here as always towards a relatively positive value. The object of desire or of want has still positive value, although the realisation brings not pleasure but pain: it is, therefore, clear that positive value is not coincident with positive feeling-tone, nor negative value with negative feeling-tone. "Everything that brings satisfac

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